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This study considers the government of Siberia in the seventeenth century within 
the context of recent scholarship on the Muscovite empire which has shown that the 
influence of the nobles and the provincial gentry recovered during the seventeenth 
century following the disruption of the Time of Troubles. This thesis demonstrates 
that there were groups beyond the nobles that could also influence government 
policies. The tsar depended on the Siberian Cossacks to protect the transports of 
valuable furs throughout the vast insecure overlapping frontiers of the steppe and the 
north of Siberia to Moscow. Their specific form of organisation, a temporary primary 
group, accounts for Cossack cost efficiency and military prowess that no regular 
force could beat under the conditions of isolation and the superiority of the nomads. 
In Siberia, central authority was even more restricted than elsewhere since repression 
by an army would have depleted the fur resources. During frequent and enduring 
rebellions, the Cossacks deposed the governor when they perceived an incapable 
leader or wanted to negotiate the implicit terms of trade. In a phenomenon which was 
rare in the early modem period, they received salary on a regular basis, which was 
sufficient to support a family. Flexible government grants for up to three years in 
advance and tax exemption, enhanced competition and explain the rapid expansion 
of a cash-starved economy. Discussing, writing and signing collective petitions 
during rebellions established a new Cossack group that organised around a specific 
aim - to stand in for each other during investigation and display loyalty while 
upholding staunchly their own ends. Limited, but vigorous public control helps to 
explain both enhanced sensitivity to administrative maltreatment and effective tax 
collection that have been noticed before but explained exclusively in unsuitable 
modern terms of efficiently centralised administrative agency. By means of analysis 
of institutional mechanisms, the thesis investigates the Cossacks' language and 
symbolic systems to establish the way in which the fledgling, albeit limited Siberian 
public spheres integrated into the autocratic empire. 
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Introduction 
Aims and Objectives 
The history of the Russian Empire has recently been extensively reappraised and 
the role of imperial expansion has been reconsidered as an explanatory tool for 
explaining Russia's historical development since the reign of Ivan IV the Terrible. ' 
The Empire has been reinvestigated from the multi-ethnic and ceremonial point of 
view, and from the perspective of international relations and power politics 2 
However, the question how this large empire functioned internally, and how its parts 
interacted in the seventeenth century, is still largely neglected, although already in 
the eighteenth century the German academic in the service of the tsar, G. F. Müller 
expressed his opinion that the Siberian frontier towns merely executed government 
orders, looking after the tasks of defense and the collection of the fur tax. 3 Apart 
from such one-sided praise of tsarist power, the question of how the empire was 
effectively governed - apart from its own claims of power - was not acceptable later 
among nineteenth-century Russian scholars. Even for its opponents, whether before 
or after the revolution, there was no point questioning the effectiveness of the tsar's 
power, and those who criticised Russia from a regional point of view kept to 
Solov'ev's and Kliuchevskii's theory of colonising Russia - instead of the state, a 
uniform mass of ordinary people was cast in the role of the hero that left uniform, 
"grey" traces while colonising empty spaces; non-Russian imperial subjects were 
mostly treated as inexistent, especially in Siberia. Thus for Golovachev, "typical for 
Siberian history, the most important agent of which was the mass of people 
(narodnaia massa), were the... facts of normal, daily life, the grey facts of life, 
' Overview of literature: Aust, Martin, "Writing the Empire", European Review of History 
vol. 10,2 (2003), 375-391; Hosking, Geoffrey, Russia. People and Empire, 1552-1917, London 1997; 
Schmidt, Christoph, Russische Geschichte 1547-1917, München 2003,1-2 
2 Wortman, Richard, Scenarios of Power, vol. 1 Princeton 1995. See Dominic Lieven's 
bibliographical essay in: Empire, London 2000,464-70. But see Marc Mancall tracing the influence of 
imperial institutions on a clash of cultures and their subsequent arrangement: Russia and China. Their 
Diplomatic Relations to 1728, Cambridge/Mass. 1971 
3 Miller, G. F., Opisanie Sibirskogo tsarstva i vsekh proisshedshikh v nem del of nachala, a 
osoblivo otpokoreniia ego Rossiiskogo derzhavoipo sii vremena, Sankt Petersburg 1750, pt. 1; idem, 
Sibirskaia istoriia, in: Ezhemesiachnye sochineniia, k pol ze i uveseleniiu sluzhashchie, Sankt 
Petersburg 1763, vol. 18-19; idem, Istoriia Sibiri, Moscow 1999, vol. 1,249-50,273-7 and passim 
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colourless in private expressions, typical only in their uniformity and permanence of 
mass and summary phenomenons", that is, "the elementary social-economic factors, 
when we find at the first level material and economic questions... " 4 Insofar as the 
relations between town and tsar are representative for imperial relations in Siberia, a 
very influential position was that of Novombergskii, drawing on the theory of the 
Russian service town authored by Vernadskii. Accordingly, the material and cultural 
growth of the town in Western Europe occurred naturally and slowly within a self- 
contained sphere of guilds, while the Muscovite state artificially interfered with this 
growth. Concerning the Siberian towns, Novombergskii maintained, "the artificiality 
of their occurrence is even more obvious" - "Organising town life beyond the Urals, 
the Moscow government brought in ready-made historical forms and there was no 
inclination to repeat this [aforementioned] long process... "5 Thereby, they accepted 
the powerful image of Russia propagated by enlightenment political theorists in 
Europe, drawing on the body of earlier travelogues. Travelling authors in the 
sixteenth to seventeenth century had readily taken over representations of power and 
omnipotence portrayed in court ritual designed by clerics anxious to increase the 
tsar's standing in the Orthodox world. The travellers had interpreted thesm in the 
categorical terms of classical learning, among them Aristotele's concept of tyranny: 
"The Tsar... alone rules the whole country ... 
he treats [his people] as the master of the 
house does his servants. s6 The rhetoric devices of Western theories of absolutism 
employed under Peter I and the consecutive, vigorous cult of Peter ensured that this 
theme of all-powerful autocracy and subservient society persisted through the 
eighteenth century. In the nineteenth century, Western and Russian views of 
° Golovachev, P. M., Tiumen' v XVII stoletii, Moscow 1903,5. However, see also his and other 
Siberian historians' insistence on the role of towns in Siberian history: Pokrovskii, N. N., 
"Introduction", in: idem (ed. ), Pervoe stoletie sibirskikh gorodov, Novosibirsk 1996,13-8 5 Novombergskii, N. Ia., Vpoiskakh za materialamipo istorii Sibiri, Sankt Petersburg 1906,20-1; 
Veradskii, G. V., "0 dvizhenii russkikh na vostok", in: Nauchnyi isttoricheskii zhurnal vol. 1, vyp. 2 
(1913), Sankt Petersburg 1914 no. 2,52-61; idem, "Gosudarevy sluzhilye i promyshlennye liudi v 
vostochnoi Sibiri XVII veka", in: ZhMNP (1915) pt. LVI, 332-54. This concept has had grave 
repercussions in Western historiography of Russia: see Pipes, Richard, Russia under the Old Regime, 
[German version] Munchen 1977,102-3; Lantzeff, G., Siberia in the Seventeenth Century, Berkeley 
1943 
6 Phrase by Adam Olearius, The Travels of Olearius in Seventeenth-century Russia, transl. and ed. 
by Samuel Baron, Stanford/CA 1967,173; Poe, Marshall, `Russian Despotism': The Origins and 
Dissemination of an Early Modern Commonplace, Ph. D. dissertation, University of California, 
Berkeley, 1993 
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Muscovy reinforced each other, and Western perceptions of Russia as exotic? 
contributed to the dominance of the patrimonial vision in debates about the past. The 
state historical school gave primacy to the state and dismissed society as inert (S. M. 
Solov'ev, Boris Chicherin). 8 The Soviet view of the tsar and the economic and 
political institutions as guarding the interests of the ruling feudal class further 
contributed to the canonisation of the coercion paradigm. Instead of asking how such 
a vast empire as Russia could be governed at all, Western and exile historians from 
the revolution until the 1970s readily succumbed to the myth of all-embracing, 
unrestrained tsarist power, overly stressing military and administrative centralisation, 
although this version emphasised political coercion over social and economical 
forces. 9 In his recent book on the eighteenth-century palace revolutions, Kurukin 
notes a similar development of historiography in another field of power relations that 
was severely censored and thereafter largely neglected. '° 
Until very recently, this emphasis on the central perspective and, well into the 
nineteenth century severe censoring in a sensitive field of governance has 
discouraged studies of the multi-ethnic empire. The main reason for the failure 
before Kappeler's recent celebrated study to produce anything remotely similar was 
the narrowing of the perspective to questions of the nation-state that occurred 
precisely at the time when modern historiography developed; thus the great Russian 
historians of the nineteenth century, Solov'ev, Kliuchevskii and Platonov conducted 
national history, as did the historians of other countries. The history of the Russian 
empire thus became Russian history. " As already mentioned, regionalism can be 
added as another reason for the failure to analyse imperial relations, since in Siberia 
these historians struggled to find an independent point of view, yet given the 
powerful tropes of Russian despotism in the narratives of emancipation, they only 
arrived at views that stressed the role of the state and exploitation of the Siberian 
7 Wolff, Larry, Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the 
Enlightenment, Stanford 1994 
Kollmann, Nancy, By Honor Bound, Ithaca/NY 1999 175 
9 For an overview of this literature, see ibid., 176 footnotes 22-3. 
10 See my review: "Rezension von: Kurukin, I. V.: Epocha "dworskich bur"". Otscherki 
polititscheskoi istorii poslepetrowskoi Rossii, 1725-1762 gg.. Rjazan 2003", in: II-Soz-u-Kult, 
11.11.2004, >http: //hsozkult. geschichte. hu-berlin. de/rezensionen/2004-4-104<. 
" Kappeler, Andreas, Rußland als Vielvölkerreich, Munich 1992,14-5. Though not contradicting 
his general argument, he still overlooks the eighteenth-century historians of Siberia: see the articles by 
Bakhrushin and Andreev in: Müller, Istoriia (1999), 17-149. 
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territories. As will be pointed out below, for ideological reasons the Siberian 
cossacks were rarely studied despite their dominant role in the early conquest and 
settlement, until in the late Soviet period, a number of Siberian historians embarked 
on this line of research. 12 These longstanding trends contributed to the lack of 
research in the field of institutional culture of the Russian empire. 
In her recent chapter on "Strategies of Integration in an Autocracy", Kollmann 
has given a useful outline of coercive and consensus-based approaches to the issue of 
social cohesion in Muscovy, but does not fully discuss empire, especially not 
concerning those parts not exclusively characterised by their different ethnic 
composition. 13 In this sense, the term "autocrat", as already mentioned designed by 
clerics to impress the Orthodox world, still overshadows the aspect of empire. 14 
However, the frequent source term "Sibirskoe tsarstvo" standing apart from 
"Moskovskaia Rus"' in the tsar's title indicates empire as closely as possible in Old 
Russian. 15 Russia was also an empire in the sense of disparate parts under a unified 
authority by virtue of the tax border between Siberia and Muscovy in the Urals. 16 
Concerning the multi-ethnic empire, Kappeler has demonstrated that it was not 
ruled exclusively by force and a bureaucratic hierarchy, but often by sharing power 
with the native elites. Below the level of ethnic elites, custom and law remained 
untouched, and the local nobles ruled their people and tribes on their own account, as 
long as no rebellions occurred and Moscow regularly received taxes. '' This study 
poses similar questions, but applies them to a different part of the empire and a 
different social group - the Siberian cossacks - within it. The main question is 
whether in the Muscovite empire, populations generally had access to the tsar and the 
chancelleries only via intermediaries from among the nobles, and could therefore 
influence political decisions only through this channel - if at all. The Siberian 
12 See 51. On spelling of the term "cossack", see 59 
13 She mentions the aspect of multi-national empire: Kollmann, Honor, 202 '4 Hans-Heinrich Torke's Lexikon der Geschichte Rußlands, Munich 1985, has no entry on empire 
or Reich, although there is "Reichsversammlungen". Cf. Lieven's brisk statement in his "Russia as 
Empire", in: Hosking, Geoffrey (ed. ), Reinterpreting Russia, London 1999,20 n. 5: "On empire in pre- 
1917 Russia, nothing in English remotely matches Andreas Kappeler's Rußland als Vielvölkerreich, 
München 1992". 
15 For examples in petitions, see Pokrovskii, N. N., Tomsk, Novosibirsk 1989,98; PSRL vol. 36,1 
p. 40 1.110; RGADA f. 1121 op. I no. 377,1.26. 
16 Lantzeff, Siberia, 122-3 
17 Kappeler, Vielvölkerreich, 33 
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cossacks are a particularly useful social group for the purposes of this investigation. 
Unlike the ethno-political cases Kappeler studied, these were largely - though not 
exclusively - Russians, and they never became co-opted into the court nobility in the 
same way as many native elites. At the same time, however, the Siberian cossacks 
regularly travelled to Moscow and were received at the chancellery and sometimes 
by the tsar. Analogous to Kappeler's questions, this study asks how the custom and 
laws of the Siberian cossacks could be made compatible with the institutional culture 
of the Muscovite empire. Unlike Kappeler's cases, however, the cossacks, who were 
mostly of Russian origin, therefore had grown up with the institutional culture of the 
empire ingrained within them. Thus, unlike the native elites, they were not learning 
about something entirely foreign. This is an interesting point, especially because of 
the reputation of cossacks as being rebels: the reason they fled to the frontiers, it is 
widely supposed, is because they wished to escape the restrictions of the Muscovite 
system. The cossacks are renown for their `free spirit'. 18 Yet this thesis shows that 
these `rebels' possessed an intimate knowledge of how to manipulate the institutional 
culture of the empire to their own advantage. Also unlike Kappeler's native elites, 
the Siberian cossacks maintained direct contacts with the court and chancelleries and 
were relatively frequently received in Moscow - to cite just one of the most 
important occasions, a delegation from each town or fortress accompanied the vital 
fur tax every year. The cossacks in part adhered to procedures established by the tsar 
to be awarded the opportunity to go to Moscow, where they also traded privately, but 
they also breached these procedures, quite often to the point of openly disobeying 
and even deposing the tsar's representative and their official commander, the 
voevoda. Cossacks are famed for their love of freedom and a "democratic" decision- 
making process, but historians have failed to put this observation into an analytical 
framework. Thus, important questions are not addressed: how could "democratic" 
institutions fit into the framework of autocracy, especially in Siberia, where 
historians suspect more rigid military command structures? How could a "free" spirit 
18 Avrich, Paul, Russian Rebels 1600-1800, New York 1972; Nikitin, N. I., "0 traditsiiakh 
kazach'ego i obshchinnogo samoupravleniia v Rossii XVII v. ", Izvestiia SORAN. Istoriia 1992 (3), 3- 
8; idem, "0 proizkhozhdenii, strukture i sotsial'noi prirode soobshchestv russkikh kazakov", Istoriia 
SSSR (1986), no. 4,167-177; Hosking, Geoffrey, Russia and the Russians, London 2001,115; Skorik, 
A. P., Kazachii Don, Rostov-on-Don 1995, vol.!, 140-4 
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co-exist with service to the tsar, and at the same time reconcile its aspirations to 
accepting the leadership of the tsar's voevodas - nobles and landowners from the 
central areas of Muscovy? This study investigates what happened when empire, 
beyond the reach of its most effective coercive means of integration encountered a 
group of people that had grown up with its institutions and were able to work the 
institutional culture to their own advantage. 
In fact, an openly rebellious attitude of the delegates from Siberia constituted a 
serious problem for the court. In some of the century's major risings in the capital, 
Siberian delegates did take part, for example in 1648, when the tsar had to sacrifice 
his highest dignitaries to the rebels. 19 In most cases, however, the Siberian rebels 
found it more rewarding to keep within the boundaries of established institutions and 
nevertheless to press home their agenda, which included important elements of their 
specific cossack customs. This ambivalence of institutional permanence and 
institutional change therefore constitutes one of the important areas of investigation 
throughout this thesis. 
Institutional analysis applied in history has received considerable attention 
recently, especially at the Dresden project of the Deutsche Forschungsgesellschaft, 
"Institutionality and History", largely triggered by the transformations in Eastern 
Europe and elsewhere. While there is a common notion of institutions as per se 
stable and enduring20, the Dresden project has investigated the ways in which 
institutions become permanent, and the mechanisms of their transformation. 
Institutionality is characterised, paradoxically, by both permanence and change, since 
the quest for social stability is basic for its analysis. 21 
Responding to the need for reliability and social order, institutions are 
established, although they, as any means for this purpose, are more likely to break 
19 Pokrovskii, N. N., Tomsk 1648-1649 gg., Novosibirsk 1989,299-302 
20 This notion harks back to Arnold Gehlen, who has introduced the term "institution", calling 
them "stabilised tensions": see Rehberg, Karl-Siegbert, "Weltrepräsentanz und Verkörperung. 
Institutionelle Analyse und Symboltheorien. Eine Einführung in systematischer Absicht", in: Melville, 
Gert (ed. ), Institutionalität und Symbolisierung. Verstetigung kultureller Ordnungsmuster in 
Vergjangenheit und Gegenwart, Köln 2001,3-49, esp. 9-17, citation 13. 
' Rau, Susanne; Gerd Schwerhoff, "Öffentliche Räume in der Frühen Neuzeit. Überlegungen zu 
Leitbegriffen und Themen eines Forschungsfeldes", in: iidem (eds. ), Zwischen Gotteshaus und 
Taverne. Öffentliche Räume in Spätmittelalter und Früher Neuzeit, Köln 2004,11-52, here: 24-5. 
Ludwig Steindorff avoids the term institution, but his description meets all standard characteristics of 
institutionality: Memoria in Altruj3land, Stuttgart 1994, esp. 245. On monastic institutionalisations: 
Melville, Gen (cd. ), Institutionen und Geschichte, K61n 1992,137-156,259437. 
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down than to remain stable. Therefore, the main effort in maintaining institutions is 
to adhere to and to fuel the illusion of institutional stability and permanence. 
However, since empire is dynamic - and changed quickly in Russia due to the early 
modern Military Revolution and, especially in Siberia, territorial expansion - 
institutions had to answer to this change. In the literature on the Russian empire, 
however, institutional change has so far not been high on the agenda 22 In fact, as 
institutions are part of the cultural and social processes that result in change, 
institutional change is part of the rise and fall of empires, which have been 
investigated so far only with the approaches of diplomatic and power politics, ritual 
and symbols of the imperial court, and in an ethnopolitical perspective. To uphold 
the vital illusion of permanence and stability, institutionality has to accommodate 
change. Siberian cossacks, like other agents - chancelleries, boyars, nobles, 
voevodas, clerics, and the tsar - answered to these ambivalences in their petitions 
and found ways to harness the empire's institutions to their specific needs. As is well 
known from the experience of others, for example large parts of the peasantry that 
lost their right to petition the tsar during the century and succumbed to serfdom, by 
no means all groups in the Muscovite empire succeeded in influencing institutions 
significantly according to their needs. 23 Therefore, institutional analysis also 
considers the category of power. Whoever can influence the way in which people 
perceive institutions wields important powers, since others have to rely on them and 
therefore to adapt themselves to the established definition. In chapter I, therefore, it 
will be investigated how Siberian cossacks organised and how they managed to 
establish a position of power that allowed to influence the tsar's and the Siberian 
chancellery's decisions, and the institutional culture of the empire. Chapter II 
discusses the material underpinning of this position - to what effect did Siberian 
cossacks communicate and negotiate with the tsar, and how did they maintain 
themselves? An implicit concern of these chapters is also the contribution the 
Siberian cossacks made that led other agents of empire to adapt partially to their 
demands. Chapter III then investigates the symbolic forms of communication in 
imperial Siberia, the institutions, their interpretations, and change, in the context of 
22 Lieven, Empire, 24-5; Eisenstadt, Samuel, The Political Systems ofEmpires, New York 1963 
23 Bogkovska, Nada, "'Dort werden wir selber Bojaren sein"', JBGO vol. 37 (1989), 345-86 
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power relations established in the preceding chapters. 24 Chapter IV explores the ways 
in which institutions and their interpretations structured administration, and the 
degree to which it can be called a bureaucracy. With regard to the latter issue, one of 
the concerns of chapter III, whether, and to what degree communication, 
negotiations, and the established position of power of Siberian cossacks resulted in a 
public sphere, will loom large for the question of the extent of accountability and 
efficiency achieved in administration. 
One of the major problems in Siberian history remains the question of how the 
tsar managed to squeeze at least ten percent of the state's budget25 out of this wild, 
remote, almost uninhabited and by all contemporary standards inaccessible territory 
bereft of virtually all infrastructure except a few wooden fortresses dotted around its 
vast expanses. The dilemma is no easier to resolve if we consider that even states 
much better suited to the demands made by the early modern military revolution on 
their budgets had to rely on the structures they already found in society. 26 Even Peter 
I., however, was surprised that not even the structures usually expected in a 
Muscovite town, such as the office of elder, existed in Siberia. 7 Trying to explain 
how Muscovy managed its wealthy but unwieldy Siberian territories, Lantzeff, in his 
acclaimed study of Siberian administration, and Dmytryshyn have relied on the 
supposed control the centralising bureaucracy exerted over Siberia. 28 However, this 
clear-cut image of control from above collides with the reality of frequent protest 
against misappropriation of funds by the tsar's representatives in Siberia, and in 
general with the well-established insight that bureaucracies work just as well as the 
degree of public scrutiny to which they are subjected. This was all the more the case 
since one of the generally accepted reasons for the relatively even functioning of the 
adminstration, the considerable level of professionalisation of the nobles who 
operated it, according to Lantzeff, did not apply in distant Siberia, where governors, 
24 Although part of this subject is discussed in ch. I with the intermediary relations between the 
voevoda and the cossacks: see 77-87 25 See 36. 
26 Frost, R. I., "Review Article: Early Modem State-Building, the Scandinavian Machtstaat, and 
the Shortcomings of Anglo-Saxon Scholarship", in: JEMfl7,1-2 (2003), 164-71,168 
27 Akishin, M. O., Politseiskoe gosudarstvo 1 sibirskoe obshchestvo, Novosibirsk 1996,6-7 
28Lantzeff, Siberia, 201,205; Dmytryshyn, "Administrative", 18-21,34-5 
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as is often stressed, enriched themselves beyond all controls. 29 Protest against the 
enrichment of voevodas, therefore, seems to be one of the most likely candidates for 
an explanation of how Muscovy extracted the riches of the Siberian furs. Historical 
studies, however, have not established a framework for the forms of organisation that 
fuelled these protests that stands up to comparative scrutiny. Therefore, one of the 
aims of this thesis is to establish the forms of organisation of Siberian cossacks (see 
chapter I) and to explore the ways by which they made themselves heard. This thesis 
seeks to apply the results of the prolonged discussions of Habermas' theory of the 
bourgeois public, which has recently been reexamined by historians more interested 
in the early modern genesis of the public sphere than in pure ideal types, to a small, 
but very important section of the Muscovite population - the Siberian town cossacks 
and their public behaviour. 30 Clearly, the Siberian public does not fit readily into 
Habermas's theoretical structure. While Habermas holds staunchly to his 
confrontation of the bourgeois public sphere with the "representational public" of the 
princely court, which "did not represent the population but represented its own power 
to the population"31, these historians have pointed out that the bourgeois public was 
rooted in early forms of public spheres that can best be understood as partitioned, 
based on face-to-face relations and primarily frequented by particular categories of 
the population, though generally open to other groups; these early forms of public 
spheres could even be thematically limited, unlike the general public of modern mass 
media. 32 At a different level, this is also a reaction to recent criticism by historians of 
modem Russia of a relatively new and fledgling field in early modern Russian 
history, the history of Muscovy from the perspective of its regions. Hausmann and 
Kappeler conclude that studies of the regional history of Muscovy lack a coherent 
theoretical framework, or tend to downplay it, especially if compared with medieval 
and early modern history in more western parts of the continent. 3 Applying the 
29 Lantzeff, Siberia, 203-4; "Satraps": Pipes, Rußland, 126. According to Hartmut Rüß, the 
leeway of voevodas may have increased with the distance from the centre: Herren und Diener, Köln 
1994,317 
30 Rau, "Öffentliche Räume", 16-7 
31 Habermas, Jürgen, "Concluding Remarks", in: Calhoun, Craig (ed. ), Habermas and the Public 
Sphere, Cambridge/Mass. 1992,462-468, here: 464-5; Habermas, Jürgen, Strukturwandel der 
Ofentlichkeit, Frankfurt/Main 1990,58-61, citation 61 
32 An overview of the literature is provided by Rau, "Öffentliche Räume", 11-20,27-52 
33 Hausmann, Guido, "Review: Die Geschichte des Moskauer Rußland aus der Perspektive seiner 
Regionen. Internationale Konferenz in Wien, 19: 21. Juni 2003", JBGO vol. 52,1 (2004), pp. 132-44, 
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conceptual framework of a partitioned and thematically limited public sphere to 
Muscovy is an approach that has not been explored. So far, it has only been 
established that the provincial gentry of the central areas and the higher nobility had 
a say in government decisions, although their influence was limited to non-public 
spheres or to the interstices of autocracy; but all those below these social ranks are 
still considered as excluded from political influence. 4 Yet in trying to conceptualise 
the relationship of autocracy and the rebellious Siberian cossacks it rapidly became 
clear that there is simply too much evidence to overlook the limited localised public 
spheres they established. 
Since public spheres, imperial institutions and local organisations are all 
intricately interconnected and only make sense in their mutual context, it is sensible 
to study and present them in their environment as completely as the sources allow. A 
narrow local focus is recommendable to manage the diverse and plentiful sources 
such an approach involves, and also since in this subject in particular, a micro-study 
is best suited to produce the kind of data, and references between the elements of 
institutional culture needed. The last chapter will make use of a suitable body of 
sources concerning the Selenga rebellion 1696-7. 
Siberia in the Seventeenth Century -Historiography and Background 
The forms of organisation and the institutions that structured the complex 
relationship between Moscow and the cossacks are related to the turns and twists of 
the history of the conquest of Siberia, showing that Moscow could not assert its 
power without compromising. In 1581/1582 Ermak and his cossacks conquered the 
khanate of Sibir' in what is now called Western Siberia. After their eventual defeat, 
Moscow's armies took over, and the first Russian fortresses were founded during the 
late 1580s and 1590s on the territory of the former khanate. In 1604 Tomsk was 
esp. 143-4; Kappeler, Andreas, "Einleitung", in: idem (cd. ), Die Geschichte Rußlands im 16. und 17. 
Jahrhundert aus der Perspektive seiner Regionen, Wiesbaden 2004,8-14, here: 10 
34 Almost a decade ago, Kivelson came to a negative appraisal of the possibility of a 
(Habermasian) public sphere in her pathbreaking study of the political culture of Vladimir and Suzdal' 
provincial gentry, although she recognised a developing civil society and a public sphere "without the 
identifiable benchmarks of opposition offered by a free press, literate culture, or institutional 
autonomy", in which, nevertheless, "premodern people could function apart from autocratic 
regulation": Autocracy, 6-7. 
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founded as an important springboard to the east on the brink of the open steppe 
shielding east-west trade; already in 1608 the Tomsk cossacks rebelled for the first 
time. 35 There were further rebellions in 1628, in 1633-4; in 1636-8; in 1642 the 
growing town was embroiled in a rebellion during Tukhachevskii's campaign, and in 
1648-50 it was governed by rebellious cossacks and their elected voevoda. This does 
not mean that the intervening periods were calm. An inventory drawn up by an 
enemy of the Tomsk rebels, voevoda Osip Shcherbatyi, based on parts of the lost 
archives of the Siberian chancellery, claimed as many as nine rebellions up to 1647.36 
Such protests and concomitant periods of temporary self-rule were widespread, but 
locally limited. Nevertheless they concerned almost all Siberian towns at different 
times. Moreover, the Time of Troubles (1598-1613) meant a serious shrinkage of 
Moscow's rule beyond the Urals. Despite such impediments to the tsar's control, 
already in 1639 cossack bands had reached the Pacific seaboard. Russian penetration 
into Siberia took two paths - in the north a combination of navigation in small ships 
along the White Sea shore and river transport attracted merchants and trappers from 
Northern Russian towns. The late sixteenth-century predominance of merchants in 
this area ended in 1601, when voevodas and cossacks sent by the tsar set up the town 
of Mangazeia on the river Taz as a trading centre and for the collection of the fur 
tribute, the iasak. Other outposts were set up in Turukhansk in 1604 and Khantaisk in 
1620 on the banks of the lower Enisei. In the south, there was another network of 
rivers along the Irtysh, Ob, Ket, Enisei and Angara, which led as far as Iakutsk 
(founded 1632) on the river Lena and the Pacific ocean by various waterways. On the 
portage between the Ket and a tributary to the Enisei, the Makovskyi ostrog was 
founded in 1618, and Eniseisk followed in 1619 north of the confluence of the Enisei 
and Angara rivers. To the south, movement was far slower, and restricted to some 
mountainous pockets in the Altai, where Kuznetsk was established in 1618 south of 
Tomsk, and to Krasnoiarsk (1628), which remained an important, but embattled 
outpost in the steppe throughout the century. In the partly wooded lands on the rim of 
the open steppe Russians encountered protracted nomad resistance, which they could 
35 Koretskii, V. I., "Iz istorii zaseleniia Sibiri nakanune i vo vremia `smuty"', in: Russkoe 
naselenie Pomoria i Sibiri, Moscow 1973,37-59, here: 53-5 36 Pokrovskii, Tomsk, 356-7; Alcksandrov, Vlast', 240-1,246-8 
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not overcome until late Petrine times. During the 1640s the Buryats around lake 
Baikal were subdued by cossacks from Iakutsk and Eniseisk; but the emigration of 
the local Buryats meant that Irkutsk was founded only in 1661 37 During a phase of 
internal Chinese unrest cossacks established an independent territory on the Amur, 
which, however, was forced to seek Muscovite support when the Manchus fought 
back to regain what they considered their dominion. The ensuing war lasted until the 
peace of Nerchinsk in 1689. 
By the early 1650s, Muscovy had, in little over half a century, extended nominal 
control over the enormous territory between the Urals and the Pacific, albeit not yet 
all of what today is called Siberia. The conquest thus was rapid, considering that 
today's Siberia comprises about one twelfth of the earth's landmass. 8 Considering 
that tsarist power also suffered serious setbacks, this rapidity raises an important 
question. While it will not be disputed that military technology and the network of 
waterways contributed to this success39, an explanation is lacking as to how the 
shortage of vigorous structures of private capital in Muscovy, which should have 
impeded this quick expansion, was overcome. This thesis asks how in a cash-starved 
country Muscovites managed to overcome distance in economic terms and how this 
huge territory was integrated politically and institutionally. (Chapter II) 
Throughout the seventeenth century, Siberia was not a territory that Moscow 
could govern chiefly by military means - more than anywhere, its power relied on 
cossacks in small, isolated garrisons while there was no regular or noble army to 
discipline them. Except for the few voevodas sent as administrators and military 
leaders to Siberian towns for two to four years, there was no nobility in Siberia. The 
sheer distance that separated Siberia from Moscow has often been used to explain 
this fact, yet distance by itself is not a sufficient reason. Causes for this different 
social structure can be found in the frontier conditions of Siberian settlements and in 
the trade with furs. Siberia was essential for Moscow for its unrivalled supply of furs 
to an increasingly affluent Europe that desired them as the prestigious adornment of 
representative garments. Furs, in particular the sumptuous black sable, could buy the 
37 Kopylov, AN, "0 date osnovaniia Irkutska", Istoriia SSSR no. 5,1960,165-6 
311 See Map of Siberia with dates of foundation. 
39 Dmytryshyn, "Administrative", 24 
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foreign weapons and military expertise the tsars needed to triumph in Muscovy's 
wars in the south and west. 40 How conditions in Siberia differed from European 
Muscovy, and how and why Muscovite institutions were adapted to meet its needs is 
a major concern of this study. 
The renewed interest of historians in Siberia following Perestroika and the break- 
up of the Soviet Union concentrated overwhelmingly on the natives. Forsyth's 
challenge to Soviet interpretations of a close partnership of Russian and native lower 
classes has demonstrated the contribution of brute force to the Siberian balance of 
power, devastating the natives in particular during the first phase of conquest. 1 In 
turn this challenge elicited a new concern with the natives' own role in the economic 
conquest of a sub-continent which was ravaging the fur resources. These studies have 
also highlighted the fact that during the seventeenth century Russian power was 
largely restricted to the grid of rivers - with the exception of the more populated 
western Siberian areas immediately surrounding Tobol'sk, which had settled or semi- 
nomadic native populations. Collectors of the traditional fur tax had to rely on native 
notions of taxes, which had developed under the Mongols. It was impossible 
regularly to tax nomadic hunters in the endless forests bare of any infrastructure 
without attracting them by some means. This meant that a strong element of barter 
had to be added to the vague promise of security made by the cossacks. While this 
exchange was unequal in terms of an ideal market, introducing a strong extra- 
economic-element, the widespread claims that cossacks deceived native hunters are 
partly misleading: The assumption that natives could not judge the value of goods 
offered betrays a degree of arrogance and ignorance of fundamental economic laws. 
Prices relate to the relative scarcity of goods in different locations and to the 
distances wares have to travel to reach markets 42 Kotoshikhin, the fugitive clerk of 
the Ambassadorial chancellery already knew that the depletion of furs in Western 
Siberia and the need to turn further east had increased prices 43 The organisational 
40 Fisher, R., The Russian Fur Trade, Berkeley 1943 
41 Forsyth, James, A History of the Peoples of Siberia, Cambridge 1992,41, passim 42 Slezkine, Yuri, Arctic Mirrors, Ithaca 1994; Collins, David, "Subjugation and Settlement in 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Siberia", in: Wood, History, 37-54; Schorkowitz, Dittmar, Die 
soziale und politische Organisation bei den Kalmücken, Frankfurt/Main 1992; Khodarkovsky, 
Michael, Where Two Worlds Met, Ithaca 1992; idem, Russia's Steppe Frontier, Bloomington 2002 
43 Kotosixin, Grigorij, 0 Rossi! v carstvovanie Alekseja M1xajlovica, Oxford 1980,107 fol. 137" 
sod 
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and institutionalised efforts to overcome the enormous distances involved in the fur 
trade are one of the subjects of this thesis. Some of the frequent, but locally limited 
native rebellions in the Taiga and Tundra served to renegotiate the terms of trade. 
Fear also reigned over the small and isolated teams of iasak collectors in the endless 
forests. There, cossacks were more than officials - they acted as agents of the tsar's 
enterprise in the fur trade and simultaneously on their own account. 
Outside Russia, this new interest in Siberian natives is not matched by any 
significant contribution to the study of their foes and partners: the cossacks who were 
the main agents of the tsar's power in Siberia. Lantzeff's 1943 account of 
seventeenth-century Siberian government treated them very briefly. He considered 
the "esprit de corps" of the cossack organisation as exclusively inspired by the 
cossack oath, the hardships of their service and their mutual responsibility to the tsar. 
However, he did not explain why, despite the substantial profits that could be made 
in Siberia, nobles either did not settle there - or turned into cossacks. Longworth 
traces cossacks in all their diverse regional and temporal settings, refuting nationalist 
myths. He claims two different styles of living, the Muscovite, originating in and 
dictated by the forest, and the Cossack, a "child of the open steppe. " Despite being 
ethnically Russian, for Longworth, the cossacks were naturally opposed to anything 
Muscovite, unless they allied against still more formidable enemies, the Tatars. 
Idealising, he describes them as: 
"Born of disorder and reared in the dangerous borderlands between the Russians of the 
northern forests and the destructive Tatars of the southern steppes, [they] had the self- 
reliant man's contempt for security. " 
This romantic, individualist image of the cossacks - besides denying the nomads 
their right of pasture - collides with Siberian reality. Struggling to explain how 
freedom-loving men like Ermak's cossacks could become the "unwitting tentacle of 
the Russian empire", Longworth, due to the one-sided treatment of cossack 
organisation and institutions common in Western accounts, distorts the source 
material and suggests that Ermak's cossacks were unusually submissive to their 
" Lantzeff, Siberia, 76. See also Dmytryshyn, "Administrative", 17-36 
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leader from early on in the campaign. 5 As chapter I will show, there is nothing 
particular in the chronicle accounts of Ermak's expedition, at least from a cossack 
point of view. Rather, this account, which was soon promulgated throughout Russia, 
stresses the same mechanisms that functioned among the so-called "free" cossacks of 
the western steppe rim. This thesis shows that the organising principles of the 
cossacks' organisation were related to the specific conditions of the frontier. It was 
further adapted to particular Siberian conditions, in particular since the cossack way 
of life engulfed all the tsar's Siberian servitors. Cossacks, musketeers (strel'tsy) and 
even the nominally higher-ranking deti boiarskie were known as "cossacks" and used 
this term about themselves 46 They also called themselves "servitors" (sluzhilye liudi) 
or even "serving cossacks" (sluzhilye kazaki), but there was no general rule as to the 
specific context in which this occurred - all sources are more or less related to 
service, and the few surviving private letters do not allow any firm distinction of the 
contexts in which these terms were used. Therefore, throughout this study, the 
cossacks will be spelled with a small letter, deviating from the convention that, 
except for the "Cossacks", writes ethnonyms with a capital letter. 
Depending on Siberian supplies and trade, and at the same time weakly 
represented in Siberia, Moscow fostered cossack forms of organisation for its own 
needs. At the same time, it found itself impelled to tolerate the manifestations of 
local autonomy that these forms of organisation stimulated. The study of these issues 
can also help dispel the myths about the relationship of Russians and Siberian natives 
still extant in Russian accounts of Siberian cossacks. Nevertheless, Pokrovskii's and 
Aleksandrov's studies of local rebellions and the role of the "mir'' in local 
administration have their particular strengths where they prove that cossacks were 
not at the mercy of Moscow's administrators in the Siberian towns, the voevodas. 
At least in the texts of instructions issued in Moscow to each voevoda, he wielded 
impressive powers. Voevodas were originally field commanders of the noble levy, 
45 Longworth, Philip, The Cossacks, London 1969,53,67,75. Cf. Bakhrushin, S. V., "Vopros o 
prisoedinenii Sibiri v istoricheskoi literature", in: idem, Nauchnye trudy, Moscow 1955, vol.!!! pt. I, 
17ff. See 35-66. 
46 Forsyth, Peoples, 34; Vasil'ev, A. P., Zabaikal'skie kazaki, vols. I-III, Chita 1918, vol. 1 prilozh., 
25; Ogloblin, N. N., Obozrenie stolbtsov i knig Sibirskago prikaza, 4 pts., Moscow 1895-1900 pt. III, 
101. In 1701 Siberian musketeers were enrolled formally as cossacks: Akishin, Politseiskoe, 13. Cf. 
Longworth, Cossacks, 67. 
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but they had first superseded civil administration by the namestnik late in the 
sixteenth century in frontier areas, where military leadership was essential; during 
the Time of Troubles they also became more common in towns removed from the 
frontier. In larger towns, the voevoda was required to decide harmoniously - za 
odno, i. e. conjointly, bezvolokitno i. e. without mutual hindrance, and bezo vsiakia 
rozni i. e. without squabbles - with his associates, a second voevoda, a d'iak or a 
pod'iachii s pripis'iu, who were usually appointed and given instructions together. 47 
In Siberia, this system, with roots in Byzantine ideas about power-sharing as well as 
in Mongol double-circuit administration, 48 was conducive to conflicts among the 
voevodas and afforded to cossacks opportunities to interfer with administration. 9 
The voevoda commanded the cossacks and headed local administration in the 
voevoda's office, consisting mainly of under-secretaries (pod'iachii) handling the 
records, and the sworn officials for tax and grain stocks. The voevoda held the 
supreme court of law on the local level and decided over recruitment of rank-and- 
file, service assignments, allotments of salary and the right to travel. His powers 
were, according to the instruction, restricted by divine advice, by the requirement not 
to offend the local population, by the associates' mutual agreement, and by the tsar's 
decree, although the exact delimitation of the voevoda's authority and the questions 
to be referred to the chancellery and the tsar was not defined. 50 Beyond theory, 
however, the voevoda was accompagnied by a few kin and servants, if, especially in 
the smaller outlying towns, by anyone at all, and therefore was in the minority if 
opposed by the cossacks. As Aleksandrov and Pokrovskii have proven, this happened 
quite often, and rebellions frequently had the desired effect of overruling the 
voevoda's decisions. However, they have relied on Western European models of the 
"estate-representative monarchy" and of absolutism to explain the cossacks' 
47 Lantzeff, Siberia, 57 
48 However, Mongol double-circuit administration and the original Muscovite adoption in the 
early fourteenth century, the namestniki and the volosteli, was divided into military and civil 
responsibilities, although they also overlapped. The voevodas replaced the military leader, the 
volosteli: Ostrowski, Mongols, 45. In the late sixteenth century, voevodas replaced namestniks thus 
acquiring civil powers. powers: Lantzeff, Siberia, 47-61. The idea of harmony (symphonia) applied to 
relations between the tsar and the metropolitan or patriarch as well as the bojars: Scheliha, Wolfram 
von, Rußland und die orthodoxe Universalkirche in der Patrarchatsperiode 1589-1721, Wiesbaden 
2004; Bushkovitch, Paul, "The Formation of a National Consciousness in Early Modem Russia", in: 
Harvard Ukrainian Studies vol. 10 (1986), 355-376,368; Rowland, "Limits? ", 140ff. 
49 Aleksandrov, Nast', 187,267 
50 Lantzeff, Siberia, 47-59. On voevodas, see also 78-82,141-2,225-6 
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tenacity, 51 which have been criticised for their reliance on legal arguments even 
where applied to France or England. Concerning Muscovy, evidence of a so-called 
"estate-representative monarchy" which preceded absolutism is particularly scant. 
The so-called "zemskie sobory" or assemblies of the land, Muscovy's main 
participatory bodies, with some minor exceptions, lacked all legal regularities, were 
convoked by the tsar and served to consent to tax bills rather than discuss them. 52 
Recent studies of cossack communities west of the Urals have also failed to produce 
significant evidence for Boeck's assertion that cossack identity during the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries hinged upon the juridical status marking their distinction 
from other subjects of a ruler. 53 Boeck claims there was no common cossack 
experience except for their extra deal with the ruler, accepting that cossack history 
disappears in a "story ... told in terms of diversity. s54 Though 
it will not be disputed 
that cossacks adapted to their environment and were quite capable negotiators in 
remuneration and status issues, Boeck's explanation and the model of the estate- 
representative monarchy do not adequately explain why they had the necessary 
resources to do so, and the nature of these resources. 
As bureaucracy grew throughout the seventeenth century, Aleksandrov and 
Pokrovskii claim, the tsar lost interest in the less controllable, but fully-fledged 
estates. 55 Yet as recent studies on western princely states have shown, even the most 
"absolute" monarchs had to rely on their estates to some degree, realising the 
importance of consultation and consent. 56 Thus the question needs to be addressed 
whether there were other reasons for the loss of political significance that cossack 
forms of organisation suffered in the eighteenth century. 
51 Aleksandrov, V. A., Pokrovskii, N. N., Vlast' i obshchestvo. Sibir' v XY11 v., Novosibirsk 1991; 
Pokrovskii, Tomsk 
52 Nosov, N. E., Stanovlenie soslovno predstavitel'nykh uchrezhdenii v Rossi!, Leningrad 1969; 
Cherepnin, L. V., Zemskie sobory Russkogo gosudarstva v XVI-XVII vv., Moscow 1978; Stökl, 
Günther, "Gab es im Moskauer Staat `Stände'? ", JBGO vol. 11(1963), 321-342; Rita, Ilerren, 442-3 
53 Boeck, Brian, "Review of Mininkov, Plokhy, Sen'; O'Rourke", Kritika vol. 4.3 (2003), 735-46, 
here: 738,744; Plokhy, Serhii, The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine, Oxford, 110, 
111. N. A. Mininkov introduces the concept of vassalage, but in the absence of written contracts or 
oaths, his argument is weak: Donskoe kazachestvo v epokhu pozdnego srednevekov'ia, Rostov-na- 
Donu 1998,271-83. 
54 Bocck, "Review", 745 
ss Aleksandrov, Past, 1-10,15-6,351-7 
56 Henshall, Nicholas, The Myth of Absolutism, London 1992; Duchhardt, Heinz, "Absolutismus - 
Abschied von einem Epochenbegriff? ", IIZ vol. 258 no. 1 (1994), 113-22; idem, Das Zeitalter des 
Absolutismus, Munich 1998,37-9,57-67 
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Russian historians increasingly doubt the interpretation of the Siberian records in 
terms of an estate of the cossacks. Akishin has unearthed Peter I's surprise when it 
became obvious during his reforms of urban administration that there were no 
zemskie izby, which elsewhere served as a precursor to the town hall, in Siberian 
towns. Drawing on these findings, Vershinin has demonstrated that cossack 
organisations lacked permanence and coherence to a degree that makes it dubious to 
consider them as estates. He has also re-evaluated Siberian voevodas' aspirations and 
service, hitherto only discussed as an aspect of increased state power. This has led 
him to conclude that voevodas were the only moving force in Siberia. He stresses 
that left to their own devices communities of Russian migrants would have 
established small, isolated, uncoordinated settlements, succumbing to the severe 
climatic conditions without externally organised mutual aid. 7 
While this might be the upshot in a highly speculative scenario, Vershinin does 
not explore the relationship of cossacks and the voevodas, or ask why Siberian 
cossacks were so useful to Moscow other than being inexpensive. Recent studies of 
the Terek and Don cossacks notice the usefulness of cossack groups to Moscow, yet 
explain it merely by the Muscovite state's weakness and the low maintenance 
sufficient for cossacks. The early modern military reforms are often measured in 
terms of increased discipline and regularisation. However, the "mercurial" - in terms 
of loyalty and discipline - Don cossacks were often more effective against Tatar 
forces and Ottoman forts than regular Muscovite armies. 58 This is not the only 
unnoticed contradiction in current accounts of cossacks. The assertion that cossack 
institutions were despotic and democratic at the same time is left unexplained. 
Democracy among cossacks is taken at face value, without further explanation as to 
how it worked, how far it was democratic and how this alleged democracy translated 
into - or at least coexisted with - military cost-effectiveness. 
59 Thus there is a gap in 
57 Akishin, Politseiskoe, 6-7. Vershinin, E. V., Voevodskoe upravlenie v Sibiri, Ekaterinburg 1998, 
145-6 
58 Boeck, Brian, "Capitulation or Negotiation: Relations Between the Don Host and Moscow in 
the Aftermath of the Razin Uprising", paper read at the international conference "The History of 
Muscovite Russia from the Perspective of its Regions", Vienna 19`s-21" June 2003,17 and passim 
59 Barrett, Thomas, At the Edge of Empire, Oxford 1999; Boeck, "Review", 743; Hosking, 
Russians, 115; Skorik, Don, vol.!, 140-4; Sokol, Edward, Cossacks, in: Wieczynski, Joseph (ed. ), The 
Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet history, Gulf Breeze/FL, vol. VIII, 60-61 
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our knowledge about how the cossack group functioned, and how it related to the 
voevoda, to the tsar and to the chancellery system. 
Based on military sociology and anthropology of the steppe rim, this study shows 
how the cossacks developed flexible and inclusive forms of organisation. (Chapter I) 
Concentrating on the cossacks in Poland-Lithuania, Kumke has shown that a very 
specific form of primary group was responsible for the peculiar characteristics of the 
cossacks noticed but not explained satisfyingly in a welter of studies. 60 Such a group, 
which I will call after Kumke "Personenverband", 61 served the cossacks as a basis 
for the articulation of their interests. 2 These forms of organisation and the 
institutional links between the cossacks and Moscow offer a coherent explanation for 
the phenomena of the rapid establishment and consolidation of a Russian Siberia. 
In a country renowned even by early modem standards for its weak market 
relations and paltry infrastructure, private entrepreneurs on their own were 
insufficient for the significant dynamism of the Russian expansion in Siberia. 
Pressing economic needs and political considerations contributed to setting up a 
surprisingly effective state enterprise. Monopolies bestowed on private merchant 
corporations by European colonial empires struggled with the same problems of local 
graft and petty trade undermining their privileges, as did Muscovy in Siberia. 63 
Nevertheless, Siberian cossacks were not simply brigands, as they are often 
portrayed. 4 The Siberian chancellery did its best to motivate cossacks in the same 
way Hanseatic merchants did by offering their sailors a small parcel of stowage room 
("Führung") during hauls. 65 Relying on the wording of petitions, and impelled under 
Soviet rule to present the cossack lower class in Siberia as disadvantaged and poor, 
scholars have overlooked this issue. Flexible handling of salaries by the Siberian 
chancellery and local voevoda offices made an important contribution to the quick 
expansion in Siberia. Individual cossacks and cossack groups had to apply each time 
60 Above those already mentioned: Avrich, Rebels; Longworth, Cossacks; Stökl, Günther, Die 
Entstehung des Kosakentums, Munich 1952; Astapenko, Mikhail, Istoriia kazachestva Rossii. vol. 1-2, 
Rostov-on-Don 1998, here: vol. 1,29-32 
61 There is no English word that quite captures the nuances of the German term: (military) `unit' 
(Verband) stresses too much a unitary character while 'association' is too lose to carry the 
implications of a 'banding together of individuals'. 
62 Kumke, Carsten, Führer und Geführte bei den Zaporoger Kosaken, Wiesbaden 1993,479-97 
63 Tracy, James (cd. ), The Political Economy of Merchant Empires, Cambridge 1991 
64 Forsyth, Peoples, 33-4 
6s Heinsius, Paul, Das Sch? der Ilansischen Frühzeit, Köln 1986,240-2 
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and could negotiate the actual amount paid. They depended on flexible lines of credit 
allowing them to undertake journeys entailing huge costs and risks. (Chapter II) 
Studies of Siberian government and bureaucracy agree that it was ineffective and 
corrupt. 66 While accepting that this might be the outcome if modern criteria are 
applied, this study re-evaluates the very conditions of effectiveness under which the 
Siberian bureaucracy functioned. Challenging conventional interpretations, this 
thesis shows that under early modern conditions and in a frontier environment 
enormously distant from the centre, the administration did surprisingly well. 
(Chapter IV) To a considerable degree, charges of corruption still await scrutiny. 
They are difficult to gauge, since sources are sparse or do not contain the right kind 
of information. Yet in several cases, close study of the sources shows that 
`corruption' is often an inadequate or misleading label for allegations of over- 
charging on the part of the voevodas or other officials; in any case it was not a 
concept known to seventeenth-century Russians. These assessments concur with a 
number of recent reappraisals of early-modem Russian bureaucracy, which concede 
that in essential issues, such as defending the frontier or redeeming slaves, Muscovite 
chancelleries were more effective than in extractive fields. 67 
Muscovite chancelleries can best be described as a historical bureaucracy, in 
particular since, diverging from modern terms, they coupled a considerable degree of 
professionalism and adherence to their own norms they themselves formulated with a 
general acceptance that people were to be treated according to scaled social value. 
Where the voice of a boyar weighed more than that of a member of the petty gentry, 
cossacks and other lower class Muscovites needed mechanisms allowing them access 
to justice and the ability to defend their local interests. Yet individuals could find 
they were lost in such an environment -a chancellery's clerks only considered 
claims promising a handsome reward. 68 Even so, members of some non-noble groups 
66 Lantzeff, Siberia, 205; Dmytryshyn, "Apparatus", 28; Aleksandrov, Plast', 135-140; 
Pokrovskii, Tomsk, 154; Leont'eva, G. A., Sluzhilye liudi vostochnoi Sibiri vo vtoroi polovine XVII - 
pervoi chetverti XVIII vv., Moscow 1972,77; idem, "Volneniia sluzhilykh liudei v Vostochnoi Sibiri", 
in: Russkoe naselenie Pomor'ia, 94-105; Nikitin, N. I., Sluzhilye liudi v Zapadnoi Sibiri XVII v., 
Novosibirsk 1988,94. But see, for Muscovy in general, Rüß, Herren, 309-26 
67 Brown, Peter, "Neither Fish nor Fowl: Administrative Legality Seventeenth-Century Russia", 
JBGO 50.1 (2002), 1-21, here 15,20; Davies, Brian, The Role of the Town Governors in the Defense 
and Military Colonization of Muscovy's Southern Frontier, Chicago 1983, vols. 1-2; Sedov, P. V., 
"Podnosheniia v Moskovskikh prikazakh XVII veka", 01(1996), 139-152 
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could expect the defence of their interests in the chancellery system against 
infringements of their rights due to over-riding concerns such as taxation or military 
demands. 69 The cossack group therefore was essential to provide the necessary 
backing for soliciting cossack interests in Moscow or with the voevodas. 
Since cossack groups were not permanent organisations, but negotiations 
demanded a high degree of permanence and organisation, a crucial question arises: 
How could they sustain an institutional order that allowed for regular negotiations 
about salary and the terms of service and exchange of valuable commodities? To 
answer this question, the nature of negotiations and soliciting has to be addressed. In 
Muscovy, the public was censored and public criticism often needed forceful backing 
akin to a rebellion to make itself heard. How could negotiation take place under such 
conditions? In this regard, perhaps, Siberia differed most from the rest of Muscovy. 
The use of institutions diverged on both sides of the Urals, not least since frontier 
conditions isolated each town - and even more so a cossack group in the Taiga or the 
steppe - to a greater or lesser degree from influences outside its local area. Still, 
these men were in particular need of contacts to Moscow, the voevodas, and the 
chancellery system, for the source of their livelihood were various kinds of trade or 
services delivered to merchants. Since the addressee of litigation was in all cases a 
Moscow chancellery or the tsar, it was essential that an institution common to both 
Siberia and Moscow was invoked. Social actors have commonly used institutions 
such as monarchy to express contradictory concerns. In doing so, litigants as well as 
wirepullers had to rely on an approved language, claiming to derive from the fonts of 
monarchy rather than challenging its foundations. Cossacks - among others - learned 
to apply this language in a suitable way to convey their concerns. To explain this 
behaviour, this study makes use of recent developments in the analysis of 
institutions. In this thesis, institutions are seen as institutional mechanisms, 
consisting of concepts, patterns of behaviour and symbolic representations of their 
aims. The double aspect of "instrumental" and "symbolic" effects inherent in 
institutions conceals to a large degree how institutions work. Institutions can be 
envisaged as "symbolic orders" - not implying that institutions are "just" 
69 Shveikovskaia, E. N., Gosudarstvo i krest'iane Rossi!, Moscow 1997; Stevens, Carol, Soldiers 
on the Steppe, Illinois UP 1995 
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emblematic, but that every "order" bears a- more or less distinct - institutional 
form, in which its principles are expressed. This can be conveyed in any 
institutionally regulated action, in gestures and material signs. What usually, even in 
scientific vocabulary, is called an institution is on closer examination an organisation 
or a form of interaction, in which the visibility of its order is put on centre stage: a 
church, state, family and kinship, educational establishments, sometimes also large- 
scale enterprises. 70 
It is true that organisations cannot exist without institutional mechanisms. 
However, institutional mechanisms can exist without organisations, for example in 
the etiquette governing letter-writing, the socially elaborated norms and symbols of 
romantic love or heightened forms of friendship. On the other hand, to codify and 
make even these norms controllable by specialists, an organisation can be 
established, as in the eighteenth-century German "friendship alliances" 
(Freundschaftsbünde). Thus an institutional mechanism - perhaps a better term than 
"institution" - can be sustained as mere conventions, requiring a social base but not a 
permanent organisation71, as was the case with the Personenverbände of the Siberian 
cossacks. 
Such a notion provides a possible resolution of recent controversies about the 
form of Muscovite government in the seventeenth century. The original meaning of 
the obligatory self-ascription as "slave of the tsar" in the regalian salutation 
contained in petitions or, according to social rank and group, "orphan of the 
sovereign" was eroded over a long time and even used in private correspondence. 72 
Kivelson has clarified Muscovites' preference for the honourable state of servitude, 
which in their eyes was ethically different from that of abject slaves serving the 
infidels or unjust masters. To bring oneself into an unfree position could be an active, 
self-defending action: if the tax base eroded and neighbours fled wilfully, the 
70 Rehberg, Karl-Siegbert, "Institutionenwandel und Funktionsveränderung des Symbolischen", 
in: Göhler, Gerhard (ed. ), Institutionenwandel, Opladen 1997,94-120, here: 102 
71 Rehberg, "Institutionenwandel", 102; idem, "Wie verändern sich Institutionen? ", in: ibid., 21- 
56; Stölting, Gerhard, "Wandel und Kontinuität der Institutionen", in: ibid., 181-203; Duchhardt, 
Heinz, Gert Melville (eds. ), Im Spannungsfeld von Recht und Ritual, Köln 1997; Melville, Gert, 
Institutionalität und Symbolisierung, K61n 2001; Schimmelpfennig, Bernhard, "Das Papsttum im 
Mittelalter: eine Institution? ", in: Melville, Institutionen, 209-29 
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Tsar'? ", SR vol. 57 no. 3 (1998), 585-608, here: 599-608 
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subsistence, dignity, and cultural values of those left behind were endangered. 
Therefore the townspeople and peasants demanding the return of refugees - 
eventually, but unintendedly, leading to their own enserfinent - did not demonstrate 
a spiteful, self-enslaving mentality, but aimed at securing fundamental rights of 
survival, order and continuity. On the one hand, the master who was considered 
rightful and observed Orthodox custom - for example, feeding them in case of bad 
harvests that were frequent due to climatic conditions at the margin of agricultural 
feasibility, even though in reality that obligation was naturally not always and by 
everyone observed - was allowed to do almost everything to them. On the other 
hand, there was still a notion of obligations that could mean that someone who 
acquired these powers without proper justification could be considered a sham. 
Considering the unsafe conditions in Muscovy, the tsar and chancellery system did a 
remarkably good job in propagating the tsar's image of piousness that secured the 
most basic needs and values - such as redeeming the vast numbers of captives taken 
during small-scale nomad raids that trickled through the frontier defences 73 Cash- 
starved Muscovy produced a welter of economic failures, and although the state was 
part of the process, it was not the only reason for this condition; perhaps Muscovites 
were right if they perceived the state's role as rather relieving. In this sense, in 
seventeenth-century Muscovite experience slavery was mostly preferably compared 
to an often - though not always and to everybody - exceedingly unsafe state of 
freedom or "at will" (samovol'no) -a notion that carried implications for both the 
victims and the perpetrators of acts of rebellion that were often difficult to 
distinguish from burgeoning criminality. 4 It should be remembered, however, that 
the Muscovite nexus between enserfinent, illegal migration, and criminality cannot 
be observed in Siberia. 75 
However, the meaning of the salutation was not so much dependent on changing 
connotations of the words, but rather on the actual balance of power, which 
according to Goldfrank and others was tilted decidedly to the advantage of the tsar. 76 
73 On the implications of redemption of captives organised by the state, see 19,39. 
74 Kivelson, Valerie, "Bitter Slavery and Pious Servitude: Muscovite Freedom and its Critics", in: 
Crummey, Robert (ed. ), Russische und Ukrainische Geschichte, Wiesbaden 2001,109-19, here: 115 
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Among Goldfrank's more convincing arguments are fiscal demands, requirements to 
serve and impoverishment by demands of services, and the crown's sense of its 
prerogatives - according to this view, consilium in Russia never bound the ruler - 
which prevented any coalescence of classes or of estates demanding political rights. 77 
Furthermore, the prohibition of private societies, clubs, and education until the 
second half of the century and the sowing of mutual distrust via slovo i delo 
gosudarevo - the obligatory denunciation of broadly defined utterances and actions 
directed against the tsar - thus rendered individuals incapable of resolute action. 8 
Yet as this thesis will demonstrate, in Siberia at least, the balance of power was much 
more equal. Western historiography has overlooked this, since the main agent of 
power in Siberia, the cossacks, seemed organisationally elusive. 79 However, 
flexibility should not be misunderstood as absence of structure. More inclined to take 
seriously the evidence of everyday life than narrowly-confined legal or constitutional 
issues, Soviet historians have provided deep but ill-defined insights which have until 
now proven difficult to reconcile with general historical terms and concepts. 
Intriguingly, in this respect, Pokrovskii and Aleksandrov have claimed that the 
sovereign's word and affair80 (slovo i delo gosudarevo) promoted unity and resolute 
action in Siberia, despite the understanding of this principle by Goldfrank and others 
for Muscovy west of the Urals. This, in turn, contradicts their own conviction that 
there was a unified "political structure" on both sides of the Urals as well as A. M. 
Kantor's recent overstated claim that the ideal sovereign of the "democratic masses" 
in the posad was secular, limited by codified law and by the elective character of an 
individual's power. 81 Thus, a coherent explanation of local resolute action in the 
framework of the institutional culture of empire is lacking. 82 
77 Torke, Hans-Joachim, Die Staatsbedingte Gesellschaft im Moskauer Reich, Leiden 1974,275- 
83. The status of the Boiar duma is still discussed - recent contributions stress its ritual properties, and 
doubt that either the sovereign or the boyars enjoyed a monopoly on political power. See Bogatyrev, 
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Analysis of the "sovereign's word and affair" (chapter III) with the institutionalist 
toolbox sheds new light on a protracted controversy. In the last two decades, several 
approaches have been suggested for the study of the particularistic interests and the 
aspect of litigation expressed in the terms of the sovereign's affair, which is 
identified as an ideology. As Perrie concludes, their drawback is the impossibility of 
reconciling monarchist illusions of the rebels with their insubordination to the 
monarch's decrees, especially when the latter became more openly condemning of 
the rebels' actions. 83 All these approaches to the sovereign's affair fall short of 
resolving a general problem - how could both cossacks and their superiors appeal to 
the sovereign's word and affair to uphold divergent interests, given that they had to 
make use of the same unified symbolic order in which the arbitrary decision of the 
tsar was considered indispensable? 
Rehberg, Schimmelpfennig and other recent theorists of institutions agree that 
institutions often function exactly in this way. Institutions provided a common point 
of reference for divergent interests. The actual meaning of empire, of papal authority, 
of English, French or German monarchy was never beyond dispute. Relative to 
specific localities, social groups, time and, in general, the distribution of power in 
society, divergent interpretations of an institution were prevalent. These 
interpretations were always contested and at the same time, to foster stability and 
permanence in a social reality that is always more prone to institutional break-down, 
claimed to derive from authoritative sources and to be expressed in approved idioms. 
To stress this function of a forum for divergent interests within what was considered 
gosudarevu"', in: idem (ed. ), Istochniki po istorii obshchestvennogo mysli i kultury epokhi pozdnego 
feodalizma, Novosibirsk 1988,24-61. Kantor, A. M., "Obshchina, mir, gosudar', bunt: problemy 
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divine providence, or what in modem organisations is a set of rules and symbolic 
representations, these authors have coined the term "leitidea". 84 
An institution is contested since those who are physically, intellectually and 
socially capable of claiming it for their actions can apply it as a resource of power. 85 
Institutional analysis identifies different leitideas competing for the legitimate 
interpretation of an institution. A "leitidea" is a determination of what "the state", the 
Roman Catholic Church, "art" etc., or "the" sovereign's affair should be at a given 
moment. Institutional analysis shows that this selectively gains acceptance from 
among a multitude of leitideas, which compete and are contested. Every leitidea is 
only temporarily successful by being set apart from and above a complex of often- 
incompatible potential orientations. Since the leitidea is a product of struggle and a 
synthesis of contradicting issues, it disowns many of the competing senses and drafts 
of order. Yet this is the very reason why its validity is never uncontested and depends 
on different places, situations, interests and social groups. The leitidea of empire, of 
papalism86, of French, English or German monarchy was always contested and at the 
same time, from the perspectives of divergent needs was claimed as being unified, 
secured from the authentic sources and therefore irrefutable. 87 Institutional analysis 
contributes to the study of pre-modern communication since it allows for the 
expression of divergent interests within the limits of a shared institution, for example 
the sovereign's word and affair, or service. 88 
The latter argument is important for the history of the Muscovite empire. A broad 
survey of the literature on the Muscovite seventeenth century and beyond is 
necessary, however, before returning to the issue of institutions. Recent studies 
84 Rehberg, "Institutionenwandel", 103. The German "Leitidee" is not straightforward to translate, 
as, for example "Leitmotiv", rendered in English as leitmotif. Other similar applications of "Leif" 
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concentrating on Muscovy's regions and local politics have revealed that the centre 
often found it hard to influence them, and was forced to make significant 
concessions. Even after the final defeat of the Solovki monastery revolt in 1676 
monks in this and other great northern monasteries pursued politics independent of 
the ecclesiastical authorities. Schismatic monasteries and congregations in other 
regions and in particular in Karelia were often inspired by particularistic interest. 89 
Extensive Moscow carters' slobody were left off the hook of police control. 90 The 
chancelleries supported northern peasants in their struggles with landlords 
encroaching on their rights and lands. 91 Far from being the all-controlling central 
power, Moscow even had to compromise with the southern frontier garrisons which 
were the instruments of its authority. 92 As late as the early 1680s, responsiveness to 
southern needs was an important element to the success of military reform since 
southerners enjoyed the opportunity to renegotiate their relationship by temporarily 
putting themselves out of reach. Regarding food supplies, Moscow made far- 
reaching concessions, despite the negative implications for such essential issues as 
military reform. 93 For the central Russian provinces, Kivelson stresses the lack of 
personnel in voevoda offices, therefore decrees disapproved by local strongmen and 
their rivals often could not be carried out. Patronage networks including locals and 
central chancellery staff formed parallel structures of power. 94 Already to 
contemporaries the seventeenth century was known as the "rebellious century"95, a 
condition constraining the tsar's rule. Perhaps the only area under Moscow's 
unrestricted sway was the western provinces suffering from the burdens of war, 
89 See the contributions to the Vienna conference 2003: Michels, Georg, "The Monastic Reforms 
of Archbishop Afanasii of Kholmogory (1682-1702), earlier version in: Geraci, Robert (ed. ), Of 
Religion and Empire, Ithaca 2001; idem, At War with the Church, Stanford 1999; idem, "The Violent 
Old Belief', Rh vol. 19.1-4 (1992), 203-29 90 Schmidt, Christoph, Sozialkontrolle in Moskau, Stuttgart 1996,228-9,402-408; Rustemeyer, 
Angela, "Verrat und ungehörige Worte", FzOG vol. 56 (2000), 257-272, here: 271 91 Shveikovskaia, Gosudarstvo, 216-59; Kamkin, A. V., "Russkii Sever i Moskovskii tsentr v XV- 
XVII vekakh", paper, Vienna 2003. See now Nolte, Hans-Heinrich, "Autonomien im vorpetrinischen 
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forthcoming. 
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which the tsar could discipline through the military. 96 In what amounts to a 
significant shift of focus on a new basis of evidence, the question has therefore been 
raised as to what the centre could contribute to regional politics, and how far and by 
what means it could control the regions. It is open to question, however, as to 
whether `strategy' is too rational a term to describe many aspects of the behaviour of 
local people. 97 
In the seventeenth century, Moscow presided over an ethnically and socially 
complex empire, which it sought to govern by a variety of means. In the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries Muscovy aggressively expanded its territory when the sway of the 
Mongol Empire and its successors yielded to progressive decline and fragmentation. 
This reaction to the regional power vacuum, which was further exacerbated by the 
decline of the Teutonic Order, betrayed no unusual messianic self-conception, nor 
plans for world-domination or nomadic spirit. 98 Moscow's rulers made use of 
Orthodox concepts and the alleged oppression of Orthodox believers in neighbouring 
countries to justify their military exploits. Such practices can also be found elsewhere 
in Europe 99 
Moscow's European neighbours developed a similar appetite for conquest. Spain, 
Portugal, the Netherlands and Britain looked overseas by the sixteenth century, long 
before they had developed theories of mercantilism or absolutism to legitimise 
expansion. The Habsburgs and Jagiellonians strove to include into their reigns 
territories towards the steppe frontier eastward from the Danube toward the Black 
Sea, although later in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the szlachta often 
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checked ambitious war plans in Poland-Lithuania. These empires answered variously 
to political and economic needs and pressures and to dynastic interests. In Muscovy's 
case, economic pressures alone were strong enough, although Moscow may not have 
assessed the real value of some of the lands it sought to conquer. 1°° Within its 
fifteenth-century borders, natural resources were scarce and land was unproductive 
because of poor soil, poorly timed precipitation and a short growing season. 101 
Expansion provided income from the Siberian fur trade and from export and transit 
trade along major trade routes of the Volga and White Sea, as well as new lands and 
peasant subjects to be distributed among the nobles. The pomest'e form of land 
distribution was one institution fostering integration of the realm, while sustaining a 
hunger for land fuelled by the eastern Slavic custom of partible inheritance; in the 
long run, however, this was a utopian promise. The Baltic provinces were attractive 
due to the higher population density, which promised the work force that was the 
resource most in demand on Muscovite estates. 102 Coercion and a sense for 
traditional institutions were both used to further viable structures of governance. 
How central control was possible at all under early modem conditions which did 
not provide most of the means of communication we are used to, under conditions of 
adverse climate, an impoverished countryside and with enormous distances to be 
covered is a question historiography has long answered along conventional lines. 
Concerning Muscovy as a whole, with too great an emphasis on the perhaps 
untypical reign of Ivan IV, historians have pointed out that autocracy served as a 
kind of Procrustean bed, cutting off locally assertive communities militarily and by 
resettling them. 103 Local elected officials and the voevodas, Moscow's 
representatives in the provinces, who frequently asked for detailed orders to guide 
their actions, were taken at face value to prove that local initiative was curtailed in 
'oo Frost, Robert I., The Northern Wars, Harlow 2000,15. Filiushkin, Aleksandr, in: Schippan, 
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Region States, 30`s April-4h May 2003, Narva", in: h-soz-u-kult, >http: //hsozkult. geschichte. hu- 
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favour of centralised control. Yet this policy ended in disarray, plunging the nascent 
empire into a period of internal troubles at the turn of the sixteenth century. Andreas 
Kappeler has provided a more subtle explanation noting that the Muscovite political 
system included different modes of integration and various kinds of social 
organisations, often without changing them, cultivating and co-opting local elites. 104 
Yet while it is part of the explanation that local nobles became part of the governing 
elites, this still does not completely explain how Moscow could exert any influence 
on the increasing number of regions it governed. Kivelson has pointed out that even 
the pomest'e, long considered the main tool in a conscious effort at uprooting and 
homogenising the nobility and gentry, did not guarantee that state orders were 
obeyed in the regions. Apart from curbing attempts at separation, this instrument did 
not much improve the state's authority over these territories. Resettled gentry 
developed a new sense of local community and tended to concentrate their lands 
within one or a few rather circumscribed provinces. Contributing to our 
understanding of centre-periphery relations, Kivelson envisions relations between 
Moscow and the central provinces through the prism of noble patronage networks, 
forming a parallel power structure to the official bureaucracy. At the apex of these 
competing networks stood the high and middling nobility in the Moscow 
chancelleries, related to local figureheads who could mobilise sufficient support 
among neighbours and among their own peasants. Clients of particular officials at the 
centre, these men from among the provincial gentry provided pressure groups drawn 
from the local gentry and their peasants to defend their more circumscribed local 
interests. Bushkovitch has shown that even under Peter I, noble networks continued 
to influence high politics. '05 
Historians of Siberia have tended to portray patronage networks as proof of an 
authoritarian society, unfolding throughout the seventeenth century, which pushed 
aside earlier, more participative modes of social life. Yet in terms of domination, 
patronage had more ambivalent effects than is often thought, particularly in the 
Siberian trading frontier. Where significant trade and dangerous steppe frontier 
conditions combined to create regional bottlenecks, the Personenverband wielded 
104 Kappeler, Vielvölkerreich, 33 
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important powers. Perhaps surprisingly, in distant Siberia patronage was also 
available closer to the local level than in central Muscovy due to the peculiar 
administrative structure. 106 Moscow aimed to overcome early-modern conditions of 
undergovernment and the potential threat of separatism1°7, exacerbated by Siberian 
distances and bad communications by establishing the razriad-system, yet this move 
could be effective only by conceding significant political influence to local power- 
brokers. 108 Thus, the Personenverband often balanced the terms of an unequal 
relationship implied by patronage toward its own advantage. 109 
Nancy Kollmann has chosen another approach, demonstrating that in Muscovy, 
the defence of personal honour of increasing parts of the population by the tsar and 
his courts was one of the means employed by the centre to integrate the empire. 110 In 
Siberia, too, this was an important means of projecting one's acclaim among the 
cossacks, not least since honour was a precondition for being elected to the more 
responsible positions. Although the tsar and his courts in theory protected honour, it 
depended on the Personenverband, since election documents had to be signed by 
cossacks. l ll 
In his influential account of Siberia's administration in the seventeenth century, 
Lantzeff overlooked patronage issues. He claimed that Siberia's administration was 
akin to a huge business enterprise on the part of the Muscovite government. The 
"modern" bureaucratic features he noted in the administration rested on several 
assumptions that recent researchers have rejected! 12 They no longer perceive the 
great princely clans and the non-titled families of royal servitors as constant rivals in 
a struggle for power at court, but rather as interwoven strands in the fabric of a single 
elite. Contrary to some earlier interpretations, these clans and the tsar shared a 
common interest in the effectiveness of the government and the well-being of the 
realm. They have also rejected the earlier interpretation that Muscovite politics can 
be understood as the struggle of a declining court aristocracy to defend its power 
106 Cf. Kivelson, Autocracy, 159 
107 See 71-6 
108 See 131-3 
109 See 241-2, passim 
110 Kollmann, Honor 
111 See (election) 61,63,66,67,78,82-3,89-94,98,122-3,134,185,233,237,243,270,280-2, 
286-7; (honour and election) 244; (honour) 65,143-5,150,152,193,213,253-4,279,288,290 
112 Lantzeff, Siberia, 200-1 
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against the challenge of a rising provincial gentry! 13 For the same reason, the d'iaks 
whom Lantzeff considered the harbingers of bureaucratisation accompanied 
voevodas only during the initial decades of the seventeenth century to some of the 
more important destinations in Siberia. 114 Later, the role of d'iaki, who were raised 
from the lower ranks of Muscovite society to become heads of chancelleries, 
diminished as nobles noticed the increasing power of the administration. Brown has 
questioned the independence of the d'iaki, whom Lantzeff considered the harbingers 
of bureaucratisation, from court factions. In Brown's reading, all chancellery 
personnel from the loftiest boyar to the humblest scribe sought their niche where they 
could make a living. They could rely on their own chancellery staff to defend their 
interests, but not on the staff of other chancelleries. ' 15 The rule that two voevodas 
held a town in a sort of collegiate arrangement was applicable only to bigger, 
administratively more significant towns that yielded more revenues. 116 
Customs administration was another field in which the Siberian chancellery tried 
to introduce as much accountability as possible. The Siberian chancellery aimed to 
effect this by employing skilfully selected personnel from different social groups and 
by adapting controls to particular situations. Merchants from larger towns in Siberia 
and European Russia staffed the customs houses in the main towns. This was a 
profitable office since Siberian Russians petitioned for the honour of being allowed 
to select customs officials among their own as soon as local communities became 
solvent enough to guarantee the exact and profitable performance of this office. 
However, voevodas often infringed on the business of the customs officer 
(tamozhennaia golova). Both were instructed to supervise and report each other's 
illegal trading activities, but only the customs officer, always chosen in a different 
town, enjoyed independence - he was exempt from the voevoda's jurisdiction, but 
did not have autonomous powers of command. "? In some rebellions, the customs 
officer provided the seals needed to safeguard the passage of petitioners to the tsar. 
113 Kobrin, V. B., Vlast' i sobstvennost' v srednevekovoi Rossii (XV-XVI vv. ), Moscow 1985. See 
other major contributions to this line of inquiry by Veselovskii, Zimin, S. O. Shmidt, M. E. Bychkova, 
A. L. Stanislavskii, Gustave Alef, Ann Kleimola, Samuel Baron, Hartmut Rüss and Robert Crummey. 
114 Vershinin, Voevodskoe, 148-183 
115 Brown, Peter, "Guarding the Gate-keepers", JBGO vol. 50.3 (2002), 224-245, here: 244 116 Vershinin, Voevodskoe, 148-183 
117 Lantzef, Siberia, 116-22 
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They sometimes shared a common interest since voevodas allied with the great 
Moscow merchants and their representatives to smooth their illegal business and for 
mutual assistance with credit, safeguarding and intercession in the Siberian 
chancellery. "8 In smaller settlements sworn men (tselovalniki) were chosen to 
supervise tax collection. Where local merchants were absent but trade was strong, 
cossacks were sometimes chosen for this office. The guards patrolling roads between 
Siberia and European Russia to prevent smuggling were also recruited from cossacks 
and sworn men. At the official border post of Verkhotur'e, voevodas were controlled 
on entering and leaving Siberia. Fixed amounts of specified wares and moneys were 
assigned to every position, which voevodas could not exceed in theory; in practice, 
however, a more flexible attitude prevailed. Even so, to prevent excessive smuggling, 
voevodas' wares were sealed and listed at the local customs house. Similar controls 
applied to merchants and trappers, who were controlled at each customs station, 
where they also had to pay the tithe on their wares. ' 19 
Consequently, Siberian administration cannot be regarded as "modern" or 
"bureaucratic", or at least as bureaucratic only in a more restricted sense, as chapter 
IV will show in detail. Ultimately, the Siberian chancellery could not rely 
exclusively on established procedure to extract revenues from Siberia. Lantzeff 
acknowledged this when noting that the feeding practices of earlier times marred 
orderly administration. Nevertheless, he did not reconcile his finding with his wider 
assertion that the evident effectiveness of Siberian administrative practices 
represented "a step toward the bureaucratic administration of more modern times". 120 
It also remains unclear how the Siberian chancellery managed to contribute, 
according to the more conservative estimates, on average about ten per cent of the 
state's budget; moreover, it was rare convertible revenue. 121 As elsewhere in the 
early modern era, the tsars had to rely on established local communities or elites to 
"g Aleksandrov, Plast', 136-9 
119 Lantzeff, Siberia, 122-3 
120 Ibid., 201,203,205 
121 Ibid., 154; Fisher, Fur, 120. For other estimates, see Miliukov, P. N., "Gosudarstvennoe 
khoziaistvo Rossii", ZhMNP CCLXXI (October 1890), 1-107, here: 346; Vernadskii, G. V., "Protiv 
solntsa", Russkaia mysl' (January 1914), 63. Kotoshikhin admitted that he could not trust his memory; 
however, he believed the yearly shipment of furs was worth 600,000 roubles: Koto§ixin, Rossii, 106 
fol. 135° co, which would be equivalent to one fourth of the budget. See illustration I. 
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pursue their aim of increasing returns-, 122 in the case of Siberia, these were mainly the 
cossacks. What, then, were the incentives for loyal service to the tsar? 
Answers to the problem of integration provided for Siberia rely on the military 
preponderance of the musket when combined with fortifications and other military 
innovations. Providing an advantage in defensive situations, they nevertheless did 
not help much when collecting iasak. In the forests, unwieldy muskets were often 
less useful than quick loading and silent bows. Another explanation concentrates on 
the waterway system allowing rapid moving across the sub-continent. 123 
Nevertheless, the rivers still forced Muscovite traders, cossacks and couriers to travel 
huge distances across burdensome portages. Natural networks of transportation and 
technical innovations do not explain how such an enterprise was organised. One of 
the earliest historians of Siberia, Gerhard Müller, stressed the role of the state to 
explain the apparent success of Muscovite colonisation of Siberia, but did not 
address many of the problems of such an approach. 124 Early modern princely states 
could find it difficult to effectively govern even a town like Leonberg, close by the 
residency in southwest Germany. 125 An oft-repeated saying goes "the sky is high and 
the tsar is far away". While the latter presumption cannot be denied, treating distance 
as a given parameter misses the main point. Over the centuries, Russians have shown 
often enough that they disregarded distance to a degree difficult to imagine in most 
European environments. This disregard of distance depended on the institutional 
environment. What counted was that the focal points of the trading network, the 
central markets, the trading posts and fortresses were organised by common 
institutions. On their way to or from Moscow, Siberian cossacks did not ask for the 
"essence" of institutions, or which social structure deserved the name institution. 
They were interested in institutional mechanisms that could stabilise social relations 
so overstretched in Siberian conditions. It was an accomplishment to transform the 
contingent into something "necessary" which "lasted", even if on closer inspection 
the actual change was visible. This aspect of coercing and restraining regulations, 
'' Lieberman, Victor, "Transcending East-West Dichotomies", MAS vol. 31.3 (1997), 463-546, 
here: 508-9 
123 Dmytryshyn, "Apparatus", 24; Lantzeff, Siberia, 87-9 
'24 Miller, Istoriia, vol.!, 249-50,273-7 and passim; see chapt. I. 
125 Landwehr, Achim, Policey im Alltag, Frankfurt/Main 2000 
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which nevertheless simultaneously empowered individuals and local communities is 
treated by institutional analysis. Institutional attainments can relieve, restrict, or 
function as a resource for producing something new and improve potentials of 
knowledge and interaction. In these capacities, they always have to be related to 
power potentialities, to privilege and overt as well as covert inequality. Social 
cohesion and the preconditions of each "legitimating belief" (Max Weber) are neither 
obvious nor adequately elucidated. 126 As long as cossacks could rely on these 
institutional structures and standards, even for recently-recruited and often 
impoverished cossacks, the dangers of a journey through the steppe frontier lasting 
up to nearly a year in one direction could become calculable. Institutions such as the 
sovereign's affair, salary, partial tax-exemptions, material support for travelling to 
Moscow, elections and the right to give advice to the commander or voevoda also 
amounted to privilege. It rendered cossack status in Siberia attractive to vagrants, 
natives, peasants and even merchants or their relatives. 
Since authority in the steppe had collapsed due to the disintegration of the 
successor states of the Mongol empire, in the resulting power vacuum, organisation 
was the most sought after resource. In its absence, the southern borderlands 
depopulated due to frequent raids from nomad groups, which had an inclination to 
split and, despite certain autochthonous forms of obedience, engaged in a "search for 
central authority" which could be extended to outside forces. 127 Once such an 
organisation was established, merchants from Bukhara changed their trading routes 
to end at Tobol'sk, where they established permanent representatives - the first step 
towards direct Russo-Chinese trade. 128 While organisations rely on institutional 
mechanisms, these cannot be set up quickly. Establishing institutions entails huge 
"hidden" costs, since they depend on acceptance by a wide array of social 
organisations and professional fields. It is this wide applicability of an institution and 
the expected behaviour that makes it attractive and provides tangible benefits to 
agents. Consequently, it is also very expensive to change institutions - the more 
126 Rehberg, "Institutionenwandel ", 103-4 
127 Kumke, Geführte, 33; Khodarkovsky, Steppe, 7-34 
128 Penrose, G. L., "Inner Asian Influences on the Earliest Russo-Chinese Contacts", RH (1992) 
vol. 19 (1-4), 361-92, here: 388-92 
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broadly they are disseminated, the more agents have to change their habits and their 
acquired behaviour. 129 
It was therefore a momentous decision of the Moscow grand princes to adopt the 
title of tsar, resounding in the nomad societies in the form of the "White tsar/khan". 
The purported Chinggisid descent was of particular use to the cossacks, drawing their 
name from outcasts of the Tatar/Mongol army. 130 Throughout the Siberian steppe 
frontier, adoption of the title by the grand princes meant that anyone who accepted 
the suzerainty of the Moscow tsar enjoyed tangible benefits in interaction and trade 
with those nomads that sought loose alliance and trade opportunities in Muscovy 
rather than with its enemies. 131 As shown in chapter I, Siberian cossacks grasped this 
reality. It is these co-ordinating services the tsars provided that historians have 
underestimated. They were also substantial in the organisation of frontier defences 
and the redemption of slaves captured by nomad bands throughout the southern 
frontier. Redemption was big business and is vastly underestimated in 
historiography; it had a significant impact on patterns of Muscovite (under-) 
urbanisation and on the perception of the tsar as rightful Orthodox ruler. 132 
Institutional coordination and a chance of obtaining a favourable outcome kept a 
stream of petitions flowing - seventy percent of personal petitions were confirmed 
and signed by the tsar or the chancellery; reiteration was prohibited only if the tsar 
had signed a definite decree. 133 Power was generated from a torrent of information 
collected, documented and compared in the chancelleries. Yet unlike the stern and 
brutal reactions to cossack and peasant rebellions on the western side of the Urals 134, 
town rebellions in Siberia were much more difficult to suppress. Any concentration 
of troops was too expensive to supply, and of necessity would have depleted the fur 
resources, which were paramount in any consideration of Siberian politics. In 
Siberia, investigations and trials, good leadership, concessions and trade 
129 Krasner, S. D., "Sovereignty. An Institutional Perspective", CPS vol. 21 no. 1 (April 1988), 81; 
Offe, Claus, Designing Institutions for East European Transitions, Vienna 1994,25-6 
"0 See 76 
131 On pattern of interaction with nomad societies, see Khodarkovsky, Steppe, 221-9 
132 Davies, Governors, vols. 1-2; Khodarkovsky, Steppe, 7-8,222-3 
133 Torke, Staatsbedingte, 89-91 
134 Avrich, Rebels, 109-10,115; Moon, David, The Russian Peasantry, London 1999,280-1 
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opportunities to a large degree took the place of centrally organised, naked force in 
the pacification of cossack rebellions. 
The final chapter draws together the threads of the thesis by concentrating on one 
major incident, the Selenga rebellion of 1696 and its repercussions. Most cossack 
rebellions have been studied before, and we have a wealth of information about 
them. Chapter V, by focusing on a detailed study of one particular rebellion, applies 
the insights developed in the thesis to challenge traditional interpretations of this, the 
greatest Siberian cossack rising of the century, and sheds further light on the ways in 
which authority was negotiated between centre and periphery. 
While conditions differed considerably concerning supply and trade 
opportunities, it is now clear that isolated steppe frontier outposts west of the Urals 
were otherwise treated in a somewhat similar way. They stood a certain, if reduced, 
chance of removing an unpopular voevoda, or of extending the tenure of a popular 
official. 135 Steppe frontier fortifications existed in a delicate balance which Moscow 
had to respect, although the terms changed. Nevertheless, for the seventeenth and 
most of the eighteenth centuries, the steppe in a more restricted sense remained an 
area the tsars aspired to rule, but could not effectively govern, '36 
Sources 
This thesis is based in large part on the substantial documentation generated by 
the Russian government of Siberia which is still held in central Russian archives, 
largely in the Siberian Chancery and in local archives. Though copious, the nature of 
Russian bureaucratic record-keeping means that there are substantial problems in 
using these materials, not least in the one-sidedness and formulaic nature of the 
welter of official documentation, which is frequently repetitive and has to be read 
with care, revealing some of the most valuable information only between the lines. 
Petitions written by local cossacks therefore provide a valuable different perspective, 
and this study therefore draws heavily on them. Even these petitions, however, are 
written in an official, formulaic style, since they were directed to the tsar and his 
local representatives. 
135 Glaz'ev, "Mestnoe", 9; Stevens, Soldiers 
116 Khodarkovsky, Steppe, 223-9 
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A number of published document collections provide, to a certain, if restricted 
extent, remedies to this situation. There are some surviving private letters by Siberian 
cossacks, which are revealing for the way cossacks articulated themselves in non- 
official documents, although they arc rather sparse in expression and, compared to 
the kind of sources that historians of Western Europe find, they are very few; 137 
similarly, there are no surviving diaries by cossacks. Cossacks could express 
themselves in writing, as the manifold reports on their travels abroad testify, but 
these do not contain the kind of information needed for this study. Descriptions by 
foreign travellers and German ambassadors and an officer in the tsar's service add 
some colour to the overly dry chancellery style that is so characteristic of the official 
documents. 138 Some valuable materials on the church, on annals and on towns - 
containing sources on cossacks, too - have been edited in the 1980s-90s. 
139 Printed 
primary sources have also been used in the first four chapters to broaden the regional 
basis of the investigation of Siberian cossack institutions. 
In describing cossack and chancellery organisation and the elements of the 
institutional culture, I have used a multitude of sources both published and 
unpublished. Most of the sources on which I have drawn in chapter I are found in the 
papers of the Irkutsk prikaznaia izba. Particularly revealing cases that have, to my 
knowledge, not been used are sometimes found between other papers; 140 although the 
files have been described in detail, these descriptions can be misleading or 
incomplete. The recent publications of sources related to towns and the copy-book of 
the Tobol'sk archbishopric have proven very helpful for materials on cossack self- 
137 Gramotki XVII-nachala XVIII veka, Moscow 1969; Aleksandrov, V. A., "Materialy o 
narodnykh dvizheniakh v Sibiri v kontse XVII veka", Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik za 1961 god, 
Moscow 1962, no. 1/2,345-82 
138 Alekseev, M. P. (ed. ), Beschreibung der Reise auff Zibirien und weiter ins Land Orth und 
Stelle. Opisanie puteshestviia v Sibir' i dalee v razlichnye mestnosti strany. (Neizvestnoe opisanie 
puteshestviia v Sibir' inostrantsa v XVII veke. ), Moscow 1936; idem (ed. ), Sibir' v izvestiiach 
inostrannykh puteshestvennikov i pisatelei (X111-XVII vv. ), 2 vols., Irkutsk 1932-36; Hundt, Michael 
(cd. ), Beschreibung der dreYährigen chinesischen Reise. Die russische Gesandtschaft von Moskau 
nach Peking 1692 bis 1695 in den Darstellungen von Eberhard Isbrand Ides und Adam Brand, 
Stuttgart 1999; Ides, Izbrant; Adam Brand, Zapiski o russkom posol'stve v Kitai (1692-1695), 
Moscow 1967; Dwa polskie pamietniki z Syberii: XVII I XVIII wiek, opracowanie zbiorowe pod 
redakc. a naukowa Antoniego Kuczynskiego, Wroclaw, Warszawa 1996 
13 Pokrovskii, N. N.; E. K. Romodanovskaia (eds. ), Tobol'skii arkhiereiskii dom v XVII veke, 
Novosibirsk 1993; Pokrovskii, Pervoe stoletie; Rezun, D. Ia. (ed. ), Letopis' sibirskikh gorodov, 
Novosibirsk 1986; Okladnikov, A. P. (ed. ), Sibirskie letopisi. Pt. l: Gruppa Esipovskoi letopisi, 
Moscow 1987 
140 E. g. the report of lakov Turchaninov on his mission to Barguzinsk and beyond: 77-80 
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organisation and institutionalisation. 141 Some sources arc in early twentieth-century 
publications and in the detailed descriptions by Ogloblin; and of course, decrees 
published in Pol'noe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii. 142 Rezun's chapter on the 
Tukhachevskii campaign, which I have used in the absence of a publication of the 
materials is found in a book that investigates the early development of the town of 
Achinsk, drawing extensively on archival materials cited in considerable detail. 
Compared to the well-observed detail in the descriptive part, the conclusion and 
interpretation are unassuming and the author often expresses that he was puzzled 
about contradictory evidence. '43 To establish the inclusion of peasants, traders and 
migrants in cossack service, I have used an investigation in 1720 into bribery in 
recruitment. " To investigate the years after the Time of Troubles and the period of 
voevoda Kurakin, I have used publications of diplomatic materials and the materials 
collected by Müller at RGADA. '45 
For the material life of cossacks I have drawn on the edited "description" by a 
German officer'46, on the map of Irkutsk in the Remezov atlas (1701)147, and on the 
aforementioned publications. Most source materials, decrees, reports and receipts 
that helped to describe the practices related to salary are found in the archives. 
This database was constructed in MS Access as a general research tool 
underpinning the thesis; it includes 1,668 entries on cossacks mentioned in the 
sources and in literature and contains information about name; rank; function; 
careers; kinship and clientage links; length of service; and other observations on their 
role in society; former rank; locality; date of record; a special lable allowing to trace 
connections; literacy; and hyperlinks to relevant notes from sources. The Access 
141 Pokrovskii, Pervoe stoletie, no. 26,88; Pokrovskii, Tobolskil arkhiereiskii, kniga v 
142 Golovachev, P. M., (ed. ), Pervoe stoletie Irkutska, St. Petersburg 1902,104; RIB vol. 35,143-4; 
vol. 18,8; Vasil'ev, Zabaikal'skie, vol. I prilozh. 25; see also the recent re-edition of Miiller's Istoriia 
Sibiri; PSZ vol. IV no. 1822,116. 
143 Rezun, D. Ia., "Pokhod Ia. O. Tukhachevskogo 1641 g. i osnovanie Achinskogo ostroga", in: 
idem, Russkie v Srednem Prichulyme XVII-XVIII vv., Novosibirsk 1984,42-83 
'4' RGADA f. 214 kn. 1619, passim 
145 Russko-mongol'skie otnosheniia. 1607-1636, Moscow 1959, no. 22,11.14-5; RGADA f. 199 
Portfeli G. F. Millers no. 478 11.66 (petition); Russko-mongol'skie, no. 22,11.3-4; Demidova, N. F. (cd. ), 
Russko-kitaiskie otnosheniia vXVII v. [hereafter: RKO], vol. 1: 1608-1683, Moscow 1969,72-78,108, 
109,115 
146 Alckseev, Beschreibung, Idem, Sibir' v izvestiiach 
147 "Caert des Lands en Stadt Yrkutskoy met de zee Baykal - Chertezh zemli Irkutskago goroda", 
in: Chertezhnaia kniga Sibiri, sostavlennaia Tobol'skim synom boiarskim Semenom Remezovym v 
1701 godu, faksimil'noe izdanie, Moscow 2003,20 - list iii 
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database has additional advantages over other forms of organising source data: It 
allows the tracing of connections between cossacks according to terms occurring in 
one label by excluding all entries that do not contain the term or combination of 
signs; resulting hints can be checked immediately against the source context through 
the hyperlink. For similar reasons, calculating proportions of literate men among 
different ranks, localities and years has also become easier. Where names were 
garbled, incomplete, or there was more than one person of the same name, 
comparison of entries often helped to establish the identity of the person. '48 
In chapter III, apart from the materials on the sovereign's affair included in 
chapter V, I have used published sources and the 1649 Uloahenie. 149 Processes of 
institutionalisation are traceable in these publications, in the copybook of the 
archbishopric, in published annals, and in archival materials such as reports and 
receipts for salary. 
Interregional relations and influences in empire are documented in petitions 
found in the archives, in the 1649 Ulozhenie and in a recent synopsis of the Russian 
Orthodox bible, in the materials published in Miiller's Istoriia, the description by the 
member of the Polish szlachta, Nemojewski as desribed by Floria, and in the 
aforementioned archives and source publications. '50 
Sources on bribery and generalised exchange are in investigations and decrees in 
the archives and in 1649 Ulozhenie, in aforementioned publications and in 
Tatishchev's published works. 151 From a file on a 1720 investigation on bribery in 
recruitment in Selenginsk found in the Siberian chancellery's records I have also 
constructed a similar database with slightly different labels. Its entries have also been 
included in the first database, but its main upshot - evidence of bribery as a common 
phenomenon that affected the relations between voevoda and cossacks in various 
ways, such as increasing dependency, but which also provides evidence of local 
148 It is intended that the database will be published after further research to fill certain gaps in the 
data. 
149 Hellie, Richard (ed. ), The Muscovite Law Code (Ulozhenie) of 1649, Irvine/CA 1988, pt. I., ch. 
IX, art. 1; ch. X, art. 1,2,24,147,149,150; DAI vol. 4 (1851), 104-5,89-90; DAI vol. 4 no. 37,91-2 
150 RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 422 11.80,88,112-114 (petitions); Hellie, Ulozhenie, 17; Simfoniia iii 
slovar'-ukazatel' k Sviashchennomu Pisaniiu, (red. ) mitropolita ... Pitirima, 3 vols., Moscow 1988- 
2000, vol. II, 864-5; Müller, Istoriia Sibiri vol. 1,201,206-7; Floria, B. N., "S. Nemoevskii o russkom 
gosudarstve i obshchestve XVI - nachala XVII vv. ", Russia Mediaevalis vol. IX, 1(1997), 105-14 151 Tatishchev, V. N., Izbrannye proizvedeniia, Leningrad 1979,143 
43 
influence - could not be included in this thesis. It forms an essential part in a planned 
wider investigation of the Pctrine reforms in Siberia. 
This study answers recent, justified criticism of studies of the sovereign's word 
and affair that concentrate exclusively on rebellions, since they tend to eschew social 
relations in more peaceful times. 152 However, in Siberia rebellions were a frequent 
experience. The approach chosen in this study re-embeds participants in their social 
networks and institutional culture to understand the significance of their actions not 
only against the background of general assumptions about the relative socio- 
economic position of groups or estates, but on that of their everyday experience and 
the options available to them in the institutional culture in which they lived. 
Institutional analysis attempts to uncover the significance of institutions in political 
and social interactions. Institutions would not be viable if they were only efficient on 
a higher level of historical abstraction, guaranteeing that the empire remained intact. 
Their pragmatic efficiency in everyday situations gained acceptance or lost it, and we 
can study this world of interaction only to a modest degree on the level of events 
considered important by historians of the Siberian cossacks - such as the large-scale, 
spectacular rebellions -, but need clarification also on the level of seemingly 
insignificant day-to-day local administration, litigation, and other forms of social 
interaction. In order to understand the impact of a petition, for example, it is 
necessary to know the personal background of the signatories, which reveals more 
fully only in the petty local documentation of their daily existence. In Moscow, at the 
Siberian chancellery, despite the great pains taken at collecting materials, events of a 
rebellion could only be partially reconstructed. Investigators were not necessarily 
interested in the reasons for a rebellion, and their investigations stopped at the point 
when it broke down. Information was more aggregated when it reached Moscow, and 
therefore lost some detail. Less "relevant" information from everyday chancellery 
business was left behind in the local archives, where it sometimes survived. The 
same happened to many records of business transactions, which appeared in 
abbreviated form only in the customs protocols, and to minor, but very revealing 
investigations. Documents of election, kabaly, petty law-suits among cossacks, the 
152 Lukin, Predstavleniia, 4-5 
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minutiae of the larger investigations and the payment of salary to individual 
cossacks, the instructions for prikazchiki and investigators who received them from 
the local voevoda, the lists of godovalshchiki who evaded their duty by paying 
money to substitutes or exchanging appointments are all found among the documents 
of the local voevoda's office, allowing some insight into the lives of the protagonists 
of later - or earlier - rebellions. This information is not available for every person 
due to the incompleteness of the archives and some materials lost by decay, but most 
of the cossacks that took part in the rebellions have left some other traces. Historians 
have tended to leave out material that seemed unrelated at first sight to the "great" 
rebellions and events, and which was more difficult to categorise. Computer-based 
evaluation of the material allows more effective processing of personal data, and the 
reconstruction of links between participants that were ostensibly unrelated. Using the 
computerised database, I have re-contextualised and linked the information from the 
Irkutsk archive. It contains a welter of sources of a primarily local nature that have, if 
at all, only been used in a statistical way in a narrow social historical approach, the 
results of which - except for a few brief articles - are unavailable in most libraries, in 
particular outside Russia. '53 
The Selenga rebellion has been chosen for this study since previous researchers 
have covered it inadequately, and the archive of the Irkutsk voevoda's office is the 
most extensive and complete on the Siberian steppe frontier. It contains the wealth of 
local detail needed to establish the aforementioned connections between individual 
cossacks and their biographies. The only other extensive local Siberian archive, that 
of Iakutsk, is much more monotonous; as chapter I shows, this is possibly so because 
of the different social and economic structures in the north, and because of its 
distance from the southern steppe frontier and from the Chinese and the Central 
Asian trade. '54 However, the 791 files of the Irkutsk archive, each containing up to 
250 folios perused for this study concentrate on the period from the end of the 1680s 
to the early 1700s, providing much of the detailed information needed for the kind of 
ls3 Leont'eva, Sluzhilye; idem, "Khoziaistvennye zaniatiia sluzhilykh liudei vostochnoi Sibiri v 
XVII-pervoi chetverti XVIII v. ", in: Agrarnyi stroi v feodal'noi Rossii. XV-nachalo XVIII v., Moscow 
1986; Mashanova, L. V., ' Promyslo-torgovaia deiatel'nost' russkogo naseleniia Zabaikal'ia", Istoriia 
SSSR (1983) no. 2,142-9. Aleksandrov and Pokrovskii made very fleeting use of the Irkutsk archive, 
keeping exclusively to the main investigation of the rebellion: Vlast', 382-3 
Asa See 94 
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investigation that I have undertaken. The fact that Irkutsk was a quickly growing 
town at this time may have contributed to the wealth of documentation preserved. On 
the other hand, archives in the wooden towns and fortresses often burned, and many 
files still perished or were stolen from local archives in modern times, as late as 
during the confusion of the 1990s. Even the Irkutsk archive suffers from evident 
losses - thus, much of the regular statistical data often available for Russian towns 
are lost: the books of account (dokhodnye and raskhodnye knigi) as well as many 
recruitment lists. It is regrettable that during the revolution of 1917, the archive of 
the Selenginsk Trinity monastery was destroyed by flooding when it was piled in a 
salt store on the shore of lake Baikal. Archives in RGADA fond 281 (Gramoty 
kollegii ekonomiki) stemming from other monasteries of the region around lake 
Baikal now also contain insufficient material on the period. Unfortunately, little has 
survived on Irkutsk and its district and, respectively, prisud, in the razriad town, at 
Eniseisk, although some files once were kept there, too. 155 The archive in Tobol'sk 
also contains no documents on Irkutsk, and it was inaccessible during my research. 
For documents denied to me from RGADA, Irkutskaiaprikaznaia izba, I have relied 
on the typewritten description of documents available in the reading-room. Records 
from the Siberian chancellery provided further materials on rebellions, bribery and 
investigations, although earlier researchers have already read them. Despite the 
substantial gaps in the primary sources, there is rich material available which does 
enable new conclusions to be drawn about the nature of Muscovite rule in Siberia. 
us Elert, A. Ch., Ekspeditsionnye materialy G. F. Millera kak istochnik po istorii Sibiri, 
Novosibirsk 1990 
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Chapter I The Personenverband 
During the conquest of Siberia and the subsequent phase of consolidation, which 
together consumed most of the seventeenth century, cossacks were the most 
numerous group of its new Russian inhabitants. Since the usual social structure of 
European Russia, consisting of nobles and serfs on their estates, did not exist and 
was not likely to flourish beyond the Urals, the role of cossacks in local politics was 
paramount. Until very late in the seventeenth century, they supplied the absolute 
majority of the Russian - or Orthodox - population of Siberia, and in most towns, 
albeit with the significant exclusion of Tobol'sk and Eniscisk, they overshadowed 
the members of the posad not only in numbers, but also in economic resources. 
Nevertheless, until very recently, for various reasons, historians have neglected the 
internal organisation of cossacks in both Russia and Siberia. '56 Despite their 
preponderant position in Siberia, cossacks have long been neglected by serious 
studies, while both romantic and despicable images have dominated the imagination. 
For the historians of the state-historical school, the numerical preponderance of 
156 Following an ecological expalantion for the cossack lifestyle, the most recent account by Brian 
Boeck, Shying Boundaries on the Don Steppe Frontier, unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Harvard University 
2002, is subtle and illuminating on collaboration between nomads and cossacks, on the fluid 
equilibrium on the steppe frontier between raiding, peace-making, trading and ransoming, and on the 
mechanisms that regulated interactions between the Don Host and the Azovites. A spirited advocate of 
the notion of cossack democracy, he places the "special deal" between the host and Moscow at the 
centre of their relations, while explaining their utility to Moscow by local knowledge and the often- 
stated cost-efficiency. Interrelations between the military components of their institutions and 
organisation, the requirements of the steppe environment, and their cost-efficiency, however, are 
treated superficially, while cossack attitudes toward leadership are treated in a one-sided manner. 
Stßkl, Entstehung, writing at length on the relations between Tatar and East-slavic cossacks, and 
giving some detail on extraordinary cossack leaders, especially those of a noble background, while 
noting that these men were deeply influenced by the frontier, fails to probe the power of the group as a 
defining factor of social structure and value. Longworth, while writing extensively about cossack 
identity, liberties and their warlike nature deals superficially with structure (see 17). In his 
encyclopaedic book on the Don cossacks, Mininkov, Donskoe, strives to reconceptualise the relations 
between the `Don Host and Moscow along the lines of European vassalage, a term unknown to the 
area and period; in the absence of written contracts or oaths, his account is based on inference drawn 
from patterns of service and reward. Plokhy, Religion, offers a new and interesting view of the 
Khmel'nytsky rebellion as a religious uprising that united various sectors of Ruthenian society against 
Catholic Poland, although he concedes that the emphasis on securing of corporate privileges - itself a 
difference to cossacks related to Muscovy - often trumped confessional concerns, and gives a clear 
impression of cossack ranks, but all too often he refers to "the Cossacks" as if they were an 
undifferentiated mass without internal organisation, especially in a period when the common people 
"all turned Cossack": see Bocck, "Review", 736-8. Nikitin, Sluzhilye, who discusses cossack "self- 
administration" at some length, fails to explain why it took hold in Siberia, except for some general 
reference to the "tradition" of the cossacks of Ermak. Nikitin, Aleksandrov, Mast', and Pokrovskii, 
Tomsk can hardly be overestimated as reference works on Siberian cossacks although they adhere to 
the estate-representative theory overrating cossack devotion to their rights and privileges. 
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cossacks in the Russian population was nonetheless not significant, since they 
considered the state and its orders as the moving force in the conquest and 
colonisation. Inasmuch as cossacks were accepted as the primary agents of state 
power in Siberia, it was their heroic exploits to overestimate which these historians 
gave prominence; otherwise they were considered mere executors of official orders. 
The whole conquest of Siberia was seen as an "achievement of Russian weapons". 
Accordingly, it was the voevodas and other officials they studied, and not the 
cossacks. 157 This interpretation was criticised by the Siberian regionalists in the 
nineteenth century, who turned attention to the "free" colonisation, undertaken by 
merchants and trappers; yet though they ascribed to these categories of the Russian 
population the main role in the conquest and colonisation, they could not prove this 
claim in the archives. Concerning the administration, they straddled the 
interpretations of their opponents. 158 Already during the pre-revolutionary period 
Ogloblin published an innovative study of town rebellions as a spin-off of his 
archival studies for an inventory of the Siberian chancellery, but for a long time he 
remained the exception. ls9 
Soviet historians tried to prove that Siberia was won for Russia not exclusively 
by the military and government. Still, musketeers were considered a reactionary 
force during the 1930s, and musketeers and cossacks were largely indistinguishable 
in Siberia. In Siberia, as elsewhere in the Soviet Union, historians were most 
attentive to the peasants' contribution to the colonisation. They could not overlook 
the important role of cossacks in agriculture during and after the conquest, but this 
did not become the subject of major studies. 160 It was only in the 1970s that Buganov 
157 Fisher, I. E., Sibirskaia istoriia, St. Petersburg, 1774; Gazenvinkel', K. B., Knigi razriadnye v 
ofitsial'nykh ikh spiskakh, Kazan' 1892,54-5 
158 ladrintsev, N., Sibir' kak kolonfia, St. Petersburg 1882; Golovachev, P., "Blizhaishie zadachi 
istoricheskogo izuchcniia Sibiri", ZhMNP (1902) no. 9,49-68; Butsinskii, P. N., Zaselenie Sibiri i byt 
perv1kh eia nasel'nikov, Khar'kov 1889 
s9 Ogloblin, N. N., Krasnoiarskii bunt 1695-1698 godov, Tomsk 1902; idcm, "Iakutskii rozysk o 
rosni bojarskikh detei i kazakov", Russkaia starina, St. Petersburg (1897) kn. 8,375-92; idem, 
"Tomskii bunt 1637-1638 godov", Istoricheskii vestnik vol. LXXXV, Moscow 1901,229-50; idem, "K 
istorii Tomskogo bunta 1648 g. ", ChIOIDR vol. 3, Moscow 1903,1-30; idcm, "Zagovor Tomskoi 
`litvy' v 1634 g. ", Chteniia v istoricheskom obshchestve Nestora letopisca, kn. 8, Kiev 1894,116-27; 
idem, "Bunt i pobeg na Amur vorovskogo polka M. Sorokina", Russkaia starina (1896) no. 1,205-21 
160 Ustiugov, N. V., "Osnovnye cherry russkoi kolonizatsii Iuzhnogo Zaural'ia v XVIII v. ", 
Voprosy istorii Sibiri i Dal'nego Vostoka, Novosibirsk 1961,67-8; Mirzoev, V. G., Prisoedinenie i 
osvoenie Sibiri v istoricheskoi literature XVII v., Moscow 1960,60-1 
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and Golikova refuted the hypothesis of the reactionary character of the musketeers 
and their rebellions during the seventeenth and eighteenth century in Russia 
generally. However, they stressed the closeness of the cossacks and musketeers to 
the "masses". 161 At about the same time, the specialist on trappers, Pavlov, still 
considered it necessary to alert historians to Bakhrushin's erroneous statement that 
"it was not the servitors who won Iakutia, ... but the hordes of Russian trappers. "162 
During the 1970s and 1980s, a number of local studies found that the cossacks 
deserved the credit not only for conquering Siberia, but also for their involvement in 
agriculture, trade, and crafts - and at times and in some regions, particularly close to 
the steppe, they were the only people carrying out such activities, 163 It was only 
during the 1980s that historians again studied town rebellions, and found that their 
social basis was mostly cossack. 164 
Considering this longstanding ideological blindness, it is unsurprising that 
explanations for the emergence and development of the specific forms of 
organisation characteristic for cossacks and for the extent and nature of their 
participation in local politics have been few and contradictory. A recent overview on 
Russian history put the state of research simply: "The [cossacks] practiced a mixture 
of primitive democracy and ruthless authoritarianism". 165 Representative as this 
statement is for the current state of studies on cossack institutions, it provides no 
explanation for the apparent tension between these terms. 
161 Buganov, V. I., Moskovskoe vosstanie kontsa XVII v., Moscow 1969; Golikova, N. B., 
Astrakhanskoe vostanie 1705-1706 gg., Moscow 1975; Golikova, N. B., Ocherki po istorii gorodov 
Rossii, Moscow 1982 
162 Pavlov, P. N., "Otsenka promyslovoi kolonizatsii Sibiri XVII v. v sovetskoi istoricheskoi 
literature", Doklady 1-i mezhvuzovskoi nauchnoi konferentsii po istoriografii Sibiri, Kemerovo 1970 163 Leont'eva, G. A., Sluzhilye liudi vostochnoi Sibiri, diss... kand., Moscow 1972; Nikitin, N. I., 
"Voennosluzhilye liudi i osvoenie Sibiri v XVII veke", Istoriia SSSR (1980), no. 2,161-173; 
Liutsidarskaia, "K voprosu o roli sluzhilogo naseleniia v razvitii goroda Tomska", in: Ocherki 
sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi i kul'turnoi zhizni Sibiri, pt. 2, Novosibirsk 1972,5-14; Liutsidarskaia, 
A. A., "K voprosu o formirovanii torgovo-promyshlennogo naseleniia Tomska", in: Goroda Sibiri, 
Novosibirsk 1974,67-74; Kurilov, V. N., "Uchastie sluzhilykh liudei v stanovlenii g. Tiumeni kak 
torgovo-promyshlennogo tsentra v XVII v"., in: Goroda Sibiri, 80-8; Nikitin, N. I., Sluzhilye liudi v 
Zapadnol Sibiri XVII v., Novosibirsk 1988 
164 Kurilov, V. N., "Volneniia v Tiumeni v 1654 g. ", Izvestiia SOAN SSSR. Seriia obshchestv. 
nauk (1973) vyp. 3 no. 11,99-104; Chistiakova, E. V., Gorodskie vosstaniia v Rossii v pervoi polovine 
XVII v.: (30-40g. ), Voronezh 1975; Kamenetskii, I. P., "Volneniia sluzhilykh liudei v Kuznetskom 
ostro e", in: Sibirskie goroda XVII-nachala XX v., Novosibirsk 1981 





Scholars have tried several approaches to explain the erratic twists and turns of 
the relations between cossacks and voevodas, unearthing problems that are even 
more difficult to trace. Early attempts at writing a history of Siberia by members of 
the State Historical School placed all power with the voevoda and the state, and since 
attempts at defining the role of the cossacks still leave room for doubt, these 
approaches were revived more than once. 166 Shunkov, though conceding the 
existence of elected local bodies in the European part of Russia, went so far as to 
argue that these were in a "rudimentary state" in Siberia, since there were no large 
feudal landowners there. Therefore, Shunkov concluded, all power was put in the 
hands of the voevoda. 167 Even Peter I was astonished as he was reminded by 
Siberians that the bodies of local governance in European Russia, the zemskaia izba 
and guba did not function in Siberia. Although this was due to the virtual absence of 
the posad in most towns, the cossacks did not establish a similar body. 168 Siberia, 
then, posed an extra challenge. Given the dearth of relevant studies up to the 1980s, 
several eminent scholars have nevertheless tried to make sense of the 1695-1698 
rebellion in Krasnoiarsk, which established the local authority of elected "judges" 
(sud'i), which may seem to indicate similarity with conditions west of the Urals. But 
Krasnoiarian cossacks changed their sud'i much too often; yet the significance of 
such detail has not been grasped. 
While Ogloblin believed the overthrow of the voevoda was caused by his 
corruption, Bakhrushin, though still concentrating on the voevoda's all-embracing 
powers and explaining the revolt as a reaction to the voevoda's abuses, tried to 
interpret the change from obedience to rebellion in terms of socio-economic 
changes. 169 As he pointed out, in the first decades after the foundation of 
Krasnoiarsk, cossacks and voevodas were close allies because of their common 
interest in subduing the natives. Yet when the nomad Dzhungars became ever more 
powerful in the last decades of the seventeenth century, most or all of the natives 
were already subjugated, and forcing new natives to pay iasak became more difficult. 
166 Müller, Istoriia, vol. 1,249-50,273-7 and passim; Dmytryshyn, Apparatus, 27; Vershinin, 
Voevodskoe, 144-6 
167 Istorfia Sibiri, red. V. I. Shunkov, Leningrad 1968, vol. 2,125 
168 Akishin, Politseiskoe, 74-110 
169 Aleksandrov Mast', 291; Ogloblin, "Krasnoiarskii bunt", 25-70; Bakhrushin, "Ocherki po 
istorii Krasnoiarskogo uezda v XVII v. ", in: idem, Trudy vol. IV, Moscow 1959,7-214, here: 170-92 
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In this period, the voevodas ceased to organise campaigns, and acted as mere 
administrators interested only in their own enrichment. Under such conditions, the 
cossacks of Krasnoiarsk rebelled against the administration. 170 However, as 
Aleksandrov and Pokrovskii point out, campaigns were organised even after the 
rebellion; moreover, they were very successful. 171 This observation is also in line 
with their broader point, that throughout the seventeenth century, there was a 
constant form of organisation among cossacks. Rather than long-term socio- 
economic change, therefore, it is necessary to take a close look at the context of these 
cossack groups, to determine their conditions of success. 
Pokrovskii and Aleksandrov deserve credit for synthesising the many scattered 
facts on rebellions and the occasionally extensive rule of cossack circles and elected 
sud'i or voevodas in a stimulating way. They sought to integrate them in a general 
thesis concerning the "estate-representative monarchy", a construction dated 
variously to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, involving the so-called 
"assembly of the land" as well as locally elected officials. 172 Describing cossack 
groups as estates, however, is questionable because of their very instability. They had 
neither codified sets of rules established, nor schedules for regular meetings, and 
they defended their rights and privileges in an unpredictable way. Sometimes they 
fought voevodas; sometimes they collaborated with them. Moreover, cossack circles 
were explicitly banned in Siberia, although with little effect. Thus it is 
straightforward for Vershinin, one of their students, to conclude that there were no 
cossack estates. He also claims that cossacks could not have conquered and 
administered such a vast territory on their own without noble guidance. Fighting each 
other, as they occasionally did, they would have endangered the whole enterprise of 
the fur trade in Siberia. Thus taking up the thread of the state-historical school, 
according to Vershinin, the voevodas were the true, far-sighted entrepreneurs 
deserving praise for having conquered and developed Moscow's north 
Asian 
possessions. ' 73 
170 Bakhrushin, "Krasnoiarsk", 180,187,188 
171 Aleksandrov, Hast', 292 
172 Ibid., 1-10,351-6, and passim 
173 Vershinin, Voevodskoe, 138-147 
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However, Vershinin could not dissolve doubts concerning the ability of noble 
voevodas to live up to their supposed role as ideal bureaucrats acting according to 
rules - or as unbiased and unselfish administrators. Although cossack groups were 
unreliable to a certain degree, they still provided an irreplaceable counterweight to 
voevodas' aspirations. Petitions were indeed the only legal way in which cossacks 
could challenge the voevoda. To negotiate their claims, it was necessary to adapt the 
institutional culture of the centre to their needs. This adaptation is described in 
chapter III. Even this most important of the "rights" Aleksandrov and Pokrovskii 
ascribed to the cossack "estates" did not refer to a regular event, but prescribed a 
language of subordination and, as already mentioned, there was even a formal 
prohibition of assembly in the instructions voevodas received in Moscow. Thus, 
voevodas claimed that the circles in which legal petitions were deliberated were 
"traitorous". 174 To understand cossack institutions and forms of organisation, 
therefore, we need to find an explanation for their irregularity and contested nature. 
Nevertheless, the anthropology of Siberian cossacks in this period has to allow for 
their steadfast involvement in local politics and the high success level of their 
actions. Instead of applying institutional models found in western Europe, this thesis 
considers the very foundations of institutions, and thus opens the way to a new 
explanation of the fluid institutional forms found in Siberia. 
The deadlock in the current state of studies on the Siberian cossacks derives from 
the problem that the form of the main agent of Siberian local politics is unclear. If 
there was a strict military hierarchy, as most historians believe, there should have 
been no limits to the power of the voevodas in distant and isolated Siberian towns 
and fortresses. 175 Yet Vershinin shows that in the last decade the approach centred on 
the military hierarchy has lost much of its explanatory value. While concentrating on 
the voevodas' contribution to Siberian administration, he avoids a description of the 
organisational structures of the immediate executors of their orders. After all, a 
central problem in the relations of the cossacks and the voevoda, and in the so-called 
self-administration of the cossacks remains unexplained; it can be demonstrated best 
once again by the Krasnoiarsk events in the late seventeenth century. While it has 
'74 Aleksandrov, Mast', 92-101 
175 Dmytryshyn, Apparatus, 27; Lantzeff, Siberia, 85-6 
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been admitted that the cossacks returned to the voevodas' rule in 1698, this is 
explained purely by Moscow's cunning in sending a popular voevoda to Krasnoiarsk. 
P. S. Musin-Pushkin had organised and led a successful campaign to the upper Enisei 
in 1692 when he first served as voevoda of Eniseisk. 176 To describe the cossacks 
merely as the deceived underestimates their control and powers of judgement. For 
over three years, Pokrovskii and Aleksandrov assert, Krasnoiarsk cossacks pursued a 
fixed programme of achieving self-administration and strove to expel the voevodas 
from Siberia once and for all, while circumspectly ruling their own affairs and those 
of the state. Yet within an approach centred on estates this careful yet eager pursuit 
of permanent self-rule is not consistent with their sudden acceptance of yet another 
voevoda, without noticing that he served as a Trojan horse, however popular he 
was. '77 
This impasse in studies of the Siberian cossacks is confirmed by other cases. If the 
Siberian cossacks could indeed permanently run the administration without the 
interference of a voevoda, how could they ever be forced to accept any of the 
bureaucratic orders that brought about the final downfall of the cossack estates, as 
Akishin's recent account of Peter's reforms and the Siberian administration 
suggests? His research is based on extensive archival studies, but also on an 
approach based on the supplantation of the estates-representative monarchy by 
bureaucratic rule advocated by Aleksandrov and Pokrovskii. Although Akishin 
provides masses of material showing that until very close to Peter's death, all 
reforms foundered on the conditions of service in Siberia, and particularly on 
campaign and guard services in the steppe, he cannot integrate this observation 
within a paradigm based on Western European models. 178 Akishin, too, is ultimately 
not content with the estates approach. Rather abruptly, he questions it then abandons 
it in his conclusion, stressing the "medieval" character of the cossack "democracy", 
in which collective authority intertwined with authoritarian and hierarchical 
influence. Within this symbiosis, the authoritarian authority gained the upper hand. 179 
16 Aleksandrov, Plast', 296,299 
177 Ibid., 328 
178 Akishin, Politseiskoe, 8-21 
179 Ibid., 205. See also Vershinin, Voevodskoe, 143; Nikitin, "Traditsiiakh", 6 
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A close look at cossack structures, however, reveals that they were very well 
adapted to their surroundings, including the various borderlands they lived in, and 
the bureaucratic framework in which they operated. As the distinct forms of cossack 
authority in Siberia and other steppe frontiers suggest, these structures were also 
capable of change. To invoke "archaism", as Vershinin and Nikitin do, using the 
same approach, does not explain why authoritarian and collective authority were 
combined. Nor does it make clear why the collective authority finally gave in, or 
why Saint Petersburg in the eighteenth century could suddenly afford not to listen to 
cossacks' petitions. What is lacking most is an explanation of the way central 
government and local or group rule interacted. This chapter is designed to provide 
such a model. 
Group Rule and the Leader 
To explain the frequency of Siberian town rebellions in the seventeenth century 
as well as their virtual absence thereafter, different interpretations have been 
proposed. Yet while `estates-representative monarchy' is an interpretation 
preoccupied with western European models which explain too little of what 
happened in Siberia, the time-consuming processes of bureaucratisation as a force 
which provoked protests misses the point as well. Historians were never slow to 
point out that from shortly after the conquest, the Siberian chancellery did its best to 
observe events in Siberia, at a very high cost. Nevertheless, the increase of 
administrative staff during the latter half of the seventeenth century was confined to 
the central chancelleries. 180 The paradox is that although historians have investigated 
local events, explanations for the abrupt end of town cossack rebellions at the end of 
the century have been sought on the outside - at the centre. To understand cossack 
groups from within, it is necessary first to analyse their interaction with their 
immediate environment. What is proposed here is an integrated view of the relations 
within cossack groups, of which relations with the voevoda or other leaders were an 
important part. Cooperation and independent action, submission and rebellion are not 
considered as mere unruliness or as opposed principles of political culture'81, but as 
180 Demidova, N. F., Sluzhilaia biurokratiia v Rossii XVII v., Moscow 1987,35 
181 Lantzeff, Siberia, 80-7; Akishin, Politseiskoe, 205-6; Nikitin, "Traditsiiakh", 6 
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coherently expressing the needs of a social formation, the Personenverband. The 
cossack Personenverband was a specific form of primary group that was not formed 
by kin, but by unrelated members. Primary groups search for group-immanent ways 
to reduce their members' anxieties under threatening conditions. They are suited to 
this endeavour due to the face-to-face relations maintained within the group, and 
therefore well adapted to steppe frontier conditions. Unlike most primary groups, 
however, the Personenverband was not a kinship group, since members formed it of 
their own volition. Thus there was an inclusive phase up to the oath delivered to each 
other in the cossack circle; prospective members could not be forced to take the oath 
or agree to a set of rules governing group behaviour. The group was formed to 
provide mutual protection and enable economic pursuits in the steppe as well as to 
carry out raids and campaigns. This was all the more important since cossacks acted 
in an environment that mostly did not provide natural defences, and where the 
influence of the state and society was limited to frontier fortresses, apart from in the 
case of major rebellions. Therefore, the union was determined by common aims, and 
not by considerations of social status. Originally, men of any social, ethnic or 
religious background could become members of a cossack group, since within the 
Personenverband, all members were valued exclusively according to their abilities 
and their usefulness for the realisation of common goals. An exclusive period 
followed when the cossacks had taken the oath - from then on, all members were 
obliged by pain of death to observe the rules, and in particular adhere to the agreed 
aim. Union was temporary; the early - and many later - cossack groups dissolved 
after a hunting, fishing or campaign season, forming anew for the next season. 
Leaders were only elected after the cossacks had agreed a common aim. Their 
authority also derived - originally exclusively - from their perceived ability to fulfil 
the common group aim. They were ordinary members of the group rather than 
exalted commanders or nobles. The Personenverband, which could depose a leader if 
he did not pursue agreed group aims, tightly controlled him. Thus, there were no dual 
sources of authority within the original cossack band, since authority exclusively 
derived from the group's aims, and was closely supervised by the 
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Personenverband. 182 This term was first applied by Kumke to the cossack groups of 
the Lithuanian frontier and the steppe beyond Lithuanian and Polish influence. 183 Yet 
its explanatory value is not restricted to this territory, and can fruitfully be extended 
to other parts of the Eurasian steppe fringe. This chapter will also address changes 
and developments in the relations of leader and Personenverband in the partially 
dissimilar Siberian setting. 
The obvious difference between such a group and an estate was the lack of 
permanence of the Personenverband. In this regard, it can be addressed as a set of 
institutional mechanisms that existed without a stable organisation. The individual 
organisation was discontinued, without personal or predetermined links, but to 
establish and maintain its organisational structure cossacks relied on institutional 
mechanisms. They existed within the cossack group, but also without it. Institutional 
mechanisms consist firstly of generally - or widely - accepted terms and gestures, 
and secondly forms of social representation and expectations of behaviour linked to 
these symbolic forms. Therefore, institutional mechanisms do not depend on an 
organisation. As far as the original Personenverband is concerned, as it occurred first 
in the Muscovite and Lithuanian steppe frontier, such mechanisms included 
deliberation over common aims, the preponderance of personal over social value, the 
election of the leader, and the close surveillance of the leader and his deposition if he 
did not respect the Personenverband 's aims. 184 As this thesis will show, the 
assumption that the cossacks decided primarily according to a set of established 
professional rules is not confirmed by archival material, although I do not deny that 
there existed certain customs governing the ways in which a fortress was set up or a 
campaign was conducted. 185 
The Lithuanian and southern Russian cossacks lived and developed in an 
environment which in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries could not be brought 
completely under the control of either of the neighbouring states. The gradual decay 
182 Nikitin, Sluzhilye, 48; Preobrazhenskii, Ural, 359 
183 Kumke, Geführte, 187-97,480-92 
184 On institutional mechanisms, see 13-4,24-5. In other areas, see Perrie, Maureen, "Outlawry 
(Vorovstvo) and Redemption through Service: Ermak and the Volga Cossacks", in: Kleimola, 
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of the Mongol empire had left an abandoned area, the wild field (dzikiepola or dikoe 
pol'e) beyond the Dnepr. There, vagrant Tatars - the former Turkic allies of the 
Mongols - who no longer accepted the suzerainty of the Mongol Khan and were 
therefore called qazaq or "free men" - banded together in groups to make a living by 
raising cattle186 and by assaults on the remaining settlements in the area. Captives 
were sold as slaves on the markets of the former Greek and Genoese, by then 
Ottoman, cities of the Black Sea shore. Devastation by these raids left whole regions 
void of population and permanent settlement. These developments of the fifteenth to 
sixteenth centuries meant that the open steppe, where these nomad groups operated, 
was too insecure for agriculture, while even in the adjacent wooded steppe peasants 
had to be guarded extensively. '87 Levels of violence among nomads as well as 
among cossacks living in the same steppe environment should therefore not be 
judged by modern standards. Frontiers in general elicit fiercer behaviour, but even in 
the "civilised" West early-modern levels of crime and violent behaviour were much 
higher than has long been thought. 188 Life on the steppe rim was reduced to the few 
remaining cities and their immediate neighbourhood. To their inhabitants, hunting 
and freebooting were the only ways to make a living, apart from the sparse yields the 
"ploughing" ecumene - as opposed to the nomad ecumene, which it confronted and 
cooperated with - derived from the soil, since full agriculture was largely impossible 
as long as unorganised nomad interference preponderated. '89 
Yet by the mid-sixteenth century the steppe frontier, where new settlers could 
find tax-exempt plots, also attracted migrants from adjacent states, and by the mid- 
sixteenth century the Slavic element predominated among cossacks. It was equally 
attractive that cossack groups remained ethnically and religiously open to virtually 
anybody, at least up to the 1630s. Some of the qazaq groups had already vowed 
allegiance to Muscovy or Lithuania, who employed them to defend border regions 
against nomad incursions. These groups became the first to intermingle with Slavic 
186 Miyawaki, Junko, "The Chinggisid Principle in Russia", RII vol. 19.1-4 (1992), 261-77,276; 
cf. Stbkl, Entstehung, 134 
187 For Siberia: Nikitin, Sluzhilye, 95 
188 Frank, Michael, Dörfliche Gesellschaft und Kriminalität, Paderborn 1995; Schlumbohm, 
Jürgen, "Gesetze, die nicht durchgesetzt werden - ein Strukturmerkmal des frühneuzeitlichen 
Staates? ", GG vol. 23 (1997), 647-63. 189 Kumke, Geführte, 28-9,111; Rostankowski, Peter, Siedlungsentwicklung und Siedlungsformen 
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peoples. While little is known about the structure of the qazaq groups, the picture is 
clearer when it comes to the resulting mixture of East Slav and Tatar institutions. 
Contrary to the myth of the cossacks who as free men were too proud to engage in 
agriculture, as Ivan III had already observed in 1502, it was the young men, the 
"molodtsy" who rode off to the steppe to get rich. 190 Those who returned with or 
without a fortune sought to settle down close to existing fortified settlements on their 
own plot of land. 191 Those heading for the steppe preferred a means of transportation 
even more familiar to the East Slavs, the boat. Like the qazaq groups however, they 
lived by the game they hunted and the furs they sold to Lithuanian and Muscovite 
merchants. There could be additional income from the booty of campaigns directed 
by the end of the sixteenth century against the coastal cities and Turkish trade galleys 
near the Black Sea. Although the rivers and their steep banks posed some obstacle to 
mounted nomads protecting the cossacks to a degree, the open steppe remained a 
dangerous place where they could easily fall victim to the nomads who were superior 
horsemen. 
To cope with fear in the insecure open steppe environment, where no natural 
hiding places suitable for defence were available, and to make sure they attained 
their goals, cossacks developed a unique form of organisation, the primary cossack 
group or Personenverband. Its main organising principle was the utility of the 
individual to the group's purpose. The cossacks' main aims were formed by the 
conditions of survival in the steppe - defensive strength was needed to counter Tatar 
attacks. On the other hand, its economic efficiency guaranteed that the hunting 
season yielded enough surplus to feed them in winter and to pay off licenses or 
bribes to the starosta or voevoda of the frontier town they lived in. The usual size of 
a Personenverband, between about ten and sixty men, depended on this efficiency - 
the number of men needed to hunt or fish, to preserve the hunt for transportation, to 
defend the group or, according to the aim the group had set, to conduct a campaign. 
The law of marginal returns, the transparency of communication during 
190 Nikitin, "Proizkhozhdenii", 168. Use of this term in Siberia: RGADA (. 1121 op. 2 no. 107 1.6 
(investigation). 
191 Kumke, Geführte, 134 n. 101 
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deliberations, the restricted human capability to maintain face-to-face relations and 
sustain an esprit de corps limited its size. 192 
One of the greatest dangers was the disintegration of the group while it operated 
in the steppe. The cossacks strove to prevent this by a range of measures. Before 
heading for the open steppe, they held an assembly to determine their aims, decide 
potentially divisive questions such as the rules for sharing the prey or booty, and 
assign tasks to individual members. Once these aims and the composition of the 
group were agreed, each member was obliged to uphold them, and changes could 
only be made by common consent. After they had arrived at a decision, the group 
temporarily closed itself to outside influences for as long as it took to realise its plan. 
Whereas, as long as it was forming, it was open to people of any social, religious and 
ethnic background - nobles, peasants and Tatars, Orthodox, Roman Catholics and, 
up to the 1630s, even Jews193 -a member would not even be allowed to leave once 
consensus was reached. This absolute and stubborn adherence to its aims made the 
Personenverband so effective in terms of economy and self-defence: Each member 
subordinated himself to the group's aims and decisions. In some regards, the 
Personenverband can be understood as a `primary group': communities in which 
`face-to-face' relations rule social behaviour and the distribution of roles and 
functions among their members. The individuality of members is of secondary 
relevance, since all aims are subordinated to the wellbeing of the community. 
According to Cooley the primary group is 
"... a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole, so that one's very self, for 
many purposes at least, is the common life and purpose of the group. Perhaps the 
simplest way of describing this wholeness is by saying it is a `we'; it involves the sort of 
sympathy and mutual identification for which `we' is the natural expressions194 
Due to this fusion, formal social exaltation in the outside society and ethnic or 
confessional boundaries played no role in the original Personenverband - all 
92 Ibid., 114 
"' Ibid., 109. Therefore the term cossack is written in lower case throughout this thesis. On 
religious tolerance, see: Richard, Jean, "Le Christianisme dans 1'Asie centrale", JAIL (1982) vol. 16.2, 
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194 Cooley, Charles, Social Organization, New York 1909, cited ace. to George, Alexander, 
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members were equal and had their functions assigned according to their utility to the 
group's purpose; only personal capabilities could contribute to a person's standing in 
the group. 195 This merger can be explained by the behaviour of small military units in 
extreme situations, which has been studied in particular by military sociologists. It 
has been shown that strength depends on the degree of danger on the battlefield. 
Search for group-immanent solutions to minimise fear was decisive for group 
identity and solidarity. The aim of these groups consisted in resisting disintegration 
and proving strength by taking a firm common stand. They would rather fight for 
someone -a `buddy' - than against an abstract enemy. 
196 This absorption in fighting 
fear led to an isolation that made cossack groups immune to outside influences - 
what could be the relevance of a faraway society and its power mechanisms to a 
small isolated group in the boundless steppe in face of a danger, be it nomads, a 
competing cossack group, or a natural obstacle? 
One way in which the group ensured unity would be preserved was by resolute 
crackdowns on dissenters. It is the inability to compromise that best highlights the 
difference between the cossack `constitution' and modern democracy. In the steppe 
environment, unity was crucial, and even violent suspension of lingering doubts 
about the validity of the consensus could be a suitable way of stabilising a state of 
harmony deemed necessary. In this respect, no frontier matches southern Rus': Prior 
to the late eighteenth century, no American Indian roamed the prairie as a mounted 
warrior, nor was there an ages old nomad society that could boast of having dropped 
western Europe like a cat a half-dead mouse. At the time the prairie was fought over, 
Indian nomads posed much less of a challenge than the Mongols, Tatars or Kalmyks 
to technically less advanced Muscovy or even Lithuania prior to the mid-seventeenth 
century. For the resulting insecurity in the population, in the east a certain degree of 
violence was frequently a necessary element in the process of deliberation. This 
`constitution' proved so vigorous, that the Personenverband severely punished 
members who offended its decisions - sometimes even by death. Although the open 
steppe was largely free of normal structures of rule of any neighbouring power, it 
was hardly anarchic. It was rather the rule of the group everybody was subordinated 
195 See illustration II: Ermak's cossacks received by Ivan the Terrible. 
196 George, Primary, 294,297-9; Kumke, Geführte, 108-9 
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to was permanent, for only groups could survive in competition with other groups, 
and with the Tatars. As military sociologists acknowledge, the primary group has the 
highest level of combat strength of all military units. 
The rule of the group was further enhanced by the election of the leader. Far from 
delegating its power to the leader, the cossack group sought a personality who by his 
very capabilities could embody the group's aims. This could mean a promise of rich 
prey or booty, or the fame of a successful cossack leader. Rather than ruling the 
group, the leader had a more representational function - he served to allow 
identification. Through the leader, the group identified with its aims. The 
Zaporozhian cossacks, according to the French engineer Guillaume le Vasseur de 
Beauplan and others, tended to believe it was only the group that mattered and had 
merit, while all leaders were equally negligible. 197 In Siberia, the sophisticated, long- 
lasting and successful Tomsk rebellion of 1648-1651, complaining about the 
malfeasance of the voevoda Osip Shcherbatyi chose for some time as its 
controversial figure-head the banned chamberlain of the metropolitan, Grigorii 
Podrez-Pleshcheev. Podrez openly denied God and owned an illegal tavern. A pimp, 
he had been reproached for his lifestyle and arrested for so serious an offence as 
instigation to murder only months before the rebellion started. Yet to the cossacks, he 
symbolised resistance to the voevoda. What is more, in view of the serious 
allegations against him, assignment to the position of syn boiarskii along with the 
highest allowance of twenty roubles straight out of prison in September 1647 leaves 
little room for doubts that he enjoyed albeit limited benefaction from his uncle, L. S. 
Pleshcheev, who was made head of the zemskii prikaz on 15 August 1647. 
Pleshcheev's career did not last long, as an enraged crowd quartered him on 3 June 
1648.195 The cossacks were ready to join Podrez-Pleshcheev in his struggle against 
voevoda Shcherbatyi, but only as long as he was useful to them. Patronage could 
thus be a vital resource in the struggle for power and a share in Siberian trade, since 
cossack groups were vulnerable during their journey to and from Moscow or 
Tobol'sk. On the other hand it was hard for the second voevoda and elected leader of 
the rebellion, Bunakov, to arrest Podrez-Pleshcheev even when ordered to by a 
197 Ibid., 193-4,197 
198 Pokrovskii, Tomsk, 45-6 
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decree from Moscow; his second attempt yielded better results only when the 
Personenverband was already divided and Bunakov avoided the cossack circle. 199 
In charge of their first delegation to Moscow they chose the successful leader, 
cossack trader and syn boiarskii Fedor Pushchin, irrespective of the bribes he had 
exacted from tax-paying natives. Rather than adding to an imaginary bad character, 
one peculiar move Pushchin made underlines that to the cossacks, the ideal leader 
was even more subject to the Personenverband conditions of equality and 
compliance. He went as far as to sue his own uncle in the cossack assembly, the 
circle, since his uncle "stays away from the troop, and does not pull with the troop" 
and demanded "he must be punished by the troop". 200 The role of Siberian cossack 
leaders in rebellions as described - potentially distorted - by their opponents was 
usually that of someone who induced the cossacks to undertake unlawful actions. Yet 
in subtler expressions, a great deal is said about the much more intricate nature of 
these relations - during the Tomsk rebellion of 1648-1649 former second voevoda 
Bunakov, who had been elected subsequently by the cossacks as their voevoda, as 
well as the d'iak Patrikeev, were called by the deposed voevoda Shcherbatyi 
"potakovniki" (indulgers, panderers). 201 In this emphasis on assistance, on 
gratification and yielding to the cossacks' aspirations the nature of the relationship 
between cossacks in the Personenverband and their leader is enunciated. 
Siberian events reveal that the authorities expected the primary cossack group to 
exert absolute group rule. During investigation into the Transbaikalian rebellion of 
1696-7, the former leader of the Selenginsk cossacks Anton Berezovskii tried to 
conceal his active role in the movement by maintaining that he had been forced by 
the cossacks to lead the campaign to Irkutsk "against my own wishes". 202 Even if this 
was a fraud, Berezovskii nevertheless tried to rationalise his actions by reference to 
an acknowledged or well-known institution; otherwise his argument would have 
been bizarre. 203 An eminent personality was not allowed to withhold his capabilities 
'9' Ibid., 303 
200 Müller, Istoriia, 312-4; cf. Chistiakova, E. V., "Tomskoe vosstanie 1648", in: Russkoe 
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due to the commitment of cossacks to their group, which demanded that they did 
everything in their power to achieve the common goal. Thus in cossacks' eyes 
rejecting leadership, once the leader was elected, meant committing an act of treason 
to the group. 204 In 1628 the elected ataman Ivan Kol'tsov tried to stop his 
Krasnoiarsk cossacks who were starved after their grain salary was not delivered in 
time, from robbing a caravan. But in doing so he exceeded his authority, and he was 
charged in the cossack circle and killed by his own men. 205 To gain the approval of 
the group and thereby achieve authority the leader had to comply with the group's 
aims and ideals to an even higher degree than ordinary members. It was only by 
embodying the group's aims that leaders of egalitarian groups could enhance their 
authority - they had no coercive means sui generis at their disposal. Thus egalitarian 
cossack groups cannot be characterised with the usual concepts of the sociology of 
rule and control. 06 
Due to this representational rather than ruling function, it follows that leaders 
were not elected before the group had agreed on its aims. Similarly, if on a partly 
different level of organisation, 295 cossacks from western Siberia headed for a 
campaign to build the fortress of Iakutsk on the river Lena in 1634. They elected 
their immediate group leaders - the desiatniki and piatidesiatniki, leaders of units of 
ten and fifty - only after a lengthy process of negotiation with the voevodas over 
salary and the general conditions of service had ended, and all preparations were 
complete. These cossacks had not even enough group leaders since none of the 
higher ranks of Tobol'sk cossacks were ready to set out for Iakutsk, several thousand 
miles away in wild and inhospitable north-eastern Siberia. Thus the motley band of 
cossacks, mostly only recently recruited, had to set up their group structure from 
scratch. Immediately after recruitment they showed extraordinary dexterity in 
confronting the voevodas, and in formulating and pursuing their aims. When 
challenged by the voevodas, they made it clear that their first aim was the survival of 
the group in its current form. In the course of protests, when several of the rebellious 
cossacks were caught and brought to the voevodas' office, their "comrades" among 
204 Kumke, Geführte, 269 n. 52 
205 Aleksandrov, Mast', 96 
206 Kumke, Geführte, 191; Hofstätter, Peter, Gruppendynamik, Hamburg 1971,147 
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the huge crowd outside "volunteered to support them and did not allow them to be 
beaten with cudgels. " Their actions incited the crowd to protest more fervently -a 
very frequent form of action. 207 Cossack groups were frequently described by the 
representative name of the leader, who might be of almost any rank including 
ordinary cossack, adding "... with comrades". Rather than subordinates to the leader, 
this term evinces the egalitarian communal mentality, repeated in Siberia from the 
time of Ermak, as well as on the southeastern European steppe rim. 208 In other cases, 
the term "with comrades" was exchanged for "with cossacks" - for example, when 
the Berezov voevoda in 1626 dined with ataman Ivan Babarykin's cossacks. 209 This 
inverse relation to the leader sets cossacks apart from the boyars of Novgorod with 
their political and economic dependants. 10 
This perception of leadership most clearly defines the difference between the 
Russian peasant or posad mir and the cossack Personenverband, forms of 
organisation that are often inaccurately equated . 
211 The mir's elected village elder 
was accountable for the taxes collected by the mir. He even had to pay any incurred 
losses himself. This directly derived from the subjugation of the mir to the grand 
prince caused by the Mongol invasion . 
212 As peasants and town-dwellers 
increasingly fled to the steppe rim, they did not simply copy this mir or fall back 
upon its more primitive forms. 213 The village community could provide essential 
security and enjoyed a degree of independence in its internal affairs, but above all the 
fugitives fled from the oppression that was organised in the form of the mir and its 
accountability to the landowner. 214 It is telling that in some sources the voisko 
fashioned itself as the mir, while forms of organisation did not alter. The way in 
which voevoda B. S. Dvorianinov of Verkhotur'e was successfully challenged reveals 
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much about the relation of the Personenverband and the mir. The voevoda, who had 
covered the misdeeds of his predecessor and patron215 fell prey to an intrigue from a 
quarter he did not expect - in June 1648, the fugitive peasant M. Kabakov, under 
torture, addressed the voevoda with the words "sovereign-tsar, have mercy", and 
Dvorianinov failed to correct him. Still, this affair was dormant until in October he 
was charged by the pod'iachii s pripis'iu I. I. Nedoveskov accompanied by the 
"young" pod'iachiis and a group of cossacks. By accepting Kabakov's invocation, 
the litigants claimed somewhat belatedly, Dvorianinov had dishonoured the tsar. The 
next day, a delegation consisting of cossacks, posad people and the elder of the 
peasants felt entitled to put the voevoda under arrest and disallow Dvorianinov all 
communications 
"while the mir come to a head (pridumaet) with Ignat'ii [Nedoveskov] and Fedor 
[Driagin, chief customs officer]" 
As during so many other Siberian rebellions, this mir consisted of members of 
virtually every imaginable settled social group in Verkhotur'e and first made sure to 
formulate and sign litigation in the form of a petition. Only after constituting 
themselves as a Personenverband by this act216, did they formally declare the 
"otkaz", connecting it inextricably with litigation - they could not allow themselves 
to be judged by Dvorianinov any more, since "[we] do not want to fall in 
disgrace". 217 This formal deposition of the voevoda was also uncharacteristic of the 
peasant mir. 
The changing states of affairs of the mir were typical of this institution's 
instability yet viability in Siberian towns, where the frontier and frequent service in 
far-off places as well as the involvement of many cossacks in distant trade demanded 
a high degree of flexibility of institutions. The memory of the mir was available to all 
Russians who had made their way to the steppe or to Siberia, while the term could be 
useful in dealing with Moscow, as we will see later. Among Siberian cossacks, 
elected leaders were not accountable to the chancellery or the tsar in the same way as 
a village elder. They could distinguish themselves by successful campaigns or the 
213 See 152-3 
216 This is not to say that the mir was everywhere equivalent to a Personenverband. In Siberia, the 
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amount of furs collected or by "leading new lasak people under the tsar's high hand". 
Yet though they might be asked for an explanation they were unlikely to pay the 
difference in tax yield on the sole evidence that fewer furs had been collected than 
the year before. This marks the divide between the frontier and central Russia, 
between taxes about which a prognosis could be made and those that could not: Any 
incurred losses in the - recorded - iasak treasure entrusted to cossacks during their 
trips to Moscow was deducted from their salary. 218 
On the other hand, even if rebels elected leaders to an official position, it was 
possible for a syn boiarskii or a piatidesiatnik to improve his service record by 
accepting the election without incurring the danger of being punished by the tsar. 
Apart from the direct protection the Personenverband could provide, cunning 
behaviour shows that the cossack primary group provided an environment in which 
playing both ends against the middle was a feasible alternative to blind obedience. 
Afonasii Beiton's career remained spotless despite his dubious meddling with the 
Transbaikalian cossacks in 1696. The former cossack Fedor Cherkasov had 
denounced his master, the Irkutsk head of musketeers and Moscow list dvorianin 
Afonasii Beiton for conspiring with the rebellious cossacks arriving from the other 
side of Lake Baikal. In his own words, Cherkasov had left the Ukrainian (cherkaskie) 
towns for Siberia after his father's death, where he served from 1685/1686 as a 
cossack in Tobol'sk, Dauria on the Amur and on the Selenga river just across Lake 
Baikal. While staying in Irkutsk, he said, he was fooled into signing a dvorovoi zhiloi 
rabotnoi zapis' in 1691/1692 after he was made drunk by Beiton who wanted 
Cherkasov to work for him in his tailor's business and by deception married the 
cossack in that same night to his servant. Cherkasov maintained he had never dared 
claim his rights in the following years, but after overhearing the conversation 
between Beiton and the cossacks, he believed he could count on the voevoda's 
support. Indeed, he made serious accusations against Beiton. According to 
Cherkasov, Beiton was approached by the Transbaikalian cossacks when they twice 
came to lay siege to Irkutsk in May or July 1696. They came with clear designs, 
218 Nikitin, Sluzhilye, 103 
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offering to make Beiton their representative ("sedok") in Irkutsk once he had swayed 
the Irkutsk cossacks to the side of the Transbaikalians: 
"You Afonasii will be sedok with us in Irkutsk and rule the local cossacks and the town 
and all the people. "219 
Quite unceremoniously, according to Cherkasov, the thirty cossacks "all of them 
as one" ordered Beiton to make sure the cannons on the palisades of the recently- 
strengthened fortress would not be loaded so they could not be fired at the 
Transbaikalians. In case this proved impossible, they had other plans - they needed 
Beiton's knowledge of the Amur area since, newly-recruited as they were, and 
without any orientation in the region, they still intended to leave the Selenga and 
promised to come and help get him out of Irkutsk. The cossacks took it for granted 
that he would join them; as they said "we will go to the Amur with you ... and you 
will serve with us as you served earlier in Albazin. " The socially equal position of the 
leader vis-ä-vis the cossacks is also conveyed in the rites of submission and mutual 
obligation he performed upon election: 
"And he Afonasii, hearing their words told them `I am pleased to serve with you [if; -] 
only you neither turn me over nor abandon me and I will live and die together with 
you. "22° 
Thus, supposed rebels against the garrison's upper class elected and forced one of 
their known `oppressors' to be their leader, believing with good reason that he would 
comply given only that the situation was in their favour. 
As Siberian cossacks could oblige an outside cossack leader to enter service with 
their group they could also turn a voevoda assigned to his duty by the tsar into their 
own elected rebel leader against his own wishes. In the Krasnoiarsk rebellion of the 
1690s as in many other cases the cossacks changed their leaders and elected judges 
(sud'i) frequently - this has rightly been interpreted as proof of the cossacks' control 
over their leaders. 21 Yet the very frequency of depositions and elections shows that 
it should not be mistaken for an example of modern inclusive democracy or estate 
rule - it was the exclusive group that ruled here. 22 
219 "Uraas" in this context must refer to the Selenga, not the Irkutsk cossacks 220 RGADA f. 1121 op. 2 no. 164 11.9-17 (investigation). Cf. Kumke, Geführte, 193 
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In a symbolic way, another incident shows the narrow boundaries constraining 
even a popular leader who was sent and legitimated by higher authorities. The 
pis'mennyi golova Stepan Lisovskii, son of a captured Polish nobleman, who was 
employed as a under-secretary in the voevoda's office and rose to the rank of 
streletskii head, was sent in 1698 by the Eniseisk voevoda to investigate the 
Krasnoiarians' deposition (otkaz of the third voevoda in a row. During his 
investigations, Lisovskii found out just how uncomfortable it could feel if one was 
popular with the cossacks. Since the Krasnoiarians present in Eniseisk at this stage 
did not confirm the claims of their petitioners about the voevoda's malfeasances, 
voevoda Durnovo was soon restored to his post by the razriad voevoda. Yet this was 
more than the Krasnoiarsk cossacks could bear, and, after consultations in the circle, 
they decided to send him back whence he came. Found asleep in his residence, 
voevoda Durnovo was taken to the bank of the Enisei, wearing only his caftan. While 
the racket was still continuing and cossacks tried to decide what to do next, Stepan 
Lisovskii took Fedor Chanchikov's and Daniil Startsov's Personenverbände aside 
and negotiated with them. Afterwards he approached Durnovo, who could not 
overhear these deliberations, to comfort him and told that the Krasnoiarians would 
not attempt to kill him, a fact Lisovskii claimed he knew "genuinely". Indeed, among 
the cossacks there were shouts that "Stepan Lisovskii was sent by the great 
sovereign", whereas Durnovo 
"came by himself.. 
. and they obey 
Stepan Lisovskii, and whatever Stepan Lisovskii 
orders, they will do. " 
At this point, Lisovskii attempted to leave on a boat half-loaded with stones 
moored at the riverbank, in which Dumovo, his people and those Krasnoiarians loyal 
to him had been put, but Chanchikov and others 
"seizing him by the sleeves, pulled him out of the boat", shouting "that they were not 
going to allow him to leave Krasnoiarsk for he must be their [leader]223 instead of the 
voevoda as before.... [Lisovskii asked: ] whether they wanted to lead him to town tied 
up?  
223 "Chtoby emu u nikh byt- -u indicates possession, albeit one that is not akin to Roman law, 
including obligations towards family and the possessed: cf. Nolte, Hans-H., Eigentumsrecht im Moskauer Staat", in: Staat und Gesellschaft im Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit., Göttingen 1983; 
Weickhardt, George, "The Pre-Petrine Law of Property", SR 52 (1993), 663-79 
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He may have wondered whether making him their voevoda was really a favour 
since the next day there were rumours in town that it had been wrong not to kill 
Durnovo. 224 There was always the danger that a voevoda might succumb to group 
rule, but he might equally well be embraced by it. 
The assertion of group rule may be surprising for a relatively large town. 
Krasnoiarsk was an advanced outpost deep in the steppe. Cossacks depended 
extraordinarily on steppe crafts and therefore the primary cossack group was an 
everyday experience for most, if not all of them. Similar conditions prevailed in the 
Transbaikal towns and fortresses in the Selenga valley opening to the steppe in the 
south. For fur hunting, hunters pulled together in arteli, groups of between two and 
nine people whose uninterrupted presence in the hunting grounds lasted between two 
and five weeks during the season from September to October. They hunted sable and 
squirrel, and in the steppe the marmot. Of the 273 declarations of furs worth 15,300 
roubles made in the customs office at Irkutsk from 1692-1700, fifty-seven 
declarations worth 3,524 roubles were made by cossacks. It was the cossack bands 
who declared the richest haul. It is therefore no surprise that private fur hunters 
(promyshlenniki) often joined cossacks or vice versa - their basic organisational 
forms were by no means different on the group level, except for formal paperwork, 
oaths and privileges. Groups (arteli) consisting of five to eight people also 
maintained fisheries. 225 Yet in the steppe, service, hunting and other kinds of steppe 
craft were even more closely connected than in the forests. For there was always 
plenty of time to hunt while groups of sentries (stanitsy, otezzhye karauly or, in 
Poland-Lithuania, lezhy) rode through the steppe listening to sounds of hooves 
transmitted by the ground to find hostile nomad bands before they could assault town 
or hamlet. This was an especially salient feature in Krasnoiarsk, surrounded by 
steppe and nomadic tribes. 226 Double income, together with a salary, or at least 
increased security of income, to a high degree made for the attractiveness of the 
registered cossacks in Poland-Lithuania. 27 It was characteristic of these 
224 Bakhrushin, Krasnoiarsk, 189 
225 Mashanova, "Promyslo-torgovaia ", 147. Staehr, Georg, Ursprung, Geschichte und Bedeutung 
des russischen Artels, 2 vols., Dorpat 1890-91 
226 Bakhrushin, Krasnoiarsk, 72-3 
227 Kumke, Geführte, 215 
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Personenverbände that they were only secondarily military associations 228 - what 
counted was the economic yield, which was however unattainable without the 
security provided by the close observance of the group's purpose by all members. 
Cossacks also banded together to trade, and the Personenverband provided a 
ready form of ensuring the highest attainable levels of security. They enjoyed trade 
privileges exempting them up to a set, if over the course of the seventeenth century 
variable, amount, and often carried large numbers of furs and other merchandise. In 
1699 two desiatki of Irkutsk cossacks returning from their one year's service in the 
steppe outpost of Tunkinsk, which was sealing off access through the mountains to 
Irkutsk, were assaulted by a superior Mongolian force. At least three of the rank-and- 
file cossacks lost their merchandise, clothes and furs, to the robbers. 229 When in 1698 
the caravan of merchant Spiridon Liangusov left Nerchinsk for China, it was 
accompanied by one hundred cossack "guards"; the Siberian chancellery, which had 
just changed tax rules, was anything but pleased as it learned that all of them had 
been tax-exempted. Such large numbers of guards were no exception. 230 The syn 
boiarskii Grigorii Lonshakov carried his own furs worth 275 rubles when he and his 
cossacks brought the "sovereign's [fur-] treasure" to Moscow. These official trips 
were used for private trade. 231 Such groups of cossack traders protecting each other 
repeated a pattern well-known from early medieval merchants; it is one of the 
distinctive elements of Siberian cossackdom as compared to their counterparts 
elsewhere in Eastern Europe, since in Lithuania river trade was reserved to town 
merchants while the only commodity Don cossacks traded extensively was slaves. 32 
The emergence of caravan trade with China at Bejing organised by Russians 
provided the Personenverband with an opportunity to prove its utility unavailable to 
cossacks elsewhere. Yet this was already the result of a differentiation of the spheres 
of trade and diplomacy, which became necessary due to irreconcilable disagreements 
228 Bakhrushin, Krasnoiarsk, 190 
729 RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 422 11.79-81,88,112-114 (investigations) 
230 pSZ vol. IV no. 1822,116; RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 416 11.68,70 (decrees) 
231 Leont'eva, Sluzhilye liudi, 292-4,303; RGADA f. 214 kn. 1228 11.95,95ob.; kn. 583 11.252-288, 
kn. 61811.312-359 ob. 232 The Polish diet prohibited marriage between cossacks and townspeople in 1638. From the end 
of the sixteenth century, Polish cossack policy was directed against the fluid limitations between the 
two categories. Trade was a monopoly of townspeople: Kumke, Geführte, 36-7; Astapcnko, Istoriia. 
vol. 1/2,55. Personal communication with Brian Boeck. 
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on protocol between the tsar's court and the Manchu. 233 Before this, cossacks already 
took part in trade enterprises involving exchange with Chinese merchants at 
improvised staples in the eastern Siberian frontier area in the 1670s and 1680s. 
Cossacks of the frontier fortresses of Albazin, Nerchinsk and Selenginsk bought 
Chinese merchandise through the mediation of Tungus and Mongols. 34 Much earlier 
in Western Siberia, overland trade with Central Asia and further to China was 
reserved to Bukharan merchants, who enjoyed tax privileges. Although cossacks 
profited from this trade, which served to supply frontier fortresses, it also meant that 
their own opportunities for trade were restricted to internal traffic. To the cossacks, 
until the establishment of direct links with China, external trade was limited to 
missions to the Mongols, the official part of which was intertwined with the purpose 
of trade, as tradition had it on the silk road. 235 This form of trade had long been 
practised by cossacks, who from the first attempts to reach China early in the century 
had carried out ambassadorial duties of their own accord. 
This combination of official and private functions, organised in the context of the 
Personenverband, had already in the final years of the Time of Troubles reached a 
state in which Moscow had reason to fear sedition in its Siberian possessions as yet 
precariously held. 236 Yet the incident also promoted a redefinition of relations 
between the tsar and the Siberian cossacks. The first Russian mission to China in 
1617 - about half a century earlier than the first officially authorised - was initiated 
locally, as was disapprovingly noted in the Moscow sources, by "Siberian people". 
The Petlin mission was sent by voevoda Ivan Semenovich Kurakin, who so far had 
enjoyed the benefits of a rapid and interesting career - in 1597 he attended the 
reception of the German emperor's ambassador, in 1601 he was stol'nik, in 1606 
voevoda in Tula. I. S. Kurakin is a controversial figure. He was deeply involved in 
politics during the interregnum, as a member of the boyar duma he fought on the side 
of the pretender and the Polish prince Wiadyslaw "against the Russians", or rather 
for a restricted monarchy on the Polish model, and petitioned the Polish King 
233 Mancall, Russia and China, 43-4,49-51,56,82-94,106,141 
234 Leont'eva, Sluzhilye, 304 
235 Penrose, "Influences", 361-92 
236 Bakhrushin, S. V., "Voevody Tobol'skogo razriada v XVII v. ", in: idem, Trudy, vol. 3.1, 
Moscow 1955,265-273, here: 262 
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Sigismund for a land grant in 1611237; later he benefited from an amnesty. As Klaus 
Zernack has observed, the boyars who proposed Wladyslaw's election as tsar were 
from the circle around the Romanovs, rendering it unlikely that he was banned under 
Mikhail Romanov for his role in the Time of Troubles 238 In 1614, after Mikhail's 
accession to the throne, he was promoted to the highest boyar rank . 
239 The prevailing 
opinion is that his assignment to Tobol'sk was an "honourable" banishment240, 
although nobody has explained what that might mean. Yet this makes clear neither 
why he stayed in Moscow after Mikhail's accession, nor why he was made a boyar. 
Demidova, however, and Baron noted Kurakin's intimate knowledge of English 
trade interests in the East - and his valuable services to the new dynasty. He 
probably first met Merrick, the company's Moscow representative, in 1606, when the 
company secured the renewal of its privilege from tsar Vasilii Shuiskii, whom 
Kurakin had helped to gain the throne. If he did not learn about English ambitions in 
Northern Russia and Siberia on this occasion, he certainly did so in 1614, when he 
engaged with Merrick in talks concerning peace negotiations with Sweden, 
undertaken simultaneously with Merrick's bid for permission to explore the Ob' 
241 It 
is unlikely that he was subsequently sent to Tobol'sk by accident. From 24th January 
1616 - 21s' May 1620 he was posted there as voevoda, 
242 but thereafter his career 
faltered. If he was in trouble and eager to resume his career, and therefore remained 
in Moscow, why then should he give such ample pretexts for the disfavour he finally 
suffered? Even the next voevoda and the newly-installed archbishop of Tobol'sk, 
Kipriian, were confronted with tensions resulting from the tsar's disapproval of the 
237 Voskoboinikova, N. P., Opisanie drevneishikh dokumentov arkhivov moskovskikh prikazov XVI 
- nachala XVII vv., Moscow 1994,249. Sukhotin, L. M., Zemel'nye pozhalovaniia v Moskovskom 
gosudarstvepri isare Vladislave, Moscow 1911,50-53 
238 Zemack, Klaus, Polen und Rußland, Berlin 1994,193 239 According to uncorroborated opinion, I. S. Kurakin became boyar in 1605: Likhachev, N. P., 
Razriadnye d'iaki XVI v., St. Petersburg 1888, Ukaz. lich. imen, 41 
240 The source, Russkii biograficheskii slovar', vol. Kna-Kiu, St. Petersburg 1903 renders no 
corroboration of its claim. Baron, Samuel, "Thrust and Parry", Oxford Slavonic Papers (1988) vol. 21, 
19-40,36 n. 52. Similar: Gazenvinkel', K. B., Knigi razriadnye v ofitsial'nykh 1kh spiskakh kak 
material dlia istorii Sibiri XVII v., Kazan' 1892,22 
241 Baron, "Thrust", 35; Demidova, Pervye, 15 
242 "Rodoslovie Kniaziakh Kurakinykh X-XIX vv. ", in: Arkhiv kn. F. A. Kurakina, vol. 2, St. 
Petersburg 1890,357; RUB, Herren, 428 n. 103. It is unlikely that Kurakin was banned to Tobol'sk, cf. 
Preobrazhenskii, Pervye, 60-1 on amnesty; Penrose, "Influences", 365; Lantzeff, Siberia, 204. 
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reign of Kurakin and his colleagues. 243 The preceding events are telling for the way 
the Personenverband could find it useful to subordinate itself to a capable leader and 
influential noble even to the point of openly renouncing the sovereignty of the tsar in 
Moscow. While authority in Moscow largely declined due to the devastating effects 
of the Time of Troubles, Kurakin led the Siberian cossacks very effectively. Dating 
back to his contacts to Sweden during the Time of Troubles, he knew about the 
powers of western navies and trade companies. He reacted quickly when a Russian 
merchant from the White Sea coast reported in Tobol'sk that English and Dutch 
merchant ships had tried to reach the river Ob' by way of the sea. To secure Russian 
influence as well as the grip of Tobol'sk and the cossacks on Siberian trade, Kurakin 
proposed closing the sea route to Siberia. This route, leading from the river Pechora 
by way of the sea to the Yamal peninsula, which was traversed via rivers and a 
burdensome carriage, finally allowed Northern Russian merchants to reach the trade 
hub of Mangazeia without even touching the government outpost in Tobol'sk, 
thereby effectively evading taxes. Under the pretext of foreign competition, the sea 
route was closed by Tobol'sk cossacks, who eagerly attended to this unrewarding 
task 244 This was the first step in the process of channelling Siberian trade 
exclusively to selected border posts. At this point of his tenure, Kurakin had good 
reasons to expect a reward on his return to Moscow: As his instruction demanded, he 
indeed had successfully sought the profit of the sovereign. 45 Siberian cossacks 
profited from this decision as well as from sending missions to China. Rather than 
the Bukharan intermediary trade, the latter design promised rich profits to those 
entitled to undertake and lead these missions. Kurakin had already eagerly promoted 
foreign relations and trade in Tobol'sk and the southern parts of the Siberian 
possessions. Increasingly self-assured as well as encouraged by a wave of popular 
acclaim, Kurakin sent Tara ataman Vasilii Tiumenets and desiatnik Ivan Petrov to 
the Oirat Altyn-Khan in 1618 with an instruction making them his own envoys: 
243 Pokrovskii, Tobolskii arkhiereiskii, kniga v., 11.120-2,142ob., 145. Kurakin faced a changed 
climate at court, since Filaret, who had learned to hate the Poles during his captivity in Poland, had 
returned to Muscovy in 1619. 
244 An ostrozhek with a garrison of 40 to 50 men was set up near the portage: Butsinskii, 
Zaselenie, 173,175-6. 
245 Cf. Demidova, N. F., Pervye russkie diplomaty v Kitae, Moscow 1966,15 n. 25. Butsinskii, 
Zaselenie, 174; RIB vol. 11 no. 254,11,1055,1059,1066-7,1071-2,1075 
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"... prince... Kurakin and colleagues and not the sovereign gave orders [for] the 
"2a6 mission... 
The apparent wilfulness on the part of the voevoda speaking these lines was 
addressed by Moscow already before the cossacks returned to Tobol'sk. On 31St 
December 1616, the boyar duma decided - without mentioning the tsar - that further 
missions to the Mongols or to China should not be sent; the resolution was sent to 
Tobol'sk the next day. 47 Several years later, the decree had to be repeated and 
strengthened by the boyar, Tobol'sk voevoda and energetic reformer Juni lanshevich 
Suleshev; but even he earned anything but joyous support by this measure 248 
With this decision, Moscow stirred up unforeseen protests which profoundly 
influenced relations between Moscow and the Siberian cossacks. Even half a century 
later, at the time of the uprisings in Moscow and Tomsk, petitioners remembered the 
election of tsar Mikhail Romanov. 249 Confronted with a leader, whether a tsar or not, 
just three years after his investiture, who was not furthering their aims, the cossacks 
strongly favoured a change at least in their local leadership. Mirroring the close 
relations between traders and cossacks, a merchant was reported saying in 
Verkhotur'e: 
"We obey the decree from Tobol'sk, not from Moscow. We would be better off if our 
Ivan Semenovich Kurakin was sovereign. Moscow is far away. "25° 
Much more serious than this incident was the rebellion faced in July 1617 by the 
voevoda of Verkhotur'e who had been assigned to his position shortly after the ukaz 
was issued. The very setting of this rebellion was uncommon for later Siberian town 
rebellions: It was not directed against any particular measure of the voevoda, but 
against Moscow's rule in general. The local cossacks of this border post and customs 
barrier on the way to Siberia, which had risen in importance after the measures 
introduced by Kurakin did not, even in the beginning, obey the new voevoda, Fedor 
Pleshcheev. The voevoda had no specific personal interest in painting the cossacks in 
24 Russko-mongol'skie omosheniia. 1607-1636, Moscow 1959, no. 22,11.14-5; cf. Demidova, 
Pervye, 21 
247 Demidova, Pervye, 16 
248 Egorov, V., "Suleshov", in: Russkii biograficheskii slovar', izdanie Imperatorskago 
Istoricheskago Obshchestva, St. Petersburg 1912,138; on Suleshev, see, chapt. ll. 
249 Tikhomirov, M. N., "Pskovskoe vosstanie 1650 g. ", Klassovaia bor'ba v Rossii XVII v., 
Moscow: 1969,79-85 
250 Bakhrushin, "Voevody", 262 
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dark colours, and his report repeats the features of the Personenverband, while 
stressing their open disloyalty. Pleshcheev claimed that he asked the cossacks: 
"Why do you swear an oath by night.. . what 
is your plot with [the cossack; C. W. ] Fedor 
Durov. And Fedor Durov and his plotters shouted... swearwords at me and pulled my 
beard and said we obey Tobol'sk decrees but not Moscow decrees; it would be good if 
our prince I. S. Kurakin was sovereign with us and Moscow is far away; and I your vassal 
answered we have only one sovereign in Moscow and not in Tobol'sk. And for this 
Fedor Durov and his plotters wanted to kill me. "251 
Assigned in 1615 as the Time of Troubles was ending, Kurakin inherited a 
troubled realm. Many men formally in the service of the tsar had just returned from 
Moscow and the north of Russia, where they had become accustomed to cossack 
ways, living virtually beyond the influence of the tsar or his boyars. According to a 
contemporary report, even the streets of Moscow at the very time of tsar Mikhail's 
election in 1613 were controlled by cossacks: 
"Among the boyars nobody dare confront the cossacks or meet them on their way, and 
[the boyars; C. W. ] make way for them and even bow their heads. " 
In the devastated city, they behaved like the typical Personenverband: 
"Cossacks walk in Moscow in groups, even where it is impossible to move in the bazaar 
- twenty or thirty men, all armed, wilful, and they never turn up less than fifteen men or 
at least in a group often. "ZSZ 
To establish his leadership among these men, Kurakin had to make concessions - 
he distributed land and peasants to the cossacks without collecting appropriate taxes 
and delayed dispatch of the land registers to Moscow. 253 However, he only became a 
popular leader by initiating missions with far-reaching and astonishing aims such as 
contacts to the Mongols and China. As Moscow and tsar Mikhail seemed neither 
willing nor able to help the cossacks to attain their aims, they oriented quickly 
towards leaders tallying with their ideal of direct and tangible leadership. Attempts to 
acclaim the voevodas of Tobol'sk as sovereigns and tsars of the Siberian realm 
occurred frequently as the Time of Troubles came to an end in Muscovy. 254 
21 RGADA f. 199 Portfeli G. F. Millera no. 478 11.66 (petition) 
252 Stanislavskii, Grazhdanskaia, 85 
253 Pokrovskii, Tobol'skii arkhiereiskii, kn. v, 11.120-5,142 ob., 145 254 Bakhrushin, "Voevody", 262 presents this as evidence for the overwhelming power of 
Tobol'sk as compared to other Siberian towns. 
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Despite lacking any means of direct control, especially the capacity to send 
troops to quell a rebellion - thus differing decisively from its Mongol predecessor255 
- Moscow never lost its possessions in Siberia. Since Muscovy was not a nomad 
power, and above all was interested in the fur trade, it would have been 
counterproductive to send substantial forces to quell rebellions among the cossacks. 
Although this was a significant difference from cossacks on the western side of the 
Urals, Moscow was not left without means to ensure Siberian cossacks remained 
within its sphere of influence. The reports of cossack envoys returning from missions 
to the Mongols and to China reflect a recurrent obstacle to any form of formal 
independence - the solidarity of the sovereigns in the area of the former Mongol 
empire. It is in these years when cossacks in Siberia first reached out for the steppe 
they could not dominate that the Mongols and other successors of the Mongol empire 
confronted them with the principles of legitimacy they observed. Though the 
instruction Kurakin had given to ataman Vasilii Tiumenets and desiatnik Ivan Petrov 
stated explicitly that they were to deliver their message in the name of prince 
Kurakin, they quickly changed their mind when confronted with the Kyrgyz 
princelings: 
"The Kyrgyz princelings with all their men, on hearing that they were sent to the Altyn- 
tsar as envoys of the [Moscow; C. W. ] sovereign, and not by the voevodas, were merry 
and allowed them to travel through their lands without fear"256 
Similar situations occurred at the Saians and the Altyn-Khan himself. In short, 
cossacks were treated favourably as they claimed they travelled on tsar Mikhail's 
orders, "and not the voevodas"'. An explanation for this behaviour at a time of 
weakness of the Muscovite state is afforded by the status of Moscow as a contender 
in the struggle for the heritage of the Mongol empire. The Altyn-khan and the Enisei 
Kyrgyz were descendants of Dzhingis-Khan, and would accept neither Russian 
cossacks nor any qazaq who explicitly disrespected the principles of steppe 
legitimacy. 257 
255 Vernadsky, Mongols, 214-5 
256 Russko-mongol'skie, no. 22,11.3-4 
257 Halperin, Charles, "Ivan IV and Chinggis Khan", JBGO vol. 51,4 (2003), 481-497, here 497; 
Kappeler, Vielvölkerreich, 42; Demidova, N. F. (ed. ), Russko-kitaiskie otnosheniia v XVII v. [hereafter: 
RKO], vol. 1: 1608-1683, Moscow 1969,108,109,115 
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Though records on the Petlin mission do not refer to the event, the assigned 
leader of the mission, voevoda of Eniseisk Trubchaninov never figured again after 
the envoys had left Tobol'sk, and the cossack interpreter, and eventual leader of the 
mission Ivan Petlin of Tomsk wrote the report to Moscow258 He was always 
mentioned with his comrade, Andrei Madov, and during his mission to China he was 
further accompanied by two cossacks . 
259 The mission had been taken over by Petlin 
and Madov. They had posed as the tsar's envoys, which brought a complaint from 
the East Mongol Altyn Khan, who was helping them to reach China in 1619 in a 
letter to Moscow. He demanded that the Russian tsar send 
"your own envoys.. . and not the Siberian people". 
In the same month, a letter from Mikhail Fedorovich to the Altyn Khan warned 
the Mongols to distinguish between the tsar's emissaries and those sent by "Siberian 
peoplei260 This gentlemen's agreement between the Altyn Khan and the "White 
Khan", as the Mongol leader called tsar Mikhail several times in his letter, and a 
confirmation of the boyar duma decision of 1616 in the instruction to the new 
voevoda of Tobol'sk in 1620 stalled all missions to China for decades. It even 
curtailed the already well-established relations with the East Mongol Oirats. Set in 
the formative years of Siberian cossack institutions, this provided a lasting lesson - 
there was no way beyond the tsar, who made the best patron to the Personenverband 
in any steppe environment even at a period of Muscovy's drastic impoverishment 
and powerlessness. Nevertheless, facing the dual dangers of foreign interference in 
Siberia and cossack revolts, it was high time for a written confirmation of cossack 
customs, integrating them into Muscovite political culture. 
258 Demidova and Miasnikov believe an instruction existed since the report by Petlin answered 
"directly to all questions discussed by Russian diplomats with Merrick", the representative of the 
Muscovy company. However, Kurakin may have known about these negotiations through his own 
channels, since they were no secret in Moscow: Demidova, Pervye, 21 
259 Demidova, Pervye, 22 
260 RKO vol. 1,72-78 translated in the seventeenth century in Moscow. The text states "sibirskie 
liudi", not to be confused with "inozemtsy". 
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Integration through Institutional Adaptation: Advice and the 
Cossacks 
In June 1684 the Irkutsk voevoda Leont'ii Kislianskii instructed the syn boiarskii 
lakov Turchaninov and the icon-painter Vasilii Korotov to search for and exploit 
ores and "blue mineral colours" in the Vitim valley on the eastern side of Lake 
Baikal. After crossing the lake with its treacherous winds Turchaninov sailed about 
four hundred kilometres to the north until he reached the small town of Barguzinsk, 
part of the district (uezd) of Irkutsk. There, he demanded that the local prikazchik 
assign workers and the necessary equipment. What seemed to be a routine request 
actually doomed the whole expedition. lakov Turchaninov indignantly described in 
his report to the voevoda the deliberations following his request. The prikazchik Ivan 
Maksimovich Perfil'ev was a renowned Irkutsk syn boiarskii with an even more 
illustrious future to come. 261 His father had led the second expedition to found 
Irkutsk, and on an earlier occasion had shown his extraordinary capacity to restrain 
his cossacks on a successful mission to pacify the Buryats, who were rebelling after 
the tribulations caused by three competing cossack iasak collecting groups sent to the 
Angara from different towns. This experienced leader did not behave like the 
allegedly all-powerful military commander imagined in some accounts of Siberian 
cossacks. As a reaction to Turchaninov's request, Ivan Perfil'ev assembled 
Barguzinsk cossacks in the prikazchik's office, reported on the demand his fellow 
syn boiarskii had made and asked the cossacks openly for advice: 
"... shall we give [them] mounts and hands and a guide and equipment? s262 
It was necessary for him to ask and have his authority reconfirmed, although the 
tsar through his representative, the voevoda, had already given it to him. This was a 
common situation: in many cases, Siberian cossacks elected their commanders. 
However, this source differs significantly from others on this subject. It was not the 
result of a cossack insurrection, but a decision in a normal situation, which was not 
particularly charged and thus reveals what is usually neglected - the all-too common 
261 See chapt. V. 
262 RGADA E1121 op. 1 no. 60 11.65-6 (lakov Turchaninov's report). On Maksim: Okladnikov, 
A. P., Ocherki iz istorii zapadnykh Buryat-mongolov, Leningrad 1937,60-2. 
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details of decision-making in mutual agreement with an assigned leader who could 
marshal powers beyond the Personenverbands immediate sphere of authority. 
Thus when Ivan Perfil'ev asked the cossacks for advice, he was summarily 
acclaimed: 
"Upon you the great sovereigns laid ["authority" is not mentioned explicitly]; whatever 
you wish, so you will do. "263 
Most striking in this statement is the absence of any confirmation by the cossacks 
of Perfil'ev's ultimate, unrestricted command over them - they merely 
acknowledged that the tsar's decree was a source of legitimacy independent of the 
Personenverband. The sentence is an accurate representation of the distribution of 
power within the Barguzinsk Personenverband. By stressing Perfil'ev's actions and 
intention while omitting their own, they established a fact that from their point of 
view needed no verbal expression: the absence of any commitment on the part of the 
cossacks to fulfil Kislianskii's demands. Perfil'ev knew very well how much he 
needed their support, and thus stressed in his answer the unity of his own and the 
cossacks' interests: 
"And he Ivan told the serving men: [If we] give them mounts and workers and a guide 
and equipment to exploit the minerals... they will exploit them, [then] it will be the merit 
of Kislianskii and the Irkutsk cossacks but not my merit and not yours, Barguzinsk 
serving men. s24 
By stressing this identity of interest, he downplayed any sense of obligation to his 
fellow deli boiarskie in Irkutsk - no feeling of a common estate bound him to them, 
no local sentiment stopped him on his course against the order of the voevoda. 
However, this did not affect his future assignments - among them interim duties as a 
voevoda in Eniseisk and Irkutsk. Even considerations of rank had no effect on his 
decision - Kislianskii was a stol'nik. 
265 Perhaps surprising to a modem reader, 
Perfil'ev did not give any orders - he contented himself with suggesting a course of 
action: 
"... and he said to the serving men: Are there any volunteers among you who want to 
travel to Kudchinsk fortress and towards the source of the Vitim river ... where to find 
263 RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 60 1.65. On the sovereign's affair, see chapt. III. 
264 Ibid. 
265 Vershinin, Voevodskoe, 156-8 
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the mineral ores and I will give you mounts [equipment etc. ] and you hand in a petition 
to the great sovereign at the prikazchik's office (s "ezzhaia izba).., s266 
Perfil'ev thus stresses a conscience for procedural elements of law. In his speech, 
action is represented as necessarily emerging from the cossack Personenverband. In 
a move characteristic of a leader of the Personenverband, he then proposes an 
alternative - and he explains it as a powerful fusion of the principles of the 
Personenverband and the legitimation as a prikazchik conferred on him by the tsar. 
As long as he was the unquestioned leader of the Personenverband, and could 
propose a compelling aim and course of action, he had the actual power to enforce 
his own and the implied will of the Personenverband: 
"And as you search for these blue mineral ores it will be my merit and yours as well but 
if there are no volunteers among you I will beat them and force them to bring a petition 
and travel to the Vitim river. "267 
Stressing merit, Perfil'ev took up the cossacks' service ethics. 68 Perfil'ev judged 
the situation accurately, for his speech was fully endorsed by the cossacks. The 
dismayed eyewitness and competitor reported how his own brother Grigorii, the 
"Barguzinsk servitors... with comrades" handed in a petition and received all Iakov 
had applied for - the Personenverband thus again overriding kinship concerns. It 
would have been impossible for Grigorii to act against the cossacks' interest and 
support his brother, even if he had been so inclined. Iakov received only mounts; he 
could merely report helplessly to Irkutsk that without equipment he was unable to dig 
the frozen ground. In the meantime, he asserted, he watched his brother and his men 
ride to the Vitim river on twelve camels with all necessary equipment and stay there 
for two weeks, not even allowing Iakov Turchaninov to observe their exploits269 
This highly formalised way of giving advice already had a long history. In 1648 
partisans of the first voevoda of Tomsk, Shcherbatyi, who had been deposed by 
rebels, tried to justify one of the voevoda's measures by citing the cossacks' 
decision. The clash was about the mode of building the new fortifications, and 
266 RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 60 1.65 267 Ibid. 1.66 
268 Kumke, Geführte, 100 
269 There is a possible alternative interpretation to this source - lakov may have colluded with his 
brother and Perfil'ev to avoid giving the voevoda and the tsar their share. Although this cannot be 
proven in this case, it would only reinforce the conclusions regarding institutions suggested in this 
account 
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Shcherbatyi's partisans tried to demonstrate that huge payments to that end, 
somewhat out of step with the tradition of work dues owed by the cossacks, had been 
agreed by the cossacks: 
"According to the advice of all servitors... [and] on their ... orders"270 
The formula that the opponents of the rebels employed in one of the century's 
major town rebellions was a citation from the official description of Ermak's 
campaign. In 1621, as the dust of the Time of Troubles had just settled, and Siberian 
cossacks were easily roused to confrontation or rebellion, the new patriarch and 
father of tsar Mikhail Romanov, Filaret, sent the first archbishop to Tobol'sk, 
Kipriian, to pacify them. 271 The latter tried to enhance his public standing by 
disseminating a revised version of the small number of survivors' accounts he had 
collected of Ermak Timofeevich's expedition in 1582 across the Urals to conquer the 
Western Siberian Khanate of Sibir'272 The text of the sinodik, which included the 
names of the dead cossacks, was read from the pulpit in Tobol'sk's cathedral of St. 
Sophia as part of the regular commemoration of the dead on Sunday of Orthodoxy. 273 
These and other forms of commemorations served to reinforce a social group's sense 
of identity; they replaced the commemorated in the group and were bound to forms 
acknowledged in the group by convention. 274 While private commemoration were 
initiated by donations, usually by nobles and the gentry to secure memorial services 
after their death or that of their kin, the sinodik pravoslaviia (synodikon of 
Orthodoxy) served to dissociate the church dogmatically from heresy and to affirm 
ecclesiastical and secular hierarchy. Dating from the synod of 843, it contained the 
decisions of the seven ecumenical councils and a list of the names of those who had 
succumbed to anathema; on the other hand all orthodox dead were publicly promised 
everlasting remembrance. The highest ecclesiastical and secular dignitaries were 
called upon by name. Entry in the sinodik of Orthodoxy was not private, but an act 
under public law decreed by the ecclesiastical and secular power. The synodikon was 
270 Pokrovskii, Tomsk, 157 
271 Pokrovskii, Tobol'skii arkhiereiskii, 11.125 ob, 126 272 Ibid., 236; Aleksandrov, Vlast', 79 
273 Nedelia pravoslaviia, first Sunday of Great Lent. Steindorff, Memoria, 60.36 cossacks listed: 
PSRL 36.1,78. 
274 Romodanovskaia, E. K., Russkaia literatura v Sibiri, Novosibirsk 1973,36; Steindorff, 
Memoria, 234,24 
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extended when decisions of later synods or new anathemata were included as well as 
those good orthodox who were regarded worthy of remembrance by name in this 
particularly honorific document and in the ritual of Orthodoxy (chin pravoslaviia); 
the lists of the sinodiki became differentiated according to region. Part of those 
worthy were also the fallen, for example the first Russian manuscript of the ritual of 
Orthodoxy, the "Ecumenical sinodilc" of Moscow Uspenskii cathedral contained the 
list of the slain at the river Voza in 1378 and on the Don during the campaign against 
Mamai in 1380; an addendum was made for the fallen at Kazan' in 1552 and it was 
the latter part of the sixteenth century when the chin pravoslaviia started to grow. 275 
In 1636 Bishop Nektarii solicited that the tsar, the patriarch and the ecclesiastical 
council acknowledged Ermak and his cossacks as martyrs. It was proclaimed 
regularly not just in Tobol'sk, but also in Moscow, thereby obtaining relevance for 
all of Muscovy. 276 Thus the cossacks strove for higher dignity, although their aims 
fell short of demanding acceptance as nobles. This was a characteristic shared with 
cossacks in Poland, who publicly raised the issue of the Orthodox Church in 1632. 
They did not aspire to the social privileges of nobility, although they demanded the 
right to elect the king, reflecting a different institutional environment in Poland. 77 
On the other hand, the sinodik emphasised the elective character of the 
Personenverband and its valour, both conveyed in Christian terms in the annalistic 
notes added to the sinodik. 278 The original sinodik Ermakovym kazakam (in the chin 
pravoslaviia) was adamant to underline that God and not the tsar elected Ermak's 
cossacks to fight and overcome the heathen besermeny of Sibir'. However, this 
occurred in later redactions, when the text "bozhieu pomoshchiiu eshche" was added 
on the margin279: 
"In the second summer since the conquest of Sibir' with God's aid and due to their 
valour Ermak and his retinue... " 
275 Ibid., 60-1,234 
276 Aleksandrov, Hast, 79; Bakhrushin, Trudy vol. 3 pt. I, 19,20,30,31. 
277 Kumke, Geführte, 53-7 
278 Steindorff, Memoria, 188 
279 Romodanovskaia, Literatura, 40 
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The church thus aimed at taking in the cossacks, whom it still had to accommodate in 
1621, as another citation underlines. In this case, the original text set God's election 
in opposition to the tsar's orders: 
"[Ermak and his unanimous retinue]... whom God has elected and who were sent neither 
by glorious men, nor by the instruction of the tsar's voevodas to consecrate the place and 
triumph over the Muslim (besermenskii) tsar Kuchium.... " 280 
The term "to elect (izbra)" also appears in a context that underlines Ermak's and 
the cossacks' free and strong wi11281 and the great valour of the Personenverband. 282 
An important reason why they were elected was also the cossacks' consent: 
"God elected them from among the common people and armed the ataman Ermak 
Timofeev syn283 Povol'skii and the unanimous and outstandingly valiant druzhina with 
"284 glory, warlikeness and initiative. 
Publicly the church thus approved of the participation of cossacks in vital 
decisions. In the text, the Personenverband is evoked when Ermak is depicted 
seeking advice from his cossacks and the question arises whether the Tatars, whom 
the cossacks had only recently fought to conquer the khanate of Sibir' should now be 
helped against the onslaught of the Kazakhs, who, according to Tatar claims 
threatened both: 
"... the impious Koracha, the advisor of the [Siberian] tsars, sent his envoys to Ermak 
and the comrades [to ask for] men [in a common effort] to defend themselves against the 
Kazakh horde. According to the decision of all comrades (po porigovoru vsego 
tovarstva), believing [the envoys'] impious and unbelieving vows, he sent ataman Ivan 
s285 Kol'tso with forty comrades to Koracha... 
Bad advice is equalled here to infidelity, threatening exclusion from the orthodox 
cosmos and community, which combined with muchenichestvo, martyrdom, was a 
common topos among Siberian cossacks. 286 Official decrees issued in Moscow, 
280 PSRL vol. 36.1,380,1.84 281 On the ambivalence of volia: Kivelson, "Bitter". 282 Druzhina is used only in these texts. Since other sources never feature this term, it is not a 
satisfactory alternative for Personenverband. Druzhina is used without a convincing explanation: 
Nikitin, "Traditsiiakh", 6. 
283 "syn" was used analogously to the patronymic. In some cases, as the stol'nik and deposed 
voevoda Af. T. Savelov, it signified diminished honour, or vice versa, as with Perfil'ev, who after 
election as sud'ia was referred to locally with -vieh: RGADA f. 1121 op. 2 no. 160,1.13 (investigation). 284 PSRL vol. 36.1,380,1.84 
285 Idem, 1.86 
26" Steindorff, Memoria, 71-8. PSRL vol. 36.1,380,1.84 ob. See 237 
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however, were expressed in the formula "the boyars advised (prikazali) and the 
grand prince resolved" 287 What is unfamiliar here is the subjects giving advice - in 
the duma the boyars, not lowly cossacks were the advisors, and they gave their 
advice to the tsar, not to an ataman. Even on an official ideological level, command 
of the cossacks was thus not single-handed, autocratic or military and hierarchical, 
but routinely involved the participation of the cossacks. 
This was not the only instance in which the model of the tsar and his wise 
advisors was applied to other spheres of society. As Soldat has shown, Iosif Volotskii 
directly referred to perceptions of the tsar and the boyar duma to legitimate his 
monastic rule. In Iosif's rule a council of twelve monks advised the igumen. 288 The 
sinodik also became the source for versions of the Siberian annals spread during the 
seventeenth century throughout Siberia. 289 In the Likhachevskaia edition, this theme 
of advice is expanded. In this passage, far from criticising decisions aided by 
cossacks, there is a clear allusion to the theme of the bad and the good advisors, 
which was so prominent in Muscovite publications dealing with the problem of the 
tsar's powers. While Muscovites used this theme of the bad advisors to the faithful 
tsar to legitimate rebellions against particular measures of the tsar or his 
chancelleries and boyars, the church used the theme of advice in the Likhachevskaia 
redaction to call in question particular decisions by cossacks or voevodas. The 
decision to help the Tatars is presented thus: 
"At that time they did not give good advice and forgot what is said: "Do not believe 
every spirit, but find out whether it is sent by God or the devil". They behaved cunningly 
(lukavaia) and deviously and handed the ataman and the cossacks over to the impious 
enemy. 290 
The terms "lukavaia" and "vragom v ruki nechestivym" are allusions to losif's 
Enlightener, which has proved highly controversial. Recent scholars have established 
that the author's intentions were far from opportunistic with regard to the tsar's 
power, but rather aimed at establishing and invigorating a body of "holy scriptures" 
the function of which is best understood in the way he included his own texts. Once 
287 Hosking, Russians, 93. "Prikazati" could also mean "to give orders". 
288 Soldat, Cornelia, Urbild und Abbild, München 2001,201 
289 See PSRL vol. 36.1 290 Ibid., 124,1.18 
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he had written them, los if referred to his own texts as "holy scriptures". 291 Soldat has 
shown that Slovo 7 and 16, dealing with the duties of the subjects towards the 
sovereign and the possibility of a bad tsar and, on the other hand, with the duty of the 
tsar to eradicate "heresies" do not contradict each other as has been claimed . 
292 SIOVO 
7 has been misinterpreted as a kind of orthodox theory of resistance - yet in the title 
Iosif clearly stated that it was about the way subjects should treat the tsar and other 
authority figures - about the way to perform the bow and to serve. He then states that 
since ordinary men as well as the tsar are both replicas of God, they should treat the 
tsar with the same reverence as other human beings - and thus perform the bow293 
However, since not all tsars are good, losif concludes: 
"Thus it is right and proper to bow before them and to serve with the body, but not 
spiritually, and to give them the tsarist honour, but not the divine, as the Lord says: give 
the tsar what is the tsar's, and God what is God's. If you bow and serve in this way, it is 
not detrimental to your soul. Rather you will learn to fear God: for the tsar is God's 
servant, assigned to men for change and for punishment. " 
For Iosif and the sixteenth century in general, the tsar was designated by God's 
will to fulfil salvific history: if he contravened the commonly-accepted standards, it 
was up to everyone to decide whether to obey an order or not. In both cases, the 
decision did not affect the most important goal of the human being - heavenly 
salvation, which was for a considerable part of the seventeenth century still more 
important than the good order and tribulations of this world. At the same time, God 
designated the tsar even if he behaved like Satan -a tormentor or hangman 
(muchitel ) could be a necessary device to punish the people: 
"Yet if the tsar, who rules men, wants to rule beyond himself - with abominable 
tribulations and sins, even greed and rage, slyness and falseness, pride and fury, more 
evil than all others - such a tsar is not God's servant, but a devil, not a tsar, but a 
tormentor. Due to his deceit Our Lord Jesus Christ called such a tsar not tsar, but fox: 
Go, he said, tell that fox. " 
291 Soldat, Urbild, 198, here 298 
292 Szeftel, Marc, "Josif Volotsky's Political Ideas in a New Historical Perspective", JBGO vol. 
13 (1965), pp. 19-29,28-9; Ostrowski, Donald, Muscovy and the Mongols, Cambridge 1998,205-6; 
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The mentioning of the fox is an allusion to Luke 13,32, where the Pharisees warn 
Jesus that Herod wants to kill him. Jesus calls Herod, although he was a legitimate 
ruler, a fox and declares that he is ready to be a martyr carrying on with his 
wondrous deeds, which has attracted Herod's scorn in the first place. Luke then 
follows up with Christ's lament, which hints at salvation at the end of time. In this 
context, `cunning' (lukavstvo) acts to define the characteristic of a tsar, obedience to 
whom was not obligatory to salvation: 
"The Prophet said: the apostate ruler dies, since his ways are gloomy.... you shall not 
serve such a tsar or prince on behalf of his Godlessness and cunning, whether he 
torments or threatens with death. " 
Although this prophecy is a falsification, it clearly states its intentions. These 
allusions were well-known to Muscovites - the Enlightener was a very popular book, 
and many of its concepts were widely used in later works. 294 Though ordinary 
Muscovites were not commonly literate, we can presume from the way the Sinodik 
Ermakovym kazakam was popularised and, for example, from the frequency of the 
use of the term "torment" in relevant court cases about misbehaviour of officials and 
rebels295, that understanding of relevant allusions was not restricted to a small elite, 
but part of a culture shared by wider segments of the population. 
The "Sinodik Ermakovym kazakam" and later editions thus parallel the ataman 
with his advisors and comrades, the cossacks, to the tsar and his boyars performing 
parallel functions to which the same words apply. Parallels are familiar in Muscovite 
theories of legitimation: the tsar himself was paralleled to God, not as a human 
being, but inasmuch as his powers were concerned. The parallel was perceived in the 
same way as an icon - as the replica of the archetype, a holy order as it was 
perceived in the Bible and the teachings of the Early Fathers. Thus a whole area of 
decision-making was sanctified and integrated unchanged into salvific history. 
Cossacks' decisions were officially sanctioned, but they remained subject to 
deliberation and could be reversed as well as the proponents held responsible if their 
294 Soldat, Abbild, 208-16; Martin, Janet, Medieval Russia, 980-1584, Cambridge 1995,264-5 
295 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 195. Cf. ch. V: Isakov and Panikadilshchikov: RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 8, 
14,17,23; Beiton and Cherkasov: ibid. op. 2 no. 1641.10; Andrei Osharovskoi: ibid. no. 183 1.2; ibid. 
no. 1531.1 
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decisions were construed as illegal, evil "bad advice" - if it was possible to get hold 
of them. 
Muscovy thus had found a very versatile method of institutional adaptation, 
which was particularly adapted to the frontier environment and to a vast empire with 
varying social formations. Institutional change is a highly contentious issue due to 
the many interests routinely involved. Institutions only gain their value to the degree 
that others accept them. Their value to individuals loyal to these institutions depends 
on the degree to which they can expect that they will meet with predictable reactions 
in other places or in different social environments; this is important even over the 
course of time, since trade operations across Siberia usually took months. In this 
regard, institutional change can be problematic since all individuals that have once 
adapted to a particular institutional environment and started to build their futures on 
these institutions' reliability would have to accommodate to changed institutions. 
Ambitious reform plans usually engender huge costs in individual learning and 
information, and therefore easily founder on a lack of popular appeal or popular 
antagonism. 296 Muscovy likened an institution that was adapted to the social 
environment of the frontier territories to another institution known in the central 
areas west of the Urals. Thereby, institutional change at both the frontier and in the 
Muscovite heartland was effectively by-passed, while people in the frontier area 
gained the bonus of direct, legitimate access to central organisations without 
forfeiting their cherished traditions. 
Intermediary Ranks 
The complex pattern of assignments of detf boiarskie297 and their attitudes 
towards the Personenverband reveals them as middlemen between the chancellery 
and voevodas on one side and the Personenverband on the other. 298 Instead of 
emphasising the long line of their fabled ancestors, like the gentry in the central parts 
of Russia299, they proudly remembered the well-recorded deeds of their ancestors 
2% Offe, Designing, 25-6; Krasner, "Sovereignty", 81; Göhler, "Institutionenwandel", in: idem, 
Institutionenwandel, 21-56 
297 See Lantzeff, Siberia, 62 n. 2 298 Deti boiarskie "formed a separate estate": Vasil'ev, Zabaikal'skie, t. I prilozh, 25. 299 Kivelson, Autocracy 
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during the conquest of Siberia, and stressed recent service in Siberia. 300 Successful 
campaigns and explorations into unknown parts of Siberia not only indicated loyalty 
and good service to the tsar, but also a leader's popularity among the cossacks. Or so 
the Siberian chancellery thought: it was constantly searching for reliable information 
on the current state of affairs, but remained far from the arena of action making it 
hard to estimate the current popularity of any cossack leader. Such information could 
be vital when news reached Moscow that one of the Siberian towns had again 
deposed its voevoda, urging a swift official dismissal and calling for an investigation 
by an outsider with sufficient authority. In such a situation, relief for the battered and 
hated current voevoda could not be delayed until a new nobleman from Moscow had 
made the burdensome journey. As has been shown above in the case of Krasnoiarsk 
voevoda Durnovo and pis'mennyi golova Lisovskii, one's reputation among angry 
cossacks could literally be a matter of life and death. Neither the razriad voevodas, 
nor the chancellery could possibly seek security by subordinating the deti boiarskie 
completely to their influence. Afonasii Beiton, the Irkutsk cossack golova already 
portrayed, used his popularity with the Transbaikalian cossacks to stay in control of 
the explosive situation as the cossacks besieged Irkutsk in 1696. According to 
Cherkasov's denunciation, he frequently conferred with the Transbaikalians at night 
on their barge, but he eventually did not implement any conspiratorial plans and did 
not surrender the walls to the rebels Sot In 1697/1698 he helped as second prikazchik 
- an unusual arrangement - to re-establish in Udinsk his son Andrei, who had been 
ousted by the rebels in 1696. Nevertheless, in the following years Andrei Beiton took 
the safe option and supported the Personenverband, even to the point of risking an 
investigation by the voevoda of Irkutsk. 302 He was one of the "courtiers of the 
Moscow list" in Siberia, who much like the Siberian deti boiarskie never enjoyed 
equal rights with their central Russian homonyms, not to mention the right to serve in 
Moscow. 303 In the long run, and under the condition of Personenverband influence, 
men such as Beiton could curb rebellious spirits in the ever more important 
300 RGADA op. 1 no. 4681.28 (investigation); Vershinin, Voevodskoe, 38 301 See 66-7 
302 Lantzeff, Siberia, 63. Ogloblin, Obozrenie vo1. IV; RGADA f. 214 no. 340. For details, see 
chapter V. 
303 Akishin, Politseiskoe, 13 
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Transbaikalian towns, which soon became rich when the caravan trade found a 
shorter route after 1703.304 Their engagement in trade - Iakov became the leader of a 
caravan to China - and popularity among cossacks suited Afonasii Beiton's sons 
well and they frequently held the office of prikazchik in Udinsk and Selenginsk well 
into the second decade of the eighteenth century. 30' The enterprising Iakov Beiton 
was sent in the aftermath of the rebellion as temporary voevoda to Krasnoiarsk, 
where his reputation apparently was less resounding. Krasnoiarsk cossacks were still 
too distrustful, and satisfied with their "elected" voevoda Lisovskii, which made 
them interfere with the act of relief. lakov Beiton could not even check the town's 
accounts, but was at least neither despised nor ousted - he formally held the position 
until a new voevoda, Petr Savich Musin-Pushkin popular for his successful 
campaigns arrived 306 
The deti boiarskie's position between the voevoda and the cossacks was further 
strengthened by several factors. Assignment to this rank was restricted to the 
voevoda of the razriad, which comprised several towns. 307 Owing to the quarrels 
between different towns and their Personenverbände, the voevodas' interest in profit 
and the subordinate voevodas' insistence on rank, which was frequently similar to 
that of the razriad voevoda's, divisive differences in opinion were part and parcel of 
relations between voevodas. An independent and popular syn boiarskii who could be 
sent in case of conflict was therefore always an asset for the razriad voevoda. 
Another major concern for the chancellery was apprehension about what might 
happen to the sovereign's interests while the cossacks and their frequently exchanged 
elective leaders ruled the town exclusively, let alone the danger of a spread of 
rebellion to other towns. The Siberian chancellery as well as the voevodas of 
Tobol'sk and the razriad towns in many cases tried to calm the excited crowd of 
cossacks by assigning a loyal syn boiarskii temporarily in place of a voevoda. 308 In 
other cases, the elected leader was deliberately chosen by the cossacks, showing their 
304 Leont'eva, Sluzhilye, 118 
305 Akishin, Politseiskoe, 178-9 
306 Ibid., 310,313,320; RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 468 11.8-47 (investigation); RGADA f. 214 
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loyalty by backing a man with a long record of loyal service such as Pcrfil'ev in 
Irkutsk in 1696/1697.309 The aged Ivan Perfil'ev was one of the leading figures in 
Irkutsk. He was one of the founders of the fort, who had led several successful 
campaigns in the Angara-region and whose solid reputation was reflected in his two- 
storey house in the hamlet named after him as well as by such unusual assignments 
as in 1688 the post of the voevoda of Eniseisk, a razriad town 310 In 1697 as "elected 
judge" of Irkutsk -a title sometimes used for elective positions in town rebellions - 
he sent another syn boiarskii, Andrei Moskvitinov, who, despite his illiteracy, 
investigated successfully the exploits of pre-rebellion prikazchiki as well as those of 
the rebellion's elected leaders in the same posts 311 Rather than formal education, for 
an appeal to cossacks more personal qualities were required. Though voevodas might 
have other goals in mind than pacifying the rebels, cossacks were unlikely to obey 
every relative of a razriad voevoda sent to them, or a pis'mennyi golova just because 
of their rank or patronage ties 312 
The Siberian chancellery recognised the necessity, though couching it in rather 
general terms. When in 1660 it was left to Tobol'sk voevoda I. A. Khilkov to decide 
whom to send to Nerchinsk in recently-acquired and heavily contested Dauria, it 
ordered to choose a 
"good Tobol'sk syn boiarskii, who has attended to the sovereign's affairs [being a 
voevoda or a prikazchik, - C. W. ] and who is experienced in Siberian service. "313 
A high level of cossack freebooting, and cossacks not recognising voevodas 
characterised this area on the Amur. Khilkov sent L. B. Tolbuzin, who had served as 
a prikazchik in Western Siberia. In 1686, his son led the highly motivated cossacks at 
Albazin, who long held out against the superior might of the Mandzhurian army. 314 
When Tobol'sk dvorianin315 Fedor Tutolmin, sent by the voevoda of Tobol'sk to 
investigate voevoda Bashkovskii's tenure, arrived in Krasnoiarsk in 1695 in the early 
3°9 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 322 
310 See the Remezov map of Irkutsk; Vershinin, Voevodskoe, 39 
311 RGADA f. 1121 no. 419 11.18-25 (investigation) 
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315 In 1684, some deli boiarskie were granted the new rank of Siberian dvorianin, still not on 
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days of the revolt, he met with Bashkovskii's fierce resistance. The annoyed 
Tutolmin suggested starving out Bashkovskii, while he himself spent the days in the 
hamlets surrounding the town living in cossacks' houses. He engaged in conviviality, 
arranging banquets for the elected sudeiki, thus strengthening his bonds with local 
cossacks to prepare for the final clash. 316 
The Siberian governor M. P. Gagarin was challenged in 1715 over his practices in 
assigning deti boiarskie, which the fiskal A. Filshin deemed exaggerated. Gagarin 
explained that oklady allotted were high since volunteers were needed for this rank 
and its extended obligations. During the investigation in 1718, Gagarin repeated 
"many were assigned for their services, and others are recruited from lower (cossack) 
ranks, for they are good and reasonable men to send for iasak-collection and other 
sovereign's affairs, 95317 
However, the closeness of the deti boiarskie and other intermediary ranks to the 
cossacks could easily prove problematic for the chancellery or the razriad voevoda. 
Siberian deli boiarskie were rarely considered eligible for the post of a voevoda on a 
permanent basis, not least since most lived lives not too different from that of the 
cossacks. Loyalty proved difficult to impose: in 1640 the voevoda of Tomsk reduced 
several local deti boiarskie to foot cossacks to punish them for insubordination and 
gambling; as replacements he was forced to promote ordinary cossacks 318 
Nevertheless, in case of confrontation many sided with the local voevoda to profit 
from his powers in assigning them to journeys to Moscow, to buy up grain for the 
cossacks' supply or to the lucrative posts of prikazchiki in the smaller forts. 319 Others 
felt left out, and supported the cossacks in rebellion, if not outright instigating them. 
In May 1695, after cracking down on the voevoda Bashkovskii and sealing his office, 
cossacks at Krasnoiarsk forced some of the more respected deli boiarskie and other 
high-ranking leaders to become their "elected judges". Not that they personally 
found fault with this idea, but they were often cautious enough to wait until they 
could prove they had been forced, and until someone they trusted could actually tell 
316 Bakhrushin, Krasnoiarsk, 183 
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them first hand that the cossacks did not want to punish them. In ataman Mikhail 
Zlobin's case this was his son Ivan who travelled to the small fort Iasaulovsk where 
his father was prikazchik. The cossacks strongly advised him to ride back to town 
without hesitating, otherwise, they threatened, "messengers" (posyl'shchiki) would 
be sent to fetch him. On Krasnoiarsk square, he met syn boiarskii Grigorii Ermolaev, 
who in his own words had also been forced to come, and Konon Samsonov "with 
comrades, who crowded in the square". 
After enlisting Zlobin to draft a petition, it was decided to elect leaders to replace 
the voevoda until the sovereign's decree reached town, to hold court between them, 
the cossacks, and to elect selectmen. " To constitute their new administration, "the 
whole town" assembled on the square and elected "as judges" Ermolaev, Zlobin, 
sotniki Pospelov and Belianin, piatidesiatniki Muruev and Rostovets, and the 
desiatnik Timofei Potylitsyn; the latter was the representative of a sprawling and 
influential cossack family. The cossacks confirmed their election by swearing an 
oath and the ritual kissing of the cross obliging them to back Grigorii Ermolaev 
"with comrades" and "not to hand them over in any case". 320 
The sudeiki clearly were not the driving force of the rebellion; this role was 
reserved to deli boiarskie Samsonov, Trifon and Matvei Eremeev, larlykov and the 
ataman-brothers Tiumentsov. Iarlykov exerted his influence to save the life of one of 
the hated supporters of the voevoda working in the voevoda's office. 321 Thus the 
importance of the elective sudeiki was effectively de-emphasised, leaving the power 
with the cossacks. This motif, and frequent changes of the sudeiki were common in 
rebellions322; they are symptomatic of the position of deti boiarskie in the 
Personenverband. The sudeiki were collectively called "G. Ermolaev with 
comrades" - thus marking his authority as similar to a voevoda's, but as well his 
position as one among equals, since this expression cited cossack customs as well. 
The authority of campaign leaders was to prevail in this rebellion, at least over the 
authority of the administration, be this voevoda or prikaznye liudi, who suffered 
much from attempts to force them to witness the voevoda's misdemeanours. 
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The Siberian chancellery tried to restrict access to the rank of deli boiarskie, yet it 
did not intend to raise the barriers between the cossacks and their leaders to a height 
that might render direct communication impossible. In everyday chancellery 
language, therefore, all of these men were called "servitors" (sluzhilye liudi) or, 
without any distinction, cossacks. 323 Deti boiarskie, for the sake of local influence, 
had to rely on the Personenverband, and comply with its rulings. Due to their 
intermediary status and their interests in trade, 324 some collaborated with voevodas 
antagonizing the Personenverband, while others derived special prominence from 
employing their patronage and kinship ties in Moscow and the razriad towns. 
The Voevoda and the Personenverband 
Voevodas arrived in Siberia as the principal representatives of the tsar. As far as 
the cossacks were concerned, they still had to prove their potential benefit to the 
Personenverband, or at least to a powerful fraction of the town's cossacks. They 
mostly appeared with little personal fame of their own and thus depended on the 
uncertain authority they derived from being sent by the tsar. Stressing their authority 
and status and translating it into a frontier context which was to a considerable extent 
beyond the influence of the Muscovite hierarchy, they brought their retinue of family 
members and household servants, which could consist of as many as thirty or, in the 
case of Tobol'sk, even sixty to seventy people, accompanied by plentiful supplies. 325 
In their assigned town they usually faced much more numerous cossack groups. 
What is more, local knowledge was indispensable to run the official as well as the 
(semi-)illegal private business of the voevoda. To overcome initial alienation and 
lack of acceptance upon the arrival of a new voevoda, instructions stipulated calling 
the cossacks to the s "ezzhaia izba, the voevoda's office, literally the `riding-together 
[meeting] house', read aloud the instruction they had received in Moscow, and listen 
to their grievances. To establish his leadership, one of the options a new voevoda had 
was to give them redress - he could investigate his predecessor's dealings and 
personal affairs, fine him and return anything taken illicitly to the claimants. Though 
this procedure should not be underestimated as an avenue of redress for the cossacks, 
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it could only in some cases help Moscow to recover losses due to larceny that had 
been agreed by cossacks and voevoda; the previous voevoda might simply leave 
before the new one arrived. 326 Cossacks could prevent this evasion by deposing and 
arresting him in time. They never needed more than an easy legal pretext 327 The 
voevoda could challenge their superiority only if he won over substantial numbers or 
very influential members of the Personenverband. The latter could pose a problem, 
as elected leaders of the lower rank would fall from favour due to the 
Personenverband's orientation towards its aims, if leaders acted against these aims. 
However, high-ranking wealthy nobles, who until the last quarter of the seventeenth 
century were sent to Tobol'sk, and sometimes to razriad towns, could violate the 
sovereign's interest, plunder the cossacks and the iasak people, and still rely on 
patronage ties. If challenged, as in the case of prince Egupov-Cherkasskii who faced 
an ambitious second voevoda not scared by the first voevoda's influence in Moscow, 
he could still buy out the cossacks, defy investigation and make the most of it. 328 Yet 
with the exception of Tobol'sk and to a much lesser degree the bigger frontier towns 
of Tomsk, Eniseisk and Irkutsk, the majority of the voevodas were not high-ranking 
boyars but petty nobles 329 
The cossacks' numerical superiority was not so significant a factor in the remote 
territories of the northeast. Nomads of the steppe posed no threat in Iakutsk, which 
was too far removed from the frontier; relatively small garrisons could check local 
Yakut tribes. In the inhospitable northeast, all supplies had to be carried over 
hundreds of miles from Eniseisk and Irkutsk, while those willing to settle remained 
in the south. Cossacks could hardly live by trading nor could they supplement the 
provisions sent from other towns by the crops of their own plot, and were attracted 
mainly by the wealth in furs persisting to the end of the century. Hunger and scurvy 
were frequent and devastating, repeatedly decimating cossack numbers. Deti 
boiarskie in Iakutsk district were in a slightly different position than elsewhere in 
Siberia. Deti boiarskie, cossacks and the voevodas profited from the difficulties of 
control over this remote territory Moscow experienced - they could make better 
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money than elsewhere in Siberia, and were less threatened by investigations and 
punishment. In the far-flung territory of Iakutsk, most cossacks stayed in distant forts 
and zimov'e, where influencing the voevoda's decisions was impossible 330 Smaller 
garrisons due to adverse conditions and distance from the frontier also meant that 
voevoda Golenishchev-Kutuzov and his entourage was probably not the only one to 
win the upper hand over cossacks. However in 1666 he faced a petition which was 
signed by all the cossacks living in the fortress of Iakutsk who early in the year were 
about to relieve their brothers in the scattered winter-huts of the district, only thirty- 
six men. The petition which started the investigation was handed in at a review - at 
the only time of year when at least a part of the cossacks were assembled in Iakutsk, 
the voevoda was forced to investigate allegations seriously. 331 
Cossacks accused not only the deti boiarskie, but also "no-names" (bezymenniki), 
who were sent as prikazchiki although they had no name and no merit from the 
Personenverband point of view: the cossacks accused them of bad leadership. Syn 
boiarskii Fedor Pushchin, one of the banned leaders of the rebellion of Tomsk in 
1648 and hardly a no-name, was nevertheless without fortune in his new place. He 
did not command much authority among cossacks in Iakutsk, although he retained 
his rank of syn boiarskii; among other failures, he was accused of losing fifty 
cossacks when leading them to the Amur against his orders. He had been unable to 
find natives on the river Argun, and ran out of supplies. His cossacks left him, he 
said, when they tried to winter in a hut, to go to the Amur - then a major cossack 
aim- but most of them died of hunger there and at the hands of Chinese troops. The 
cossacks were enraged as they had to accept that the voevoda granted favours to men 
whom they did not accept as leaders, while their direct leaders, the desiatniki and 
piatidesiatniki were not considered. The latter were the most active proponents of 
these accusations. 332 Replying to cossacks' allegations, syn boiarskii Pavel Shul'gin 
claimed that the cossacks ignored the illicit distilling of liquor and brewing of beer 
by those cossacks who actually were assigned as prikazchiki - all deli boiarskie and 
"bezymenniki" were accused of similar activities - "because he was their brother- 
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cossack". The accused cossacks could say little more than their foes to defend 
themselves against these claims. 333 Semen Epishev, another defendant, backed these 
counter-allegations with a detailed report and explanation of his own alleged 
misdemeanours, while also accusing the cossacks of similar feats. While cossacks 
and deli boiarskie were equally at fault in Iakutsk334, it was the dissociation of 
leadership, position and profit that so enraged the cossacks and their immediate 
leaders; a situation so extreme was only possible in this territory. 
While collecting the iasak, cossacks could be checked by the prikazchik making 
common cause with the iasak people. This could happen in Irkutsk and other places 
as well - Barguzinsk cossack Khariton Evdokimov sued syn boiarskii Gerasim 
Turchaninov, who was said to have ordered the iasak-paying Tungus to beat up his 
cossacks in a winter-hut. Cossacks were not the only ones who suffered during the 
dangerous business of collecting the iasak. Besides the iasak people, who sometimes 
endured atrocities, the prikazchiki themselves were under peril. Evdokimov raised 
his charge after Turchaninov accused him of inducing his cossacks to rebel against 
the prikazchik of Angarsk fortress in 1687/1688. Prikazchik Moisei Viazmin did not 
agree to divide the sovereign's fur treasure among them "according to cossack 
custom" ("po tebe"); Evdokimov's cossacks hung him with his legs in the smoke of 
the zimov'e until he acquiesced. However, Khariton's cossacks could not get away 
easily with their insubordination, they were fined in Irkutsk. 335 The balance of power 
between the voevoda and the cossack Personenverband therefore mattered, since it 
defined who could profit from the iasak collections. 
For the petty nobles who made up the bulk of voevodas, the motives for applying 
for a post in the smaller and middle towns included the pursuit of personal wealth, 
which they were not well advised to seek in some of the poorer towns like Pelym or 
Narym, as well as an improvement to their service record. 336 Most Siberian towns 
were on distant frontiers where a voevoda's initiative was generally appreciated. 
Campaigns were the original environment of the Personenverband. They presented a 
voevoda with a peculiar mixture of opportunities and problems. Iurii Tukhachcvskii, 
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a Tobol'sk syn boiarskii, longtime voevoda of Tara and later Mangazeia and 
descendant of an impoverished clan of Smolensk shliakhtichi banned to Siberia felt 
this predicament even after successfully leading his cossacks in 1641 against the 
Enisei Kyrgyz princelings. Although they had gathered rich booty, the cossacks 
suddenly abandoned him. From their point of view the aim of the campaign was 
attained, and the plans of the voevoda and Moscow were of no concern to them. 
They wanted as soon as possible to sell their zipuny, their "silken kaftans" as they 
called their prisoners, alluding to booty and trade opportunities; -a new fortress 
Tukhachevskii wanted to built on a frontier they were used to view as "their" iasak 
area could only bring unwelcome competition. It had been Tukhachevskii's strategy 
that enraged them - to pacify the Kyrgyz by being victorious, but never to allow the 
cossacks to defeat and plunder them completely. However, he had not reckoned with 
his cossacks, whose leaders did not spare him on several occasions with their very 
urgent and timely advice. Having their booty on them, they finally left him claiming 
they had to find supplies in the fortress of Kuznetsk. Significantly, the cossacks of 
different towns involved in this campaign had formed a Personenverband by 
pledging to stand fast to their own campaign aims before leaving Tomsk. 337 It was 
the anomy of the frontier region that made the Personenverband indispensable to 
Moscow and the voevodas. They had to acquiesce to the impenetrable and in 
principle unsubjugated Personenverband that offered the basis for establishing a 
political space in which cossacks could negotiate the terms and conditions of their 
actions. Cossacks could not be interested in a settlement between Moscow and the 
nomadic tribes for the sake of this settlement; like the nomads, cossacks had a vested 
interest in keeping the window open rather than enclosing the sphere of Moscow's 
influence. 
Conclusion 
One clear distinction between cossack institutions and the mir is provided by the 
term volia: the runaway serf, displeased with his landowner, pressed hard by labour 
dues and his status binding him to his lord, began a new life of "freedom", which 
337 Rezun, "Pokhod", 67 
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meant a nomadic, boundless freedom, or "freedom plus space". 338 The cossacks in 
turn bound each other only at campaign times according to "consensus". This 
temporary character of bonds was later, especially in Siberia, partly removed. 
However, in the constant reprimands against holding circles - which presumably 
meant drinking as well - and the unruly behaviour some of this volia was always 
preserved, as opposed to the serfs' rigid division of the year into festival time and 
strada. To the cossacks, strada meant campaign, but on campaign in particular, 
unruly behaviour could only be restrained by submission to voluntary group aims 
and consensus. Furthermore, rebellions were not a return to mir practices, but to 
those of the cossack Personenverband: rather than exclusively electing one among 
their own, the measure of eligibility was a mixture of leadership qualities and the 
standing in the outside world, and both criteria could well mean that an outsider was 
preferred. Outsiders were not automatically excluded, which was a typically cossack 
feature at odds with the peasant world, where "ne nash (not our man)" was a 
damning judgement in the tightly-knit and interdependent community. 339 By contrast, 
Siberian cossacks never excluded cossacks from other towns from the circles just on 
account of their mere otherness, which was all the more at odds with mir practices 
since towns could be in harsh competition. Nevertheless, since the 
Personenverbands aims were related to a specific campaign and its exclusiveness 
set in after the initial consensus only, they could even call a boyar "nash" and obey 
him as their campaign leader or for the sake of other enterprises, if they were pleased 
by his politics. They could also include guliashchie and promyshlenniki into their 
voisko if campaign aims demanded this. 340 Thus, it is doubtful whether cossacks can 
be addressed as a separate estate - although at times inclined to promote their own 
kin, the Personenverband recruited new members ad hoc if necessary, and was very 
capable of absorbing them if they set out for campaign. In this way, promyshlenniki 
could earn the right to be considered eligible for service. Since the families of the 
first settlers were all but separate according to estate, recruits could rely on their kin 
as advocates among the cossacks. The attempts of the government to limit the 
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number of servitors and actually expel former peasants or posadskie were doomed 
wherever manpower was needed. 341 This meant that the potential for rebellions 
represented by the newly recruited cossacks was highest in the east of Siberia, or 
wherever the process of conquering and defending new territory was still in full 
motion. This pattern is at odds with any institution of settled people. It illustrates 
how nomadic ways of life were closely interwoven with settled patterns in the reality 
of Siberian cossack life in the seventeenth century. It is not necessary to refer 
excessively to backwardness, administrative arbitrariness and all-embracing central 
and voevoda power to explain why institutions of European Russia like the volost or 
the separate zemskaia izba of the posad were largely absent from Siberia, and why 
the voevodas had a central position. 342 The Personenverband replaced or, in the latter 
case, needed and controlled them by custom, which the Tobol'sk archbishops 
institutionalised and the tsar endorsed. 
34' Nikitin, Sluzhilye, 76-7; Aleksandrov, Hast, 152-3 
342 Lantzeff, Siberia, 47 
99 
Chapter II The Economics of Siberian Service 
During the first half of the seventeenth century government forces and private 
hunters probed ever deeper into the scarcely populated forests, mountains, swamps 
and open steppe of Northern Asia. At the same time, the government increasingly felt 
the main dilemma of fur-tax politics: how could Moscow maintain a suitable 
organisation guaranteeing its share of precious furs in a territory so huge and wild it 
was essentially uncontrollable? The prolonged frontier, which merchants and fur 
transports had to travel along for thousands of miles while being within reach of 
nomad assaults exacerbated this problem. One of the instruments available to achieve 
an organisation capable of providing the necessary security was zhalovan'e, 
translated as remuneration, reward or salary. It was paid upon receipt of a petition 
handed in by the cossack individually or collectively by a desiatka at the voevoda 
office. Each cossack was entitled to an oklad or allowance. Yet payment of 
zhalovan'e was delayed if cossacks did not appear to claim it. The voevoda decided 
when the amount was paid and on what conditions. He could also decide to pay an 
advance for up to three years if he considered the cossack reliable and his mission 
necessary. Additional monies were paid when cossacks travelled to Moscow: the 
daily podennye deng'i in Moscow, and a lump sum paid on departure. 
Russian expansion in Siberia, from Ermak's conquest of the (Western-) Siberian 
khanate in 1581/82 to the establishment of Okhotsk on the Pacific seaboard in 1648, 
was intrinsically linked to ahalovan'e. Historians have explained this speed by 
geopolitical factors. The convenient river system allowed the crossing of enormous 
distances throughout the whole continent by boat. From the mid-fifteenth century 
onwards an increasing demand for luxury goods, especially costly furs such as sable 
and marten was created by the prosperity and pomp of Renaissance Europe. 
Muscovy's ability to provide them was unrivalled until the latter half of the 
seventeenth century. 343 The Western provision of the muskets Muscovy needed for 
its wars as well as supplying the cossacks in Siberia with superior weapons, were 
among the favourable conditions that made the fur trade feasible. In Asia, turmoil 
following the downfall of the last successors of the Mongol empire secured an 
343 Forsyth, Peoples, 40 
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auspicious environment for Russian expansion. The conquest of the khanate of 
Kazan' in 1552 opened the way to Northern Asia. Political instability in Eurasia 
included civil war among the steppe khanates, which resulted in shaking off lesser 
nomad confederations into Romanov or Manchu dependency. War wrecked the 
Turkic khanates of Khiva and Bukhara, and combined with dynastic change in China 
to disrupt commerce and life in the oasis emporia on the trade routes from China. 344 
Yet one factor has been dealt with rather superficially, if at all: how did a cash- 
strapped economy manage to make such efficient use of all these opportunities - 
even if it was desirable and physically possible to reach Tobol'sk within three 
months by boat, or Irkutsk within nine months, it was still necessary to finance such 
an enterprise. Zhalovan'e emerged as a convenient solution to these linked problems 
of financing and administration, since it allowed for the conveying of information 
about the current state of the affairs as well as negotiations between centre and 
periphery. 
Yet the actual practices of zhalovan'e show that emphasis was not put exclusively 
on its use as an instrument for disciplining unruly cossacks: 345 Zhalovan'e was to a 
high degree negotiable. From early on, Moscow stressed reliability in the delivery of 
salaries for Siberian cossacks. The tsar and the Siberian chancellery were in no 
position to neglect these salaries - Muscovy's logistic efforts in wartime depended 
crucially on the Siberian treasure. Furs were the principal commodity of foreign 
exchange, providing the means for purchasing goods from abroad which Russia 
lacked, such as precious metals, textiles, firearms, lead, sulphur, tin etc. A procession 
of boyars carrying huge bundles of forty sable pelts each, caused astonishment at the 
court of the German emperor Rudolf II in 1595. This huge gift of Siberian furs, a 
contribution to the war against the Ottoman Turks, was valued at 400,000 roubles. 
Between 1585 and 1680 the total number of sables and other valuable skins obtained 
in Siberia amounted to tens of thousands per year, reaching a peak of over 100,000 in 
the 1640s. Their value in Moscow (which was considerably less than the prices they 
fetched on the foreign markets) constituted about ten per cent of the state's 
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income 346 The resources of the taiga made the Russian empire the unrivalled 
supplier of furs to European and Asian markets until the eighteenth century. Even 
after Canada arrived as a competitor, it could not match the Siberian sable, supplying 
beaver as its highest priced commodity. 347 
The sable, with its dark colour and luxurious texture, commanded the highest 
price, followed by the black fox and the marten. A single hunting or trading trip 
resulting in the possession of a few pelts could make a Russian prosperous for life - 
however in case of failure, it could also throw him into the claws of indentured 
labour. 348 Enormous distances made seekers of wealth look for secure forms of 
travelling and financing their adventures. It was this security that state organisation 
could provide. 
Competition for furs was stiff - as in the Californian gold-rush in the nineteenth 
century hunters and merchants streamed into Siberia, set up small bases in the 
austere regions on the Gulf of Taz near the Arctic Sea, where they initially operated 
independent of the government, their supply routes during the Time of Troubles 
beyond Moscow's reach. Initially, merchants and hunters even called on the native 
Samoyeds to defeat Muscovite troops arriving in 1601 with orders to found the town 
of Mangazeia and take control of the region 349 Further south, closer to the steppe, 
frontier conditions placed Moscow in a more advantageous position from the start. In 
these areas, which also provided the best routes for trade and the only arable land 
available beyond the Urals, forays of the nomad Kalmyks and the eastern Mongols, 
the claims of members of the partly expelled, partly co-opted Western-Siberian Tatar 
dynasty, and the defensive tactics of expansion on the frontier made military 
organisation and fortifications indispensable. In frontier conditions it was hard to 
grow the necessary grain, the basis of Russian fare and an attraction to everyone in 
the vicinity of the steppe. 35° Control of grain supplies was thus a prerequisite for a 
position of power, causing many conflicts. Yet given the opportunities Siberia 
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offered to accumulate wealth, Moscow could not confine itself to the narrower 
approach it took to its European southern frontiers - there, a policy of lean 
management meant that fortresses had to stock their emergency grain reserves from 
the soldiers' own service dues . 
351 Furs had to be extracted from an immense country, 
and, since supplies were scarce, had to be collected by small, vulnerable groups, and 
then brought safely to Moscow, therefore the Siberian chancellery was prepared to 
pay a price. The best forces available for such a business were those otherwise most 
likely to rob transports - cossacks provided the highest degree of security possible in 
small groups due to their Personenverband structure. To oblige cossacks, much 
earlier than in other parts of Russia, perhaps with the exception of the capital, 
Moscow went to great lengths to organise a reliable and permanent system to ensure 
reliable provisioning. 
Already in the sixteenth century, Muscovite governments had been conscious that 
the availability of food was indispensable to ensure the frictionless functioning of 
society. Distributions began as infrequent and intermittent payments from the tsar's 
household to individuals. By the early seventeenth century, however, grain 
distribution had acquired a more organised and predictable character. Much of the 
central bureaucracy in Moscow was maintained on a regular basis from the tsar's 
own holdings, and the musketeers, members of the lower service classes, received 
payments intended for food purchase. A limited number of supply wagons, filled 
with grain from the tsar's demesne lands, followed troops on campaigns where men 
with cash allowances could buy food. During emergencies, the tsar's private 
granaries also distributed food in the capital, as in the 1601-3 famine. Finally, the 
government frequently fixed grain prices on certain delimited markets. These efforts 
remained small in scope, sporadic, and decentralised well into the seventeenth 
century. The bureaucracy and the musketeers were still limited in size during the 
early 1600s, the army in European Russia prior to mid-century was substantially self- 
supporting, and urban populations had declined from their pre-1600 size. 352 Even 
when after mid-century army reform under tsar Aleksci began to create a larger 
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dependent population, the Russian government did not recognise the need to organise 
additional provisioning. Only when the size of its army had doubled and the numbers 
of new formation troops had vastly increased did supply become an important 
element of the military reforms. 353 
More relevantly, these conditions remained confined to central Russia: Southern 
musketeers did not receive the payments Moscow owed them on paper, although the 
South was obliged to pay the related tax, musketeers' grain. National supply did not 
function in the south throughout the century, unsurprisingly given early-modern 
conditions. Therefore, isolated fortress towns in the south organised their own 
localised system of emergency food supply. However, these local granaries 
distributed their grain only if the besieged could no longer access the fields the 
service men were to serve from. As late as 1650, the military governor of Boboriko 
in the extreme southwest demanded outside supplies since with the next siege, people 
would die of starvation. Small towns, distant from any trade that regularly brought in 
grain, themselves produced trifling amounts. In the first years of settlement the 
opening of the steppe and forest land was onerous, and most of the new farmers were 
also military men, whose farming time was limited by their military duties. Their 
plots of land were often small, and there was little labour besides their own with 
which to work it. Even after the lands were open, bad harvest years were frequent, 
and farms lying outside fortress walls were vulnerable to hostile attack. Furthermore, 
granaries collected grain as service dues - both their clients and contributors were 
locals and largely the same individuals. 354 
Overall, therefore, Moscow had the system of new fortresses guarding central 
Muscovy built and maintained on the cheap 355 The situation of Siberian fortress 
towns guarding access to trading routes and fur suppliers was very different. Tomsk 
may serve as a point of reference, since it was located in a similar environment, far to 
the southeast from the main area of peasant settlement in Western Siberia around 
Tobol'sk. As in many of European Russia's southern towns it was an exposed 
353 Stevens, Soldiers, 43; Plavsic, Borivoj, "Seventeenth-Century Chanceries and their Staffs", in: 
Walter McKenzie-Pintner (cd. ), Russian Officialdom, 19-45, Chapel Hill/N. C. 1980, here: 37; Nellie, 
Richard, Enserfinent and Military Change in Muscovy, Chicago 1971,163,271; Smith, Dianne, 
"Muscovite Logistics, 1462-1598", SEER 71 (1993), no. 1,35-65 
354 Stevens, Soldiers, 49 
355 Cf. the lower Volga: Vodolagin, M. A., Ocherkii istorii Volgograda, Moskva 1968,22 
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frontier town, finding it difficult to produce its own grain in sufficient quantities. 
Trade did not bring in enough grain, and market prices sometimes soared around 
twelve to fifteen roubles per quarter. 356 Yet from soon after Tomsk's foundation in 
1604 the government, in a significant shift from its policies on its own defensive belt 
south of Moscow, was ready to provide grain over enormous distances to Tomsk as 
well as to most Siberian towns. More often than not, cossacks received their grain 
remuneration. Tomsk was vital for the fur trade as an outpost organising and 
equipping campaigns to the river Enisei, Iakutia and Eastern Siberia in general. 
Northern Russian towns collected grain for Siberia, since they also profited from 
the fur trade with Siberia. During the years of food shortage in the Time of Troubles, 
when cossacks left their families to make a living in war-ridden European Russia, 
cossacks roaming the Muscovite countryside signed contracts with the mir of 
northern towns on "grain and money zhalovan'e"; 357 despite the term used in the 
documents, this was close to the alimentation practiced between communities and 
officials ass 
After the Time of Troubles, when supplies slowly resumed former levels, 
cossacks sought to secure an alternative source of income. As their numbers grew, 
and pressures on the supply-side of grain delivery augmented, the cossacks hid their 
new hamlets and lands from Moscow's vigilant eyes. As early as 1623, the Siberian 
chancellery, concerned about the drain on resources, promoted reform of the grain 
delivery system, since, as the decree proclaimed, 
"this is a heavy burden on northern [European Russian] towns and villages and many are 
deserted, the inhabitants have fled". 359 
The tsar's father Filaret sent his protdgd boyar Iurii Ia. Sulcshev to Tobol'sk with a 
warrant to sort out Siberian supplies. Suleshev classified Siberian towns as either 
agrarian or non-agrarian, cossacks assigned to the latter receiving their full salaries, 
whereas the former had to accept reductions; some towns, such as Tara, suffered 
356 Ogloblin, Tomskii bunt", 230 357 Shveikovskaia, Gosudarstvo, 219; Stanislavskii, A. L., Grazhdanskaia, 23-24,31,41,105,111, 
127,244-5. Cf. the practices of German mercenaries: Burschel, Peter, Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts, Göttingen 1994. 358 On kormlenie, see chapter IV. 359 Goehrke, Carsten, Die Wüstungen der mittelalterlichen Rus', Wiesbaden 1968,209; Pokrovskii, Tobol'skii arkhiereiskii, 172-4, here: 1.125 
105 
from this categorisation. On the other hand, the cossacks benefited from reform since 
Suleshev legalised their land-holding rights. This balanced approach did not spare 
Suleshev from attempts to overthrow him360, but overall his measures were 
implemented, making his endeavour an outstanding example of early modem 
administrative reform. Suleshev achieved major economies and was suitably 
rewarded. Institutional change at that scale is not an early-modern common place, 
but rather something achieved only where certain conditions were observed; even in 
Central Europe a law's implementation depended in many ways on the compliance 
and quite autonomous motivation of the subjects, which could be very different from 
the intentions of the sovereign 361 A land survey conducted during Suleshev's period 
as Tobol'sk voevoda was the basis for reform in Siberia, which came earlier than in 
other parts of Russia. In southern European Russia such an endeavour proved too 
expensive; therefore in this region similar reforms were never undertaken. 362 
Vershinin has cited Suleshev's reform as proof of the towering role he assigned to 
voevodas in Siberian politics. 363 However, at least as long as the Personenverband 
provided an organised basis, succesfull institutional change depended on the careful 
institutionalising more reliable boundaries according to comprehensible procedures 
as did Suleshev and Kiprian (ch. I), apparently depending also on conditions of 
economic prosperity. If cossacks had an incentive to use, or abuse these institutions, 
they had gained a firm foothold beyond the Urals. These conditions were partly or 
entirely absent in two other attempts at reform in Siberia: so, those of voevoda P. I. 
Godunov in Iakutsk, who lacked support when he attempted to introduce the less 
360 Ibid., 11.331-333. The Tobol'sk archbishop's rights to supervise secular local administration 
adds to the main line of arguing in this thesis, but it is a sub-system that is not strictly necessary for 
explanation. See my planned article. 
36' Recent debate on the ability of the early modern state to enforce its norms is summarised by 
Landwehr, Achim, "`Normdurchsetzung' in der Frühen Neuzeit? Kritik eines Begriffs", ZJG vol. 48 
(2000) no. 2,146-62. Landwehr asserts that terms like "implementation" and "effectiveness" of 
ordinances and norms have been applied in a wholly unreflective way. See Raeff, Marc, The Well- 
ordered Police-state, New Haven 1983,45. Landwehr combines both strands of the debate: the long- 
term effectiveness and middle range powerlessness of the state and the efficient resistance of the 
subjects. Based on a carefully-observed case study, he claims that the long-term effectiveness of state 
initiatives occurred through complex forms of dialogue between the subjects and various authorities in 
a process which could foster new regulations, and through the subjects' use of norms against the 
intentions of the sovereign. Norms and organisations for their enforcement gained weight when 
subjects used, and abused them. Landwehr, Policey im Alltag, Frankfurt/Main 2000. 
362 Pokrovskii, Tobol'skii arkhiereiskil, 237-8; Aleksandrov, Mast', 204; Nikitin, Sluzhilye, 104; 
Bakhrushin, "Voevody", 270-273. Stevens, Soldiers, 46-8 
363 Vershinin, Voevodskoe, 82-3 
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institutionalised dragoons instead of the well-established rights of the cossacks and at 
the same time to reduce salary significantly. 64 The attempts of O. Shcherbatyi in the 
1640s in Tomsk will be discussed below. 365 Both reformers could also be deposed by 
the cossacks since, although they enjoyed considerable protection within their 
respective networks of patronage, the tsar did not afford the same overriding level of 
protection as to Suleshev. Despite the enormous distances from the centre, Siberia as 
an important source of revenue was treated much more like the central parts of 
Russia, with respect to cossack zhalovan'e; it can be compared to Moscow rather 
than to any other frontier - apart from Astrakhan, seen as an exception due to the 
Persian trade. 366 
In assessing actual payments recorded in local cashbooks N. I. Nikitin concludes 
that for about half a century from Suleshev's reforms to the economic crisis of the 
late 1660s - and the beginning of the drop in Siberian fur output - actual supply and 
deliverance of zhalovan'e in Western Siberia was more or less equal to entitlement 
for all but a few; the latter, for various reasons, usually did not apply for it. 367 Based 
on estimates of consumption valid in Siberia in the eighteenth century, Nikitin admits 
that grain zhalovan'e alone was sufficient to feed an unmarried cossack. Overall, 
however, he and other Soviet historians maintain that provisions were insufficient, 
since a family could not be fed on an ordinary foot cossack's salary. 368 Yet the 
estimated minimal consumption of Siberians he presents is based on accounts by 
travellers like the student S. P. Krasheninnikov. He received two years' money salary 
in 1739 on Kamtchatka for working for a scientific expedition, which was, as he said, 
"given the local prices, just enough to buy grain only, since one man needs twenty- 
five pud a year. " Given the brevity of this statement, it is doubtful whether the same 
norm applied to seventeenth-century cossacks living in the same town for years, who 
usually cultivated a garden and kept cattle 369 Another example for this "norm" are 
364 Kopylov, A. N., Sud'ba odnogo iz 'pribylykh del" P. L Godunova, in: Russkoe naselenie 
Pomor'ia i Sibiri (period feodalizma), Moscow, 129-148 
365 See 226-7. 
366 Opposite conclusion: Nikitin, Sluzhilye, 195. On Astrakhan, see Golikova, Ocherki ... 
gorodov, 54-6. 
367 Nikitin, Sluzhilye, 137-8 
368 Leont'eva, Sluzhilye, 111,141 
369 Nikitin, "Voprosu", 55-6; Aleksandrov, V. A., Rossiia na da! 'nevostochnykh rubezhach, 
Moscow 1969,151. In Tiumen' and Tara in 1700-01 livestock registered with the absolute majority of 
servitors. Even in the northern towns they held their own cows and other animals: Butsinskiy, 
107 
the newly-enlisted western Siberian cossacks in F. A. Golovin's army embarking in 
1687 to defend the Amur against Chinese troops, who received two pud of flour a 
month. They hardly had anything to supplement their salary, depending on what was 
issued. 370 Nikitin gives a figure regularly paid to an unmarried cossack of 7 %z -9 %z 
chetverty grain per annum, while a married cossack would receive 9 /2 -10 '/2 in the 
"agricultural" towns, and married cossacks in towns positioned too far north for 
farming, such as Berezov and Surgut, received eleven chetverty. Okladnikov 
mentions an "official norm" of 2.5 -3 chetverty for the rather long period of 1710- 
1795 on which Nikitin relies, with a chetvert' equalling 8 %z rather than 4'h pud. 371 
A calculation of the nutritional value however - though very rough, and hardly an 
accurate reflection of the real" value - yields astonishing results. 
Given the 
nutritional value of carbohydrates as four calories per gram, with eighty-seven 
percent of the grain being either carbohydrate or fat372, follows rates of more than 
3.48 kcal per kg grain. 36.6 kg per pud, four or 4 V2 puds per chetvert' and an 
assumed average of ten chetverty per family yields more than 5094 kcal or 1,463.8 
kg grain p. a. for one family. "' Assuming that a family with two children aged 
between nine and twelve needs 9,600 cal p. d. - 3,504 kcal p. a. (Okladnikov's norm 
equals 8,375 cal p. d., or 3,066 kcal p. a.; but it is unclear to how many persons this 
relates), even cattle could be fed on this diet. Now this perhaps overstates the 
nutritional value of grain zhalovan'e, as some loss occurred during processing, 
severe winter conditions and hard work increased intake, and in general this kind of 
computation can be far from everyday reality. Still, even in the "agricultural" towns 
the official ration was substantial, and hardly corroborates claims that a family could 
not feed itself on it. 
Many of the qualifications Okladnikov made with regard to this "norm" need to 
be borne in mind: applicable to peasants, it was rather elastic. lasak people and 
Zaselenie, 140; Ogloblin, Obozrenie, pt. II, 137; pt. 3,228; Gol'dcnbcrg, L. A., Semen UI'ianovich 
Remezov, Moscow 1965,12; RGADA f. 214 kn. 1276,1182; st. 76 1.204; st. 186 11.154-155; st. 8 1.90 
(registration). Gagemeister, Iu. A., Statisticheskoe obozrenie Sibiri, St. Petersburg 1854, pt. IH, 83. 
370 Andreev, A. I., Ocherkipo istochnikovedeniiu Sibiri, Leningrad 1960-65,151 
"' Krest'anstvo Sibiri, 191-2,271. Given the latter chetvert' was equal to 8 pud, results 20-24 
pud: Nikitin, Sluzhilye, 227 n. 123; Shunkov, V. I., Mery sypuchykh tel v Sibiri XVII v., in: Akademiku 
B. D. Grekovu ko dniu semidesiatiletiia, Moscow 1952,167-71. 
372 According to Encyclopaedia Americana. 
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promyshlenniki needed much less than this, and even the peasants themselves proved 
flexible enough to provide more for the market once fiscal pressure made this a 
favourable option - there were other means to live by. A German officer in Russian 
service expressed his astonishment and dismay about the Russians on arrival in 
Tobol'sk in 1667, at the very end of the period of relative wealth. He compared them 
either with -mercenaries in the German principalities or with European Russian 
cossacks: 
"The Russians in this part of the world deal with ... 
fat and tasty fish caught in 
superabundance. They trade in different kinds of grain and other foodstuffs,... everyone 
aspires to be a merchant. There are diverse handicrafts,..., but no one wants to be a 
peasant, thus the rich land lies idle. Most of these people serve the tsar as... cossacks..., 
each of them receiving his travel-salary; that is why they ... do not want to work, but rely 
on the general good bargain here, especially the wonderful fish. "374 
Though the unknown German officer vented his prejudices - his grasp of iasak- 
collection was all but non-existent, as he did not leave Tobol'sk - and 
underestimated nomad influence on agriculture, he was right as to the role fish 
played in the diet. Much fish was to be found in the Ob, Irtysh, Enisci, Amur, the 
lakes of the Western Transbaikal, and in lake Chan. Less fish lived in the Nerchinsk 
area and in the Lena. 375 In Tomsk, fish was so plentiful that - still in the 1730s - 
even on meat days people ate more fish than meat, although most cossacks reared 
cattle 376 
Cossacks needed cash zhalovan'e to buy equipment and clothing, such as horses, 
saddles or muskets. Yet a married cossack with children could spend at least part of 
it on food. Certainly, zhalovan'e did not cover all the expenses of a family, and there 
were - rather infrequent - incidents of complaints by married cossacks. Yet the 
measure of "regularity" of zhalovan'e and the assumption that the Siberian 
Chancellery not only felt an obligation to feed the cossack and his wife, but a whole 
family377 appears to be informed by contemporary notions. Indeed, comparisons with 
374 Alekseev, Beschreibung, 17-18. 
375 Krest'ianstvo Sibiri v epokhufeodalizma, red. A. P. Okladnikov, Novosibirsk 1982,33 376 Emel'ianov, Nikolai F., Gorod Tomsk v feodal'nuiu epokhu, Tomsk 1984,24; S. P. 
Krasheninnikov v Sibiri, Moscow 1966,53-5; Vilkov, O. N., "Rybnaia torgovlia Tobol'ska XVII v. ", 
Voprosy istorii sotsialno-ekonomicheskoi i kulturnoi zhizni Sibiri, Novosibirsk 1968, vol. 1,5-14 377 Nikitin, Sluzhilye, 141 
109 
early modern European mercenaries, coming closest in status to the cossacks, suggest 
a different notion. German mercenaries in the Thirty Years War were as much 
victims as guilty parties in the destruction caused. Ordinary soldiers were swindled 
over pay, food, lodgings, and medicine both by officers and by civilians who profited 
from food shortages and pocketed money meant for the upkeep of troops. 78 While 
they were confined to the camp market and the sutler, and were not allowed to access 
towns and their markets at will, Siberian cossacks were town residents and could 
travel on duty to other market-places; they rebelled successfully when barred from 
the market-place, as in 1648 in Tomsk 379 Even unmarried mercenaries in the 
German Empire found it hard to feed themselves on their salaries, even in the best of 
times, since weapons, equipment and additional foodstuffs had to be bought at 
exaggerated prices. They could not even think of supporting their wives and children, 
unless they earned something extra. The wretched and abject soldiers' wives, 
concubines and p--)stitutes stumbled on muddy roads behind the host, carrying heavy 
weights, begging their way through the country. Only at the very end of the 
seventeenth century, did states devote their attention to this problem. Long before 
this, Siberian cossacks had different, though related worries: Their wives, though 
eligible for increased zhalovan'e for married cossacks, were often left behind in town 
without any supplies during cossacks' distant journeys, since the men needed to carry 
whatever they could, seeking a good deal elsewhere. 380 For this reason, and since life 
in two separate places was more expensive, even the increased salary for married 
cossacks sometimes could not save their families from hunger. The Siberian 
chancellery, concerned about this problem as early as 1639, though not inclined to 
condone a second extra salary for married cossacks when on expeditions, decreed 
that one third of the salary had to be held back for wives. However, this decree was 
conducive to fraud - voevodas often tried to profit from the payment of salaries, 
holding back one third of the salaries of all cossacks, married or unmarried, and 
appropriating the rest for themselves. Cossacks complained about the practice in 
378 Kroener, Bernhard, "Conditions de Vie et Origine Sociale du Personnel Militaire Subalterne", 
Francia vol. 15 (1987), 321-50 
379 Burschel, Söldner, 181-2; Pokrovskii, Tomsk, 96 
Sao See 128: the transactions of syn boiarskii Lonshakov. Burschel, Söldner, 241-55; Meumann, 
"Soldatenfamilien und uneheliche Kinder", in: Kroener, Bernhard (ed. ), Krieg und Frieden, Paderborn 
1996,219-236. 
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petitions, and the decree was abolished in 1647 after a thorough investigation ordered 
by the tsar - further proof of the responsiveness and flexibility of the Siberian 
chancellery. 381 
Siberian cossacks had another profitable source of income. German mercenaries 
in the seventeenth century could not hope for a substantial share of ransom, since 
they were only allowed to demand ransom of prisoners of war of their own rank. 
Consequently, the greater part of ransom was swallowed up by the higher ranks; 
lowly mercenaries mostly could not pay any ransom at all, and even if by chance 
they had something to offer, their captors were only allowed to take as much as the 
amount of their own monthly salary. 382 In Siberia, however, the struggle between the 
Siberian chancellery and the cossacks over ransoming and enslaving their prisoners 
could not be won by either side, although enslavement meant huge losses to 
Moscow's revenues - it infringed upon the number of iasak payers, as cossacks did 
not refrain from campaigns against "peaceless" natives. Yet cossacks saw taking 
captives as their inalienable right, a point of view only strengthened by the fact that 
in Siberia, as everywhere along the steppe frontier, enslavement was seen as a 
traditional practice even before the Russians appeared. On several occasions, the 
Siberian chancellery tried to stem the tide, inter alia by forbidding the trade in 
captives and the enslavement of non-baptised natives. Thus at least it legally 
separated the spheres of the iasak-paying natives from legitimate transactions with 
cossacks' private economies. The natives lived their traditional and shamanistic 
ways, and would expel renegades. The success of these decrees, however, was 
limited. 383 In 1678/1679 the cossack Ivashko Ignat'ev, then prikazchik of Tunkinsk 
ostrog launched a successful campaign, returning with two male natives and two 
"devki"'. Despite reports received from Irkutsk, it was only six years later that the 
voevoda prince Shcherbatyi succeeded in laying his hands on Ignat'ev and 
interrogating him over what happened to the natives when he was sent to Eniseisk, 
beyond the reach of the local Irkutsk Personenverband. The Irkutsk prikazchik 
Pervyi Samoilov had reported on them in 1679/1680 when they were living in the 
381 Lantzeff, Siberia, 79; Butsinskii, Zaselenie, 250-1 
382 Burschel, Söldner, 210-11 
383 Lantzeff, Siberia, 102-4 
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house of Irkutsk cossack Petr Studenitsyn "and comrades"; Studenitsyn was engaged 
in trade with Mongol nomads. 84 Only the fate of another native, known by his new 
Christian name of Timoshka, was known in detail. According to Ignat'ev's petition 
the next Irkutsk prikazchik Ivan Vlasov had handed young Timoshka to Ignat'ev, and 
this time the transaction was recorded. Notwithstanding Ignat'ev's remonstrations 
that he had just hired Timoshka out for ten roubles, he could not state the boy's 
whereabouts, or the date until which he had hired him out. Shcherbatyi found that 
Ignat'ev had pawned Timoshka for thirty roubles to Irkutsk piatidesiatnik Kozemka 
Fedorov, and claimed he did not even know where he lived by the time of his 
interrogation. 385 Studenitsyn's career likewise suffered no lasting setback, as he 
again went to Tunkinsk as godovalshchik receiving a year's zhalovan'e in advance 
and as elected tseloval'nik conveyed the fur treasury to Golovin's army at Nerchinsk 
in 1688.386 For years, the Personenverband had provided sufficient cover for these 
illegal deals in slaves, as the local prikazchik, dependent on local society to a larger 
degree than the voevoda who was to be exchanged within two to four years, did not 
dare interfere with it. 
Seeking cover in the Personenverband worked quite well particularly in the first 
period after the conquest of a region, when the hold of the voevoda administration 
was still remote and prikazchiki regarded themselves as not too far removed from the 
Personenverband. 387 Relatives could be inclined to pay ransom, thus trading slaves 
and asking for ransom made for a convenient source of income which cossacks 
openly regarded as an inalienable privilege, which they strove to protect from 
infringements. 388 While the government strove to limit these practices throughout the 
seventeenth century, it was the effects of overhunting and the decline of iasak that 
changed Moscow's priorities in the eighteenth century, when iasyri were 
increasingly owned openly. 389 
384 On Studenitsyn, see Chapter V; RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 1 1.96; no. 35 1.60 (report); no. 33 1.90 
(investigation); no. 67,1.120; op. 2 no. 74 (investigation) 
385 RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 67,11.108-9 (decree, Eniseisk) 386 Ibid., no. 2,11.21-2 (investigation); no. 1201.12 (receipt for fur transport) 
387 Okladnikov, Ocherki, 113-4 
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Conflict and Negotiation 
The controversy caused by cases of fraud on deliverance of zhalovan'e tends to 
obscure the fact that in Siberia cossacks were in a good position to prevent such 
practices. Already in the 1620s, when the supply problems of the Time of Troubles 
were still not entirely overcome, which affected provisions for the cossacks, since 
they made up for most of a town's expenses, voevodas had to seek loans from local 
merchants and "all people". 390 Cossacks were in many cases in direct control of the 
supply of money, grain and salt. They were the only ones who could protect the long- 
distance transports from the European Russian North or Tobol'sk, even if a syn 
boiarskii was in charge. While inter-regional trade in grain was weak391, the 
capabilities of the Personenverband provided the defensive strength necessary to 
protect transports, since more numerous troops could not be supplied. This position 
could prove strong enough to force the Siberian chancellery and the voevoda to make 
concessions on their plans for reforms. In 1637, after a commission had surveyed 
Tomsk cossack land, new regulations on zhalovan'e were introduced in the region. 
The Siberian Chancelllery, conscious of the burden supplies placed on the grain- 
growing regions of the European Russian North and the costs of transport, stipulated 
that cossacks who cultivated even small parcels of land should not receive 
zhalovan'e from the next year onwards. Instead, they would either "serve from their 
land" or receive a lower amount. The resultant rebellion focused on the arrival of the 
barges carrying the grain zhalovan'e from Tobol'sk. The voevoda, stol'nik prince 
Ivan Romodanovskii, tried to circumvent an explosive situation by keeping closely, 
if superficially, to legality. Zhalovan'e was paid out in full only for the preceding 
year and, according to custom, at the barges on the river quay. Romodanovskii 
ordered the cossacks to carry their allowance of grain for the coming year 
themselves, but not, as usual, to their home, but to the sovereign's granary. 392 The 
cossacks, queuing at the quay and already disturbed by the rapid introduction of the 
new law, protested and refused to comply. 393 Romodanovskii made clear they would 
390 Nikitin, Sluzhilye, 117 
391 Stevens, Soldiers, 64 
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393 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 247-8. Aleksandrov, V. A., "Narodnye vosstaniia v Vostochnoi Sibiri", 
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receive their zhalovan'e as soon as they had earned it, but no longer in advance. As 
they explained in a petition, the cossacks feared they would not receive their 
zhalovan'e or might have to pay bribes in future; indeed such a regime deprived 
them of their best opportunity to influence the levels and conditions of salary since 
issuing ceased to be a public event open to the pressures of the Personenverband. 
They were also quick to point out that Romodanovskii had ordered the posad people 
to carry a significant number of sacks to his private house and to those of several 
other persons under suspicion of collaboration with the voevoda, an allegation the 
mir of the posad corroborated in their own petition. However a different light is cast 
on the proceedings in the petition of the cossacks, which hints at earlier battles over 
the issuing of grain. Thus voevoda Egupov-Cherkasskii had delayed the issue for 
more than five weeks, they claimed, until the sudden appearance of ice on the "quick 
and stony" river Tom crushed the barges and the whole grain transport sank. After 
this catastrophe there should have been severe dearth, but the next voevodas, prince 
Ivan Romodanovskii and his colleagues managed to "offend and violate and insult" 
them even more. Arriving in 1635 the newcomers not only delayed issuing the grain, 
sorting it to retain the best for themselves while dealing out only "wet and rotten" 
grain, yet still there seemed to be reserves, since the voevodas also bought up the 
cossacks' allowances wholesale, as the latter admitted frankly in their petition 394 
The protesters' less than desperate approach to the issue is apparent in their 
attitude towards tangible concessions the voevoda made to their cause. After the 
announcement of the new law and the determination of the voevoda not to pay out 
zhalovan'e in advance, the cossacks threatened to seize the barges, yet never did. In 
particular Ivan Matveev, the desiatnik who brought the transport from Tobol'sk to 
Tomsk "said many rude words to the voevoda and barked at him", as Romodanovskii 
put it. The vocvoda reacted by imprisoning seven of the ringleaders, all of them 
piatidesiatniki, with the help of some of the deli boiarskie. However, he had not 
taken into account the resolution of ordinary cossacks: 150 men "went into prison 
forcefully and imprisoned themselves" to join their leaders; they did not allow their 
names to be listed and followed their leaders to the prikaznaia izba when the latter 
394 Ogloblin, "Tomskii bunt", 241 
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were summoned, a common tactic. 395 Romodanovskii reported that the cossacks 
reproached him: 
"whatever the host orders, so it will be: [we] will not carry the sovereign's grain nor will 
[we] serve from [our] fields without grain zhalovan'e. " 
After another attempt at separating the piatidesiatniki from their 
Personenverband had failed, and in town the signs of rebellious spirit could not be 
overlooked - the voevoda reported: 
"They [the cossacks] assembled circles and gave advice and instigated some unknown 
crimes concerning the sovereign's and someone else's affairs. " 
Romodanovskii tried to divide his foes by a calculated partial retreat. He offered 
to hand out the grain zhalovan'e for the next year (1638/1639) straight away to those 
who were entitled to receive it according to the new regulations. The rebels, 
however, did not even react to this offer: 
"They had all convened at that time in the refectory of the church of the Resurrection, 
for deliberation". 396 
Considering that the cossack petition claimed an earlier voevoda had withheld the 
grain on the barges until early and sudden ice on the river Tom sank them, such 
endurance hardly confirms that they felt the consequences of their refusal heavily. 
Nor did the poor make a romantic sacrifice in the interest of their "mir"; a term 
which was not even mentioned at this stage, or at almost any stage of the rebellion. 397 
The cossacks still had enough reserves at their disposal, and knew in particular they 
had untapped resources for their political bargain. The Personenverband 's firm 
stance over the distribution of zhalovan'e explains why, among the abuses uncovered 
by investigations, there were few occasions in which cossacks were outmanoeuvred 
with regard to the payment of their salary. 398 
Tempting as it may be to compare this rebellion to the grain and bread riots in 
England described by Thompson and his followers as part of a moral economy, 
serious differences remain. English rioters, relying on an eroded body of statutory 
and customary law responded to dearth by the reintroduction of market regulations, 
395 Ibid., 230. Cf similar events in 1641: Rezun, "Pokhod", 51 396 Ogloblin, "Tomskii bunt", 240-1 
397 Ibid., 239 
398 Nikitin, Sluzhilye, 135-7 
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and did not abstain from seizing merchants' barges on the rivers and selling them "at 
their price" in the market place. 399 The rebels in Tomsk, however, despite a similar 
opportunity did not attempt to take the sovereign's salary by force. They sent a 
delegation with their petition to Moscow, to persuade the Siberian chancellery not to 
reform. As petitioners sent on a distant journey, they felt entitled to seize their 
zhalovan'e directly from the barges for a year in advance 
400 The Personenverband 
was fully prepared to disobey the voevoda - who was entitled to withhold a safe- 
conductaol - yet would rather negotiate through its delegates with the chancellery in 
distant Moscow than simply seize the barges on the grounds of claimed rights. 
The rebellion's outcome was close to a full vindication of this strategy. With the 
participation of one of the later leaders of the rebellion, Andrei Guba, a complete 
overview of cossack land had only just been filed as a preparation for reform, yet 
under the threat of rebellion the Siberian chancellery decided the land should be 
reinspected. At least for now, the new law on service from the land was not to be 
applied. 402 
The cossacks used the same strategy of exploiting the trade bottleneck formed by 
the frontier town in other events, too. In 1645-6 Tomsk cossacks demanded - "as a 
pretext" for not being ready to leave for campaign, as Bakhrushin believed - an 
advance of two years on their allowances for a campaign against the Buryats who 
were threatening Krasnoiarsk, when voevoda O. I. Shcherbatyi ordered two hundred 
cossacks to be elected from their ranks. They declared that Krasnoiar cossacks were 
guilty of 
"provoking skirmishes with the Buryats... due to their limitless greed. A03 
The delay caused by these negotiation tactics meant serious danger for 
Krasnoiarsk. However, for Bakhrushin this was but quarrelling between the voevoda 
and the voevoda of the razriad, seeing the former as supporting the interests of the 
cossacks. 04 Yet this is to view the events in isolation. In 1648 the same happened 
399 Thompson, E. P., "The Moral Economy of the Crowd", in: idem, Customs in Common, London 
1991,200. Randall, Adrian (ed. ), Moral Economy and Popular Protest, London 2000. I am indebted 
to Roger Bartlett for pointing out this potential comparison. 
Ogloblin, "Tomskii bunt", 240 
401 On petitioning, see chapt. IlI. 
402 Ogloblin, "Tomskii bunt", 251 
403 Chistiakova, E. V., Gorodskie vosstaniia v Rossii, Voronezh 1975,209 
404 Bakhrushin, "Krasnoiarsk", 153-4. 
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again when voevoda Shcherbatyi argued that the system of paying zhalovan'e once a 
year was detrimental, so he paid only half the oklad once at a time. 405 When he sent 
another two hundred cossacks on the urgent demand of the Krasnoiarsk voevoda 
Durnovo, he triggered the long-lasting rebellion discussed above. 406 
The Krasnoiarians meanwhile remained a poor lot. Rivalry between Eniseisk and 
Krasnoiarsk started with the foundation of the latter by Eniseisk voevoda Andrei 
Dubenskii, who built the fortress "by his own volition, not according to the 
sovereign's decree", as Eniseisk cossacks believed. While Eniseisk cossacks were 
burdened with shipping supplies from Makovsk fortress, cossacks in both fortresses 
soon became rivals over the Buryat territories, since Krasnoiarsk was blocked to the 
south by the Kyrgyz and by mountains and rapids to the east. When a Krasnoiar host, 
after collecting iasak and fighting in Buryat territory in 1629, had to return from the 
Angara via Eniseisk, cossacks there obliged their voevoda to confiscate their iasyr' 
since they had fought in peaceful and obedient territories. Eniseisk handled supply as 
well and the voevoda had already refused to advance zhalovan'e for this campaign, 
although the Krasnoiarians had besieged Eniseisk 407 At the turn of the 1680s and 
1690s, it was again this southern outpost bypassed by most of the trade and 
surrounded by steppe that was insufficiently supplied: Krasnoiarsk reliably received 
zhalovan'e only in years of service journeys. Even voevoda Musin-Pushkin 
complained that already thirty cossacks had fled and more would follow if 
compensation were not paid out, since they were all indebted and could not pay their 
creditors. 
However Krasnoiarsk cossacks themselves knew well that: 
"In other Siberian towns, sovereign, the servitors are granted your sovereign's... salary in 
advance for a whole year, while all of us... receive... salary [only] for the bygone years, 
but in advance they do not give us [anything]. We have also received no grain salary for 
several years. " (1647)408 
Krasnoiarians could not offer the same amount of iasak other towns collected, 
since the steppe yielded much less valuable furs than the forests. Bakhrushin's 
405 Aleksandrov, Hast', 202; Pokrovskii, Tomsk, 171,176; cf. Nikitin, Sluzhilye, 125. 
406 Chistiakova, Vosstaniia, 220; idem, "Tomskoe vosstanic 1648", 81 
407 Okladnikov, Ocherki, 50,55 
A's Bakhrushin, Krasnoiarsk, 75-6 
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figures show that the main problem in the early 1690s was not the general low level 
of zhalovan'e, but rather the fact that over several years, a huge sum of delayed 
payments had accumulated, so reliability of salary was no longer guaranteed: in 
1692/1693 it amounted to 11,404 roubles for the last six years. In addition to their 
isolation Krasnoiarians had clear material motives to doubt their superiors' loyalty. 
These suspicions could only have been confirmed, and were directed towards the 
voevodas and investigators when a reward granted by the tsar for a successful 
campaign was withheld in 1695; a heavy drought and famine contributed to the 
combustible situation in Krasnoiarsk on the brink of the rebellion, which lasted until 
1698.409 
Manipulation of supplies was one of the major devices by which 
Personenverbände of different towns competed. Significantly, it was not the cossack 
Personenverband that shed light on a plot in Tobol'sk involving forged weights and 
a regular issuing of shortweight grain provisions to cossack detachments; Tobol'sk 
was the major entrepöt for shipments to the north, south and east, receiving supplies 
directly from European Russia. The affair was uncovered by the litigation of 
pod'iachii Savva Kliapikov, who had been imprisoned by voevoda P. I. Pronskii to 
silence him. Although he had served for thirty years in Tobol'sk, he had been 
excluded from the company of those profiting from the forgeries. In his detailed bill 
of complaint, Kliapikov claimed that the ordinary cossacks had supported him 
against the voevoda's false advisers. While the archbishop of Tobol'sk, returning 
from a long sojourn in Moscow, managed to release the renegade pod'iachii, he 
could not assemble sufficient support among cossacks for a local investigation into 
the affair, which had already lasted a decade. In the end the undersecretary Kliapikov 
was brought to Moscow, where the tsar assigned an investigation uncovering 
massive evidence of administrative malpractice 410 As will be argued in chapter V, 
Irkutsk cossacks behaved similarly. A string of more populous administrative 
centres, from Tobol'sk over Eniseisk to Irkutsk, therefore, commanded supplies and 
increased their fortunes at its expense, as the military situation allowed. These towns 
included the poorly-endowed Tomsk, which, however, marshalled a huge garrison 
40 Ibid., 179 
410 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 115,132,134,154,155,371,373; Pokrovskii, "Slovu", 38-40,44-5 
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and was important as a point of departure for campaigns; and Iakutsk, where 
different circumstances meant that the voevodas could unilaterally withhold part of 
the supplies. Supplies were more generous in the north and other regions unsuitable 
for agriculture, as in Berezov, Surgut or Nerchinsk411, where conditions demanded 
this; however the rich fur yields in these regions or other reasons, such as the 
performance of functions essential for trade also gave the tsar opportunities to 
display his largesse. 
Some historians consider zhalovan'e as merely a tool in Moscow's hands to trick 
the cossacks into dependency "from the very beginning of the conquest", which 
allowed the metropolis to regulate the internal life of the cossack periphery. 412 
However, such a model of absolute control is belied by events such as the Achinsk 
campaign and its preliminaries, which also shows the extent to which Siberian 
cossacks exploited the state 413 In 1641 Moscow attempted to open up the land-route 
between the southern outposts of Tomsk and Krasnoiarsk by establishing the ostrog 
Achinsk on the Chulym River. On this occasion, cossacks showed how little inclined 
they could be to follow government decrees, despite receiving appropriate 
zhalovan'e, if orders contravened their interests. lakov Tukhachevskii, assigned to 
this campaign as voevoda, led a host drafted from several Western Siberian towns 
which was planned to comprise one thousand cossacks, a number it never reached. 
They were all to meet in Tara, where the zhalovan'e for one year had already arrived 
in the spring and summer of 1639. The first delay occurred when cossacks from 
Tobol'sk claimed their salaries for the preceding year - yet deliveries had already 
gone to Iakutsk, and there was nothing left in Tobol'sk to placate them. In a petition 
the cossacks complained their horses were weak and not fit to endure a long 
campaign; grain supplies, they maintained, had not yet arrived, while their equipment 
and winter clothes were not sufficient 414 
At the same time those cossacks who slackly transported grain and asserted that 
they had become bogged down near Narym, nevertheless had made their way to 
411 Nikitin, Sluzhilye, 106,227 
412 Astapenko, Istorfla, 107 
413 The following relies on a reinterpretation of Rezun, "Pokhod", which is to my knowledge the 
only historiographic account of these events. 
414 Rezun, "Pokhod", 47 
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Tomsk. In town, they immediately claimed in a petition that they had travelled 
"hungry and needy", and in Tomsk "they rove from one homestead to the next" and 
"finally die". It is striking that the cossacks who wrote this served and lived in 
Tomsk. 415 
While Tukhachevskii used the hold-up to make further observations on the 
region, supplies from Tiumen', which were meant to replace those from Tobol'sk, 
met an apparently similar fate when they froze while taking the wrong way. 
Tukhachevskii was quick to point out that this snag proved that some cossacks "do 
not want to serve you, sovereign". He asserted that Tobol'sk sotnik Ivan Rukin, a 
descendant of a sprawling family of wealthy cossacks in Surgut, Narym and Tomsk, 
who was influential among cossacks in Tobol'sk, initiated acts of sabotage. On a 
recent service journey to Moscow he had learned of the details of Tukhachevskii's 
plan; back in Siberia he claimed there was no official decree backing this campaign. 
He therefore sent his cossacks back to Tobol'sk with the supplies they had escorted 
before they even reached Tara. In Tomsk, cossacks petitioned for compensation -a 
particular example of soft sell on their part: They depicted a truly apocalyptic 
situation. On their way to Tara, they claimed, 
"many of us lost their horses, while others were lamed, and many of us arrived on foot". 
But since 
"we do not want to desert your sovereign's service-we indebted ourselves to one 
another in the circle [v kruga druga] and bought [foodstuffs and horses] at a good 
bargain-and on our way to the town of Tomsk we... rode to the Baraba [steppe] 
and... exchanged two horses for one and gave our last clothes; many of us with difficulty 
reached the town of Tomsk on foot,... hungry and cold, naked and barefoot and were left 
without horses, and the salary which had been sent to us from Tobol'sk... drowned in the 
river while others did not reach us [... ] and froze... and while we were in Tomsk. . . we 
roved from one homestead to the next and died of starvation... " 416 
However much hyperbole was involved, Moscow did not think twice about 
ordering Tomsk granaries to dole out grain zhalovan'e. Since the granaries were 
empty, the cossacks asserted, Tomsk voevoda Klubkov-Masal'skii ordered the 
collection of four quarters per campaigner from all the people in Tomsk. Only then 
415 Ibid., 47; Ogloblin, Obrozrenie, pt. 1,205,279 
416 Rezun, "Pokhod", 52-3 
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did the cossacks sluggishly prepare for campaign, but they still waited to receive 
their cash allowance. Despite all efforts to fit them out for campaign, the cossacks 
claimed that 
"we borrowed from each other.. . and set out 
for the sovereign's service.. . in great 
want... ", 
but then petitioned and waited again, this time for the arrival of the delayed cash 
and grain salary for the preceding year, sent from Tobol'sk 417 All claims of the 
cossacks notwithstanding, the Tomsk voevodas, who in those years had to appease a 
rebellious attitude in their own town and were therefore hardly leaning towards 
Tukhachevskii, while denying all claims as to contributions collected among the 
population, reported that granaries had issued 456 quarters of rye; Tukhachevskii 
confirmed this version and explained: 
"In their petition they wrote treacherously that they do not want to serve you, although 
the arrears have been sent from Tobol'sk: rye, groats, oatmeal and salt,... [and there is 
also] ham, butter and cheese.. . 
but that their supplies drowned in the river Ob', as they 
wrote in their petition... that is all untrue. " 
Only one boatload got slightly wet since 
"they transported their supplies early in spring after the thaw. s418 
Tukhachevskii ordered Rukin, Tomsk syn boiarskii Vasilii Prokof ev and sixty 
cossacks to transport grain to the Enisei Kyrgyz grasslands. Even after this, Rukin 
disobeyed again, and when Tukhachevskii tried to imprison him, Tobol'sk litva and 
mounted cossacks interfered. 
When the army left Tomsk on 20 June 1641, half a year later than planned, and, 
due to desertion, 210 cossacks short of the envisaged 870, there was lasting 
disagreement about strategy - the cossacks wished to strike hard, and in fact took as 
many prisoners and booty as they could. Surprisingly, as they claimed, in no more 
than a month they managed amidst the steppe to exhaust their grain and money 
remuneration. Once they had seized a huge trail of dromedaries and other livestock 
in a successful assault, using the animals as shields to keep the Enisci Kyrgyz from 
retribution, they claimed they could no longer sustain campaign service. During the 
417 Ibid., 53 
418 Ibid., 46,54 
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campaign, one of Tukhachevskii's most ardent foes, piatidesiatnik I. Misailov, 
managed to sell weapons for eight roubles to Kyrgyz warriors, while accusing 
Tukhachevskii of the same feat. As the voevoda found out, many of his men planned 
to flee to the Kalmyks in the southwest, looking to seize the opportunity for trade. 
The cossacks were infuriated when they learned they should return their captives 
whom they considered their rightful remuneration for the campaign. Tukhachevskii 
planned to defeat the nomads, yet to treat them respectfully to placate potential 
opposition to a new ostrog amidst their lands. Returning successfully from the 
campaign, on a crossroads near Kuznetsk the vast majority of cossacks in the circle 
could find no good reason to depart again and build an ostrog; after a row only 
twelve men, half of them his own military slaves, followed Tukhachevskii. 419 
Syn boiarskii Ivan Rukin and his entourage of Tobol'sk litva and mounted 
cossacks appeared to have their own agenda concerning Achinsk and the desirable 
status of the area. Yet the majority of cossacks could hardly care less - as mentioned, 
they might sympathise with the former, but they were much more concerned with 
their short-term gains, and negotiated for salary as best they could. Returning to 
Tomsk the cossacks received a caravan of Ob Ostiaks to exchange livestock and 
slaves for furs. On 13 August and 9 October 1641 4,418 roubles cash salary and 2506 
sack of rye flour and 2,591 1/2 chet'; 906 chet' of oat; 450 chet' groats and oatmeal; 
and 700 3/4 chet' oat were delivered from Tobol'sk. Tukhachevskii's rebellious 
cossacks straight away petitioned Tomsk voevodas to issue grain zhalovan'e for their 
"military affairs". In Tomsk, they claimed, they were dying of starvation since rye 
was expensive - four roubles for one chet'. Again, negotiations started, and the 
voevodas gave in as before. Having received their salary for two years in advance, as 
the Tomsk voevodas reported, they nevertheless objected to a return to 
Tukhachevskii. They claimed that they were unable to serve under his leadership: 
"... we will not obey voevodas Iakov Tukhachevskii and we will not serve this 
service. "420 
Tomsk voevodas adopted desperate means - they allowed the cossacks to elect 
their own leaders to head for the ostrog of Achinsk, which then had been established 
419 Ibid., 45-61 
420 Ibid., 73-4 
122 
by Tukhachevskii's few men. In his unusually detailed and reliable piece on the 
Achinsk campaign based on archival sources en passant of his studies on the 
foundation and subsequent flourishing of the town of Achinsk, which, years before 
Pokrovskii's first book on the cossacks, in the spirit of its time does not aspire to an 
analysis of the campaign, 421 let alone the forms of organisation, or the way in which 
cossacks negotiated their salary, Rezun claims this was unusual; 422 yet as already 
mentioned, it was a common, institutionalised practice. Since the cossacks were little 
inclined to relieve Tukhachevskii in his steppe fortress, they claimed not to be able to 
leave for Achinsk as long as there was no sovereign's decree assigning a voevoda 
since - "it is not [our] custom", they declared, to elect their own voevoda. They had 
good reason to hesitate, as Tukhachevskii inundated Moscow and Tomsk with 
petitions demanding severe punishment for the "traitors" who had deserted him. The 
rebels, however, suffered no harm, for they bluntly declared they would not allow 
any of them to be imprisoned selectively, but only all together -a fairly improbable 
outcome. The Personenverband formed of these oddly assorted cossacks from 
several towns defied the razriad-voevodas of Tomsk, and a stol'nik voevoda 
Klubkov-Mosal'skii at that, using the tsar's own institutional prerogatives. It was 
only after a decree from Moscow arrived, and as many as fifty-seven cossacks had 
taken to their heels, that the rest of Tukhachevskii's army, reinforced by new men, 
well prepared for trade by the zhalovan'e they had received, and under the officially- 
confirmed leadership of the second Tomsk voevoda I. Kobylskii, set out to relieve 
the founder of Achinsk. 423 
Thus, when the interests of the Personenverband were concerned, even 
zhalovan'e could not guarantee the smooth execution of Moscow's wishes. This 
sheds light on the decisive powers of the Personenverband - cossacks could not live 
without their remuneration, and depended on disbursement in advance in order to 
make their actions viable. Negotiations about a sensitive issue such as the granting of 
loans for years in advance were fierce, yet contenders insisted on the legitimacy of 
their actions. 
421 Rezun, "Pokhod", 42 
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Rezun believes that Ivan Rukin and his supporters, who put up a more fervent 
opposition to Moscow's and Tukhachevskii's plans, feared the establishment of a 
sovereign's fortress headed by a voevoda, which from the point of view of Rezun's 
time is identical with the "all-powerful... state". 424 To a certain degree, they certainly 
considered "the state" a competitor, however, it seems unikely that they perceived it 
as "all-powerful" since they had already proven again that the state was not even 
capable of controlling efficiently what was going on in the frontier. Therefore, they 
rather feared the competition of another Personenverband in trade - and an 
unwelcome voevoda with personal needs - at Achinsk that would exclude them from 
exploiting parts of the hinterland of Tomsk and Tobol'sk. Similar motivations can be 
found on a number of other occasions. Thus, in December 1672 Samoil Aleksandrov 
syn Lisovskii, prikazchik of Barguzinsk, reported that on three occasions five 
cossacks from Selenginsk had used a forged decree to turn away more than thirty 
local Tungus from Barguzinsk, inciting them to pay iasak in neighbouring 
Selenginsk 425 In 1661, Irkutsk was founded on behalf of a petition by a Buryat 
princeling pledging the Eniseisk voevoda for protection from the depredations of the 
Krasnoiarsk cossacks. 26 In another case, in 1646 Eniseisk voevoda F. F. Uvarov 
proposed, in accordance with a petition of "the whole town (vsia gorod)" which 
referred to delays and shortcomings in the administration of justice, submitted to the 
Siberian chancellery that Eniseisk should no longer be part of the Tomsk razriad, but 
rather that legal matters should be investigated in Eniseisk. 427 
Credit, Trade and Service 
Cossacks considered their possessions and entitlements worthy of defence, and 
cossack service desirable. Therefore, for the Siberian authorities recruitment was not 
as thorny an issue as for example in the German Empire; actually problems related to 
recruitment were altogether different. The Siberian chancellery could not even think 
of the vigorous suppression of rebellions, and could not exert a control tight enough 
424 Cf. Ibid., 67 
425 RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 2 11.22-3 (report). Emelka Evdokimov was a local leader (sec 
chapt. V), another figures "with comrades". 426 Kopylov, "0 date", 166 
427 Aleksandrov, Nast', 123,164. See 212-5,231-6. Cf. Lantzeff, Siberia, 47, claiming without 
evidence rivalries were caused by the voevodas. 
124 
as to impose exterior discipline; desertion could be a problem in some regions where 
there were new, more attractive conditions. However, even the settlers in Albazin, 
which came closest to a "free cossack republic", choose to collect and pay the iasak 
- thus allowing the interpretation that they were loyal; hence the Siberian chancellery 
was quick to deliver whatever supplies were needed. 428 Rather than desertions, 
though they were not unknown, the Siberian chancellery was forced to tackle the 
problem of unsanctioned enrolment. After investigations headed by Moscow or 
Tobol'sk envoys, those unlawfully registered by the voevodas were ousted 429 
Siberian cossacks paid enormous bribes just for the privilege of enrolment - an 
investigation in Selenginsk in 1720 revealed that common bribes regularly amounted 
to up to seven roubles and a length of Chinese cloth, although some paid even more. 
At the same time warlords in the German Empire were forced to pay increasingly 
higher amounts of Handgeld, a one-off payment on enrolment. Handgeld often 
amounted to more than a mercenary could earn in a whole year and nevertheless - or 
rather for that reason - the princes and towns faced frequent defections, sometimes 
already on the recruiting square (Musterplatz). While German princes could only fill 
the ranks of their armies with criminals and vagrants, thus inevitably harming their 
efforts to increase discipline, in Western Siberia the Siberian chancellery 
increasingly relocated those enrolled unlawfully from among the banned, the vagrant 
and even the tax-paying people to their former quarters. The aim was to increase the 
number of descendants of cossacks among the recruits. 430 Even in the east itself, a 
candidate needed some qualifications to be eligible for service. Twenty-six out of 
185 cossacks interrogated at Selenginsk in 1720 were Tungus, Buryats or Mongols 
baptised shortly before their enrolment during 1700-1719. Seventy-two were 
vagrants (guliashchie) - mostly sons of peasants, bobyli, and priests or orphans from 
all over Siberia and the north of Russia while just seventy-one cossack sons, and 
three "inhabitants", were enrolled, the latter two groups all from Selenginsk. 
However, in Siberia vagrants showed a tendency to remain in the same place for long 
periods, or return regularly. Just twelve of the guliashchie had lived in Selenginsk for 
428 Forsyth, Peoples, 106; Bakhrushin, Ocherki ... 
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four years or shorter, and only half of the latter for one year or less, while thirty-six 
had made a living in Selenginsk for ten to twenty-seven years before enrolment. Two 
enrolled cossacks had formerly been banned for unknown reasons - the latter a rather 
low percentage. Eight came from the posad or were descendants of posad people, 
one of them even a merchant 431 
A certain degree of steadiness and the ability to adapt to the new environment, as 
well a minimal accumulation of wealth were preconditions for enrolment as a 
cossack, at least in the first two decades of the eighteenth century, when Selenginsk 
was a rich caravan town on the Chinese border. The attractiveness of cossack service 
can be discerned from the fact that out of the 218 aforementioned cossacks in 
Selenginsk only thirty-two claimed they had not bribed the voevoda or the prikazchik 
to be recruited, many of the others paying as much as seven roubles, while another 
fifteen are not known to have paid bribes. While in the second half of the seventeenth 
century military service in the German Empire lost its appeal even to the lower 
classes432, in Siberia at the turn of the seventeenth century cossack service still 
looked appealing for people from the posad. Although there was a shortage of 
manpower, most of the vagrants or rather migrants had to wait for decades to enrol, 
until they were reliable enough for the service of the sovereign and had acquired 
some local knowledge. 
At least in the 1690s payments were considered so reliable in Eastern Siberia that 
cossacks could frequently take out a loan on this security. Between January and 
August 1694 in Irkutsk twenty-six foot and mounted cossacks borrowed sums 
between one and five roubles, which were to be paid directly by the voevoda's office 
"in advance for the next year (1694/1695) from my first instalment" or on the spot 
"in advance for next year". Buyers of these futures were the prikazchik of the 
Eniseisk gost' Ushakov, mounted cossack piatidesiatnik Erofei Iakovlcv syn 
Mogilev, the mounted cossack desiatnik and holder of the venal office of the scribe 
in the town square Andrei Kakhovskii, the cossack Ivan Kandrageev syn Khmelev, 
and the pod'iachii Ekim Samoilov, all of Irkutsk. These transactions show that 
economic relations were intense enough to change social relations. The need to 
431 RGADA f. 214 kn. 1619,11.21-110 (investigation). See also chapt. IV. 
432 Burschel, Söldner, 318-9 
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identify debtors generated by the developing financial relations in a quickly growing 
town with a high turnover in population led to the routine recording of full names. In 
Irkutsk, all ordinary cossacks and lower ranks signing a loan were recorded with 
their father's name, which was not common practice in other documents. On the 
contrary, the town square scribe and the higher-ranking pod'iachii who drew up the 
deeds were recorded with their titles and whereabouts, but without their father's 
name. Significantly, the same was true for two cossacks signing their transaction in 
the small Bel'skii ostrog. 433 
The economic success achieved by means of such loans could be considerable. In 
1691 unknown perpetrators stole soap and tobacco from the premises of Irkutsk 
cossack Andrei Osharov. Osharov, thereby unable to pay the lease, lost his soap 
factory and tannery to the owner syn boiarskii Sidor Shestakov, who repossessed his 
property. 434 In the same year Osharov, not prepared to stand by for long reclaimed an 
- as yet minor - debt from a fellow cossack435, and already in the next year came up 
with an even more ambitious plan to recover the soap works and tannery - this time 
he wanted finally to buy it out at the considerable price of 230 roubles. Unable to pay 
cash, he petitioned the Siberian chancellery for the right to take out a security. In 
1693/1694 the Siberian chancellery accepted liability for Osharov's debt to the 
amount of four roubles per annum taken from Osharov's service entitlement 436 The 
records are silent on whether this was the full annual amount of payment due, but 
apparently the arrangement was attractive enough for Shestakov to agree to the deal. 
For several years all went well for Osharov's and Shestakov's deal, while Osharov 
rose to become a desiatnik of mounted cossacks, until in 1696, the year of the 
cossack rebellion around lake Baikal, the embattled voevoda Savelov tried to oblige 
his most important supporters. While Osharov was away from Irkutsk, Shestakov 
seized the opportunity to enrich himself unlawfully. He claimed that the payments 
had not been made, repossessed the factory, and finally had the returned Osharov 
"put in prison ... and had him flogged ... 
for two weeks". Osharov and his wife 
complained they were forced to pay for a horse worth five roubles fifty, clothes for 
433 RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 317,11.1-6 434 Ibid. no. 226,11.2-17. Cited according to opis' (file "vetkhoe"). 
435 Ibid. no. 257,11.24,147 
436 Ibid. no. 422,1.117 
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himself and his wife, and eight funt437 silk to Sidor. In 1696, for Irkutsk the regular 
payment of all debts to all cossacks was still half a decade away, although 
neighbouring Nerchinsk already fully relished the rewards of the prospering caravan 
trade with China. 38 Yet Savelov had given many examples of subterfuge, Shestakov 
was his equal in this art, and an investigation was already impending against both. 
Whatever the reason for the quarrel, Shestakov could not indulge in his gains for too 
long. In early 1697, Irkutsk cossacks overthrew voevoda Savelov, and Shestakov was 
killed by rebellious Nerchinsk cossacks siding with the relatives of a Tungus guide 
he had killed in a quarrel while leading a caravan returning from China. 439 The 
Siberian chancellery, though still ignorant of this train of events, fully endorsed 
Osharov's complaints, ordered the return of his valuables and again obliged the 
Irkutsk treasury to pay the full liability each year. 440 Only months after this lawsuit, 
Osharov managed to take part in escorting the iasak treasury to Moscow, providing 
him with an opportunity to buy merchandise in the capital. When he re-applied for 
remuneration in advance for 1699/1700 after returning in early 1699, the loss of one 
fifth of the treasury during the journey was considered, yet in the end he was 
exculpated and received his salary. aal In 1699/1700, Andrei Osharov was busy in 
Irkutsk, most likely working at his zavod; he exchanged his service due in the 
frontier fortress of Tunkinsk during 1700/1701 with rank-and-file cossack Poliakov 
avoiding any distraction from his endeavours 442 
The rebellion of the Transbaikalians, and the subsequent fall of the voevoda, had 
changed the balance of power in favour of Osharov. Yet Osharov, a cossack of low 
status, gained primarily through the engagement of the chancellery and its steadfast 
commitment for financial securities. 
Flourishing international trade induced such a commitment. As merchants had to 
fear hungry cossacks and had yet to rely on them on distant journeys, it comes as no 
surprise that after the crisis of payments following the 1670s there was first a 
consolidation in Nerchinsk, the essential border post on the caravan route to China. 
4371 funt = 409.5 grams 
438 Leont'eva, Sluzhilye, 116,125-6 
439 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 324. See chapter V. 
440 RGADA f. 1121 op. 2 no. 183,11.2-4 (decree) 441 Ibid. op. 1 no. 175 11.41-2 
442 Ibid. no. 462,1.7 
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By 1690 all outstanding payments were made, and no further delays occurred except 
for those allowances not applied for in individual years. A decade later, the same 
level of performance was reached in Irkutsk, and in 1703 caravans finally changed 
their route to the shorter Irkutsk-Selenginsk-Beijing trail 443 
In many ways, the Siberian chancellery managed to bind cossacks' interest in 
petty or large-scale overland trade to its own business of securing the fur tax. 
Cossacks often received part of their salary which was either delayed or was paid in 
advance on arrival at the Siberian chancellery with the sovereign's fur treasury or 
with reports the voevoda sent to Moscow. In Moscow the "podennyi korm" was paid 
at a rate of three to four kopeks per day, "on taking leave of Moscow" between two 
and six roubles - however this was paid not only to cossacks, but also to servants of 
the bishop, sworn men, and iasak people as long as their journey was related to the 
"sovereign's affairs" 44 
During the seventeenth century, a variable total of up to fifty roubles in trade 
goods was free of tax, as well as zhalovan'e. Taken together, this could amount to a 
considerable sum: In early 1697 Nerchinsk syn boiarskii Grigorii Lonshakov was 
sent to Moscow to convey the sovereign's treasury - destined as zhalovan'e for 
cossacks and iasak people - back to Nerchinsk. He had prepared for this long 
journey appropriately, carrying goods, mainly Chinese cloth and other items worth 
275 roubles. However, of the whole amount he paid taxes only for goods worth 145 
roubles, since fifty roubles were tax-free anyway, and merchandise worth another 
eighty roubles was counted as zhalovan'e for 1694-6 and even "vpred' (in advance) 
for the years 1697 and 1698. He was the leader of a caravan to China in 1689-91, one 
of a number of rich merchants among the cossacks. Some of these were kin of 
merchant families, attracted by the opportunities for trade that cossacks enjoyed, in 
particular service journeys abroad; diplomatic journeys were otherwise inaccessible 
to merchants, who therefore worked together closely with their cossack relatives. In 
Irkutsk and Nerchinsk uezds, such families included the Savvatecvs, Istopnikovs, 
Shtinnikovs and Torshievskiis; some merchants however preferred to become 
443 Leont'eva, Sluzhilye, 327 
444 Astapenko, Istoriia, 107; Nikitin, Sluzhilye, 103-141; idem, "K voprosu o sotsial'noi prirode", 
54-55; Alekseev, Sibir, vol. 2,346; Safronov, F. G., Russkie na severo-vostoke Asii, Moscow 1978, 
72-79 
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cossacks themselves, such as the Burdukovskiis, or the Selenginsk piatidesiatnik 
Dmitrii Tarakanovskii, recorded as a trader in the 1680s and early 1690s in 
Nerchinsk, Selenginsk, and Udinsk. However these few families did not make up the 
vast majority of cossacks escorting the caravans. In 1698, the caravan of Spiridon 
Liangusov was escorted by one hundred cossacks, using the loophole created by 
new, complicated decrees limiting the number of tax-exempt escorting cossacks to 
four, and their tax privilege to a mere twenty roubles; not surprisingly, the Siberian 
chancellery reacted furiously. Even so, between twenty and fifty cossacks constituted 
a normal escort 445 
Although the lion's share in trade regularly belonged to the merchants, det! 
boiarskie and wealthy rank-and-file cossacks, it would be artificial to separate a 
"verkhushka" from the poor mass of the cossacks 446 According to precedents, lesser 
cossacks took their turn in the caravan's escort and in other distant services 447 Out of 
127 cossacks and deti boiarskie who escorted six caravans between Nerchinsk and 
Beijing during 1690-1701, only twenty-four declared less than twenty roubles of 
dutiable merchandise on return. In the resulting statistics, a large middle field can be 
determined, with cossacks bringing back significantly more than their cash 
zhalovan'e for the two years of service. Fifty-two cossacks imported merchandise 
worth three to fourteen times their entitlement of seven roubles (20-100 roubles), and 
another twenty-four carried wares up to two hundred roubles. The wealthy cossack 
merchants can be divided into several groups as well, with eleven trading in between 
200 and 300 roubles, and another twelve bringing back 330 to 630 roubles. It has to 
be admitted that there was a considerable gap to those cossacks and deti boiarskie 
earning the largest incomes from the caravan trade - these four brought back 1,442 
roubles 60 kopeks, 2,450 roubles, 2,464 roubles and 2721 roubles, accounting for 
nearly half of the merchandise worth 23,813 roubles cossacks and deti boiarskie 
imported from China in these years. Nevertheless, it is hard to see how the garrisons 
could be divided into the leadership on the one hand and ordinary cossacks on the 
other. As Leont'eva rightly points out, it misses the point that ordinary cossacks in 
445 Leont'eva, Sluzhilye, 322,292-4,307 
116 Cf. Aleksandrov, "Dal'nevostochnykh", 216 
447 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 158,375; Nikitin, Sluzhilye, 98-100 
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the escort received their merchandise exclusively as a form of payment for services 
to the merchants, since these services could form a considerable part of the 
business 448 Moreover, in many ways much of the population of uezds involved in 
foreign trade took part in the profits of caravans. In 1699 Nerchinsk cossack E. 
Gusevskii drove twenty-five horses across the border with the caravan of Iakov 
Beiton, to carry 185 pud kitaiki back from Beijing; he received Chinese silver worth 
555 Ian, or three Ian for one pud load. Profitable contracts like this were very 
widespread. On Nerchinsk market, where cattle, horses etc. were in good supply, 
locals never sold livestock. The border was close, caravan escort was restricted to 
members of the border garrisons, and cossacks of each town were allowed to escort 
only to the next station on the way. Therefore selling food to members of a caravan 
was more profitable than in the market place 449 During the period of Russian- 
Chinese caravan trade through the town, the number of assignments of Nerchinsk 
rank-and-file cossacks as deti boiarskie increased significantly. Members of the 
cossack families of the Liangusovs, Molodois, Kazanovs, Peshkovs, Khludnevs, 
Lugovskiis, Firsovs, and others, started during the 1670-80s as ordinary cossacks. 
They advanced in the 1690s and early years of the eighteenth century to the ranks of 
piatidesiatnik, deti boiarskie, and dvorian of the Nerchinsk and Moscow list. They 
shared a growing professionalism and good fortune in trade, leading some of them to 
the conclusion that changing their profession from cossack or servitor to private 
merchant served their interests better, despite the lost privileges. Though records on 
individual careers are usually incomplete, the high margins of profit in caravan trade 
allowed careers like Nerchinsk cossack V. Khludnev, who moved to Selenginsk 
when the caravans changed their route, and returned from Beijing in 1717 with 
Chinese merchandise worth 875 roubles. In 1726 he had already changed his 
profession to merchant, and sent his prikazchik to Moscow with Chinese wares worth 
10,845 roubles. 450 
Nevertheless, many risks were associated with caravan trade, and many ordinary 
cossacks who travelled for the first time found that they could not master all of them, 
448 Cf. Aleksandrov, "Dal'nevostochnykh", 216. Leont'eva, Sluzhilye, 310-312,315,351-3,327 
449 Leont'eva, Sluzhilye, 312 
450 Kafengauz, B. B., Geograflia vnutrennei torgovli, Moscow 1950,192; Lcont'eva, Sluzhilye, 
341-3. 
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as scores of law-suits show. Returning with empty hands or damaged goods due to 
inexperience or frequent unforeseeable events on the road, they lacked the material 
backing their wealthier comrades enjoyed. Since high-interest short-term loans of 
well over one hundred roubles were not rare, they found themselves frequently 
pilloried, and redeemed themselves at a rate of five roubles annually: 
"Cossacks, gunners and other servitors of the lesser ranks, who cannot buy themselves 
out from their debt, shall be handed over to the litigant after one month for indentured 
labour. "451 
It is little wonder, therefore, that at the border-post a second caravan of creditors 
usually awaited those returning, eager to get hold of their merchandise. Even for 
wealthy gosti like the Ushakovs and Nikitins foreign trade was connected to a whole 
system of loans 452 For ordinary cossacks it was a great relief to face the considerable 
risks with the security of interest-free zhalovan'e in advance. The huge advantage 
such an arrangement offered the cossacks can be appraised from the high rates of 
interest in Muscovy: 20 per cent as against 5 per cent in the Netherlands -a level 
matched by an equally huge problem to make debtors pay for their debts 453 The 
Siberian chancellery took care of the needs of cossacks escorting caravans; in a 
decree concerning the use of additional zhalovan'e issued in 1698/99 it was 
stipulated that to ease preparations those who were sent on distant journeys should 
receive more cash zhalovan'e and less merchandise 454 
Even ordinary cossacks were very much up to the relative prices on different 
markets, as the dogged resistance by the Tobol'sk cossacks to their new voevodas' 
plans to hold back zhalovan'e on the occasion of the campaign to set up Iakutsk 
ostrog in 1638 shows. In the course of their finally successful struggle they observed: 
"As compared to Tobol'sk, in the fort of Eniseisk everything is three times more 
expensive. And if they receive their salary [only] at the river Lena, they will not find 
anything for their needs, and what they find they will have to buy at exaggerated 
4ss prices. ", 
451 Hellie, Richard (transl., ed. ), The Muscovite Law Code (Ulozhenie) of 1649, Irvine/CA 1988, 
pt. 1., 81. Debt bondage: idem, Slavery in Russia, Chicago 1982. 
asz Leont'eva, Sluzhilye, 343; Bakhrushin, S. V., "Torgi gostia Nikitina v Sibiri i Kitaie", in: idcm, 
Trudy vol. 3 pt. 1, Moscow 1955,226-251 
13 Arel, Maria, "Making a Honest Rubel in the Russian North", FzGO vol. 54 (1998), 15-20. 
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which was indeed the situation early in the century. 
Although caravan-trade was the quickest way to get rich, for the new and poor 
men there were more effective means available involving less of a gamble. The 
caravan trade infused other, less spectacular trades and crafts with new life, many of 
them held by cossacks. Grain forestallers travelling the country-side to buy out grain 
on the voevoda's request were largely deti boiarskie and some upwardly mobile 
rank-and-file cossacks. Yet on account of direct sales in the market-place, for 
example in Nerchinsk in the years 1699/1700,1701,1703, and 1714, all other 
categories of sellers were outnumbered more than ten times by 151 ordinary 
cossacks, rank-and-file, desiatniki, retired and their relatives. Their presence was 
overwhelming in number of sales and a volume of 2,115.75 chetverty, while all other 
suppliers taken together accounted for just 394.5 chetverty ash A lower proportion of 
cossacks joined in trading livestock, with 33 per cent of all cattle sold in Irkutsk 
market during 1694-1697 and twelve per cent in Nerchinsk in three periods during 
1697-1701 belonging to cossacks of predominantly lower ranks. While forestallers 
accounted for most of the trade in livestock, traders in the market place were usually 
rank-and-file cossacks. Since the 1670s, nearly every year small caravans travelled 
from Nerchinsk, Irkutsk or Selenginsk to Mongol tribes to purchase livestock; the 
nomads also drove their cattle to Nerchinsk and the walls of Selenginsk on the brink 
of the open steppe. At least four cossack butchers occupied shops in Nerchinsk and 
two in Irkutsk. 457 Other commodities included furs, processed leather fur, salt, 
minerals, metals and light-coloured mica, which was used for windowpanes; some 
large, jointed church windows made of this material survive. 58 In all of these trades 
considerable numbers of cossacks were engaged. Jobs were available in servicing 
caravans, contractual provisioning of transport animals, building houses, or helping 
at harvest time, all of which were, due to a still limited work force in Eastern Siberia, 
well-paid up to the amount of a cossack's annual allowance. 
Church architecture reflected how intricately interwoven cossack service, trade 
and localism were in Irkutsk uezd. Slovtsov considered a certain style of church 
456 Leont'eva, Sluzhilye, 296 table 18 
457 Ibid., 298-300 
458 Serebrennikov, I. I., Pamiatniki starinnago dereviannogo zodchestva v Irkutskoi gubernii, 
Irkutsk 1915, table 17 
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architecture including shatrovye (tent-formed and sloped at the ends) bell-tower 
roofs instead of onion cupolas as "cossack taste", a way of building known in the 
European Russian north which in the last years of the seventeenth century was 
forbidden by decree, but continued in Siberia 459 Monasteries and churches occupied 
a vital place in daily life. The refectory of the parish church often served as meeting 
room for the cossack community and priests were elected and paid by the parish. 60 
After the Udinsk cossacks' raid at Il'insk on the possessions of the voevoda of 
Nerchinsk, Anton Savelov, the desiatnik, rebel cossack leader and elected prikazchik 
of Udinsk Mosei Borisov donated a part of his booty to Il'insk parish church as an 
appropriate means of pacifying the estranged inhabitants of Il'insk 461 Considering 
the important role monasteries and churches played in everyday life, it is not 
surprising to find shops on the outside of the church as part of the "cossack" style. In 
the 1684 inventory of Irkutsk it is mentioned that under the porch of the Saviour 
church there were "six shops in a circle and two habitations". There was also a 
"new bell-tower with a tent roof made of logs near the church, and under the passage 
connecting it with the church there were four more shops and a church storehouse. A62 
In Irkutsk and uezd, many wooden churches kept to this style. 463 
Conclusion 
In comparison to mercenaries throughout Russia and in the German Empire, even 
ordinary Siberian cossacks were well off. Trade across an uncontrollable frontier 
region as vast as the south of Siberia in the seventeenth century presupposed the 
military power of small warrior groups as a key element of Moscow's power in the 
region. Given Muscovy's dependency on furs, as long as cossack duties included the 
collection of iasak or guarding trade overland and abroad, it proved hard for Moscow 
and its voevodas to reduce their income significantly. Moscow could not even 
militarily control the towns, as soon as the main part of the population, the cossacks, 
decided to rebel. The potential for negotiation derived from a variety of bottle-neck 
situations. These included the public distribution of huge annual deliveries of grain; 
459 Ibid., 5; Slovtsov, Obozrenie, vol. 1,108 460 Zo1'nikova, N. D., Sibirskaia prikhodskaia obshchina, Novosibirsk 1990,178-82 
461 RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 1851.53 462 Golovachev (ed. ), Pervoe stoletie Irkutska, 1 
463 Serebrennikov, Pamiatniki, 6 
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the departure of large detachments of cossacks for campaign or guarding the 
caravans; salary's effect as an incentive actually to deliver the fur-tribute and 
information to Moscow, all of which were the duty of ordinary foot cossacks. 
Cossacks' effective impunity in collectively robbing merchants if they had not 
received their salaries also helped to improve their position in negotiations. Even in 
the long periods of abundance, when supply generally met allowance, these 
deliveries were occasionally unreliable due to bad communications. Although the 
government as well as the cossacks was generally interested in the substitution of 
grain salary for land, until the end of the seventeenth century frontier conditions on 
top of continuous expansion did not allow cossacks to live exclusively from their 
own lands. Conflicts arose as over-zealous or self-seeking voevodas attempted to 
introduce reforms that regional agriculture could not yet sustain, and also when 
regional centres such as Eniseisk competed for profitable iasak territories with 
disadvantaged, outlying frontier towns or fortresses in the steppe, which were 
dependent on the former for the delivery of salary. Local interests influenced the 
outcome of these conflicts to a considerable degree. 
Used as an incentive for cossacks to explore new territories, negotiate with the 
fur-hunters as well as subjugate them and escort fur tributes, zhalovan'e itself 
became a bone of contention on a local level. Since zhalovan'e amounted to a hefty 
loan, cossacks were spurred to engage in petty overland and local trade whereby 
some of them became wealthy merchants. These loans and tax privileges as well as 
access to the iasak territories and to caravans granted to cossacks induced even 
merchants to set up their relatives as cossacks or they found it rewarding to enrol as 
cossacks themselves. Ironically, it was under the tutelage of the Siberian chancellery, 
promoting the state monopoly on trade with China, that numerous local cossack 
long-distance merchants were enabled to make their fortunes. As they strove to 
control the main sources of wealth, such as iasak, zhalovan'e, and interregional 
trade, local Personenverbände competed with one another for the revenue, within a 
town as well as between towns. They could be opposed to the voevoda, who by 
himself constituted a major contender in the struggle for revenue from iasak and 
trade, or choose him as their leader. 
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The Personenverband underwent certain changes: Remuneration elevated the 
position of the voevoda for it granted him power of allocation. Yet in times of dearth 
moral economy rallied the Personenverband to check these tendencies of 
hierarchisation on a local level. In doing so, the cossacks referred to customary 
expectation, precedent, the instructions the chancellery issued to the voevodas, and to 
decrees. In the end, local networks defined by Personenverband values often gained 
the upper hand even in prospering towns where cossacks found it convenient to 
subordinate themselves to a voevoda at least for his initial period of tenure. As long 
as the basic preconditions of Russian expansion in Siberia were in place, therefore, 
the Personenverband allowed interregional collaboration, exchange, even 
participation in decision-making, and at the same time fuelled a fierce localism. 
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Chapter III Integration of the Trading Frontier: The 
Sovereign's Affair 
Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Muscovy's territory 
increased more than thirty times to become an empire that included very different 
peoples, customs, religions and climates. Siberia dwarfed all other annexed 
territories. Although distances were already huge within Muscovy west of the Urals, 
this exacerbated the problems of governance in Siberia. During the early modem 
period, governance was restricted by many factors even in countries such as France 
or Germany, therefore the question of how Siberia was integrated into the realm and 
what institutions made its government possible is even more salient. The problem is 
also complicated since in Siberia the only officially-sanctioned armed forces were 
the various cossack bands, while the rest of the population bore weapons as well. For 
economic reasons, the tsar could not simply send an army to discipline Siberian 
towns. Yet just as there were economic reasons that prevented coercion being applied 
to rebels, there were also economic motives that urged the Siberian towns to remain 
under the suzerainty of the tsar. Since the main markets for fur and a considerable 
part of the supply of foodstuffs, weapons and other supplies were located in the west, 
they always sought some sort of agreement with Moscow. Because any accord was 
apt to be renegotiated more than once, institutions enabling cossacks to communicate 
with the chancellery and the tsar had to be flexible. On the other hand, they also had 
to confirm the expectation prevalent in autocratic Muscovy that only God's laws 
bound the tsar. 
Hardly any institution in central Muscovy combined the expectation of faithful 
service with the needs of independent-minded traders in isolated outposts. Yet 
institutions are not as pre-determined as it may seem - the actual meaning of 
symbolical forms depends on the distribution of power in society. The exercise of 
power in seventeenth-century Siberia was different from its exercise in central 
Muscovy. Therefore the vital institution regulating service and providing for the 
security of the tsar, the sovereign's word and affair, in Siberia obtained variant 
meanings as well. Thus, for example, the Selenga rebels justified the siege of Irkutsk 
in 1696 as well as several confiscations of voevodas' merchandise by declaring a 
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sovereign's affair against the voevoda, and called for his deposition. Due to the 
staunch support that the Irkutsk Personenverband afforded the voevoda, and 
substantial fortifications, they could not achieve this in that particular case, however 
other Siberian cossack rebels quite frequently deposed the voevoda by the same 
means. This chapter focuses on the regalian salutation and the sovereign's word and 
affair as examples of key institutions which proved particularly useful for the 
Siberian cossack bands in their relations with the Muscovite centre, as a case study 
which suggests an explanation for the processes of adaptation Muscovite institutions 
underwent in Siberia. The institutionalist approach chosen in this study stresses that 
despite such transformations, they remained Muscovite institutions; hence, in 
principle all Muscovites could apply them. Power relations determined what these 
and other institutions facilitating communication throughout Siberia and Muscovy 
meant to Siberian cossacks. The first two chapters have established three main 
factors influencing these relations: the Personenverband, its capacity to negotiate 
salary and credit, and the fur trade. This chapter will explore the interplay of these 
factors with other sources of power and the institutional environment Muscovy 
provided to Siberia. Before dealing with the specific features of the regalian 
salutation and the sovereign's word and affair it will, however, consider certain 
aspects of the Siberian environment necessary for an understanding of the particular 
way the sovereign's word and affair operated in the very different power-structures 
of Siberia. 
Siberia in the Seventeenth Century -a Vast Military Camp? 
From Müller onwards, historians of Siberia have agreed that Moscow conquered 
and controlled Siberia by means of strong authority. Since Müller stressed the 
achievements of state power already during the discovery and conquest of Siberia, 
the state's exclusive initiative in establishing absolutism has never been called into 
question. 64 For critics of tsarist rule, the glory added to the tsar's crown by the 
conquest of Siberia was an eyesore, although they did not disapprove of the conquest 
as such; to such commentators it radiated tsarist credentials. The Siberian regionalists 
in the nineteenth century, therefore, stressed the exploitation and suppression of 
464 Miller, lstoriia, vol. 1,249-50,273-7 and passim 
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Siberia as a Russian colony, but did not grasp the nature of early modern conditions. 
Slovtsov believed frequent nomad assaults were invited by the chancellery's 
negligence and reluctance to afford proxy powers to regional voevodas, caused by its 
acquisitiveness and distrustful attitude, which in turn destroyed regional unity. The 
greedy voevodas sent out scores of small groups, measures that depleted garrisons in 
towns and fortresses. 465 Early Soviet historians attacked tsarism, but hardly 
questioned the tsars' powers of suppression. From the 1940s onwards, others again 
attempted to rescue the old statist paradigm - accordingly, the estate-representative 
monarchy's demise came about by the intervention of the strengthened state. 
Nevertheless, the conception of the estate-representative monarchy was a step on the 
way towards overcoming a view that ascribed all developments in Muscovy to 
centralisation. At the same time, however, this paradigm, following Bogoslovskii, 
considered the "bureaucracy" that allegedly marginalised the estates, as no more than 
a governing class occupied in administration for salary466 
Current accounts of governance in the early modern period stress problems in 
enforcing laws and decrees throughout Western Europe. 67 Yet the latest Western 
historiography on Siberian administration and on the cossacks has done little to 
explore these problems and the specific dynamics of early-modern governance in the 
Siberian context. Dmytryshyn's account rests on the implicit assumption that all 
institutions, and especially bureaucracies, were - or at least became - modem during 
the seventeenth century,. Unimpaired by this development, the tsar's power was 
unbridled by institutional arrangements of any kind, or by physical, customary and 
social impediments. Administration consisted of two intertwined tiers of effective 
"bureaucracies", the Moscow and local levels. Dmytryshyn explains bureaucratic 
efficiency by the Russians' superior knowledge, skills, and technological superiority, 
without referring to a general early modern context. 68 There is also not a word about 
how much time it took to convey Moscow's "timely guidance", which is allegedly 
465 Slovtsov, Obozrenie vol. 1,33-4,37,87; Collins, David N., "Russia's Conquest of Siberia: ", 
Euro'ean Studies Review vol. 12 (1982), 17-4 6 Aleksandrov, Mast', 1-10,15-6,351-7; Bogoslovskii, M. M., Zemskoe samoupravlenie na 
Russkom Severe v XVII v., Moscow 1912, vol. 11,261 
467 Henshall, Myth; Landwehr, Policey 
468 Dmytryshyn, "Administrative", 18-21,34-5 
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proof of the chancellery's control of Siberia. Thus, to Dmytryshyn absolute power 
was a local reality: 
"Of course, the tsar - the absolute and autocratic monarch - whose power was 
unrestricted, presided over both ... 
bureaucracies. Indeed, the entire conquest was 
undertaken in his name, and the whole area was his patrimony, and the revenues went 
into his treasury. , 469 
At particular points, Dmytryshyn passes sentence on bribery or physical 
extortion, without exploring the context. He is most articulate and witty where he 
tells how the voevoda was forced to devise special tasks - such as sentry duties in the 
steppe (! ) - to keep cossack boredom below critical level. This remains the only 
flimsy hint at cossack rebellions, devised more to distract from or to discredit them. 
Yet Dmytryshyn does not address the obvious contradictions in his account between 
the supposed boredom and the "perennial lack of manpower" he has also found. The 
question of how bureaucratic efficiency, which he stresses, could be achieved if the 
voevodas often lacked enough men even to defend towns is not addressed at all 47o 
All of Siberia is presented as one huge "military camp", but the reader is left 
wondering what "military" means here. Cossacks enjoyed no privileges, voevodas 
closely controlled their mobility and they apparently engaged neither in trade nor, 
miraculously, in robbery47 Dmytryshyn reduces petitions and their functions to a 
sentence, suggesting that they served Moscow well by providing intelligence about 
the colony. Henry Huttenbach provides a more balanced approach, pointing out the 
vibrant and dynamic life in the frontier. In his account, careful observation is mixed 
with unexplored tensions as he does not explain how Russian Siberians could be 
"Muscovites at heart and in substance, [yet, they] were also Siberian in personality. " 
While giving a good sense of Siberian rebelliousness, he fails to explain how 
"Muscovite central authority quickly snuffed out these Siberian troublespots. s472 
In Dmytryshyn's view Muscovy's aims in Siberia were not commercial. He 
deviates from his distinguished predecessor, Lantzeff, whose main hypothesis is that 
the Siberian chancellery was a giant business enterprise run on behalf of the tsar by 
469 Ibid., 35 
470 Ibid., 25,29-30,34 
471 Ibid., 31 
472 Huttenbach, Henry R., , Muscovy's Penetration of Siberia", in: Rywkin, Michael (ed. ), Russian Colonial Expansion, London 1988,70-102, here: 100,97 
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officials in Moscow and Siberia. Yet Lantzeff failed to explain how the tsar's orders 
came to life in an isolated and distant environment. While he did acknowledge a 
certain level of "democratic" habits among the cossacks, he explained this 
phenomenon by state-imposed mutual responsibility 473 However, this judicious 
observation is not related to the administrative structure of Siberia. Similarly, he 
dealt with the Siberian chancellery's demands to the voevodas to ask their cossacks 
for advice on essential service-related issues in isolation. Like Bakhrushin, Lantzeff 
was convinced that the sole cause for cossack "disturbances" were voevodas' 
machinations and maltreatment. Although he mentioned the removal and 
imprisonment of voevodas, he failed to analyse who had the power to try and arrest 
them; Lantzeff also overlooked the fact that the cossacks detained voevodas without 
orders 474 
This apparent lack of reflection on the relations between the administration and 
social relations in Siberia is a feature of both the vivid and often controversial 
Russian-language and Western historiography. A recent western review of Russian 
and Soviet views on the conquest of Siberia discusses whether Russian settlement in 
Siberia was government-dominated or spontaneous, but does not explore the extent 
to which the government controlled the cossacks ass 
The distinguished early Soviet scholar Sergei Bakhrushin took a hard look at 
these issues. However, he had extreme ideas about the inefficiency of mechanisms of 
control. He wrote in a sweeping style, though not necessarily with balanced 
judgement about the rituals and institutions of relieving the voevoda: 
"The ceremony of reception and the contents of speeches was once and for all laid down 
in the instructions the voevoda received in Moscow. After two years, when a new 
voevoda arrived, he would tell with the same pathos his predecessor had employed, that 
the latter had mistreated his subjects and had robbed them. Out of mercy, he said, the 
sovereign put the speaker in his place - although he already knew exactly that after 
another two years the following voevoda would say the same about him.... Since [the 
government] was unable to fight the abuses, it feigned instead and tried to distance itself 
in a naive manner in the eyes of the population from its own agents. s476 
47 Lantzeff, Siberia, 80 
474 Ibid., 205 
als Collins, "Conquest", 33 
476 Bakhrushin, Trudy vol. IV, 164-5 
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It is the aim of this chapter to answer the question of whether Bakhrushin was 
indeed right, and to investigate the ways in which cossacks could subvert the alleged 
strict hierarchy of power in Siberia. 
The Limited Public Sphere, Patronage, and Cossack 
Litigation 
The main outside source of power available to Siberian cossacks was patronage. 
The peculiar form of subordination of Siberian towns and forts offered to Siberian 
cossacks opportunities to establish and make use of regionally-available support 
from high-ranking nobles. While the highest level of authority was unified in the 
Siberian chancellery in Moscow - unusual as it was in Muscovy - there was a still 
greater choice of authorities to which grievances could be addressed than the 
Moscow chancellery system offered to petitioners in the European Russian 
provinces 477 To speed up the reaction to nomad assaults, first Tiumen' had been 
given an elevated status over the other towns and forts, a status soon to be transferred 
to Tobol'sk, which then headed the first so-called razriad. Yet in all but military 
affairs, Tobol'sk was only of minor importance; the Tobol'sk voevodas, it has been 
suggested, were more first among equals than superior officials, and enjoyed 
authority over other towns exclusively by emphasising the orders they received from 
Moscow. The Military Office (Razriad) in Moscow appointed voevodas, and even 
the Tobol'sk voevoda did not enjoy the right to depose by his own judgment even the 
least of the voevodas in his own razriad. Instructions issued to new voevodas in 
Moscow stressed that voevodas had to report issues of primary importance to 
Moscow, and those of secondary importance to Tobol'sk. Tobol'sk functioned as a 
centre for the collection of information, since Moscow was too far away to deal with 
this task on its own. The only leverage the voevoda of Tobol'sk had was to report a 
recalcitrant voevoda to Moscow. 478 
Members of a hostile faction, therefore, might relieve voevodas who enjoyed the 
support of the head of the Siberian chancellery. 479 Recent studies on Muscovy 
rejected the earlier view that noble clans represented mere kinship ties of competing 
477 Kivelson, Autocracy, 156-61,176. Exceptions: Ogloblin, Obozrenie pt. III, 184 
478 Lantzeff, Siberia, 39-45. See his organigram, Illustration III. 
479 See 154 
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individuals locked in mutual enmity and eagerness to please the tsar. They tend to 
portray noble clans as interwoven strands in the fabric of a single elite committed to 
a certain degree to the flourishing of the whole realm and the effectiveness of 
government. 480 Thus the outcome of litigation, even if for the time being the voevoda 
inhibited it, was unpredictable, but there was always the hope of a favourable 
settlement. 
By the provisions relating to the razriad-status of towns and the assignment of 
voevodas, Moscow sought to prevent the concentration of power in Siberia in the 
hands of one person, and to stabilise its power beyond the Urals 481 However, these 
terms also created a certain degree of fluidity in administrative relations. In many 
cases, the formally lesser voevoda did not accept his subordination to the razriad 
town. He might be motivated by the importance of honour to a Muscovite noble, who 
at least until the abolition of mestnichestvo in 1682 could find it hard to accept orders 
from a person of lower or equal rank, since that would affect his own and his kin's 
standing within the nobility 482 Ignoring razriad-towns became a common tactic 
employed by voevodas in their squabbles with each other and among different 
kinship groups and clienteles, but it was useful to their foes among their local 
subordinates as well. Adding to ambiguity in administrative relations, towns and 
their voevodas sometimes attempted to establish an independent uezd that made their 
town less dependent on another uezd during court procedures. Squabbles between 
cossacks from towns in different razriady - for example, Eniseisk in Tomsk razriad 
(established 1608) and Mangazeia in Tobol'sk razriad - over furs, which often 
caused the mistreatment of the native population, led to the foundation of the third 
razriad, of Iakutsk, in 1638 483 On occasion the voevodas of the razriad town 
commissioned special investigations into abuses of the assigned voevoda's power484, 
480 Crummey, Robert 0., "The Latest from Muscovy", RR vol. 60 (October 2001), 474-86, here 
475-6 
481 Lantzeff did not relate this observation to rebellions and litigation: Siberia, 32. The razriad 
organisation was emulated later along the frontiers under the first two Romanovs in Riazan', Ukraine, 
Novgorod, Sevsk, Belgorod, Tambov, and Kazan': Kliuchevskii, "Kurs", 195; Chicherin, B. N., 
Oblastnyia uchrezhdeniia Rossii vXVII-m veke, The Hague 1968,61. 
482 Ogloblin, Obozrenie, pt. III, 215,36; Pokrovskii, Pervoe stoletie, no. 26,78-9 
483 Initially, this was an independent voevoda ruling over a handful of small forts lacking, it 
should be mentioned, the steppe frontier character of other razriady, only to be called the Iakutskii 
razriad in 1697. Lantzeff, Siberia, 34-9. Thus razriady were organisations of the frontier. 
484 Ibid., 42 
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which could be embraced by cossacks, or prove unpopular. Quarrels among 
voevodas offered ample opportunities for cossacks in the nominally subordinate 
towns to outmanoeuvre their voevoda and make use of the condition that voevodas 
were eager to serve the tsar - at least as long as patronage issues and their own 
interests did not interfere. 
When in 1686 Krasnoiarsk deti boiarskie and cossacks sought their "full" 
remuneration, they could make use of the diverse and mutually bickering patronage 
and kinship networks among Siberian voevodas. Krasnoiarsk was by this time part of 
the Eniseisk razriad, and stol'nik and voevoda Grigorii I. Shishkov made sure to 
obey while his superior in Eniseisk was prince Konstantin 0. Shcherbatyi. Still, 
when deti boiarskie Trifon Eremeev and Mikhail Bernadskii handed in a petition in 
Eniseisk, Shishkov reacted ruthlessly and, on their return, put them under guard. 
Threatening to make use of the knout, he forced them to sign yet another petition 
declaring that their first petition was a lie. Shishkov treated syn boiarskii Fedor 
Aikanov, who had petitioned in Eniseisk, in a similar way. Aikanov however was not 
so easily pacified; on 17`l March 1686, he declared a sovereign's affair on the market 
square. Shishkov sent a messenger to bring him to the voevoda's office, and when 
Aikanov objected, he sent cossacks. Aikanov said he feared "he would be beaten to 
death" and demanded the gathering of the cossacks in front of the voevoda's office 
since he dare not go to the voevoda on his own. He arrived at the voevoda's office 
with a crowd of cossacks - as the voevoda reported, Fedor made them drunk and told 
his friends and "bread-eaters" to beat the drums and ring the alarm-bell. Aikanov was 
one of a family of cossacks and deli boiarskie; he was likely to mobilise his 
supporters and kin, but as subsequent events show, there was more going on in town. 
Confronting Shishkov from a point of safety amidst the crowd, Aikanov declared he 
could not make public his sovereign's affair and demanded permission to travel to 
Eniseisk, where he would report it. Shishkov demanded that he be told the contents 
of the accusation. He threatened again to make use of torture, this time, however, to 
no avail. The cossacks in the crowd demonstrated a clear sense of due legal 
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process485 while defending Aikanov, which Bakhrushin did not notice. They 
petitioned orally that 
"Fedor cannot be tortured, for he has declared a sovereign's affair against you, stol'nik 
and voevoda Grigorii Shishkov. He must be sent under guard to Eniseisk. " 
Shishkov claimed that he did not lose his temper or try to beat Aikanov, but 
Aikanov's supporters threatened the voevoda so that several of his supporters, 
cossacks recruited among the exiles, had to be rescued from the mob. 86 Apparently, 
in a sense to be defined below, this event had a limited public character. 
If Shishkov was right, then, the cossacks still made good use of the rivalry 
between Shishkov and his new superior in Eniseisk. They described in their petition 
a different course of events. According to them, Shishkov refused their demands and 
wanted to write to the Siberian chancellery himself, claiming that he was 
"not under the authority (razriad) of Stepan Afanas'evich Sobakin and [I] will not obey 
him and [I], Grigorii, [am] in any case more honourable than the stol'nik and 
voevoda. s487 
Taking Muscovite administrative law literally, the cossacks asserted they had met 
Shishkov head-on stating that "Krasnoiarsk is part of Eniseisk razriad" and they did 
not "want to disobey the decree of the great sovereign". 488 The incident shows that 
there was no chain of command privileged in an absolute sense. Rather, authority 
was liable to interpretation, to changeable leitideas derived from ambiguous and at 
times contradictory elements of various official decrees, laws, instructions, and local 
custom. In general, leitideas are formed from the contested and contradictory 
contents and interpretations of an institution, and they answer to and are promoted by 
socially conditioned needs which temporarily prevail in a given locality and social 
ass Weickhardt, G. G., "Due-Process and Equal Justice in the Muscovite Codes", RR (1992) 
vol. 51.4,463-80, here: 477 
456 Bakhrushin, "Krasnoiarsk", 175-6 
487 Why Shishkov deemed himself more honourable than Sobakin is not clear. Several "Sobakins" 
were chamberlains in tsarevich Ivan's household in 1682: Bushkovitch, Peter, 133. One was Mikhail, 
but the relationship of his father Vasilii and uncle Grigorii Nikiforovich, boyars and okol'nichye, with 
Stepan and his brother Aleksei, who was a voevoda in Viatka in 1683-4, remains unclear. 
G. Shishkov's brother Semen was killed as a voevoda at Chigirin in 1678: Azbuchnyi ukazatel' 
imen russkikh deiatelei, Vaduz 1963 
488 Bakhrushin, "Krasnoiarsk", 156-7 
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group; therefore, a certain leitidea can become obligatory to the exclusion of others 
in a place, a social group, and a particular period 489 
The cossacks' aim was to gain access to the paths of information and 
communication, and they proved quite inventive in its pursuit. The next day, when 
Trifon Eremeev had also declared a sovereign's affair, the rebels felt strong enough 
to circumvent Shishkov's right to disallow departures and send a delegation to 
Eniseisk. Shishkov's subsequent attempt to discredit the petitioners when he heard 
about their tricks - they sat on a pillow stuffed with the petition while travelling by 
boat - by invoking a sovereign's affair got him nowhere. There was a noteworthy 
difference between Siberia and Russia in the way the sovereign's affair was used to 
dissolve petrified social relations. On the western side of the Urals it was mostly 
prisoners seeking to escape unbearable conditions who used it without much local 
support. They simply invented a sovereign's word or affair or denounced their 
former accomplices, often disregarding the grave consequences of a false 
denunciation to attain a brief spell of relief. 490 However, beyond the Urals the 
Personenverband often applied the sovereign's affair as a legal device to overcome 
the voevoda's capacity to block appeals in an administrative lawsuit, a measure that 
was introduced in Siberia for financial reasons. The sovereign's word and affair 
therefore was of particular use in breaking down barriers between the distant 
Siberian lands and Moscow 491 
The question of whether Muscovy was a bureaucratic society has often been 
posed. For the central chancelleries in Moscow, Brown has given a more 
differentiated answer - in his analysis, Muscovy was no equal to modem 
bureaucratic political societies, with their political rights, genuine popular 
participation in public affairs, and an increased accountability of executive branch 
leaders and their subordinates. 492 Yet the chancellery system could claim the 
characteristics S. N. Eisenstadt formulated for "historical bureaucratic societies", i. e. 
staff specialisation, staff professionalisation, organisational hierarchy, and rule- 
making capacity. To an astonishing degree, chancellery staff maintained a culture of 
489 For similar squabbles see Aleksandrov, Mast', 241-5. On leitidcas: Introduction, 16. 490 Lapman, Denunciation, 74-90 
491 Aleksandrov, Vlast , 225; Pokrovskii, "Slovu", 27-8 
492 Brown, "Neither", 21 
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accountability. 493 Like most of the heads of the chancelleries in Moscow, the 
voevodas were nobles - albeit in the lesser towns and forts often minor dvoriane - 
but were not part of this system to the same degree as chancellery staff. Shishkov 
therefore was in the forefront of a conflict between a growing administrative- 
mindedness and the old privileges of the nobles, claiming the pre-eminence of 
mestnichestvo over administrative hierarchy, although the former was abolished in 
1682.494 Surprisingly, at least from the point of view of most interpretations of 
Siberian administration, his was a doomed cause. His foes' strength, however, lay in 
that they did and did not act out the same conflict. While their tenet was greater 
accountability - demanding their due salaries - and one of their means of achieving 
them was formal adherence to the principle of administrative hierarchy, their social 
environment does not fit the corporate description Brown gives for the chancelleries. 
In Muscovy, he found that scaled social value rather than a strict formal hierarchy 
shaped the social relations among the staff of the central chancelleries. It also guided 
the interpretation of terminology and statute application. In Siberia, the rank of the 
voevoda and his right to disallow a leave from service embodied an apparently strict 
hierarchy. Yet it was the non- or pre-corporative Personenverband rallying around 
the seemingly traditional means of a sovereign's affair which together provided the 
social backing enabling Siberian cossacks to break the monopoly on law suits a 
voevoda otherwise might have enjoyed. As it was integrated into the texture of 
Muscovite institutions, the looseness of the traditional cossack group, its ability to 
regroup spontaneously and to exercise control over other social groups as soon as it 
gained momentum, was usually sufficient to thwart the ambitions of a recalcitrant 
voevoda, although he was nominally more elevated in the hierarchy. ] 
Despite some inroads literacy had already made'495 the seventeenth-century 
Siberian public was predominantly bound to personal interaction. Social experiences 
still stemmed mostly from direct communication among those who were present at 
an event. Therefore calling the Krasnoiarsk cossacks to meet when accusing the 
vocvoda was essential - it afforded security to the litigant and constituted the public 
493 Eisenstadt, Empires, 21-2 
494 Kivelson, "Devil" 
495 See 156-60. 
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character of the event. However, much care was afforded to the uses of the written 
official documentation of this litigation, the petition. Increasing literacy meant that 
the public could command experience of situations in which the sender or recipient 
of the communication are imperceptible -a process with many implications in a far- 
flung empire. The relation of written documentation and direct interaction in 
constituting a public sphere thereby became contingent and needed definition. Thus 
there was mounting tension when the petition was brought to Eniseisk in the pillow - 
the cunning of each side reached high levels. 
Communication among those who are present means more than just vocal 
exchange of information, but is rendered as "symbolical-interpretative exchange"496, 
in which gestures, mimic, dress and symbolical arrangements in space perform vital 
functions. Moreover, interaction tends to promote undifferenciated inclusion. The 
rule is that anyone involved in it cannot communicate: anyone can cut in at any time, 
but his speech and actions can also suffer from the intervention of others. Therefore 
communication in a public place depends on the permanent convergence of a centre 
of attention. The mentioned symbolical-theatrical elements as well as ceremonial 
structures and symbols relating to the sovereign's affair could form a specific 
communicative context from an amorphous mass of people. 97 The Krasnoiarsk 
cossacks displayed a very keen consciousness of these structuring elements of the 
public sphere - the symbolical centre was the sovereign's affair demanding attention 
from anyone involved. The litigant and his supporters eagerly observed the rules 
attached to the sovereign's affair - the litigant had to be brought to an impartial 
judge, if not directly to Moscow. 
Similarly, the point of assembly in front of the voevoda's office directed attention 
to the sovereign's affair. Siberian cossacks acted in this way on numerous occasions 
- in Tomsk in 1648 they brought the litigant who had invoked a sovereign's affair 
without any suitable action taken on the part of the voevoda, directly from prison to 
the voevoda's office, where a huge crowd of several hundred cossacks had 
496 Mead, Georg Herbert, Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft, Frankfurt/Main 1960 
497 Cf. Dörk, Uwe, "Der verwilderte Raum. Zum Strukturwandel von Öffentlichkeit in der 
frühneuzeitlichen Stadt am Beispiel Berns", in: Rau, Taverne, 119-54, here: 122-3 
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assembled and decided to depose and arrest the voevoda 498 Owing to the 
Personenverband's institutionalised custom of giving advice and deposing their 
leaders, the right to convocate military reviews was not only contested between 
voevoda and cossacks, but they were often converted into cossack assemblies. 99 
Thus, before deliberating the actual contents of a petition and signing it, which were 
public activities taking place in suitable spaces, such as cossack circles or church 
refectories500, attention was focused by public acts of accusation. These relatively 
open, inclusive public acts in which frequently outsiders - peasants, members of the 
posad - took part, were followed by an exclusive phase, after the Personenverband 
constituted by collectively signing the petition. Thus, actions of the Personenverband 
fitted the early modern partitioned public that pertained to certain groups in society 
but was nevertheless open enough to include others, at least at times. There could be 
petitions by different groups of the town population, but the cossack petition was the 
decisive document, defended by a sworn and influential community. Thus, the 
Personenverband was both constituted in public and, together with other institutional 
mechanisms, contributed to the permanence of the decisions reached at in public. 
Close observation of what was to be made public and what was not at the same 
time testify to the nature of this public event - its limitations were defined by the 
sovereign's affair, the contents of which were not to be communicated to the 
voevoda who therefore could not judge them. Thereby, the litigants already actively 
set the agenda - while the public character of this assembly was limited to questions 
of due process, the following delibaration in the cossack circles that excluded the 
voevoda sought to define the contents of the sovereign's affair in order to win as 
many signatures as possible. 
In some cases, however, cossacks decided not to confront voevodas of extremely 
exalted rank. Such was the case in Verkhotur'e, a town with a large and wealthy 
498 Pokrovskii, Tomsk, 50-1, cf. 86-7. Examples in: Aleksandrov, Mast', 171-2,173-192,238; 
Pokrovskii, "Slovu i delu", 24-6; 
499 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 187,237. The extent to which this practice may also derive from posad or 
peasant custom remains to be investigated, see ibid., 378 n. 167; Pokrovskii, N. N., "Neizvestnyi 
dokument o volncniiakh Ust'-nitsynskikh krest'ian v XVII v. ", in: Sibirskoe istochnikovedenie i 
arkheografiia, Novosibirsk 1980,178-84; Kivelson, Valerie, "Merciful Father, Impersonal State", 
Modern Asian Studies, 31,3(1997), 635-63, here: 661-2, for one example. On reviews, see 
Aleksandrov, Vlast', 200. 
500 Alksandrov, Vlast', 176-7; Pokrovskii, Tomsk, 94,145; RGADA f. 214 st. 1424,11.79-80,122, 
124 (petitions). 
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posad; yet even in this town situated on the very artery of Siberian trade, the 
cossacks proved the decisive force. With the Bashkirs close by, the town was in 
constant danger and well fortified. 50' While the cossacks remained inactive in the 
first of two cases interconnected by patronage, the posad in 1645 even confronted the 
voevoda, boyar M. F. Streshnev, a member of tsaritsa Evdokiia Luk'ianovna's clan. 
The incident was initiated by the town's second in command, pod'iachii s pripis'iu 
M. Likhachev, who met Streshnev head-on, accusing him of various abuses in front 
of other officials at the voevoda's office. When he made no headway at all, he went 
to the market place to make them publicly known. Relieving Likhachev of his duty, 
the Siberian chancellery sent F. M. Postnikov to Verkhotur'e in December. On his 
arrival in February, he found out about Streshnev's bribe-taking on the very first day 
of his inspection. Since the voevoda knew about a range of petitions signed by a 
priest "and all the land", by merchants, trappers, shipbuilders, and iasak tributaries, 
which had reached the Siberian chancellery, he decided to sack Postnikov on the 
pretext that "he was not sent according to the tsar's decree" and ordered his servants 
to beat him. 502 
Nevertheless, backing by a local group was essential in the vicious politicking 
between Streshnev and Postnikov. The pod'iachii s pripis'iu claimed that he had 
managed to escape the deadly beating only due to the threatening crowd gathering in 
front of the voevoda's court. The next day, his family carried him through town, to 
make Streshnev's oppression publicly known. There was never an attempt to 
investigate, let alone to punish the apparent indiscretions of the two pod'iachii s 
pripis'iu. In their desperate appeal to the public, they hoped for spontaneous support. 
The medium of such a sudden turn could only be the Personenverband, which was 
capable of accommodating a leader completely unknown to the locals. 
Despite such administrative bravery, however, Verkhotur'e cossacks decided 
otherwise on this occasion. In town, Streshnev's servants again tried to capture 
Postnikov, yet they were impeded - as Postnikov claimed, 
"the mir has seen and heard our charge in this affair and the dishonour and how I was 
tormented and covered with blood. " 
S01 Baidin, V. I., Ocherki istorii i kul'tury goroda Verkhotur'ia, Ekaterinburg 1998 
502 Aleksandrov, Viast, 259-61. Similar practice by cossacks: Pokrovskii, Tomsk, 246-9; 
Bo9kovska, "`Dort werden wir selber Bojaren"', 351,367-8,381-2. Cl. Rustemeycr, "Verrat", 269 
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Yet this mir should not be confused with a permanent organisation involved with 
decision-making. It was a spontaneous, public meeting in the market place, but 
remained without consequences beyond the immediate emergency - inclined to 
support Postnikov, as it was portrayed by him; it neither included more than a few 
cossacks, nor did it take steps feasible for cossacks drawing conclusions from such 
incidents, that this voevoda could no longer be supported. In marked breach with 
usual formulations, there was no mention of cossacks in Postnikov's report - or of 
other social groups, for that matter. 503 The voevoda may have as a precaution made 
sure of satisfying the cossacks, as Pokrovskii and Aleksandrov believe; otherwise, 
the complacency shown by the cossacks may have been due to Streshnev's exalted 
rank. In any case, this was not an opportunity Verkhotur'e cossacks would seize to 
present grievances against the voevoda, nor did they rise in rebellion. Verkhotur'e 
was anything but a provincial backwater, and its cossacks understood well not only 
their potential role as local power brokers, but also their exposed position in an 
internal border town to reproaches from Moscow or Tobol'sk 504 Far from blind 
obeisance or complete insubordination, but also from the estates structures 
Aleksandrov and Pokrovskii try to prove, the Verkhotur'e cossacks were adept in 
navigating between different sources of authority. 
While the cossacks also remained neutral in subsequent developments during 
Streshnev's period in charge, events make it clear to what degree mestnichestvo 
could destabilise even his exalted position. Verkhotur'e witnessed a startling 
confrontation between two members of top-level boyar clans, which reveals much 
about Muscovy's power structures at the time. In 1646, in a move proving not only 
the remarkable degree of internal accountability in the chancelleries but also the 
leverage of boyar clans, the head of the Siberian chancellery, prince N. I. Odoevskii, 
decided to investigate Streshnev's rule in the key border town, through which 
everyone had to pass on their way to Siberia. 505 The person of choice to undertake 
such a task was the new Tobol'sk voevoda, boyar I. I. Saltykov, a relative of tsar 
Aleksei's mother Marfa, who headed the investigation in person. In Muscovy's 
503 Aleksandrov, Plast', 259-62 
504 Lantzeff, Siberia, 38-9. 
505 Ibid., 38 
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clandestine oligarchy, relying on marriage politics under cover of the tsar's virtual 
omnipotence506, the family clans of the tsar's mother and of the tsaritsa were the two 
most important power groups. Saltykov had orders to send Streshncv and his sons to 
Turinsk during the investigation, a measure prescribed by law during poval'nye 
obyski, involving all the town and dependent on influence by litigating parties. 507 On 
arriving at Verkhotur'e in April 1646 during his journey to Tobol'sk, Saltykov 
started to investigate Streshnev's customs misdemeanours and in particular the 
latter's seizure of the customs documentation in the summer of 1645. This seizure 
had served Streshnev as a convenient means to refuse the control of his possessions, 
which he sent to Moscow in October, by the head of customs, K. Gogulin. While 
Saltykov's investigation supported the view expressed in the petitions, he could not 
proceed to sending Streshnev out of town. Streshnev started to get in the way of 
investigation and, to lead the gross insult towards its climax, declared Saltykov's 
decrees bogus. After both boyars had insulted each other, Saltykov set out to 
continue his trip to Tobol'sk; he had already decided to litigate a dishonour suit. In 
his desperate position, Streshnev remembered the potential support locals could 
offer, and while Saltykov's riverboats were still in sight, the fire-alarm bell rang in 
town, while bonfires were lit to provoke rumours. Streshnev attempted to incite 
Verkhoturians to sign a petition accusing Saltykov of setting fire to Verkhotur'e. His 
"advisers" "barked" at Saltykov calling him a "denigrated and not trustworthy man", 
while the voevoda himself called Saltykov "boiarishkom" (lit. "little boyar"), and, 
though short of invoking a sovereign's affair, used its terminology adding the term 
"traitor" ("vor") 508 On the one hand, these forms of symbolic communication and 
ritual interaction underlined aspects treated by Habermas as "representative public 
acts". 509 On the other hand, studies about honour have shown that there were forms 
and functions that are neither "bourgeois" nor "representative", but necessarily relied 
on a premodern public opinion. The focal point of public orientation was the repute 
of a person or group, measured at common values of modesty and righteousness. 510 
S06 Kollmann, Kinship 
507 Weickhardt, "Due-Process" 
sos Aleksandrov, Vlast', 261-4 
509 Rau "Öffentliche", 19 
510 Kollmann, Honor, 84; Rau, "Öffentliche", 19; Schreiner, Klaus; Gert Schwerhoff (eds. ), 
Verletzte Ehre, Köln 1995 
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In the case of the two nobles at Verkhotur'e, these values had a different meaning 
than in other cases involving primarily cossacks. Ch. IV will inquire into such values; 
even without doing so, the Verkhotur'e quarrel shows that it aimed primarily at 
influencing public opinion in the town. Streshnev's show of strength was primarily 
intended to silence opposition. The unwillingness to sign the petitions, however, 
shows that the cossacks were not particularly impressed and well aware of the 
opportunities the two alternative offers of patronage opened up to them. 
Verkhotur'e was not primarily a frontier town, nor was its predominant function 
the collection of iasak. Still, the turning point was reached after this outrageous 
behaviour, and Saltykov knew well about the unwillingness of the Verkhotur'e 
cossacks to defend the voevoda. It is therefore not surprising that cossacks at 
Verkhotur'e did not interfer when Saltykov sent pismennyi golova - an officer 
capable of keeping records - A. T. Sekerin with a detachment of cossacks to continue 
the investigation into Streshnev's affairs. Although Streshnev again tried to impede, 
the recalcitrant voevoda this time was sent under guard to Moscow. As could be 
expected, his clan did not fail to defend him; Streshnev even managed to have his 
client, B. S. Dvorianinov appointed the new voevoda of Verkhotur'e. This helped 
Streshnev during the investigation, when Dvorianinov from the outset blocked 
attempts at scrutinising his patron's rule. 
While even a Saltykov could not thwart attempts to get by with impunity through 
patronage in Moscow, the end of the rule of Streshnev's successor shows that the 
Personenverband could. Dvorianinov, like O. I. Shcherbatyi in Tomsk, or, more 
successfully, Suleshev in Tobol'sk, was one of the Siberian voevodas who tried to 
increase the tsar's profits while at the same time pushing hard to increase their own 
income. Overestimating his own position, he even estranged the cossacks by his 
attempt to block their trade with the iasak people before they had collected the 
tribute. Locally, this double-bill of enhanced control proved overly ambitious, and 
cossacks addressed the issue in letters inciting their comrades in the uezd: 
"Boris [Dvorianinov] seeks the sovereign's profit here, and he will deprive you of 
everything of which once you were replete - you acquired zipuny (silken shirts, i. e. 
slaves) and without orders you rode out to the Voguls with merchandise". 
153 
In these words, there is little indication of the special concerns of the cossack 
elite, as Aleksandrov and Pokrovskii claim, while the apprehension of all cossacks 
was tackled. 511 
Also revealing of the politics of the Personenverband is the way Dvorianinov 
was challenged. The voevoda fell prey to an intrigue from a quarter he did not expect 
- in June, the fugitive peasant M. Kabakov, who was tortured, in his pain addressed 
the voevoda with the words "sovereign-tsar, have mercy", and Dvorianinov failed to 
correct him. Still, this affair was dormant until in October 1648 a sovereign's affair 
was filed by the pod'iachii s pripis'iu I. I. Nedoveskov accompanied by the "young" 
pod'iachiis and a group of cossacks. By accepting Kabakov's invocation, the 
litigants claimed somewhat belatedly, Dvorianinov had dishonoured the tsar. The 
next day, a delegation consisting of cossacks, posad people and peasants felt entitled 
to put the voevoda under arrest and disallow Dvorianinov all communications "while 
the mir deliberates with Ignat'ii [Nedoveskov] and Fedor" Driagin, the customs head. 
As during so many other Siberian rebellions, this mir consisted of virtually every 
imaginable settled social group in Verkhotur'e, but was dominated by the cossacks; it 
first made sure to formulate and sign litigation in the form of a petition. It was only 
after constituting themselves as a Personenverband by this act512 that they formally 
declared the "otkaz", connecting it inextricably with the sovereign's affair; they 
could no longer allow themselves to be judged by Dvorianinov, since "[we] do not 
want to fall into disgrace". 513 This was imaginative formulation of a leitidea in 
handling the sovereign's word and affair, which, obtained under torture, was often 
not considered effective; and the otkaz, as mentioned in chapter I, was derived from 
custom though institutionalised by Kiprian. 
The changing states of affairs of the mir were typical of this institution's 
instability yet viability in Siberian towns, where the frontier and frequent service in 
far-off places as well as the involvement of many cossacks in distant trade demanded 
a high degree of institutional flexibility. Once again, the Personenverband depicted 
this unpopular voevoda of Verkhotur'e as the tsar's representative, who lost his 
511 Cf ibid., 261-2,265 
512 See 36-57 
513 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 265-7 
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power when falling into disgrace, or when such a fall was perceived. Dvorianinov 
never won back authority in Verkhotur'e: when in February 1649 he was relieved by 
R. R. Vsevolozhskii, the town's population interfered with the first attempt to punish 
some of the rebels, making sure to beat up Dvorianinov's supporters. In the 
meantime, an element of due process had been observed by the customs head's 
official seal serving as replacement for the voevoda's - which Dvorianinov still 
possessed -, allowing the rebels' delegations to leave town. To underline their claim 
that there were two divergent normative spheres involved, cossack custom and the 
estate-representative principle on the one hand, and on the other hand emerging 
bureaucracy with its top-down power relations, 514 Aleksandrov and Pokrovskii make 
reference to the term "diarchy" at least twice, in this case and in the case of voevoda 
Eldezin of Tiumen'. 515 It is hard to see in these cases, however, that there was a 
diarchy in the town, since the voevoda was bereft of any real power, while cossacks 
relied on arguments of due process to establish their claim to bypass the voevoda. 
Cossacks preferred clearly-defined authority in town, and did not tolerate ambigious 
situations where power and the law were concerned, as might be indicated by 
"diarchy", as on one occasion when Saltykov ordered that Dvorianinov was to act as 
a colleague of Nedoveskov in the voevoda's office, repelling the voevoda at the 
entrance. Another pctiton was formulated and signed by 48 cossacks, 18 members of 
the posad, 32 members of the postal service and 23 peasants to substantiate their 
claim that they could not obey the voevoda until Dvorianinov was officially relieved. 
The chancellery, in turn, was impelled to take their stance seriously, and could 
not do so without recourse to due process to implement its decision. Unfortunately 
for Dvorianinov, it had taken time to decide that he was liable only for not 
communicating the "sovereign's word" to the chancellery, and not for accepting the 
homage. Even when its resolution was first to be executed, after a threat uttered by 
the rebels towards the former voevoda, he died in Verkhotur'e under unclear 
circumstances. The chancellery did not indict the deposition of the voevoda as such, 
but merely questioned whether an investigation in his behaviour had indeed been 
necessary, implicitly accepting that different leitideas rather than one official, 
514 Ibid., 172 
s]s Ibid., 265,189 
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unquestionable interpretation of the sovereign's word and affair were at issue. 
During this interval, rebels impeded the punishment of Nedoveskov, whom the 
chancellery indicted for enticement to rebellion. It was only in June 1649 that 
twenty-six of his opponents were punished with the knout on orders issued by the 
new Tobol'sk voevoda. 516 Relatively close to the centre of power and European 
Muscovy, Verkhotur'e was far from being the pacesetter of rebellion. At the same 
time, trade relations nonetheless created conditions rife with institutional 
mechanisms517 like the "forged decrees" or the use of the sovereign's word and affair 
to get rid of an unpopular administrator. Verkhotur'e also reveals, however, the 
dependency of all Siberian local institutions on patronage, a consideration which has 
not been given due weight either by Aleksandrov and Pokrovskii or generally in 
historical writing on Siberia. 
These factors make it possible to explain why Shishkov, like so many other 
Siberian voevodas, could not escape investigation. In the typical chancellery Brown 
describes, such an outcome was unlikely. Corporate solidarity bound superiors and 
subordinates who partook in bribes and gift-giving while covering for one another. 
Nevertheless, the chancellery system was dependent on the periphery, at least on the 
Siberian periphery, since the Personenverbände were the only groups who could 
offer sufficient control of the fur-providing frontier. In this sense, it was not an 
exclusively formal hierarchy and patronage that decided over opportunities to ensure 
obedience to commands, but rather scaled social value, a broader concept that can 
take into account the power of the Personenverband. 
As in Siberia, central power had to rely on the interests of local power brokers 
throughout the early modern world. 518 The Siberian cossack Personenverbände 
sought alliances with central forces, since this increased their radius of action, their 
opportunities for trade and their leverage vis-ä-vis the voevoda or other 
Personenverbände. Such co-operation, however, could not occur by decree of the 
tsar. Central control depended upon the willingness and ability of the cossacks and 
other Siberian inhabitants to utilise central institutions for their own ends. 
516 Ibid., 268-9 
517 Rehberg, "Institutionenwandel", 102-3 
5g Lieberman, "Transcending", 478-9; Kollmann, Kinship 
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Literacy 
Implicitly or explicitly, all accounts of the Siberian administration based on the 
postulation of hierarchical command structures and the powerlessness of the 
cossacks and the general population depend upon the general assumption of cossack 
illiteracy. Cossacks needed such skills if they were to seize the opportunities that the 
chancellery's efforts at regulating Siberian affairs and the multiple default lines of 
noble networks offered to them. The mounting proportion of literate cossacks reflects 
the increasing need for these skills in their dealings and negotiations with the 
chancellery system, and was thus important for their ability to work the system to 
their advantage. This was particularly - but not exclusively - so in the eastern parts 
of Siberia, where, as we will see in this chapter and in chapter V, trade in furs and 
increasingly, Chinese wares, produced rising levels of literacy in the late seventeenth 
century, despite Kopylov's misgivings. 519 The level of literacy also provides an 
answer to the question about which part of the population was capable to check 
petitions, instructions, reports, and other official documents, and therefore was at 
least able to get directly involved in the processes of institutionalisation investigated 
in this chapter. No doubt this involvement was not the exclusive realm of the literate, 
but without them there was no access at all. The investigation of levels of literacy 
provides some of the general cultural background of the processes discussed in this 
thesis. 
There are, however, different concepts of literacy, which can include higher or at 
least secondary education. Yet it is difficult to apply normal assumptions about 
literacy rates and the experience of literacy based on the experience of contemporary 
Western Europe to the general Russian, let alone the Siberian, situation. Almost all 
books printed in pre-Petrine Muscovy were religious in nature, although there were 
also chronicles and historical descriptions 520 Yet, a considerable amount of secular 
literature in circulation in Russia was printed in Cyrillic in Lithuania. 521 From mid- 
century onwards, there was marked change towards more openness and new cultural 
519 Based on a- apparently fleeting - comparison of local western and eastern Siberian annals: 
Kopý'lov, A. N., Ocherki kul'turnotzhizni Sibiri XVII - nachala XIX v., Novosibirsk 1974,96 20 Haumann, Heiko, Geschichte Rußlands, 177 
521 Topolska, Maria, Czytelnik i ksiqzka w Wielkim Ksicstwie Litewskim w dobie Renesansu I 
Baroku, Wroclaw 1984 
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tendencies. Literacy, therefore, is understood here in the most basic sense as the 
capability to read and write. This was the critical skill to deal with government 
documents and to write or at least to sign a petition. Siberian petitions in the 
seventeenth century, far from indicating the powerlessness of petitioners that Roman 
law would have ascribed to them before a patrimonial slaveholder, were for the 
cossacks a means of expressing and demanding their rights and privileges. Frequent 
petitioning contributed to institutionalisation, while cossacks relied on these means 
of communication and learned to value literacy. Other incentives to become literate 
include provisions by the Siberian chancellery demanding that literate cossacks 
should be sent to collect the iasak, so that they could keep records of those who had 
paid the tribute and avoided levying it twice. 522 Even if in the middle of the 
seventeenth century the chancellery knowingly added that this provision should 
apply even where "only one literate" was available for each party; assignments were 
influenced by this consideration, and literacy was always a good argument for 
applicants. 
The first available census of literacy among Siberian cossacks dates from as late 
as 1761. Significantly, by the middle of the eighteenth century literacy among 
Siberian cossacks was about four times higher than on the southern defence lines in 
Russia to the west of the Urals. All sotniki and atamans and sixty percent of the 
lower ranks of officers were literate, although there are no figures for the rank-and- 
file. This was before 1765, when the government founded a series of schools in the 
forts of the Siberian fortification line. The exceptional status of this achievement is 
underlined by the rates of neighbouring, more western garrisons of the same line: On 
the Don, in 1761 only seventeen percent of officers were literate, while no figures are 
given for the lower officer ranks. 523 
Unexpected though this achievement might appear in Siberia, there are many 
factors that contributed to the spread of literacy. Many outlaws, cossacks considered 
renegades by the government and Polish-Lithuanian prisoners of war of the Time of 
Troubles and the wars of 1632-4 and 1654-67 were literate and became enlisted as 
522 "Nakaz iakutskomu voevodu 1658", DAI vol. 4 (1851), no. 46,104-5. RGADA f. 1121 op. I 
no. 72 1.19; no. 467 1.2; no. 419 1.18 (petitions). Cf. Lantzeff, Siberia, 12 
523 Elsewhere, literacy was even lower: Katanaev, Kazachestvo, 9-11 
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cossacks in Siberia. 524 In 1632, for example, 83 Poles were sent to serve in the 
southern frontier towns of Tomsk, Eniseisk and Krasnoiarsk. After the truce of 
Andrusovo in 1667, as already in 1634, when Polish prisoners of war were free to 
return home, hundreds asked to be accepted into the tsar's "eternal" service in 
Siberia, and in the 1680s Polish "shliakhtichi"' still appeared on the service lists. 525 At 
least one of the proponents of the Selenga-rebellion in 1696 possessed four - or more 
- books 
526 Many of the urban rebels of 1648 were sent east, and one and a half 
decades later Old Believers sought refuge in Siberia, but were also exiled by the 
government. Literate cossacks were specially assigned as well as prepared on a case- 
to-case base in Siberia, as literate men were needed to describe expeditions. Handing 
down the knowledge of writing to their sons was a necessary precondition of status 
preservation, and achieved in the same way as in the families of Moscow d'iaki. 52' 
Data emanating from my database contains details of 1,668 cossacks528 from 
Irkutsk and its prisud during the 1690s. I have counted every cossack as literate who 
was able to write at least the signature formula applicable to petitions and other 
documents. Such were the poruchnye zapisi and otpisi (receipts) cossacks signed to 
confirm their assignation of their next year's salary to a merchant, voevoda, 
pod'iachii or another cossack in exchange for receiving the money in advance, 
presumably to pay off a loan, to pay rent or to invest in an expedition.. 529 Alternative 
formulations read: "K sei chelobitnoi vmesto [name, surname] po ego veleniiu 
[name, surname] ruku prilozhil" or the shorter variant, if the undersigned was 
literate: "K sei chelobitnoi [name, surname] ruku prilozhil's30 Out of 168 signatures 
I have analysed, twenty-four belonged to non-cossacks - promyshlennye, church 
d'iachki, posad, guliashchie - thirty-eight cases could not be classified. 106 cossacks 
and officers from desiatnik to syn boiarskii could write their signature and the 
524 Bachrushin, Trudy, vol. 3,1,163-5; Ogloblin, Obozrenie, pt. 1,301; pt. 3,61-63,115 
Butsinskii, Zaselenie, 200 Leshchenko, G. F., Pereselenie iz Belorussii v Povolzh 'e i Sibir', Avtoref. 
dis., Minsk 1983; Emel'ianov, N. F., "Tomskie sluzhilye liudi "litva" v XVII-pcrvoi chctverti XVIII 
v. ", in: Problemy istoricheskoi demografii SSSR, Tomsk 1982, vyp. 2; Appolova, N. G., 
Choziaistvennoe osvoenie Priirtysh'ia, Moscow 1976,76-7; Aleksandrov, Vlast', 84-5 
525 Ibid., 85 
526 RGADA f. 1121 st. 429 1.45 (investigation): syn boiarskii Petr Arsen'ev. 527 Katanaev, Kazachestvo, 13; Huttenbach, "Penetration", 95,99-100 
52$ These include double entries for individuals allowing to track their careers and biographies. 
However, this does not affect the numbers cited. 
529 RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 317 (28 receipts, Jan-Apr 1695) 530 Ibid. no. 4621.5 ob. (petition) 
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appropriate formula in their individual handwritings. There are also thirteen other 
literate men who were most likely cossacks, while six of them bore surnames of 
known cossacks in the region, though it cannot be proven that they were related. This 
data is not comprehensive since I have analysed only those files which yielded the 
greatest number of signatures and only took into account files of relevance for my 
thesis. 
There were eight (seven) literate piatidesiatniki, fourteen rank-and-file desiatniki 
and three mounted desiatniki, and ten more rank-and-file mounted cossacks. On top 
of these cossacks there were seven literate deti boiarskie, who can be counted as 
cossacks. The bulk of literate cossacks constituted more than fifty-nine rank-and-file 
riadovye cossacks, not even including the desiatniki, who did not differ much in 
status. Considering their main function was accompanying transports, this is not 
surprising. However, there were also some literate mounted cossacks. Twenty-five 
literate cossacks of all ranks had a stake in trade, perhaps somewhat less than 
expected, but this may be due to missing evidence such as unproven kinship to 
merchants as well as the fact that the level of trade transactions was not necessarily 
reflected by literacy - tax-free trade would not usually be mentioned. 
Out of a hundred literate cossacks, just thirty-three lived in Irkutsk and 
Verkholensk, eleven are of unclear abode, and two were from Idinsk. This bias in 
favour of the Transbaikal is due to the fact that many sources in the Irkutsk archive 
are concerned with the Transbaikal, yet there is no reason to expect fewer literate 
cossacks in Irkutsk and north of the Baikal than in the southern frontier towns. 
In the vast majority of cases the lifespans of the literate cossacks I have found 
overlap in the late 1690s, allowing a comparison with the available census data. Only 
eleven cases occur earlier than 1690 reaching as far back as the 1670s. There are two 
cases of rank-and-file manifest no later than 1694-1695. Eighteen literate cossacks 
could be traced only in 1696, among them there are two cossack sons, one mounted 
cossack, five desiatniki, and one piatidesiatnik. One case remains unclear, but is 
most likely related to the late 1690s. All other literate cossacks are evident during the 
immediate years surrounding the date of the relevant census in 1699, i. e. 1698-1700, 
or sixty-eight cossacks of all ranks. Five of the deli boiarskie are evident during the 
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period of the census, one (Iurii Kryzhanovskii) was killed by the rebels at the border 
near Nerchinsk in 1697.531 
Ninety-two literate sluzhilye including deli boiarskie are evident in the period 
1696-1700. This is the most relevant number of all the available data, since it is hard 
to see how a large part of those in the pre-1698 sample could have left Irkutsk or 
died. I also count cossack sons and one retired, since they were likely to continue in 
service or teach their sons. In any case, the data is sufficient to conclude that literacy 
among cossacks was surprisingly high. According to the census conducted in 1699, 
there were thirteen homes of dvoriane and deti boiarskie in Irkutsk prisud and 939 
homes of "voenno-sluzhilye Rude'. 532 While the lower margin of the level of literacy 
among cossacks in Irkutsk prisud of roughly ten percent can be established from 
these figures, the upper margin is less clear. It is not unlikely that this figure may 
have reached levels found in Russia otherwise only in Moscow, where the literate 
population did not exceed thirteen percent. 533 The data allows the conclusion that 
already in the 1690s already literacy was by far not restricted to officers, a limitation 
Carol B. Stevens observed, by comparison, in the Belgorod army files she 
investigated. 534 
The Regalian Salutation 
The terminology of the regalian salutation illuminates important aspects of the 
nature of authority in Muscovy. Contained in any document used in the Muscovite 
chancelleries, and in particular in the petitions and reports used for communication 
between the populace and the ruler, the regalian salutation has inspired vivid 
discussion as well as dogmatic positions among both observers and historians. 
Contemporary travellers from Western Europe were appalled by the sight of 
Muscovites "knocking their forehead" in front of the tsar, as the literal translation of 
the phrase "biti chelom" runs. They also remarked that by calling themselves the 
s3` RGADA f. 214 st. 1424; f. 1121 op. 1 nos. 68,76,82,130,164,360,317,381,402,403,405, 
415,419,420,422,429,462,467,468; op. 2 no. 233 (petitions and receipts) 
532 Vodarskii, Ia. E., "Chislennost' russkogo naseleniia Sibiri XVII-XVIII vv. ", in: Russkoe 
naselenie Pomor'ia, 194-213,202. 
s" Mironov, Boris N., "The Development of Literacy in Russia", History of Education Quarterly 
vol. 31,2 (1991), 229-252, here 252 
534 Stevens, Carol B., "Belgorod - Notes on Literacy and Language", RII vol. 7 (1980) no. 1/2, 
113-24 
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"kholop" of the tsar, Russians abased themselves and abdicated any rights they had, 
since this term was usually translated as "slave". 535 
Since the middle of the seventeenth century, there has been a dispute about the 
correct translation of these terms. The older historiography understood the formal 
address in petitions as an expression of the unconditional submission of the tsar's 
subjects to his powers, following the interpretations of oriental powers as "despotic" 
or "patrimonial". As recent scholars have established, the juxtaposition of "oriental" 
and "Christian" or "European" rulership was an invention of the enlightenment, 
when it was used to warn of certain tendencies in French government perceived as 
"absolutist". While writers such as Bodin and Montesquieu had little actual insight 
into the dealings of Asian governments, mobilising racist sentiments in the early 
colonial capitals was a rewarding way of influencing the public. Bit' chelom or "to 
knock one's forehead" was a direct calque from the kou tou customary in Chinese 
administration, which Muscovy encountered via Mongol intermediaries. In its 
original form, the kou tou hardly expressed oriental despotism. At the time of the 
lending of this term, during the Mongol suzerainty in the thirteenth century, after 
centuries of prosperity and openness of Chinese civilisation, the age of increasing 
seclusion during the Ming and Manchu dynasties was still far away. Conditions 
under the latter dynasties contributed not the least to Jesuit missionary descriptions 
of despotism. Already under the Han, however, a civil service had developed which, 
despite political unification, allowed for administrative decentralisation. The Chinese 
civil service of scholar-administrators governed a prosperous China for centuries. 536 
These observations serve to remind us that a term's etymology and actual meanings 
at a point of time and in a particular place are at best loosely related. Thus, biti 
chelom was the appropriate address by a slave to his master in European Muscovy up 
to at least the early seventeenth century, but it was also used in more equal and even 
in inverse relationships. Thus, the Irkutsk syn boiarskii Ivan Arsen'ev addressed his 
brother Petr, who had been awarded the same rank, in this way in one of the very few 
private letters surviving,. Petr wrote a short notice on the back of the letter, addressed 
to a rank-and-file cossack, which commences: 
535 Poe, "'Slaves'? ", 594-8 
536 Ostrowski, Muscovy, 87 
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"Brother Petr Ermolin, greetings (zdravstvui), Petr Arsen'ev chelom bet. , 537 
Il'insk rebel cossack Ivan Pinega used the same term to address his fellow rebels 
when he reminded them of their duties: 
"To our Gospoda [in the text: Gdsam] the Udinsk piatidesiatniki and desiatniki and all 
rank-and-file mounted and foot cossacks, cossack Ivashko Grigor'ev Pinega from Il'insk 
"ssa ostrog chelom bet... 
Although historians have long ignored such observations, recent studies on the 
regalian salutation have begun to challenge older views. Marshall Poe deems a 
peculiar patrimonial gloss of its social terminology in many respects convincing, but 
observes evolving meanings in the seventeenth century. The institution of slavery, 
which flourished in Muscovy until the late seventeenth century used the term 
"kholop" to denote a slave. 539 According to foreign travellers, slaves and serfs often 
prostrated themselves before their masters in a gesture also called "bit! chelom". 
540 In 
this context, Iurii Krizhanich made important remarks: "To be tsar is to serve God, 
but to be slave of the tsar of one's own people, this is honourable and is actually a 
kind of freedom . "541 This statement, 
however troubling it seemed to contemporary 
Western eyes, adds two aspects to the image of the tsar in Muscovy: In a society of 
scaled social value, where honour served as social cement for society, it signified a 
difference in status between an ordinary kholop and the kholop of the tsar. To be the 
tsar's kholop was not only honourable, it also conveyed a notion of freedom and 
reciprocal obligations that bound both tsar and kholop. 
542 As in medieval west- 
European customary law, thus, the tsar's kholopy were seen as privileged servants of 
the monarch, who, in case of rebellion, enjoyed the right to be accepted back to their 
suzerain as equal vassals once they were ready to repent. 
543 While this parallel to 
medieval Western Europe calls into question the dominant patrimonial 
537 Aleksandrov, "Materialy", 375 (letters) 
S38 RGADA f. 1121 op. I no. 378,1.43 (letter). The common abbreviation for gosudar and gospodar 
is gdsr. 
539 Hellie, Slavery. "Kholop" in legal contexts, see Kaiser, The Laws of Rus'; Grekov, Sudebniki; 
Iiellie, Law Code. Hellie considers indentured labourers as slaves in a wide sense. In this sense, 
however, there were "slaves" (for example Knechte) in almost all Western societies. 
540 Poe, "Slaves? ", 598 
541 Mordukhovich, Lev M., "Iz rukopis'nogo nasledstva lu. Krizhanicha", 185 
542 Kivelson, Bitter ", 112-4 543 Althoff, Gerd, "Das Privileg der deditio", in: idem, Spielregeln der Politik im Mittelalter, 
Darmstadt 1997,99-125. Cf. Perrie, "Outlawry"; idem, "Cossack 'Tsareviches' in Seventccnth- 
Century Russia", FzOG vol. 56 (2000), 243-256 on related privileges. 
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interpretations, and emphasises the right of free departure, it was no more relevant in 
the seventeenth century, except to some degree in Siberia, where cossacks frequently 
left service and were accepted back into it. 544 
In a different environment, a term could change its connotations. Kholop in the 
Siberian context since 1623/1624 indicated the illegal ownership of natives. 545 While 
the tsar's decrees were not always obeyed, cossacks used kholop as a derisory term to 
signify the illegal ownership of slaves. Siberian cossacks called native servants 
devka, as many of them lived as their concubines. 546 The more common terms 
applied to male slaves were iasyr' or pogromnye inozemtsy to mark their customary 
right to own them as booty, which was however not fully endorsed by the 
chancellery. 547 They did so even if they used them as a means of payment or of 
raising credit. 548 
Prosecution of those who enslaved natives and sold them in other towns was 
efficient as a part of the government policy of protecting iasak-payers. There were 
very few cases of slaves sold on the market in Siberia, where the slave-holders were 
often Bukharans and nomads, and prices reflected this relative scarcity. One 
voevoda, who had left his Tatar slave-girl with his in-laws west of the Urals before 
leaving for Krasnoiarsk, had been warned by his kin of the possibility of Moscow 
launching a high-level investigation if he misbehaved in Siberia. 549 Most likely, there 
was a certain grey market among local cossacks, although it has left few traces. On 
the other hand, rebel cossacks were opposed to vocvodas exporting iasyri, and this 
cannot be explained by coercion or a military command structure 550 Although 
individual cossacks did have an interest in selling their captives, implementation was 
facilitated by the collective interest of the cossacks in entertaining good trade and 
service relations with the sovereign - and in acceptable yields of fur iasak. Thus, in 
Siberia, the concept kholop was not employed to denote native slaves, nor was there 
an extensive slave trade among Siberian cossacks. Thus there was a slightly different 
S44 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 329-40 
say Hellie, Slavery, 76,82,70 
546 Collins, "Subjugation", 37-54 
547 Pokrovskii, Tomsk, 98; Aleksandrov, Mast', 223-4; Nikitin, Sluzhilye, 192. Ogloblin, 
Obozrenie pt. 2,60-3; pt. 1,194 548 RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 67 11.108-9 (report); op. 2, no. 1471.1 (petition) 549 Hellie, Slavery, 102,343,348,597 
550 pokrovskii, Tomsk, 98; Aleksandrov, Vlast', 223-4 
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background to the concept of kholop employed in the regalian salutation than in other 
parts of Muscovy. 
With regard to Siberian Russians, kholop was used to indicate unlawful 
deprivation of liberty rather than legitimate possession. The former cossack Fedor 
Ivanov syn Cherkasov in 1696 gave a vivid description of the methods used by 
golova Afonasii Beiton to enslave him: 
"... he invited me into his home since I am a tailor and filled me with alcohol until I was 
drunk. By his power he indented me, your kholop, stating that I, your kholop, marry, live 
and work in Afonasii's place with the wife and children and I, your kholop in a drunken 
state signed the document under the influence of alcohol. Afonasii married me against 
my will to his bought servant. That girl of Russian origin, who was also drowsy, was a 
slave (poraboshchena v kholopstvo ponevoli) who lived in his house in eternal 
051 dependency ... 
si 
There is a contrast in this text between the Cherkasov who ascribed to himself the 
honourable title of the tsar's "kholop tvoi", and his description of his wife as 
"involuntarily enslaved (poraboshchena) into kholopstvo (ponevoli)"; Cherkasov 
thereby indicated that kholopstvo was not equal to abject slavery, but only kholopstvo 
ponevoli. Accordingly, voluntary kholopstvo could go along with self-esteem. 552 
Muscovites viewed the gosudar', the sovereign, as the source of justice who 
decided in the last instance, by virtue of his anointment. 553 Siberians, while not 
averse to such ideas, often added a threatening edge to their petitions, as the coda of 
the Tomsk petition of 15`h June 1649 to tsar Aleksei made clear: 
"Compassionate sovereign, tsar and grand prince Aleksei Mikhailovich...! Confer on us, 
sovereign, the Lord's Anointed, your absent kholopi and orphans, your just compassion, 
look at us, and order that we, your kholopi and orphans will be saved from prince Osip's 
and Mikhail's expulsion and oppression... and do not let yourself believe his false reports 
about us, your kholopi..., since they want to destroy us without leaving a rest and shed 
our innocent blood and lay your sovereign's distant frontier waste. "554 
551 RGADA f. 1121 op. 2 no. 1641.9 (petition). Cf. Nellie, Slavery, 93 
552 Kivelson, "Bitter", 112-4 
553 Lukin, Predstavleniia, 253-6 
554 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 318 
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At first sight, this statement seems to confirm expectations nurtured by the use of 
sovereign's affair west of the Urals. The next sub-chapter, however, will challenge 
this view and look for an explanation of the dissimilar uses of this institution. 
The Sovereign's Word and Affair 
The sovereign's word and affair is a well-known punitive norm for infringements 
of the security of the person of the tsar, relating to financial, political, and even 
magical misdemeanours. The relevant articles in the Ulozhenie contain stipulations 
against treason and insurrectionary plots mainly intended to defend the tsar and his 
officials' body, honour, and power. 555 The sole exception from the rule that 
disrespectful or aggressive behaviour towards these persons must be punished 
severely is made in case it is proven conclusively that "a small number" of people 
approached an offical in order to submit a petition accusing him or other officials for 
improper behaviour, not showing an aggressive or insolent attitude. 556 In recent 
years, the sovereign's word and affair has seen numerous re-evaluations that place it 
at the very core of their respective approaches to Muscovite society. However, as I 
will argue in this chapter, while historians have reasonably seen denunciations under 
these articles as proof of Muscovite popular monarchism, its institutional and ritual 
aspects structured channels of appeal and public interaction that open up new 
insights into the ways in which Muscovite institutional culture was harnessed to 
Siberian conditions of trade, negotiations, and the limited public sphere. 557 
In looking at the sovereign's word and affair, most historians have relied on 
Novombergskii's collection that assembled almost exclusively cases of the 
sovereign's word from the central areas. 558 In his much-cited essay Keenan has 
called the "sovereign's word and deed" one of the characteristic elements of 
Muscovite political culture. Although, according to Keenan, in these proceedings the 
state prosecuted only trifles, it was done with "hair-raising earnestness and brutality", 
sss Hellie, Ulozhenie, ch.. 2 art. 1-21 
556 Ibid., art. 22 
557 I am using this term in the sense attributed to it by the "Theory and analysis of institutional 
mechanisms (TAIM)": Rehberg et al., "Abschlußbericht fur die DFG", Ms., Dresden 1996; Rehberg, 
"Institutionenwandel", 101-4. 
558 Novombergskii, N. Ia., 'Slovo i delo gosudarevo', vols. 1-2, Tomsk/Moscow 1909-1919. See 
Ditiatin, Rol', and Torke, Staatsbedingte. 
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in precarious times aiming to "protect not the real safety and dignity of the tsar but 
the myth of his all-embracing and all-knowing power". In periods of political 
stability cases introduced with "words" or "deeds of the sovereign" receded. 559 The 
quality of denunciations prevalent in Novombergskii's collection stresses the 
tendency of the absolutist state to subdue society by dividing it. Individual actors, 
many abject prisoners among them, informed the authorities about their fellows, to 
gain a fleeting alleviation of the brutal conditions they lived in. Since the sovereign's 
word and affair was a norm that safeguarded the tsar and his family, it stipulated that 
litigants were to be brought to Moscow - thus they could by-pass the loathed 
administration. 
The less well-known Siberian cases are different, however: in Siberia, the 
invocation of the sovereign's word, more often the sovereign's affair, served to 
depose the voevoda. Therefore it is no surprise that Pokrovskii challenges Keenan's 
interpretation, emphasising the importance of the sovereign's word and affair by 
construing it as a mechanism for feedback from the provinces, since the voevoda 
administration was corrupt and diverted revenues from the fur trade to the voevodas' 
own pockets. He observed that Siberians used this direct line to Moscow or 
otherwise to their superiors in higher-order, uezd towns or in Tobol'sk to challenge 
voevodas and take over the administration during rebellions. In his interpretation he 
otherwise stuck to established models of the Russian population's "utopian" or 
"naive" belief in the "good" tsar, which were bound to be disappointed, yet 
constituted an abundant resource which even the tsarist regime took until 1917 to 
exhaust. 560 
While generally agreeing with Pokrovskii's findings, Perrie has altered the 
emphasis put on the naivety of Muscovites to include other elements, such as 
negotiations centring on the zhalovan'e Moscow paid to cossacks. She incorporated 
these observations into a model characteristic of the region she studied in detail, the 
southern frontier, where cossacks offered their military services and expertise for a 
rather meagre ration supplementing what they acquired during campaigns and as 
steppe hunters, fishers and beekeepers. She contrasted these southern cossacks with 
559 Keenan, Edward L., "Muscovite Political Folkways", RR vol. 45 (1986), 115-81, here: 147 
560 pokrovskii, "Sibirskie materialy"; see also Aleksandrov, Mast', 224-33 
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the town rebellions "in the name of the tsar" which Pokrovskii had described: 
Perrie's cossacks were preoccupied with pretenders. An important contribution to the 
interpretation of the sovereign's word and affair is her observation that the traditional 
pattern of relationships between the cossacks and the government described by 
Khodarkovsky - involving petitions, promises, negotiations, threats, shows of 
strength, and concessions - fitted this pattern of dependency well. 
561 On the other 
hand, the tsar and Moscow depended on the cossacks for their costly military 
assistance as well. On a more general level of analysis, the rhetoric of the tsar's 
paternalistic benevolence towards the cossacks, and of the cossacks' humble 
petitioning for pardon and rewards provided an appropriate ideological framework 
for their relationship, in which the `monarchist populism' of the authorities 
corresponded to the `popular monarchism' of the cossacks, and helped to reinforce 
it. 562 
The sovereign's word and affair facilitated appeal against local court and 
voevoda decisions by some of its implications. The high level of attention afforded to 
any case in this category had its origins in the wave of pretenders during the Time of 
Troubles, who rallied substantial mass support, in particular from the cossacks of the 
Don and Southern Russian regions by claiming to be the legitimate tsar or 
disappeared tsarevich. Their aim was not rebellion against feudalism, but rather the 
notion - typical of early modern Europe - of a "world turned upside-down" in which 
not the system itself changed, but only the relative position of individuals within it. 
Since in sixteenth and seventeenth-century Muscovy, all decisions at least nominally 
had to be made by the tsar, only the claim to be the tsar gave a person sufficient 
power to challenge existing authorities. 563 As central authority was reconstituted, it 
responded to this challenge by closely investigating each and every utterance of 
improper words referring to the tsar or popular imitations of the majesty, even if this 
appeared futile. If a known robber uttered the words "I know a sovereign's word" in 
prison, that was enough to launch an investigation and immediately transport him 
away from local influence into the capital. The approach at grassroots level was 
561 Khodarkovsky, "Razin", 9 
562 perrie, "`Tsareviches"', 243-256; idem, Pretenders, 250 
563 Lukin, Predstavleniia, 168-9 
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Moscow's answer to the perils of a vast frontier area threatened by nomad 
incursions, where any attempt at building a more secure border meant that everybody 
had to be armed and every hand was needed for defence. The lack of natural borders 
meant that an effort at strengthening frontier defences brought about an increase in 
vulnerable, insecure communities suffering from inadequacy of supply as well as 
cultivable land, since open fields could hardly be defended. During the seventeenth- 
century effort at fortifying the southern borders, this meant that anomie situations 
spread just beyond the fortifications of the day, while unrest was prevalent in the area 
behind the zaseki. Any spark could ignite a boundless area and besides boyars and 
gentry, it was ordinary peasants and townspeople, suffering from the rebels' 
depredations, who, in the end, often overthrew them. This experience also made 
pretenderism unpopular at the end of the Time of Troubles and explains the attention 
to seemingly futile denunciations. 5M 
Even in Siberia, Moscow sought to punish derisory speeches about the tsar, or 
just the omission of parts of the tsar's title in a document. Nevertheless, the Siberian 
chancellery did not care to bring any of the perpetrators of this category to 
Moscow. 565 Yet if there was as little military threat to Moscow from its small, 
scattered and extremely distant bases in Siberia as there was a military threat to 
Siberian towns from the centre, Moscow still depended on their loyalty. It needed 
Siberia's resources to wage war in the west and relied on them during the crucial 
seventeenth century. The chancellery as well as Siberian cossacks reflected this 
difference in conditions in the approach adopted towards the gosudarevo delo. 
Where financial aspects outweighed the attempt to "turn the world upside-down", 
attention focused on machinations with the funds that were made available to 
cossacks and voevodas. 
Apart from this, there were other conditions that facilitated the transformation of 
this institution into a viable mechanism for litigation and appeal. The very ample 
field of meanings attached to "dell" has contributed to this transformation; it has also 
led historians to translate it as "deed"; I am translating it here as "affair" to highlight 
the main meaning or nexus Siberian cossacks had in mind when they invoked the 
564 Perrie, Pretenders, 250; Davies, "Village", 481-501 
565 Pokrovskii, "Slovu i delu", 50 
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"gosudarevo delo". Besides its implication of treason and related phenomena, the 
gosudarevo delo denoted an obligation to work, in the same vein as monastyrskoe 
delo, gorodovoe delo, ostrozhnoe delo. An instructive side aspect of the combination 
of the term delo meaning "craft" as well as "livelihood" is provided by delo 
barkhatnoe, zheleznoe, zhivopisnoe, zolotoe, ikonnoe, pushechnoe, chasovoe etc. 
There were many intermittent uses of this combination: What is usually interpreted 
as "sovereign's affair" thus can be translated as "working for the sovereign" as in 
"Simon is always occupied with the sovereign's affairs of icon-painting"566 
The most common meaning of gosudarevo delo in Siberia during this period was 
a service assignment or mission to cossacks, chancery staff or the voevoda. 
Pokrovskii refuted attempts by M. N. Tikhomirov and Man'kov to trace these 
meanings - what analytically can be termed the "affairs of state" on the one hand and 
the denunciation for treason or political crime on the other hand - in the text of the 
Ulozhenie statute of 1649, which codified this double meaning, noting that there was 
no basis in the law for such a distinction. He concluded that this inconsequence and, 
to the modern mind, confusion in the text reflected the 
"contradictory early stage of the founding of an important juridical terminology 
connected to the deep processes of social awareness as well as to the very pungent 
realities of contemporary political and class struggles". 567 
Perceptive as this interpretation is, it does not explain the way in which these 
"deep" processes functioned. It is also questionable whether this confusing condition 
later on changed much; in the seventeenth century, the impression that this institution 
was in the early stages of its development and somewhat confusing is created by its 
transformation: the cossacks found this institution well suited to their needs in 
particular since it covered such a broad and even contradictory array of meanings, 
provisions of law, and the custom and institutions of their own service to the tsar. All 
these partly diverging rules and stipulations could be used as lcitideas according to 
daily needs varying among localities, social groups and time in a vast and diverging 
empire, to interpret the institution. In this way, norms taken from cossack custom, 
such as the otkaz, could gain tacit acceptance through their continual use in service 
566 SRIa, entry delo", no. 1,3 567 Pokrovskii, "Slovu", 59; Hellie, Ulozhenie, ch. IX, art. 1; ch. X, art. 1,2,24,147,149,150. 
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relations568 and thus transform the institution. After the rebellions of mid-century, it 
became particularly clear that despite all the efforts to the contrary made in the 1649 
Ulozhenie, such as restricting access to the tsar, or the norm barring skop 1 zagovor, 
prohibiting rebellions and mass assemblies569 and providing much of the leitideas of 
the rebels' opponents, in Siberia at least it was accepted that the `tsar's dignity' could 
be saved by publicly ousting his representative, the voevoda. 
This was facilitated by the fact that cossacks could claim that they relied on the 
"true fonts" of the sovereign's affair, in their case their claim to be vigilant for the 
sovereign's profit570 and to abide by the norm limiting the prohibition of assemblies 
- in case it could be established conclusively during investigation that the defendants 
approached an official not as part of an insurrectionary plot, but to submit a 
petition571 - thereby making it difficult for their opponents to claim that they were 
traitors. This state of affairs was not conditioned by an "early stage" of this 
institution's development, but rather by the needs of empire. In the Muscovite 
empire, there were so many diverging needs and conditions of life, so that an 
overarching institution such as the sovereign's word and affair had to undergo 
changes according to the place and social group in which it was used. After all, 
establishing an institution is very costly in economic and social terms - many people 
rely and build their future on it. 572 Specific expectations such as privileged treatment 
of these cases, overriding the hierarchy, and direct access to the tsar contributed to its 
esteem among the population. At the same time, however, a certain amount of 
confusion in this juridical term where the individual case was described should not 
deter us from acknowledging that such confusion could be useful in an empire. To be 
indistinguishable at first sight from litigants with radically different needs and 
opinions was useful in an empire that put a premium on outward conformity. As this 
chapter will show, this uniformity in appearance did not deter Siberian cossacks from 
568 See ch. I 569 DAI II, 2.1613 g.; Hellie, 1649 Ulozhenie, chapter II, art. 18-21 
570 Aleksandrov, Mast', 223-4,248-9; Rezun, Prichulyme, 59-68; Pokrovskii, Tomsk, 98,99; 
Nikitin, Sluzhilye, 192 
571 Hellie, 1649 Ulozhenie, chapter II, art. 22 
572 Krasner, S. D., "Sovereignty. An Institutional Perspective", CPS vol. 21 no. 1 (April 1988), 81; 
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pursuing their needs successfully. Rather than a proof for the cossacks' naivety, this 
shows that they made good use of the opportunities afforded by the tsar's populism. 
The Muscovite appeal system took into account changing positions of power, 
rather than permanently enfranchising certain groups and guaranteeing their status 
over other concerns. In an extended frontier area, such as Muscovy's south, this 
constituted an enormous advantage. Throughout the "rolling" border, communities 
were raised from peasant status to servitor, only to lose their status again when the 
border fortifications moved. In this area, the sovereign's affair not only empowered 
elites, but also communities. Similar to Siberian cossacks, these servitors made a 
common stand to depose their voevoda, and denounced him to the chancellery. 
Trade, as it was in Siberia, was therefore only one economic and social background 
among others that provided communities with sufficient bargaining power. In 
Muscovy's south, the isolated frontier condition of a force that was indispensable for 
protection against nomad assaults granted a degree of autonomy and leverage. 
However, in the case of the southern border forts, which were unconnected to trade, 
inconclusive evidence suggests there were fewer successful challenges to voevodas 
than in Siberia. 573 Moreover, in the Left Bank late in the seventeenth century, well- 
connected cossack officers used the "sovereign's word and affair" against ordinary 
cossacks and peasants in the process of enserfinent when frontier conditions ceased 
574 to provide significant income. 
In clear contrast to the practice in the Left Bank, "free" ordinary Don or 
Zaporozhian cossacks were not immune to the appeal system. This might be puzzling 
at first sight, since many of them fled from worsening conditions in the Left Bank 
and elsewhere, yet leitideas changed locally according to the social conditions. In 
these areas, it was often the cossack group who used their former leaders as 
bargaining chips in negotiations with Moscow, since social status was irrelevant. 
They enjoyed this bargaining power as long as the cossack Personenverband was 
immune to considerations of expert knowledge and the related boost to recognition 
of social status independent of the aims of the Personenverband, which such 
S73 Glaz'ev, "Mestnoe". Davies, "Village", 481-501 
574 Rustemeyer, Angela, "Ukrainians in Seventeenth-Century Political Trials", Journal of 
Ukrainian Studies vol. 24 (1999) no. 2,37-58, here: 43-58 
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knowledge could give in more complex armies. When a rebel leader no longer 
seemed capable of embodying the aims of the Personenverband, and became a 
liability, they often denounced him as a traitor and exchanged him for a generous 
reward. Subsequently his former followers were redeemed through service. 571 
In Siberia, Muscovite policies encountered a frontier in several different ways 
that also meant different conditions and needs, and therefore a tendency to change 
the contents, or leitideas of the sovereign's affair in denunciations: Less fortified than 
the southern steppe rim of European Muscovy576, the southern Siberian frontier 
during the seventeenth century became punctuated by a loose series of isolated forts, 
separated by hundreds of miles from each other. The most southern outposts, such as 
Kuznetsk or Krasnoiarsk, found themselves encircled by nomadic peoples. Yet 
another kind of frontier comprised the whole of the conquered territory and this was 
not exclusively due to the feeble grip of the tsar's forts and towns dotted over 
thousands of miles throughout the Northern Asian territories. While most of the 
Tatars collaborated with the new power, the further the Russians went to the fur-rich 
North and Northeast, the less adapted were the semi-nomadic peoples of Siberia, the 
Tungus, Samoyeds and Koryaks to notions of suzerainty and taxes derived from the 
Mongol Empire. They were as little inclined to consider an oath of allegiance as 
anything more than a loose temporary peace or trade agreement as were the nomads 
of the south. While it was easy to send punitive forces against the more settled, those 
with a nomadic or semi-nomadic life-style frequently evaded predations as well as 
attempts to enforce levies. Tribute imposed on the natives by decree therefore locally 
took the form of barter, which took into account the superior power of the Russians 
and their promises of security, as well as their better access to markets. By decree, 
the government barred access for merchants to the iasak people before the iasak was 
taken. 577 Yet since control relied on the loyalty of the cossack Personenverband as 
well as the voevodas, their collaboration was hard to avoid. In 1658, the Siberian 
chancellery admonished the new voevoda of Iakutsk to make sure he did not repeat 
the practice that, as the chancellery reminded him, had led Moscow to establish 
575 perrie, "Outlawry", 530-42; idem, "Cossack `Tsareviches' in Seventeenth-Century Russia", 
FzOG vol. 56 (2000), 243-256 
576 On the southern frontier, see Khodarkovsky, Steppe. 
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Iakutsk. In the 1630s cossacks from the southern town of Eniscisk had forced the 
Yakuts into submission and paying the iasak. However, taking advantage of the 
situation they had deprived the tsar of the best furs by bartering with their own 
merchandise before collecting the iasak. The voevoda of Eniseisk, "befriending 
them" accepted the cossacks' gifts. 578 Thus, two overlapping frontiers combined to 
make the Russian forts and towns look like isolated spots in an area where claims of 
suzerainty on the part of the tsar and even the cossacks went far beyond the actual 
ability to enforce them. However, it was not just the natives who resisted closer 
control; in trying to deal with the natives, the cossacks could not be controlled 
tightly. The garrisons of the towns and forts themselves pursued their own interests, 
and whether collaborating with the voevoda or resisting him, time and again escaped 
Moscow's sway. 
In this extended area of weak state control, Moscow nevertheless pursued some 
of its most profitable economic activities - the fur trade and the Chinese caravan 
trade. A good part of this trade was conducted as government trade; the government 
therefore was keenly interested in ensuring loyalty throughout the Siberian frontiers. 
Muscovite policies in Siberia are therefore best understood by investigating the ways 
the chancellery and the voevodas handled the issue of loyalty. To be considered loyal 
was crucial in an area where all boundaries were in a state of flux, where private and 
state spheres were not separated and personal as well as group conflicts were 
therefore fought as pitched information battles for the most loyal profile, best 
expressed in the form of the sovereign's word or affair. 
On the frontier, loyalty was primarily owed to the Personenverband, while 
loyalty to the tsar often had to be artificially manufactured post factum. In 1657, a 
group of eighteen cossacks with their piatidesiatnik Ivan Pavlov was chased into the 
forests between Ilimsk and the Amur after syn boiarskii Kurbat Ivanov had 
proclaimed a sovereign's affair against them: 
"I wrote immediately to syn boiarskii Fedor Pushchin and the Amur and Iakutsk 
cossacks, to Ilimsk fort sotnik lakov Antsyforov and to the cossacks, and merchants and 
trappers, so that we, after meeting, could pursue them all together, may God grant it. " 
578 DAI vol. 4 (1851), 104-5 
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In the ensuing battle two cossacks were wounded, while the "traitors" were 
captured by the pursuing Personenverband comprising about three times as many 
men. Kurbat maintained that only when all the captured cossacks' effects had been 
listed, would the Personenverband be given its due: They 
"distributed among themselves, for they need motivation to chase such traitors again. " 
According to his report, Kurbat Ivanov was not involved in the decision-making 
process leading to the split in the cossack group and the separate campaign of 
Pavlov's men. Kurbat claimed he knew about the "traitors" from a letter Fedor 
Pushchin had sent to him, asserting that they had stolen Pushchin's and his men's 
equipment and supplies when leaving their group, and had stripped merchants of 
their goods on their way to the Amur. 579 It is characteristic for this report that it omits 
all details about the decision-making process leading to the split of Pushchin's men. 
These internal processes of the Personenverband remained opaque for the outside 
world; at least as long as there was no counterallegation and no outright 
investigation, since claimants of the true interpretation of the sovereign's affair 
asserted that they relied on the true sources, which could not be discussed. 58° In the 
frontier area, the outcome of competition between and within cossack groups was 
affected little by outside forces; thus the "sovereign's affair" served as a rallying-cry 
uttered by those who felt they could make use of the Russian authorities and wanted 
to make it clear to the emerging Personenverband that they were ready to take 
responsibility for ensuing action. As an institutional mechanism, the sovereign's 
affair facilitated integration of the empire. 
Whereas in this case Pushchin found someone else to declare a "sovereign's 
affair", restore leadership and report to Moscow and the voevoda of Eniseisk, this 
was not always so easy. Ten years later, in a similar yet rather unfortunate course of 
events he was among the deli boiarskie and "no-names" accused by rebellious 
Iakutsk cossacks and desiatniki of appropriating and exploiting all positions of 
prikazchiki in the small forts of the Iakutsk uezd; moreover, they failed to provide 
adequate leadership. Pushchin faced charges of losing up to ninety men at Okhotsk 
and in the Amur region. Yet under investigation he showed considerable dexterity in 
579 Ibid., 89-90 
580 Rehberg, "Institutionenwandel", 101-4 
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defending himself. He claimed that during the campaign to the river Argun he had 
shipped upstream for ten days, but could not find any natives. When he ran out of 
supplies, he asserted, he returned to the mouth of the Argun and set up a zimov'e. 
Forty-three cossacks left him and fled to the Amur. He followed them, as he stated, 
stayed with them for the winter "among the Giliaks" and in the spring, with the iasak 
treasure they had collected, and persuaded twelve of them to return with him to 
Iakutsk. The others stayed behind, but "without him" the natives killed them, except 
for two cossacks, who later returned to Iakutsk. Pushchin's report exemplifies the 
typical behaviour of the Personenverband which threatened to judge Pushchin's 
leadership on the Argun as no longer successful, while the Amur was a nearby and 
tempting aim. Whether or not he indeed risked all in winter and waited until they left 
him or rather prudently yielded to their wishes, next spring Pushchin could persuade 
some of them to return to Iakutsk to earn the merits and benefits of the collected 
iasak. Rank-and-file cossack Andrei Ivanov corroborated Pushchin's claims, and 
added that some of the remaining cossacks died of starvation and the Chinese killed 
others. sai 
There were already sufficient reasons to doubt Pushchin's claims. During the 
rebellion of Tomsk in 1648/1649, cossacks under the lead of Pushchin and the 
second voevoda backed a sovereign's affair against the first voevoda. While most 
cossacks were never punished for this and subsequent acts of insubordination, 
Pushchin, a forceful advocate of the rebels' cause and leader of their delegation to 
Moscow, was among the thirty-one punished by the knout - few indeed for one of 
the longest town rebellions in Russian history. The tsar then banned him to Iakutsk 
along with eleven of his comrades. 582 During the rebellion, the protagonists faced 
multiple counteraccusations of sovereign's affairs by their mutual foes. The 
considerable experience Pushchin amassed in this rebellion can be gauged from the 
fact that the whole period from April 1648 to August 1649 was spent in attempts to 
break the information embargo the rebels had imposed on their captives, the partisans 
of Tomsk voevoda Osip Shcherbatyi. 583 
581 Ogloblin, "Iakutskii rozysk", 383 
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With regard to transforming the sovereign's affair, Siberia profited from its 
frontier status. Even in the European north of Russia, where on top of the traditional 
organs of self-administration a voevoda administration had been superimposed in the 
early seventeenth century, voevodas ruled with the help of outside troops. Taxes 
were collected by these troops in the vicinity of the north-western border, and at 
times even the local levy of service men was assembled in this manner. 584 Coercion 
used to convene the sluzhilye liudi in Moscow was codified in the 1631/1632 statute 
to Beloozero, threatening to send guards from Moscow in case of objections and to 
make the local dvoriane of the Moscow list pay for the persecution twice over. 58' In 
the more central rural areas of Muscovy, it is true, the lack of even the most basic 
staff reduced the voevoda to little more than one of the local dignitaries, whose 
connections at court and in the chancelleries as well as local support were indicative 
of their local standing. 586 In Siberia, however, patronage followed rather different 
channels. Moscow was indeed far away, as word would have it, and it received the 
news long after it was current: three months later and more. 587 When a cossack 
Personenverband returned from "distant service" to its base in a Siberian town the 
voevoda usually had changed at least once, for his tenure was only two to four years. 
Returning cossacks could not expect the voevoda's collaboration, yet expecting the 
opposite was even more unreasonable. As already mentioned, any cossack 
Personenverband returning from campaign could anticipate a pardon for anything 
they had done whatsoever, if only they brought sufficient fur tribute. 
In this institutional context and considering that territories in a newly conquered 
and not yet entirely mapped land were hard to delineate, let alone defend, 
competition between different towns and forts over territories was intense. Whenever 
a clash occurred, one party claimed it had been assaulted when "accepting new 
iasak-payers under the sovereign's exalted hand", as did the Tomsk cossacks in 
1639. Their opponents, Eniseisk cossacks in the new fort of Iakutsk, returned the 
allegation, claiming it was indeed their established iasak-people living close by the 
584 Bogoslovskii, Samoupravlenie, vol. 2,287-90 
5: 5 Iakovlev, Namestnich'i, 188 
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fort who had been attacked by Tomsk cossacks, based at their own fort, and their 
non-iasak paying native allies588, an allegation tantamount to a sovereign's affair. 589 
Even in the 1690s, when most potential iasak-payers had been divided among the 
towns and forts, usurpations still occurred. In 1697 Selenginsk prikazchik Ivan 
Korytov, on the river Selenga east of lake Baikal gave a good example of vicious 
local politicking with government decrees and petitions. He complained that the 
prikazchik of the small fort of Kabansk, the desiatnik Emelian Panikadilshchik, one 
of the leaders of the Transbaikalian rebels in 1696, had made inroads into the 
"Selenginsk great sovereign's iasak Buryats". In that year, Korytov had refused to 
follow the rebels, for which he was punished. 590 Panikadilshchikov claimed that 
instructions given to him in Irkutsk subordinated the said iasak Buryats to Kabansk. 
In his own favour, Korytov cited a petition by "Selenginsk deti boiarskie and 
piatidesiatniki and sluzhilye liudi of all ranks" sent to Irkutsk "before my arrival". 
The petition asserted that Selenginsk Buryats were ordered to deliver the iasak to 
Selenginsk when they were first subjected to "the sovereign's elevated hand". In 
Siberia, no force could be sent in to bring recalcitrant local cossacks to order, since 
that meant increasing the number of contenders for the fur tribute and of mouths to 
be fed with imported grain. Likewise, no patron at court was powerful enough to stop 
a successful cossack group that had managed to bypass its competitors in the 
Siberian forests. 
In such cases, the sovereign's affair remained almost the only way to contest the 
spoils and spheres of influence. This was a reality Iakutsk cossack Samson Artem'ev 
and his comrades had to accept in 1657, after they lost their interpreter in an accident 
at the portage between the rivers Vatan and Nantara. As they were left without 
anyone who could gather information from the natives, give orders or collect the 
iasak, they soon lost their best amanat as well. This amanat lost no time, calling on 
the iasak-paying Tungus Khudynets to destroy the equipment of Artem'ev's men 
stored in a hiding place. Artem'ev sent to cossack Kondrat'ei Moiseev in the middle 
winter-hut on Nantar river "on behalf of this sovereign's affair", but Moiseev 
588 DAI vol. 2 (1846), no. 82, pp. 231-4; Lantzeff, Siberia, 84 
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preferred to shelter Khudynets during winter until the lasak was paid. In his report, 
the furious Artem'ev, unable to present any furs at Iakutsk, accused his rival Moiscev 
of leaving the sovereign's service by not taking appropriate care. 591 Artem'ev did not 
rely on the loss in profit engendered by the hidden amanat, since he knew his 
opponent had collected a huge amount of tribute. His strategy is still reminiscent of 
the ritual aspects of the sovereign's affair. Though stressing financial matters, he 
nevertheless tried to create the impression that Moiseev was a traitor. 
Rustemeyer, who has provided a number of interesting cases of the sovereign's 
word and affair taking place in European Muscovy, has argued that Muscovites used 
the pretenders as well as the sovereign's word and affair in an instrumental way she 
describes as modem political behaviour. 592 To understand early modern 
developments, historians need to be careful with the assumption of irreversible 
modernisation processes from archaic compact ritual to rationally differentiated 
codified law. On a closer look, communicative forms indulged in a "long" medieval 
age as well as entered into a "premature" modern era, which both overlapped 
everywhere in early-modem Europe to differing degrees and at different times. 
Already in the Carolingian era, processes of codification served to institutionalise 
basic forms by elaborating on canonic texts. On the other hand, even in much later 
centuries ritual codes of communication used for regulation turned out sweeping 
successes, while seemingly rational codified law stood on a shaky basis, because it 
lacked the organisational basis as well as complementary mentalities. In this sense, 
there was indeed a field of tension, but it ran rather diagonally between the two poles 
of uncombinable ritual and codified law, across the whole cultural system as an offer, 
opening up a functionally differentiated alternative. This is obvious in particular 
where political tenets are pragmatically pursued, while rituals and law were 
elaborated, for example the order of the Golden Fleece, where rituals were rationally 
instrumentalised, as during summits and royal entries, or where in codified, but 
precarious arrangements speech was used as a ritualised medium of 
communication. "' In this sense, ritual arrangements such as the sovereign's word, 
591 DAI vol. 4 no. 37, pp. 91-2 
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oral petitioning, invocation of the sovereign's word or affair, or the withholding of 
the contents of the sovereign's affair were not necessarily "traditional". They fitted 
well the conditions in Siberia, where the main problem was to overcome distance 
both economically and politically: building up a stable, hierarchically controllable 
infrastructure would have been too expensive. On the other hand, codified political 
privileges for some groups - such as privileges for elective courts of law, or a 
codification of separate cossack law beyond the institutionalisation that actually took 
place - would have meant reducing interaction to a degree that threatened to 
minimise coordination and stall trade. Thus, the two partly mutually exclusive 
requirements of economy and politics could undermine overly "rational" 
codification, while ritual arrangements in some places stabilised the empire. 
Whether we are prepared to consider the sovereign's affair as modem or rather 
as traditional, it is reasonable to look at processes of institutionalisation or 
institutional change from a perspective that allows for their possible rationality. By 
establishing the sinodik ermakovym kazakam, for example, Kipriian founded an 
idealistic objectification, an explicitly-formulated reflexion that set up, justified and 
legitimated the institutional stock. Idealistic objectifications comprise (at least in 
general) the whole complex of an organisation's significance, its system of norms, 
form and purpose. Its methodical orientation can be prospective, setting a target 
('programme', for example Dante, De monarchia), analytically ascertaining 
('science', e. g. Aquinas De regimine principum), or, as in this case, retrospective 
('historiography 9). 594 Overcoming the problem of publicising such objectifications in 
a still largely illiterate environment, Ermak and his cossacks' feats were read out 
regularly in Tobol'sk's St. Sophia cathedral. It left no doubt as to the preferences of 
the tsar concerning the relations with the cossacks: 
"Ermak sent the iasak to Moscow, sable, fox, polar fox and squirrel with an ataman and 
cossacks to the sovereign... Ivan (IV. ) [reporting] that by his sovereign's fortune they 
conquered the tsarstvo of Sibir' and praise God for everything. " 
In this early formula the sovereign's affair does not yet appear as a term, 
however, the magic and God-bestowed qualities of the sovereign's support and the 
apparently staunch loyalty of the cossacks to the tsar are evident in many places in 
594 Melville, "Institutionen", 14 
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the sinodik. This ritual display and the tribute delivered made them eligible for the 
sovereign's mercy: 
"When the cossacks arrived in Moscow, the sovereign... received them and ordered that 
the report was read. The sovereign bestowed cash and clothes on the cossacks, sent great 
reward and his merciful sovereign's word to Ermak and the cossacks. "595 
Even if the tsar did not approve of the earlier feats of a cossack group, as he did 
in Ermak's case, he would never fail to redeem and bestow his gifts on the 
successful. 596 The voevodas' instructions stipulated that cossacks returning with 
iasak from "new lands", which had not previously paid iasak, could rely on a 
handsome reward. 597 While in this case, written reports took centre stage, in the 
largely illiterate frontier environment of the fur tribute collectors, ritual aspects of the 
sovereign's affair remained important. 
Town Rebellions and the Sovereign's Affair 
While these examples highlight how the sovereign's affair structured conflicts in 
outlying areas during campaign service and collection of the iasak, where it proved a 
useful means to make the contenders acceptable back to service of the tsar, it was 
also applicable to urban power struggles. In these cases, it was more important to 
express differing points of view without questioning the authority of the tsar. If the 
voevoda demanded too much from the cossack community, even if he acted 
according to the tsar's interest as did voevoda Shcherbatyi of Tomsk in 1648 - 
economising on expensive cossack salaries - they quite often united to overthrow or 
disobey him. In a contradiction of sorts, however, they also formulated their claims 
as a sovereign's affair. Historians either have neglected this problem completely, or 
have seen in such cases a naive belief in the "good tsar", which squarely contradicted 
the underlying forces of bureaucratisation and the increasing power of the voevoda 
and therefore could only be frustrated. 598 Moon and Field, studying nineteenth- 
century peasants, have raised the question of whether cossacks as well as peasants 
really believed in their own zeal for the sovereign's affair, or only feigned it, but 
59' PSRL vol. 36.1,40,1.110; 123,1.14 ob. 596 Perrie, "Outlawry", 534-9 
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despite their inclination to explain the seeming contradiction in terms of the 
dissimulative, cunning and manipulative nature of peasant behaviour, Moon 
concludes that the evidence is contradictory and inconclusive. 599 Perrie has noted that 
in the last analysis such questions are perhaps unanswerable. 60° Sincerity, however, 
is only in question where coherence - of an ideology of monarchism, be it popular or 
otherwise - is obligatory. In this respect, institutions are much more adaptable. An 
institution is contested since it can be used as a resource of power by those who are 
physically, intellectually and socially capable of claiming it for their actions 601 
Institutional analysis identifies different leitideas competing for the legitimate 
interpretation of an institution. Every leitidea is only temporarily successful by being 
set apart from and above a complex of often-incompatible potential orientations. 
Since the leitidea is a product of struggle and a synthesis of contradicting issues, it 
disowns many of the competing senses and drafts of order. Yet this is the very reason 
why its validity is never uncontested and depends on different places, situations, 
interests and social groups. 602 
Contested and varying leitideas allowed for a limited degree of politics on the 
local level. On 12 April 1648, Grigorii Pleshcheev-Podrez, an outlawed noble and 
well-known troublemaker, while still in prison invoked a "sovereign's affair" against 
the voevoda, Osip I. Shcherbatyi of Tomsk, which was then made public with the 
help of cossack plotters by mouth-to-mouth propaganda. Thereafter, well-oiled 
machinery staged a rebellion pre-planned by cossacks from all ranks during the days 
before. A huge crowd, - according to Shcherbatyi - no less than three hundred or 
one-third of Tomskans, assembled in front of the voevoda's office and demanded the 
conditional release of Pleshcheev to have him questioned on the details of his 
accusation. The voevoda, who already knew that his supporters among the cossacks 
had lost control of the population, tried to remind the cossacks of Pleshcheev's 
misdemeanours and keep him imprisoned, however finally yielded to the demands of 
the crowd. The rebels sent a delegation to fetch the prisoner. Thus the voevoda was 
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confronted by Pleshcheev publicly, at which point Pleshcheev repeated the 
invocation. In a characteristic combination of these ritual elements with written, 
institutionalised forms of communication, the rebels asked whom he accused -a 
detail withheld until this moment - and the cossack Chechuev documented his 
answer. 603 Thus in this case, too, the invocation of the sovereign's affair focused the 
proceedings of a mass assembly. The result of this confrontation was the official 
"otkaz", the deposition of the voevoda by the cossacks, who declared they could no 
longer live under Shcherbatyi's jurisdiction and serve the sovereign faithfully. 
While from the onset there was little doubt that Pleshcheev-Podrez's sovereign's 
affair was void, an information battle ensued about the proper interpretation of the 
events vis-ä-vis Moscow. The voevoda, under arrest in his court, managed at times to 
by-pass the information blockade imposed by the rebels. In his version of events, he 
had been violated by the rebels, and the rebellion was subsumed under the heading of 
"riotous assembly and plot (skop i zagovor)", one of the special cases of the 
sovereign's affair. 604 The rebels, comprising most of the cossacks and inhabitants of 
the town, compiled long lists of transgressions they claimed the voevoda had 
perpetrated, and send them to Moscow, along with their own version of the events on 
12a' April, which were presented as a fully legal submission of a petition addressed 
to the sovereign. They claimed they had only acted in the best interest of the 
sovereign - reductions in salary and the retributions forced upon them by 
Shcherbatyi, they claimed, made them incapable of performing service, tantamount, 
in their view, to a sovereign's affair. These conflicting leitideas under the common 
institutional cover of the sovereign's affair were typical for Siberia, and they had 
lasting consequences - for over a year the rebels controlled the town; another three 
years were to pass before even a few of them were - comparatively lightly - 
punished. 605 
Even in the case of their iasyr'. Tomsk cossacks employed the leitidea that their 
service was at the heart of the sovereign's affairs. As mentioned above, cossacks 
believed they had a traditional right to own these captives, whose relatives then 
6°3 Pokrovskii, Tomsk, 51 
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bought them out. Although supplies to the cossacks were not necessarily against the 
interest of the tsar, any unnecessary harsh treatment of the iasak people violated the 
principle of protection (obereganie) - as captives, they could neither hunt fur-bearing 
animals nor pay the iasak with their herds. The rebels made sure they stroke the right 
tone, revealing that the cossacks' leitidea concerning the sovereign's affair opposed 
Shcherbatyi, who deprived Tomsk cossacks of this income: 
"In 1645/1646 we, your sovereign's kholopi, retaliated against your sovereign's traitors, 
the Kalmyks. With the aid of your sovereign's fortune we defeated them. Prince Osip 
took all our booty and captives.. . 
by force. He baptised our iasyr' to send them to 
Rus' "606 
Instead of insisting on their traditional right, which they felt was contested by the 
tsar's and the voevoda's demands, they relied on another decree, banning the baptism 
of captured natives or their selling into slavery. They tried even harder to prove that 
the voevoda had violated the tsar's affairs by taking away their private iasyr' -they 
designated their captives as amanat (official captives who lived in the forts and 
towns according to steppe tradition to ensure their relatives paid the iasak) 607 
"The foreigners, seeing that their wives and children were in Tomsk and not dispersed 
[throughout the empire], visited them and obeyed the tsar. 99608 
When the voevoda took the captives away, the argument runs in the cossack 
petition, the Kalmyks withdrew from Tomsk, and instead of trading began hostilities. 
The virtue in this is clearly not naivety, but purposefully somewhat twisted logic, as 
even Pokrovskii, calling the cossacks' perceived needs somewhat overstated their 
"interests", has to admit in this detail, but not in the general picture. This approach 
served to confuse and occupy the chancellery - in the service of the sovereign the 
cossacks mixed their iasyr' with the amanat as though it was one and the same. 
Siberian cossacks, in short, had developed a very peculiar attitude towards Moscow - 
instead of raiding the tsar's treasury on the highway, they hijacked it symbolically 
using competing norms and decrees - the instructions unequivocally barred slave- 
trade with iasyr' to stabilise the fur tax - to put together a suitable leitidea 
interpreting the sovereign's affair in line with their perceived needs. Since their 
606 Pokrovskii, Tomsk, 98 
607 Khodarkovsky, Steppe, 56-60 
608 Pokrovskii, Tomsk, 99 
184 
elected voevoda was formally second voevoda, they maintained that they were 
heeding the sovereign's affair even after refusing to obey Shcherbatyi. 
On 30th July 1648, after a series of contradictory petitions from the Tomsk rebels 
had been sent and reports written by the voevoda and his imprisoned supporters had 
slipped through the lines of the information embargo around the voevoda's court, the 
prison and on the roads and rivers connecting Tomsk to the outside world, the regular 
new secretary arrived in Tomsk to relieve his - by then deceased - predecessor. 
609 A 
fierce battle ensued, with both sides seeking to win over secretary Kliucharev, who 
had left Moscow before any of the above documents could reach it. Since Kliucharev 
from the outset supported prince Osip, who had briefed him in advance, the rebels 
tried to entice him to change. Their main argument was the sovereign's affair, 
Shcherbatyi's transgressions and the "destruction and oppression" suffered by the 
population of Tomsk. Since the first days of the rebellion, when the first voevoda, 
only just deposed, had entered the voevoda's office and seized the official seal, the 
second, elected voevoda Bunakov and secretary Patrikeev, not without instigation 
from the rebels, set up office in town, on a cossack's homestead, to avoid implication 
by the deposed voevoda's affairs. Ilia Bunakov then tried to persuade Kliucharev to 
join him in the new s "ezzhaia izba, instead of trying to convene both voevodas in the 
old, "raided" office, which was in the eyes of the rebels not secure from 
Shcherbatyi's unlawful afflictions. Thus, although they could hardly miss on the 
difficulty of reconciling this decision with the spirit of their petitions - Bunakov had 
a hard time in explaining why he held office in the "traitorous home-stead" during 
interrogation -, they did demonstrate a keen awareness of the relevance of 
controlling secret access to a public space. Bunakov explained that 
"according to their petition these days I1'ia alone sits at your sovereign's affairs. With 
prince Osip he cannot sit by any means. P1610 
That very hour, Kliucharev reported, a delegation "of about sixty people" arrived 
and supported Bunakov's view, adding "with great noise" that they would not allow 
anyone to become messenger or bailiff, thus preventing Kliucharev and Shcherbatyi 
609 Although there are other accounts of the Tomsk rebellion, only Pokrovskii presents the sources 
of the Kliucharev debate. 
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from enacting a decree or court decision. Thereby they betrayed a very keen sense 
for the limits of hierarchic implementation of monologic law, which Pokrovskii 
overlooks in his account. He equally overlooks that they, again, made their 
appearance in the public sphere limited to service issues in front of the voevoda's 
office, where they made adept use of the opportunities it offered. That same evening 
another rebel delegation asked for the tsar's decree, which Kliucharev had already 
given to Shcherbatyi; he also accepted a petition by one of the first voevoda's 
supporters accusing Bunakov of a sovereign's affair. On 1st August, another, bigger 
delegation with "many people of all ranks" approached Kliucharev, repeating the 
arguments and the threat to beat anyone who acted as messenger or guard. Syn 
boiarskii V. Ergol'skii also hinted to the underlying assumptions of this step - once 
the first voevoda and secretary could not enact their court decisions, their popularity 
would be minimal, 
"and therefore there will be many killings among the cossacks and there will be great 
confusion (smuta) in Tomsk. 9,611 
The secretary understood very well that this reference to the Time of Troubles 
pointed at the very heart of the sovereign's affair, and that he was in the middle of a 
struggle for the leitidea interpreting the institution. In his public speech, he lumped 
together several events, to show that attempts from below to restore security never 
helped: 
"So it happened when Moscow was destroyed, when the Lithuanians and Poles 
conquered Muscovy and there was no sovereign at that time in Muscovy. Their brethren 
the cossacks were at Moscow with the boyar, voevoda and prince Dmitrii Trubetskoi and 
with prince D. M. Pozharskii, and that is what... [they] did: They killed each other 
traitorously. "612 
From secretary Kliucharev's point of view, not even the second militia had any 
influence on the history of Muscovy, let alone the liberation of Moscow. His ideas 
about the sovereign's affair, far removed from the realities of the Siberian frontier, 
represented a radical solution to relations between Moscow and the cossacks. In 
Muscovy west of the Urals, however, in this guise or in the other, portraying the 
611 Ibid., 251 
612 Ibid. 
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peasant muzhik as the culprit, it would have been a mainstream leitidea, on which 
even peasants often agreed 613 Nevertheless, Kliucharev expounded one of the 
leitideas competing for influence in Tomsk, striving to disown divergent orientations 
to set apart one vision of pacification: 
"Yet when God cleansed Muscovy and... there was a tsar again in Muscovy, [as]... your 
father Mikhail Fedorovich ... [was crowned], these traitorous cossack customs were 
indicted. "614 
That was a bit much for Tomsk cossacks a generation after the Troubles, 
especially since the rebels themselves had referred to the smuta in their first petition 
in April 1648 accusing the voevoda of causing troubles in town. 615 Although there 
might be some bias in Kliucharev's report of the rebels' prickly answer, it is 
nevertheless entirely in accord with their further stance: 
"They told me, your kholop: You are free (volen) in this, sovereign tsar and grand prince 
Aleksei Mikhailovich of all Russia, but you will never order that all of them be hanged. 
Prince Osip will not lead them. "616 
Whether Kliucharev reported the exact wording, or accentuated his belief in the 
only true leitidea about the sovereign's affair, with the intention of marking Tomsk 
cossacks as openly rebelling against the tsar, cannot be established with certainty 
from his account alone. Yet it is quite clear that the rebels did not nourish naive 
hopes as Pokrovskii assumes, or a "monarchist illusion", when they carried on 
petitioning the "true" tsar. They knew very well the fundamental body that supported 
their stance: It was not the mir they cited, but "all of us". The solidarity of the 
Personenverband resounded in these words; a self-reliant conviction that even the 
tsar was, in the last analysis, no stronger than any Siberian cossack in a 
Personenverband pursuing its aim - in other words, even Moscow had to take into 
account the solidarity of the Personenverband. The strong, centralising, active and 
penetrating state Pokrovskii and Aleksandrov depict, and to which the "estates" of 
the cossacks supposedly succumbed under Peter 1., 617 could not gain a foothold in 
Siberia. Prince Osip Shcherbatyi nurtured other, perhaps naive, hopes, in his attempt 
613 Lukin, Predstavleniia, 71-3 
614 Pokrovskii, Tomsk, 252 
615 Ibid., 26 
616 Ibid., 252 
617 Aleksandrov, Ylast', 355-7 
187 
to terrify Tomskans with torture and the gallows, which, despite his best efforts, he 
could only realise in a different time and in a less autonomous place: He helped to 
hang scores of rebels in the Middle Volga region during the Razin rebellion. In 
Siberia, nothing quite comparable ever happened, despite numerous rebellions. 618 
Tomskans, however much they referred to the "istinnyi tsar", never forgot the 
very real struggle of leitideas: The last Tomsk delegation repeated these words in a 
Moscow jail in October 1649, when petitioners for the last time tried to explain their 
position to the tsar. 619 Nevertheless, Kliucharev's speech made a lasting impression: 
Some of the deli boiarskie and wealthy cossacks decided to switch sides at this point, 
and, though they were punished by their former allies, became supporters of 
Shcherbatyi. For the time being, the rebels did their best to preclude any contact and 
collaboration between the first voevoda and the secretary, who were arrested in their 
courts. 
The rebels had no illusions about their situation, as their further course of actions 
showed. On 8th August 1649, sixteen months after Shcherbatyi was arrested, new 
voevodas arrived from Moscow. For the rebels, this was a clear victory. Bogdan 
Andreevich Kokovinskii was the brother-in-law of Il'ia Bunakov's brother Andrei 
and brought Il'ia's spirits and supplies; Mikhail Petrovich Volynskii was an old foe 
of Shcherbatyi, who had alienated some of Shcherbatyi's slaves on an earlier 
occasion. 620 This did not happen by chance - patronage was one of the strongest 
forces in Muscovy, and Bunakov used it as anybody else did. Pokrovskii cites these 
connections in the main body of his book, but offers no concept for proper analysis, 
and there is no mentioning of these forces in the conclusion at all. Furthermore, he 
tends to downplay patronage links of the Personenverband, while patronage 
networks that aided the voevoda or his partisans are presented as proof of 
bureaucratisation and centralisation implemented successfully from above. Bunakov 
was a protege of the boyars Grigorii and Stepan Gavrilovich Pushkin and appealed to 
618 Ibid., passim. The exact number is hard to establish due to the nature of the subject, the sources 
and the secondary literature; suffice it to mention that hardly any of the Siberian towns was touched 
less than a few times, let alone spared. Rebellions to some degree cluster around dates of general 
crisis, but were by no means restricted to these periods: cf. the dates mentioned for Tomsk in the 
Introduction, 14. 
619 Pokrovskii, Tomsk, 326 
620 Ibid., 319 
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prince M. I. Viazemskii, the brother-in-law of former Tomsk secretary Boris 
Patrikeev, to save him "from the ground of hell" which his colleague Shcherbatyi 
prepared for him, as he claimed. 621 Shcherbatyi and his protector prince Trubetskoi, 
who headed the Siberian chancellery had little influence on who was to become 
voevoda. 622 Still, the rebels as well as Bunakov had to struggle for their rights and 
view of events, in Tomsk as well as in Moscow, signifying altogether different 
contexts for respective leitideas. 
Opposed leitideas are also to be seen during the relief of the old voevodas and the 
settling of financial accounts. Unsurprisingly, Shcherbatyi reported that from the 
outset the relieving voevodas did not agree unconditionally with his interpretation 
that the cossack rule in town was "traitorous". The new voevodas' stance was aided 
by two opposed orders - one being the instruction issued to the new voevodas, 
which, according to normal procedures, stipulated that the old colleagues should both 
account for the town. Shcherbatyi presented another decree: It was pronounced in 
Moscow on 4`h March 1649, already taking into account the new conditions in 
Tomsk and therefore spared the first voevoda from the procedure of transfer. Despite 
angry and extended quarrels with Shcherbatyi, Kokovinskii and Volynskii adhered to 
the instruction they had received. They invited the rebels' representatives to their 
courts and vice versa. Despite his attempts to resist, Shcherbatyi was powerless - the 
voevodas had had him posted "in a house without circumvallation on the meadows" 
and he feared retaliation by the cossacks; after ten days he gave in. 623 
In Tomsk, rebels could now rely on due process to press for their interests. 624 
Already on 12th August, the rebels demanded the exclusion of secretary Kliucharcv 
from the impending investigation, due to his partiality. Shcherbatyi's partisans, Petr 
Sabanskii and comrades, according to due process, had been sent to Tobol'sk during 
the investigation. The rebels did not feel insecure at all - none of their petitions was 
signed so carelessly as this one, by only twenty-three persons, including two deli 
boiarskie, among them the notorious Fedor Pushchin, four piatidesiatniki, ten 
desiatniki who also signed for their men, and seven rank-and-file cossacks. Once no 
621 Ibid., 350; Chistiakova, "Tomskoe", 78 
622 See 141-2 
623 Pokrovskii, Tomsk, 318-21 
624 Weickhardt, "Due-Process"; Brown, "Neither", 4,20 
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effort seemed necessary, these men formed the very core of the rebels. They had 
judged the situation correctly - Kokovinskii and Volynskii relieved Kliucharev from 
investigation without even waiting for orders, and wrote to Moscow they could not 
start the investigation, for the decree demanded Kliucharev's signatures under all 
documents to be sent to the chancellery. Kliucharev resigned and sent a petition in 
September, asking to be relieved from his duties. Trubetskoi was impelled to 
agree; 625 the bureaucracy was dealt one more blow. 
The investigation now took an unwelcome turn for Shcherbatyi, but satisfied the 
majority of the garrison. As in many other cases after Siberian rebellions626, the 
odinachnaia zapis', the written decision not to hand over each other, as well as the 
general line prescribed by petitions signed by almost all cossacks and other 
inhabitants of the town made sure any investigator had a hard time. While 
Kokovinskii and Volynskii gave Shcherbatyi reason to complain about their irregular 
investigation methods, and did not find much evidence directed against the rebels, 
the seemingly softening stance of the Tomskans encouraged the Siberian chancellery 
to send in new investigators, who were to act independently of the voevodas, and 
who arrived in Tomsk on 20`h March 1650. At the same time, Trubctskoi ordered 
Fedor Pushchin and ten more "advisors" of Il'ia Bunakov to Moscow to be 
confronted face to face with Osip Shcherbatyi. Shcherbatyi had also used his position 
as first voevoda to request several petitioners on behalf of the rebellion to be arrested 
en route back to Tomsk at Tobol'sk and other towns - although the tsar had received 
them - measures that were sanctioned afterwards by Trubetskoi 
627 The road and the 
towns marking the stations, were dangerous places for rebels, since the local 
Personenverband in their town of origin could not always help them against their 
foes, with their far-flung networks of clients and patrons. However, they did not 
cease to send delegations to Moscow, with solemn affirmations that they heeded the 
sovereign's affair. When the direction of the investigation turned against them, with 
the second successors of Shcherbatyi and Bunakov in office in Tomsk, they still kept 
to this line. In Tomsk, investigators had a hard time to find anyone not involved in 
625 Pokrovskii, Tomsk, 328-9 
626 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 251,276; Torke, Staatsbedingte, 87-9 
627 Pokrovskii, Tomsk, 335-6 
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the rebellion, since until March 1652 Tomskans maintained they had given their 
statements to Kokovinskii and Volynskii and did not wish to contradict them. Again, 
the rebels stood their day by regulating what could be said in a particular form of 
partitioned public by means of referring to norms and leitideas related to the 
sovereign's affair. It was by no means evident that these norms could only be 
interpreted in the way that pleased the Personenverband. However, by highlighting 
the appropriate norms according to its needs, the Personenverband for a long time 
set the agenda. Power, after all, exists in action - it depends on the resources an agent 
by his knowledge and position in society is capable to mobilise in a given 
situation. 628 The institution of the sovereign's affair served to structure, focus and 
empower public resistance to a course of investigation that might destabilise the 
Personenverband's position when it was, as any public communication, endangered 
by the tendency of participants in public not to listen to each other, especially in a 
situation of hightened tension and impending danger of defeat. This is an aspect of 
the sovereign's affair Aleksandrov and Pokrovskii overlook due to their concept of 
"obratnye sviaay"; they are more interested in the reactions of some deti boiarskie to 
the Kliucharev speech to prove that the upper crust finally left the "radicals to their 
own devices". Only when the investigators illegally questioned priests who were 
declared partisans of prince Osip, the balance of power changed. With the facts this 
yielded, and with the statements of some detf boiarskie who had remained neutral, a 
more detailed picture of the rebellion emerged. Moscow proceeded to draw 
conclusions and considered punishing the rebels. 
With earlier delegations already under arrest, the third group of petitioners still 
arrived in Moscow. Nevertheless, the detained kept maintaining that their actions 
were undertaken on behalf of the "gradtskie chelobitnye", the garrison's petitions 
rather than the town's, as Aleksandrov, Pokrovskii and even Ingcrflom believe. 
According to the detained, these proved that prince Shcherbatyi had contravened the 
sovereign's interest. Their seemingly desperate, "illusionary" but steadfast stance 
was rewarded. In the summer of 1652, the chancellery sent an instruction to Tomsk 
detailing punishment for those among Bunakov's advisors whom the chancellery and 
628 Maset, Macht, 78,82 
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the tsar considered the worst offenders. Out of the good two-thirds of the garrison, 
who had signed the rebels' petitions, these were seven delegates arrested in Moscow, 
seven rebels sent to Surgut and Tobol'sk during investigation, and eleven who stayed 
in town. They were to be beaten with the knout, which signified a painful but 
comparably light chastisement629 - Ustiug in 1648 or the aborted Tomsk plot planned 
by a small minority in 1634, which never started but yielded twelve executions by 
hanging, demonstrated that the laws prohibiting "rebellion and plotting" were still 
taken seriously. 630 Although Shcherbatyi was determined to prove that quite a 
number of Tomsk rebels had been guilty of treason even before 1648 - the gallows 
were of no use during and even after a rebellion had engulfed the trading frontier. 
All the while, for two years the partisans of the voevoda, syn boiarskii Petr 
Sabanskii with his twenty-one comrades had stayed in Moscow, to further their aims. 
Although they were never arrested, they complained about the volokita, the endless 
procedures in the chancellery, and about the detrimental effect that the continuing 
power of "cossack circles" in Tomsk had had on their possessions and their servants 
who no longer dared to show themselves in the streets. In this respect, as in many 
others, Tomsk conditions were a mirror-image of the Siberian chancellery, proving to 
the inconclusiveness of interpretations, or leitideas, of the sovereign's affair, rather 
than to the capability of the tsar or the chancellery to define an outcome that was 
obligatory to all participants, as Pokrovskii maintains - both quarrelling sides had to 
pay during investigation. Trying to create at least the impression of a victory, the 
chancellery claimed in its instruction, that: 
"... the cossacks were beaten for having plotted with Il'ia [Bunakov], for not being 
willing to accept ... 
Shcherbatyi's jurisdiction, deposing him, locking him into his court, 
... and 
barring communication... They beat and robbed their brethren, the Tomsk deli 
boiarskie Petr Sabanskii and comrades and put them in prison without the decree of the 
sovereign... and they elected II'ia as their only [voevoda] and acted treasonously with 
"631 him, holding cossack circles and rebelling. 
629 Ibid., 351-68 
630 Ibid., 368 
631 Ibid., 365 
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This however did not amount to an immovable "pravda gosudarevof' as opposed 
to the "mirskaia pravda" to which, as Pokrovskii claims, the rebels adhered632 - it 
was Trubetskoi's and Shcherbatyi's interpretation of the events, and it may be 
assumed that tsar Aleksei shared this leitidea. Diapproving of a common leitidea of 
the nobles and the tsar, even some of the former saw the affair in a different light, 
though not necessarily in the same way that the Tomsk cossacks did, while all, 
perhaps except for Shcherbatyi, knew very well that they had no leverage to impose 
it on Tomsk. During the early stages of the Moscow rebellion in 1648, when the 
monarchy seemed endangered, Aleksei even went as far as to receive the Tomsk 
rebels' delegates and assure them of his benevolence and help. Even when the 
petitioners were held on remand in Moscow prison, after handing a petition 
personally to the tsar on 20 October 1649 during the public procession on Dmitriev 
day, they never forgot about the difference between the institutional mechanism and 
the leitidea they propagated. In their letter directed to Tomsk cossacks they put it 
thus: 
"You, brothers, our masters, shall stand all as one, so that you will not be tried. And do 
not hand us in, brothers atamans molodtsy! We stand in for the truth for all the town; 
even if the sovereign orders to hang us, we will die in the truth waiting for the 
sovereign's grace. 
Therefore we beat our foreheads many times to you, our masters: live in Christ! 9633 
As a necessary precondition for their actions, they stressed again, they depended 
on the power the Personenverband provided by not admitting anything to 
investigation that could be used against them. Yet even in this unobserved moment, 
they did not imagine themselves as bearers of an ideology, of a truth that existed 
beyond the ramifications of the institutional mechanism, of the sovereign's justice. It 
was not "the town's justice" perceived as separate, as Pokrovskii claims, 63a but "the" 
one and indivisible justice that they felt they were upholding, bravely and 
honourably, for their whole town. 635 Although they understood that they ran the risk 
of ending up on the gallows, they also knew that their main opportunity lay in the 
632 Ibid., 365,371 
633 Ibid., 325-6 
634 Ibid., 325,372 
635 According to C. Ingerflom, in this letter "the tsar is dead": "Entre le Mythe et la Parole: 
l'action", Annales vol. 51.4 (1996), 733-57, here: 751-4. 
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attempt to influence the balance of power, which, however little inclined to their 
side, nevertheless would determine the outcome of the law suit. Therefore their 
unceasing attempts to maintain their position that all their actions aimed consistently 
to increase the profit of the sovereign and their hope for the sovereign's mercy were 
rational. They did not vie - or at least not mainly - for miraculous intercession, and 
were clearly reflected in the outcome. None of them was put to death, although 
Shcherbatyi by the same institutional mechanism of the sovereign's affair threatened 
to hang all of them. Even the leading rebels did not fare too badly. All the rebels 
returned to Tomsk, though some of them subsequently were outlawed to Iakutsk. 
Altogether sixty-five people, the banned rebels and their families, including Fedor 
Pushchin, were sent to Iakutsk, where they served in their former ranks. On their way 
to Iakutsk, the banned had ample opportunity to discuss leitideas, or the justice they 
were ready to die for irrespective of the tsar's decree, as syn boiarskii Petr Lavrov, 
one of Shcherbatyi's partisans, was checked by rebel piatidesiatnik Matvei 
Nenashev, who were both ordered to accompany the group. They also had good 
reason to do so - after all rebellion as well as punishment had proven that Moscow's 
most extreme measures and ambitious projects were not applicable to Siberia. 
Thus the sovereign's word and affair offered a means of structuring, ritualising, 
and focusing debates in partitioned and public spheres that were thematically limited 
to issues of service. In the frontier, it provided a means of rallying cossacks that 
helped to integrate the empire. The sovereign's affair also provided a channel of 
appeal to higher-order authorities and allowed different members of a network of 
patronage to communicate on controversial issues without running the danger of 
being apprehended as traitours. As a set of related norms, expectations and related 
patterns of behaviour, it provided resources of power actors could make use of in the 
pitched semi-public battles for information and control that were characteristic of 
seventeenth-century Siberia. 636 
636 For further examples of the invocation of the sovereign's affair against voevodas in Siberia, 
see Alcksandrov, Ylast', 171-329, Bakhrushin, Krasnoiarsk, 175; Pokrovskii, "'Slovu"', passim. 
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The Sovereign's Profit and the Sovereign's Affair 
To open a channel for appeal, and to be able to engage in negotiations, petitioners 
had to travel to Moscow, or at least to a more elevated voevoda or the bishop of 
Tobol'sk. 637 Siberian voevodas, however, enjoyed the right to ban journeys they 
deemed unnecessary, or else in case of emergency. This was in the interest of the 
tsar's treasure, since it prevented excess trade of furs by cossacks. Yet it should be 
mentioned that to a Russian of the seventeenth century, the notion "gosudarevo 
kazna" also meant a form of security. For this attitude the southern frontier must be 
held responsible. While Muscovy west of the Urals from the 1630s became 
increasingly capable of defending its southern borders against all-encompassing 
nomad invasions, fencing off small raiding groups was far more difficult. For such 
small groups, the fortifications of the border (the zaseki) were hardly impregnable. 
They came intending to capture a few hostages whom they could either sell as slaves 
or liberate for ransom. Muscovite steppe politics had different ways of dealing with 
this issue - while attempts to dominate the steppe nomads never lasted long, much 
was done by paying tribute to the Crimean khan and other nomad suzerains. Yet 
whenever Moscow failed to live up to expectations, nomad groups who lived on this 
tribute - as part of the traditional steppe politics - felt that they were not bound by 
earlier agreements. 638 Their solution to their economic slow-down was raiding, and 
they often did so irrespective of the khan - in nomad societies, elected khans were 
not nearly as authoritative as a European monarch. Ransom and tribute therefore 
amounted to an enormous financial burden for Muscovy. Thus the tsar had powerful 
and convincing arguments for his dominant role in spending at least five million 
roubles in the first half of the seventeenth century on ransom for captives to the 
Crimean khan alone. These were not trifles, as estimations of the number of new 
towns never built on account of the spending of state means on ransom payments - 
1,200 in the first half of the seventeenth century - clari fy. 
639 Siberian cossacks were 
eligible to compensation for captivity, 640 although the polonianichnyia deng'i were 
637 Bakhrushin "Krasnoiarsk" 156-61,175-6 
638 Kappeler, Vielvölkerreich, 28 
639 Khodarkovsky, Steppe, 223 
"0 Cf chapter II. RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 422 11.80,88,112-114 (petitions) 
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not levied in Siberia. In comparison with other European states, Muscovy was in a 
far worse situation: in the Mediterranean, according to some estimates, captives 
amounted to no more than a few thousands overall'641 as opposed to an estimated one 
hundred and fifty thousand in Muscovy in the first half of the seventeenth century, or 
ten thousand in Western Siberia during the first two decades of the eighteenth 
century alone 642 The polonianichnyia deng'i was the second most important tax after 
those levied for military spending, it was the most quickly growing tax in the 
seventeenth century, the first to be levied by homesteads, and it contributed to the 
growth of the state sector in ways unknown to Western Europe, where ransom 
continued to be handled by private interlocutors and monastic orders. 643 
Even ordinary people were well aware of this, as is shown by the case of the wife 
of a Ukrainian (cherkashenin) serving in Korochi. She was denounced for 
condemning the tsar who did not ransom her son, a prisoner in the Crimea: "... as I 
do not see my son before me, so the tsar shall not see daylight. "& To no little 
degree, this explains why piety was one of the tsar's most valued attributes in 
popular and elite consciousness, and in loyal propaganda. The gosudarevo delo, 
inasmuch as it referred to financial affairs and the voevoda's prerogatives in allowing 
travelling, therefore had strikingly different overtones for those who ran the risk of 
capture - or at least for every Russian or Orthodox - that is, not of exploitation by an 
overwhelming state machinery, but of a legitimate claim to its revenues. Alienating 
funds on the part of the voevoda therefore was accused by the cossacks not only on 
private considerations, but also because they knew that these funds were not 
available for the "pious" ends of ransoming. This was especially significant as they 
expected that recovered funds from voevodas' belongings mostly ended in the state 
coffers rather than with those from whom they had been taken. 645 
641 Wolfgang Kaiser (Aix) in oral communcation during the Historikertag 2004, Kiel. 642 Khodarkovsky, Steppe, 21-6,205,223; Akishin, Politseiskoe, 10 
643 Originally, it was collected by the patriarch: Alekseev, P. A., Tserkovnyi slovar' ili istolkovanie 
slavenskikh ... rechenii, 
(4th cd. ) Hildesheim 1976,5 pts., pt. 3, p. 257. On the mediterranean: Kaiser, 
Wolfgang, "Zwischen Loggia und Fondouk. Transkultureller Handel u Kommunikation zw Südeuropa 
u dem Maghreb id Frühen Neuzeit", paper, Historikertag Kiel 2004, Sektion "Städtische 
Kommunikationsräume" 
6" Rustemeyer, "Verrat", 272 
64' Leont'eva, G. A., Zemleprokhodets Erofei Pavlovich Khabarov, Moscow 1991,94 
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Another conspicuous influence of the southern frontier on Russia and, 
consequently, on Siberia, is a problem with the system of private financing obvious 
already in the history of Ermak's conquest of the Khanatc of Sibir'. The tsar had first 
granted exploitation of Western Siberia and the right to set up their own fortified and 
armed garrisons and to judge their own people except for criminal lawsuits to the 
Stroganovs. 646 They were thus in theory in a similar position to Western European 
merchant corporations granted by their monarchs these rights which amounted to a 
state in the state. Yet in Russia, undercapitalisation meant that merchants could not 
fill this role. Undercapitalisation and low urbanisation were in no small degree 
caused by the significant drain on capital and people, caused by unceasing nomad 
raids, which in Siberia had still greater dimensions and lasted well into the eighteenth 
century - longer than west of the Urals. 
647 As private merchants could not or would 
not organise cossacks during the conquest, or provide sufficient funds for any 
sustained presence, Ermak's cossacks preferred to deal with the tsar, despite Ivan 
IV's grant to the Stroganovs. While Ermak's cossacks did not prevail in the medium 
run, campaigns funded by the tsar finally set up a stable presence in Siberia. MS 
About the same time, Moscow faced the increasing desire of the emerging 
northern maritime powers to establish their power over Northern Russia and to find a 
new route to Siberian furs and to China. M9 To secure Siberia for Russia, Moscow 
was ready to place an enormous burden on the northern towns west of the Urals. In 
the 1630s, Ustiug paid the "Siberian supply": in 1632-36, it paid no less than 2,204 
roubles 30 altyn every year in cash; transport to Tobol'sk was even more 
expensive. 650 Payments continued until 1685, when an edict decreed that Viatka was 
relieved of the obligation, since "there [was] enough grain in Siberia" by then. 651 
Thus, facing amorphous political pressures from the south and highly organised, 
technically superior influences in the north, in the formative period of Siberian 
cossack institutions at the end of the sixteenth and in the early seventeenth century 
646 Müller, Istoriia Sibiri vol.!, 201,206-7 647 Altogether, the Crimea divulged tribute equalling the cost of the construction of 1.200 small 
goroda in the first half of the seventeenth century: Khodarkovsky, Steppe, 223. Floria, "Nemocvskii", 
113 
64s Miller, Istoriia, vol.!, 266 
649 See chapter I. 
650 Bogoslovskii, Samoupravlenie, vol. 11,69,76 
65' AT, vol. 5,1842, no. 120,199 
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after the Time of Troubles, Moscow was ready to provide flexible and palpable 
assistance. The cossacks were traditionally oriented towards Moscow's subsidies, but 
also lacked access to sufficient private funding and made a clear choice for the tsar. 
Henceforth, therefore, private spheres and trading was inextricably linked to the 
tsar's interests and vice versa. For the same reason, taxes as well as the tsar's 
attempts at monopolising trade with certain luxurious goods, most of them traded 
across the border or throughout the frontier may have enjoyed a higher measure of 
legitimacy than elsewhere, yet in Siberia the exact level was still subject to dispute. 
In particular, barring cossacks from travelling, 652 understood as legitimate zeal in the 
name of the sovereign's affair on the part of the voevoda, a task entrusted to him in 
his instruction, could be put forward as a legitimate leitidea capable of winning the 
acclaim of the cossacks under certain circumstances. However, the mixing of private 
and state spheres also meant that voevodas could exploit their position unduly. As 
explained in the next chapter, feeding practices meant that the voevoda was entitled 
to a limited amount of provisions that were to be laid down by mutual agreement. If 
the voevoda demanded too much from the cossack community, even if he acted 
according to the tsar's interest as did voevoda sShcherbatyi of Tomsk, Dvorianinov 
of Verkhotur'e, and others - economising on expensive cossacks' salaries - they 
united to overthrow or disobey him. Thus, in Siberia state and private spheres were 
blurred to a considerable degree. Privileged treatment of cossacks in travelling meant 
that state and private spheres were further intertwined. 653 At the same time, for 
cossacks these provisions facilitated travelling once the gatekeeper, the voevoda, had 
been won over or overcome. 
Conclusion 
The realities of the conditions under which Siberian cossacks served tended to 
increase the level of institutionalisation. The latest time for a relative break-through 
in literacy in an area as far east as Irkutsk was the 1690s, a time which also saw a 
marked increase in trade across the newly established border. Institutionalisation 
answered to the need for negotiation and information exchange. Yet, it was not so 
652 Aleksandrov, Hast', 105-6,172,188 
653 See chapt. II 
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much the symbolic uses of a form of address and its interpretation, but the 
opportunities to exert control over these uses or to structure them that define a 
political system. 654 In Siberia, there was little chance of obtaining obedience directly 
- the power of the centre was largely virtual. Its material aspects depended on the 
motivation and means of overcoming distance and transport problems, which in turn 
could only be realised by trade. Thus, trade and finances, rather than military power, 
constituted the main means of ruling these vast territories. 
Siberian cossacks of the seventeenth century provide an example of how 
Muscovite emphasis on the power of the group could be adapted to the needs of a 
dynamic community of merchants. While this meant that individual cossacks 
remained within the sway of group power, it did not indicate that these groups 
became particularly oppressive or petrified. With different, often opposed, groups in 
town, in a limited way cossacks could choose between different options, while they 
had to cooperate with one of the groups usually only for a limited period of time. As 
in confrontations in Italian city-states, adherents of the defeated group were often 
forced to leave the town. The sovereign's affair and the Personenverband did create 
peculiar social pressures to conform. Neutral bystanders could find it difficult to 
resist. Once a sovereign's affair was launched by a significant group, an obligation to 
sign came into existence: "Why do you refuse to sign the petition with us; are you 
not well disposed towards the sovereign? "bss At the same time, decrees sanctioned a 
duty to denounce, in theory obligating everyone who knew about a sovereign's affair 
to make it known to the authorities. 656 Nevertheless, if the majority did not "haul 
with the mir" to support a sovereign's affair, and if the voevoda was not interested in 
it, it could be hard to inform Moscow. Early modern conditions were not conducive 
to the close control of local actors by the distant centre, and that was no less true in 
Siberia. 657 The sovereign's affair thus differentiated between those supporting action 
against the voevoda, and his supporters, tertium non datur. This was important for 
the rebels to make sure investigations, which had to rely on polls among the 
654 Cf. Maset, Macht, 84 
655 pokrovskii, Tomsk, 94. See chapter V. 
656 Kleimola, "Denounce", 759-79 
657 For comparison, see Beik, Absolutism; Kivelson, Autocracy; Landwehr, Policey 
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residents658 did not find statements out of line with either the rebels or the equally 
tainted supporters of the voevoda. These precautions helped locally to establish a 
dominant leitidea. 
On the other hand, cossacks could make sure they were not excluded from the 
Personenverband and its power, leaving the choice between different options to 
them. On 6th September 1680, Eniseisk cossack Karp Ermolin lodged a complaint 
with Ivan Perfil'ev, syn boiarskii and prikazchik in the ostrog Irkutsk. He protested 
against his comrade, Pronka Sirotinin who cursed the guards of the grain transport 
and claimed he "knows a sovereign's affair against all cossacks. " The very same day, 
Eniseisk cossack Sirotinin was questioned. Perfil'ev inquired into the precise nature 
of the sovereign's affair and who was its perpetrator. Sirotinin however in part talked 
his way out claiming he was drunk. He asserted that on a service journey the year 
before one of his comrades, Trenko Tikhonov, had seized and sold three sacks of the 
sovereign's grain supplies at Udinsk ostrog on the other side of Lake Baikal. 
Sirotinin claimed he had reported this incident to the other cossacks, the hired 
cossacks and the trappers "who were sent with him". He added he had made a slip of 
tongue and apart from this incident, he knew no other sovereign's affair about 
659 anybody else. 
Unusual as this incident might seem in the light of existing Siberian accounts of 
the declaration of a sovereign's affair preoccupied with the impeachment of 
voevodas and other officials660, it is revealing in many respects. The 
Personenverband's complicity with Tikhonov had been stronger than any obligation 
to the tsar until Sirotinin accused all cossacks of a sovereign's affair. It was not 
uncommon to sell official supplies privately, but it was much less accepted not to 
share the proceeds with comrades. Sirotinin challenged the limitations of this 
Personenverband which no longer lived up to either of its promises - to serve the 
sovereign or to share the spoils - by uttering a mere five words. Thus, the 
sovereign's affair increased cossacks' options to ensure they received their share in 
658 Described as an early form of the jury by Weickhardt, "Due-Process"; Pokrovskii, Tomsk, 259; 
Aleksandrov, Vlast', 272-90 
659 RGADA f. 1121 op. 2 no. 94 (investigation) 
"0 Pokrovskii, "Slovu". Novombergskii collected proceedings against non-officials, mostly of 
lowly status. 
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trade as well as strengthened collective allegiances 661 While peasants in Central 
Russia in the early twentieth century still used methods reminiscent of the 
gosudarevo slovo i delo to silence a minority of reform-minded local opponents662, in 
the seventeenth century Siberian cossacks were already using this institution to make 
sure trade flows were not disrupted by authorities dominated either by noble 
patronage or by the Personenverband. 
66' See chapter V. Aleksandrov, Hast, 154; Pokrovskii, "Slow", 40 
662 Figes, Orlando, A Peoples Tragedy, New York 1996,232-41,361-2 
201 
Chapter IV Kormlenie and Bribery - Local Influence and 
Administration 
In the last years of the seventeenth century, a huge scandal rocked Siberia; 
extensive investigations were conducted into the financial machinations and fraud 
surfacing in the east of the tsarstvo. The voevodas in particular were under scrutiny, 
yet among those who had transgressed the law, some survived investigations with 
impunity, in particular M. P. Gagarin and S. I. Durnovo of Krasnoiarsk. The head of 
the Siberian Chancellery since June 1695, A. A. Vinius, who regularly corresponded 
with Peter I, covered up for them, he kept in touch with them and was their "patron 
(milostivets)". 663 Neither Gagarin nor Durnovo were descendants of boyar families; 
but those were the days of favouritism early in Peter's reign, when the tsar was trying 
to establish a counterweight to traditional boyar power. 664 Yet Durnovo was opposed 
by Krasnoiarsk cossacks because he tried to cover up for his predecessor. He had 
little time to perpetrate any misdeeds himself but he had a hard time, since he was 
confronted by Krasnoiarsk cossacks, who became so alienated that they travelled 
forty versts to prohibit the official investigator, duma secretary Polianskii, from 
entering the town and uezd. In Moscow, Polianskii was accused of abetting the 
voevodas and was thus ousted as a side effect of the revolt 665 This indicates that the 
investigation was indeed thorough, and could only be thwarted by a voevoda like 
Gagarin who, as a client of the tsar's favourite, Menshikov, was already high on the 
social ladder of patronage 666 The question raised by these observations is how they 
can be reconciled with the obvious fact that bribery in Siberia was commonplace and 
widespread. 
In 1701, shortly after these events, Vinius fell out of favour and tried to pay 
10,000 roubles to Peter's friend and favourite Menshikov, to save at least the most 
cherished among his many posts giving him access to Siberian wealth. Menshikov 
663 Akishin, Politseiskoe, 9 Zol'nikova, N. D., "Pis'ma iz lichnogo arkhiva sibirskogo voevody 
kontra XVII v. ", Izvestiia SO AN SSSR. Istorfia, vyp. 3 (Sept. -Dec. 1991), 8-14; Pavlenko, N. I., 
Aleksandr Danilovich Menshikov, Moscow 1981,29; Bushkovitch, Peter, 183-5,235 n. 44 
"4 Akishin, Politseiskoe, 186: in 1565,18 members of the princely Gagarin kin fell out of Ivan 
IV's favour and were banned. Thereafter, the Gagarins occupied only voevoda positions in minor 
frontier towns. 
66' Bakhrushin, Krasnoiarsk, 191 
666 Bushkoviteh, Peter, 272-3,276-80 
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was new to the business and reported the affair to tsar Peter. As Pavlenko notes, had 
Vinius given "a more modest bribe", Menshikov might have accepted and helped 
him. Though Russia was hardly a positive exception among contemporary realms, it 
is interesting enough that the son of a Dutchman misjudged Menshikov so severely. 
The European overseas colonies at that time were by no means void of bribery, 
which at the local level interfered with central orders. 667 It is much more likely that 
Menshikov, despite his later habits, was indeed indignant at Vinius's behaviour, 
since the norms of his time did not exclude bribes in general, but excessive bribes. 
But is it feasible to assume that only Menshikov expressed the real norm of their 
time, while Vinius, as an embodiment perhaps of Russia's - and even more so - 
Siberia's deep and corrupt interior, behaved illegally? 
To understand the issues of corruption, it is necessary to examine the chancellery 
system in some detail. With the growth of the chancelleries during the late sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, the need to govern the conduct of administrators among 
themselves and between them and their clients also grew. This need generated 
administrative law, which encompasses standards establishing the performance and 
behaviour of administrators. It was institutionalised first in the 1550 Sudebnik, and 
the system was further developed in the judicial chancelleries charter and edict books 
(ustavnye i ukaznye knigi), non-codified Muscovite court case documents. It was also 
influenced by external sources, such as Byzantine and Lithuanian law. 668 The most 
comprehensive codification of Muscovite administrative law was the 1649 
Ulozhenie, which also exposed an increasing consciousness of this need - it was a 
response to rebellions and, compared to the 1497 Sudebnik, the text of the code had 
increased tenfold. Administrative misconduct according to seventeenth-century 
Russian law could cover illicit material gain, theft of property or money, bribe- 
taking, the display of favouritism and nepotism towards colleagues or litigants, sheer 
inattentiveness, indifference or haughtiness towards subjects as well as untoward 
consumption and parading of wealth. 669 
667 Tracy (ed. ), Political Economy 
668 Brown, "Neither", 5 
669 Ibid., 1-6 
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Yet Russians were disposed to view these not as fixed values, but as categories of 
degree that were condemnable only when such practices became too venal and 
corrosive of organisational efficiency. This was expressed in seventeenth-century 
terms denoting what today would be called corruption: Likhoimstvo meant the taking 
more than was allowed or expedient, and did not necessarily condemn the taking of 
bribes. It is received wisdom in Siberian studies that bribery was rife in this distant 
territory, with petty nobles paying bribes to be appointed to the post of voevoda670 
down to a whole "system of bribery" and corruption, which has been diagnosed by 
some researchers in passing, without supplying much evidence nor any definition 671 
Such superficial diagnoses were never followed up with an in-depth study of the 
conditions of bribery; scholars have also been reluctant to consider the question of 
whether modem terms are applicable to this period. Even in Muscovite studies in 
general, this question has been addressed only very recently. Vziatka, meaning 
literally "that which has been taken", had a multitude of meanings, such as 
recovering a debt or diverting zhalovan'e. One of Peter's well-known decrees 
regarding bribe-taking in 1714 used this word in a way close to modern usage. In 
1698/1699 secretary of state Polianskii, who had been sent to Eniseisk to investigate 
irregularities and the rebellions of the preceding years, drew on the term to sum up a 
petition from members of the gostinnaia sotnia, handed in by two prikazchiki. Yet 
these early usages did not become current: A judicial dictionary of the late eighteenth 
century did not even bother to define the term vziatka. Instead, it referred the reader 
to likhoimstvo; though synonymous to vziatka for Russian readers by the nineteenth 
century, the latter term was derived from two roots, lishnii and imat', the former 
denoting "superfluous, excessive, or unnecessary", while the latter is an archaic form 
meaning "to take". 672 Literally, thus, the term preferred by the eighteenth century did 
not refer to the transgression of the state's interest, as Peter according to his decrees 
would have it, or to the crossing of the fine line between the duty owed to the state 
and private interests, as the modern age sees the matter. Rather it was a reference to a 
670 Chicherin, B. N., Oblastnyia uchrezhdeniia Rossii v XVII-m veke, The Hague 1968,83,85; 
Ogloblin, Obozrenie vol. III, 26-7,31; vol. IV, 52; Lantzeff, Siberia, 48; PSZ, vol.!!, 76,143 
671 Leont'eva, Sluzhilye, 77 
672 Potter, Cathy, "Payment, Gift or Bribe? ", in: Ledeneva, Alena (ed. ), Bribery and blot in 
Russia, Basingstoke 2000,21-34, here: 31; Langans, F., Slovar' iuridicheskoi, Moscow 1788. 
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limit defined either by custom or arbitrarily by the tsar. Thus this petition, as reported 
by Polianskii, did not make use of the term vziatka but placed great emphasis on the 
circumstance that Savelov had demanded an unusually large number of bribes and 
had in addition extracted them by force. 
Savelov tried - successfully - to defend himself by pointing out that he never 
took "huge" bribes from the merchants "by force" (vziatki napadkami ne vzial) and 
did not inflict damages on the traders. Implicitly, he was maintaining that receiving a 
vziatka was not by itself a crime. To buttress his claims he produced statements made 
by two traders in June 1697, which explained that on their way back from China, 
Transbaikalian cossacks had forced the merchants to sign the petition incriminating 
Savelov. 673 There is little doubt that these statements were at least partially falsified. 
Contradictory statements by other members of the same caravan claiming that 
Savelov had demanded more than 660 roubles to let them pass had already been 
handed to Polianskii in Eniseisk in July 1697. However, in its conclusion, the 
Siberian chancellery found Savelov guilty of not demanding taxes, but not of taking 
bribes. To make sure his defence was received favourably, Savelov elaborately drew 
upon custom, reflecting the standards of its time. 674 
One of the most outspoken defenders of this viewpoint was the historian and 
voevoda of Astrakhan, V. N. Tatishchev, who was later administrator of the mines in 
the Urals. In his literary exhortations to his son on the virtues of a judge and a 
nobleman, he gave a lesson in how to make use of mzda, another term close to what 
in modern usage would be "bribe". Recounting his confrontations over this question, 
he gave a self-confident account of his purported answer to tsar Peter who had 
questioned his behaviour, giving a fair insight into the habits of a judge and vocvoda. 
Tatishchev referred to biblical sources, "Delaiushchemu mzda ne po blagodati, no po 
dolgu" ("Now to him that worketh is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt. " 
Romans 4: 4), in replying to a charge by Nikita Demidov in 1722. Accordingly, he 
went even further when cornered by Peter: As long as the judge first looked at the 
affair, and decided by the letter of law, he did not transgress, while likhoimstvo 
would be illegal only if the judge decided wrongly and took money for it. 
673 RGADA f. 1121 op. l, no. 429,11.5-14 (investigation) 674 Golovachev, P. M. (ed. ), Pervoe stoletie Irkutska, St. Petersburg 1902,116 
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Tatishchev's main argument is not a formal one; he claims to be much more 
concerned with political questions, such as the welfare of a merchant who might lose 
a substantial amount of money while he was waiting for a decision. A judge, 
Tatishchev knew, was paid to sit in court during the first half of the day, while the 
second half was not paid for. Therefore, if he was to refrain from playing cards, from 
hunting and society, he was to be remunerated for this extra effort. Since there were 
many cases that had to wait due to administrative overload and their position in the 
court's register, it was only fair to receive payment for renouncing his leisure time. 
According to Tatishchev, even such an ardent fighter against corruption as Peter, 
could not deny this necessity, though he specified that such leeway could only be 
granted to the honest judge. As Tatishchev argued, giving the term vziatka a proper 
interpretation: 
"Neither God nor your majesty can censure what is given as a quittance [of the debt] (za 
mzdu vziatuiu). "675 
The vziatka, therefore, is literally "that what is owed to the judge. " He implied 
that only excess demands supported by physical or other means of power were 
deemed illicit. 
A comparison of Tatishchev's views with those of a rather more distinguished 
thinker is instructive when comparing Muscovy to Western Europe, where the great 
debate was not so much about likhoimstvo, but about venality. Montesquicu himself 
had bought office and claimed: 
Cette venalite est bonne dans 
les Etats monarchique parce qu'elle fait faire, comme un 
metier de famille, ce qu'on ne voudroit pas entreprendre pour la vertu; qu'elle destine 
chacun a son devoir, et rend les ordres de 1'Etat plus permanents. Suidas dit tous bien 
qu'Anastase avait fait de 1'empire une espece d'aristocratie en vendant toutes les 
magistratures. " 
If offices were not sold publicly, in a monarchy they would be distributed and 
sold by courtiers under the counter: 
Enfin, la maniere de s'avancer par 
les richesses inspire et entretient l'industrie, chose 
dont cette esp6ce de gouvernement a grand besoin. " 
675 Tatishchev, V. N., Izbrannye proizvedeniia, Leningrad 1979,143 
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In short, this was an ideology of absolutism , tempdrde par la vdnalitd des 
offices", as Mousnier characterises conditions in the sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries. 676 In Western Europe, the princely state and the monarchies lived with 
similar administrative constraints, but they enjoyed the advantage of a much more 
developed trade capitalism. In both cases princely states found it difficult for their 
ambitions as well as their defensive needs to raise sufficient loans against securities, 
which they institutionally could not guarantee. With the exception of the Netherlands 
and England, the state was not yet able to guarantee a loan beyond the life-span of 
the monarch, and they also frequently resorted to force to make creditors more 
amenable. The tradition in canon law as well as in secular law of the beneficium, 
which was well-fortified against intrusion on the part of the state, however, allowed 
the employment of medieval structures in financial administration to raise loans 
against the security of perquisites. 
In Muscovy, there was a significant lack of capital, to no small degree due to the 
financial drain of the open frontier, which has been estimated as equalling the 
construction of 1,200 small towns during the first half of the seventeenth century 
alone. 677 Since harvests ruined by bad weather and other causes of economic 
deterioration such as nomadic intrusions were more frequent in Muscovy than in the 
West or even in the more densely-inhabited parts of Poland, revenue from a 
particular province was less secure and stable. 678 To finance the income of a high 
noble, one province was not adequate - for an administrator, it paid much better to be 
sent to different provinces, and obtain revenue according to the leverage, patronage 
and other means of power provided, including personal capabilities. 
The forms of service remuneration subsumed as alimentation (kormlenie) differ 
from zhalovan'e in that they were collected and paid locally, and not through the 
central chancelleries. Appointment to the post of a voevoda, on the other hand, was 
considered as zhalovan'e, too, in this traditional and basic sense meaning a boon, a 
676 Mousnier, Roland, La vgnalitd des offices, 2. ed. Paris 1971,623; Montesquieu, Charles, De 
! 'esprit des lois, ed. G. Truc, Paris [n. d. ], vol. I, 76; cited ace. to Reinhard, Wolfgang, "Staatsmacht als 
Kreditroblem", 218-31, here: 230-1 
67' Khodarkovsky, Steppe, 223-4 
678 Much of Muscovy's military success depended upon the efficient stockpiling of supplies: 
Frost, Northern, 53. Baberowski, Jörg, Autokratie und Justiz, Frankfurt/Main 1996, chapt. I. 
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favour. 679 In principle, there was the alimentation "on entering" and "on departing" 
from the district, the alimentation on holidays and the daily, weekly and monthly 
alimentation. The term korm was not reserved to voevodas, but could also apply to 
foreign dignitaries on the steppe frontier, who served the tsar or stayed for a short 
period. The rules governing alimentation (kormlenie) of the voevodas, their kin who 
accompanied them and the staff of the voevodas' office have often been blamed for 
the administrative inefficiencies and economic backwardness from which Russia 
suffered in the modern age. 680 However this is not evident by itself - it is obvious 
that any local collection of taxes was difficult to control in a huge empire with 
underdeveloped communications and inclement climatic conditions. To control them 
centrally was enormously expensive, while controlling them locally, by elected or 
hereditary organisations, reduced central control to naught, and rendered integration 
impossible. Therefore the voevoda was sent out with the unequivocal aim of 
enriching himself, the marginal returns of which he had to estimate himself - "po 
lamoshnim delam", as the instructions stated, according to local conditions. Yet he 
could also be called to account if, due to his activities, local taxes dropped, which 
resulted - albeit infrequently - in confiscations. Since Siberian returns were far more 
important to the central treasury owing to their immediate value in foreign exchange, 
Siberian voevodas were controlled more closely than was the case elsewhere. The 
special customs border established at Verkhotur'e was never beyond the influence of 
certain clienteles, but it was instructed to check and compare vocvodas' wares and 
cash on entering and leaving Siberia, to find out about their illegal trading activities. 
It also constituted an impediment voevodas had to obviate by employing cossacks to 
appoint their excess wares to cossacks' tax-free allowances 681 
At the changeover point between voevodas, kormlenie could accompany 
satisfactory or unsatisfactory contact between an administrator and judge and the 
population - but in a country which was so vast and little developed, which lived 
under such a strain of bad weather conditions and insecurity as Muscovy, this was 
better than no contact at all. Rulers had to content themselves with much smaller 
679 Enin, G. P. Voevodskoe kormienie v Rossii v XVII veke, St. Petersburg 2000,315 
680 Torke, H. -J., "Statthalter", in: idem (ed. ), LGR, München 1985 681 Lantzeff, Siberia, 55; Ogloblin, Obozrenie pt. II, 58-64 
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steps in financing their ambitions than in France. Under these conditions, venality 
could not be employed as a security to the same degree as in France, and it was 
reasonable to leave it to voevodas and chancellery staff to pocket this revenue. 
Tatishchev reported that in the seventeenth century, there was a so-called "oklad" to 
be paid for any position as a town voevoda. 682 From the tsar's point of view, it was 
reasonable to limit this practice, but impossible to stamp it out. 
683 The same was true 
for bribery and kormlenie, which can in this respect be addressed as the nearest 
suitable institutional mechanism available to the tsar for financing at least his 
administrative, and to some degree military, personnel. In France corporate concerns 
over venality could cover interests directed against the strengthening of the crown's 
power, seeking to obtain the privilege of disposal of offices by patronage and sale of 
offices in their own hands. 684 Venality and kormlenie in Muscovy, while giving the 
tsar additional, if not readily convertible, sources of income, strengthened these very 
separate interests of noble clans and chancellery corporations, although they did not 
enjoy the same kind of institutional guarantees granted to them in France. 
Kormlenie did not enjoy the same judicial privileges fortifying its usufructuary 
against the intrusion of the princely state as did secular officials in France in the 
tradition of beneficium. While in France tax collectors were sometimes simply 
chased away685, in Siberia the judicial leverage of the tsar allowed the 
Personenverband to await investigation, while taking suitable measures. 
Entitlements of the holders of the office of voevoda were much less fixed, and more 
contingent on community approval, than in Western Europe, which meant that the 
community had perhaps even more influence on the office holder than in the West 
686 
However, any evaluation of the degree of this influence hinges on the relative power 
of the voevoda and the local community. 
The conventional image of the corrupted voevodas of Siberia is slightly 
misleading, since contemporary norms knew no concept similar to the modern idea 
692 Vershinin, Voevodskoe, 190 n. 59; Chicherin, Oblastnyia, 85 
683 On attempts to prohibit kormlenie, see Lantzeff, Siberia, 19-24. For a discussion of the issue of 
prohibition, see Enin, Kormlenie, 267-305 
684 Reinhard, "Kreditproblem", 230-1 
685 Mettam, Roger, Power and Faction, Oxford 1988,312-3, passim 
686 In France as in many other European and some non-European countries, officially approved 
and managed venality has been observed: Reinhard, "Kreditproblem", 233-5 n. 6-18 
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of corruption. "Korystoliubie" and "likhoimanie", the two terms used in accusations 
were both directed against excess charges, not against bribery as such. 687 Out of his 
confiscated belongings to the value of 12,742 roubles, Vocvoda Frantsbekov of 
Iakutsk was granted 2,000 roubles on investigation. 688 This was nearly three times 
the average allowance to a voevoda leaving for Iakutsk, and in principle he was not 
allowed to return more than he had taken in. 689 Yet this kind of accountability was 
only one of the principles governing Muscovite chancelleries. In 1698, voevoda 
Mikhail M. Arsen'ev of Iakutsk petitioned the Siberian chancellery concerning his 
belongings, more than eleven thousand roubles, which he had sent to Nerchinsk in 
1696. At Udinsk, local cossacks rebelling against their voevoda confiscated the 
whole caravan consisting of fifteen horses, and finally divided the booty among 
them. The voevoda did not attempt to hide the fact that he engaged in trade while he 
was voevoda in Iakutsk. He used the very same language rebellious cossacks used in 
negotiating the terms of trade with the Siberian chancellery - in order to be able to 
serve faithfully, he needed the tsar's support and clemency. He explained that when 
he was appointed to this distant post, he borrowed from gost' Aleksei Filat'ev in 
Moscow and in Iaroslavl from gost' Semen Luzin and their prikazchiki in Tobol'sk 
and Eniseisk to be able to travel. After his arrival in Iakutsk, he received a letter from 
the prikazchiki ordering him to send the money, or, preferably, furs bought for this 
money "for trade with China" to Filat'ev's prikazchik Aleksei Lobanov at Nerchinsk. 
Arsen'ev stressed that his debt was due for repayment and that he stood to lose, 
among other securities, his hereditary villages, rendering him incapable of serving. 
He claimed that to meet the target he had to sell "my attire, and my wife's and 
children's, and all my table silver". The chancellery decree indeed accepted this 
application for an allowance, thus underlining again its function as an insurance for 
the tsar's servitors, and ordered the new voevoda of Irkutsk, Nikolev, to investigate 
exactly whether the list of Mikhail Arsen'ev's loans coincided with documented 
loans the prikazchiki were to produce "whenever next they touch Irkutsk". This was 
done not without suspicion. The chancellery had long noticed that revenues from 
687 Potter, "Payment? ", 21-34 
688 Leont'eva, Zemleprokhodets, 94 
689 Lantzeff, Siberia, 48-9 
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Siberian towns were falling, and put the blame on the voevodas. In Mikhail 
Arsen'ev's case it also noted that in one year of his tenure alone, the amount of iasak 
fell from about thirty-nine bundles of forty sables each to just nineteen bundles, 
while there was ample evidence of sables in private trade with China 690 Whatever 
the outcome of this investigation, like others, it did not destroy the family's 
reputation and connections. 691 The chancellery weighed up the relative importance of 
the principles of accountability and provisioning for its servitors even in an obvious 
case of illegal transactions, and voevodas knew they could rely on officials turning a 
blind eye to a certain amount of illegal trade on their part. 
Furthering their interests, voevodas by no means inevitably fell out with the 
Personenverband. As with other cases in European Russia, satisfied inhabitants 
sometimes sent petitions to Moscow to ask for another period for their "milostivyi"' 
voevoda. "Merciful" was the word used in contrast to "likhi"'; in other words these 
voevodas managed to respect the limits of the cossacks' endurance, and proved their 
qualities as leaders of the Personenverband in towns on the steppe rim such as 
Tiumen', Turinsk and Tomsk. 692 The petition asking not to exchange a musketeers' 
and cossacks' golova in Tiumen' in 1686-7, in which his cossacks and musketeers 
argued that I. Tekut'ev, a Tiumen' syn boiarskii, caused them no "obidy" and 
"nalogi". Although their petition contradicted an already existing decree of 
appointment, it was granted by the chancellery. 693 "Merciful" never meant that the 
voevoda lived on thin air or on his savings or credit alone. Rather, he was "fed" by 
the population, relying on traditional habits of kormlenie. Though it was officially 
abrogated several times in the late sixteenth and during the seventeenth centuries, of 
necessity this habit lived on. 694 As long as the voevoda, prikazchik or other officials 
were perceived as "merciful", they could rely on this voluntary, generalised 
690 RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 394 11.10-17 (decree) 
691 Mikhail's two daughters were among the boiaryshni (ladies-in-waiting) of Peter's sister, 
tsarevna Natal'ia. In their company at St. Petersburg in 1704 was Marta, daughter of a Livonian 
servant who was to become Catherine I: Bushkovitch, Peter, 237; Barsukov, A. P., Spiski gorodovykh 
voevod Moskovskogo gosudarstva XVII st., St. Petersburg 1902,283 
692 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 124-5; Vershinin, Voevodskoe, 33 
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exchange of favours 695 Thus, recently arrived cossacks at Tara gave their vocvoda 
"from all the sotnia ten pud of salt from their salt allowances". 696 During the bloody 
war of conquest against the Buryats voevoda Pokhabov received Buryat slaves on a 
permanent basis from his thankful cossacks for his manifold "successful" 
campaigns. 97 His fall occurred characteristically after the Buryats fled their 
homelands and rode off to join the steppe Mongols. Attempts on the part of the iasak 
people to obtain exemption from the iasak bringing the voevoda bribes were 
common - in such a situation everyone in the district could be satisfied. As long as 
the voevoda did not try to take more than the cossacks conceded, they could make a 
profit from buying up some of the better furs not given as tribute to the tsar. 
698 Still, 
there was the danger of alienating the chancellery, which paid for their livelihood 
and might reduce the salary; the limits were defined by the inevitable fluctuations in 
annual yields the chancellery could not assess from a distance. 
Even the voevodas who at one point or another of their term of office were 
deposed by their cossacks knew better times when the latter had voluntarily offered 
presents. When Aleksei Bashkovskii arrived in Krasnoiarsk district, he was offered a 
sable worth twenty altyn by his later foe Aleksei Iarlykov; altogether, he received 
sixty-three sables while travelling to Krasnoiarsk. In town, he met with the local 
cossacks, Bukharian and Russian merchants and trappers offering another 175 sables. 
On arrival in the same town of Krasnoiarsk, Semen Durnovo was offered a horse 
worth ten roubles, before he fell out with the population for supporting his 
predecessors, the Bashkovskiis. 699 A similar condition could ensue on holidays and 
name-days of the tsar and his family, or when the voevodas were invited for dinner. 
The latter events took place in the homesteads of clerks, piatidesiatniki and even 
rank-and-file cossacks; often, the voevoda and his wife were presented with furs 
during dinner. These were not the exalted voevodas presented in literature; they 
returned the favours, in particular to their own partisans once the Personenverband 
695 Davies, Brian, "The Politics of Give and Take: Kormlenie as Service Remuneration and 
Generalized Exchange 1488-1726", in: Kleimola, A. M. (ed. ), Culture and Identity in Muscovy 1359- 
1384 Moscow 1997,39-67 
66 Nikitin, Sluzhilye, 132 
697 Okladnikov, Ocherki, 113-4 
698 Ogloblin, Obozrenie pt. IV, 132 
699 Bakhrushin, Krasnoiarsk, 171 
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had split. The rebels therefore called the voevoda's partisans "convivial scandal- 
mongering informers and brawlers (prikormlennye ushniki 1 gorlany)", referring to 
the methods in which they interfered with decisions of the Personenverband and its 
relationship with the voevoda. 70° Conviviality served as a reliable means to smooth 
personal relations as well as to influence the Personenverband at large. It also 
worked the other way round: Dvorianin Fedor Tutolmin, who was appointed by 
Tobol'sk voevodas to investigate the rebellion against the two Bashkovskiis in 
Krasnoiarsk, on 18 February 1696 arrived in Krasnoiarsk, where Bashkovskii did not 
agree to hand over the symbols of office - the town's seal and keys - and refused to 
account for his residency. Dismayed, Tutolmin declared the voevoda should be 
starved out, while he lived in the hamlets surrounding Krasnoiarsk, distilled alcohol 
and arranged banquets for the sudeiki rebellious Krasnoiarians had elected. In August 
he received official orders to investigate Aleksei Bashkovskii's tenure. During the 
investigation, he closely observed local customs, while Krasnoiarians offered him 
pre-emptive gifts. 701 
Despite attempts by historians to distinguish between legal offers and illegal 
corruption, there were no clear boundaries. A voevoda fallen into disgrace with the 
local Personenverband could find it difficult to prove whether he received gifts on 
grounds of generalised exchange or simply forced people to pay tribute. In 1695 
Krasnoiarsk cossacks for the first time tried to corner A. Bashkovskii; they 
approached the clerk of the voevoda office Semen Nadein demanding that he write a 
report claiming Aleksei Bashkovskii peculated the furs Moscow sent as a reward for 
their victory over the nomadic Tubin tribe. Yet Nadein changed the text to report that 
they had voluntarily offered the furs in honour of the voevoda, as "pochest", and 
Bashkovskii returned this favour by offering "drinks, while some took money". 702 In 
1654 cossacks deposed the voevoda of Tiumen', Lodygin, on charges of corruption, 
after only a few months in office. This was even more suspicious as they did not 
even mention one of the reasons which incensed them most: Lodygin had tried to 
70° Aleksandrov, Vlast', 154,199,247; Pokrovskii, "`Slovu"', 40; Pokrovskii, Tomsk, 321; 
Loginovskii, K. D., Materialy k etnografii Zabaikal'skikh kazakov, Vladivostok 1904; Vershinin, 
Voevodskoe, 89; Bakhrushin, Krasnoiarsk, 174,183. Dal', V., Tolkotiyi slovar', vol. 4 ukho". 
Scc also 
Chapter I. 
t Bakhrushin, Krasnoiarsk, 183 
702 Ibid., 171 
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stamp out illegal distillation, one of the backbones of the town's economy in the 
vicinity of the agricultural district of western Siberia. 703 
However, there are many examples of the use of outright graft and blackmail on 
the part of voevodas pressing for gifts - the favourite means was a short, yet 
extendable stay in the town's gaol during harvest; beatings were common as well, an 
evil which was not restricted to Siberia. 704 Until he was relieved or deposed, the 
voevoda enjoyed the competencies of an unrestricted despot. However, it was not 
advisable to make use of these powers too extensively. After the relief of the 
voevoda of Nerchinsk, I. Nikolev, in 1707 - he was not the first voevoda in this town 
bearing his family name705 - the prisoner Gordei sent a petition to the Siberian 
chancellery. The conflict with the voevoda unfolded during a trial over the quarrels 
between Gordei and A. Plotnikov. Gordei was dissatisfied with the sluggish business 
of the court that "made him suffer from red-tape for a long time" and accused the 
voevoda. Nikolev answered angrily: 
"Who dares to give orders to me? No one dares, even if you carry on litigation for five 
years. "706 
As in one of the typical cases of the seventeenth century of a "sovereign's word" 
or "indecent words", the voevoda further asked: 
"Who gives orders to me? I am myself tsar in the same way as in Moscow tsar Petr 
Alekseevich: I do whatever I want. Nobody gives orders to me. Not only in Nerchinsk, 
even in Moscow I would be tsar. It is I who deals with such affairs in the voevoda's 
office! And in Moscow they do not agree with my decisions! And nobody will change 
my decisions! " 
This amounted to verbal abuse of the tsar and the expression of pretensions to the 
tsar's throne. His words, however, returned to haunt Nikolev: Although Gordei was 
imprisoned clad in fetters and "starved twelve weeks", as the prisoner asserted, the 
problems for the voevoda started when Nikolev was relieved. Nikolev freed Gordci 
and sent him to the steam bath where his confessor, priest Grigorii Nikiforov, the 
town major (gorodnichii) Sawa Bolotov and the syn boiarskii Danila Gavrilov 
703 Alcksandrov, Hast', 186 
704 Enin, Kormlenie, 132-3 
705 See 220 
706 Akishin, Politseiskoe, 76 
214 
attended him. Obviously Nikolev enjoyed the support of the Personenverband, since 
nobody else voiced allegations. In the bania, nevertheless, Gordei's reception 
committee urged him not to sue the voevoda and offered 500 roubles compensation. 
Gordei was uncompromising in his adherence to due process, and perhaps motivated 
by his duty to denounce a sovereign's word - he rejected the offer. Even when 
Nikolev put him in prison again, he still declined the same proposal a second time. In 
his petition, the main incrimination apart from the sovereign's word was for Gordei's 
own sufferings, but he did not forget to report that Nikolev had robbed Tungus iasak- 
payers. 707 It could prove hard for a voevoda to evade legal persecution in Siberian 
service under the old system. This could even be the case if the Personenverband did 
not support the litigant, although this was an exception to the rule. Not without 
reason Siberian voevodas' kin in Moscow warned them to keep a low profile, and 
reminded them of cases in which the tsar had punished voevodas when their subjects 
made allegations against them. Although instructions restricted their prerogatives in 
traditional, sacral terms, these constraints could be as binding as any. 08 Presumption, 
as in Nikolev's case, was nevertheless always close at hand - the Personenverband 's 
support could temporarily make a man feel and behave like a despot. 
Cultural Blindness or Reasonable Flexibility? Leitideas and 
the Supply of Siberian Servitors 
While social hierarchy in the administration provided a fairly rigid straitjacket, 
not everything was decided by its constraints. 709 Nevertheless, a strict social 
hierarchy as expressed in the law was irreconcilable with modern administrative law. 
In 1649, members of the duma ranks - the committee formulating the Ulozhenie was 
chosen from among them - were given far-reaching immunity from the provisions of 
the Ulozhenie concerning administrative misdemeanour. 710 Brown has noted that by 
our lights there is a glaring contradiction: While members of the governing apparatus 
filled their purses very well through tacit extortion, at the same time they performed 
essential tasks, especially in national defence, with reasonable competency. 
707 Ibid., 76-7 
708 Lantzeff, Siberia, 51 
70' Kivelson, "Bitter" 
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Nevertheless, we should not fall into the trap of diagnosing a "certain cultural 
blindness towards condoning bribery and gift-giving". 71 1 Historians have found it 
difficult to reconcile the prevalence of bribes with the service ethos of the Muscovite 
civil administration. However, this is due to the failure to grasp the point that a noble 
might have to pay a bribe to acquire a position, but his successful retention of that 
position, and opportunities for profit, depended upon his loyal performance of 
service. At the same time, he could accept bribes in the form that society condoned, 
or else by outright robbery, if local power relations were favourable. For example if 
there were no local organisations of self-administration of the posad, there was no 
other way than to use force to acquire local surpluses. 712 
Despite the very different understanding of legitimacy of taking payments by 
government officials, there were many cases in which chancellery officials were sued 
for bribery. 713 In fact, as the rebellions show, Muscovites had the same problems 
with these contradictions as we have, but had to assess them in a very different 
context and environment. Thus the very populace that had as recently as June 1648 
successfully demanded the heads of several of Muscovy's most influential boyars, 
through its own elected representatives agreed with the 1649 Ulozhenie, which 
contained explicit stipulations partially exempting the boyars and other Duma ranks 
from the afflictions of administrative law. 714 Notably, the 1649 Ulozhenie stands out 
for its clear, understandable language among comparable collections of law, and it 
was the last - and largest compilation of dialogic law, as opposed to the monologic 
law promulgated in the eighteenth century. 715 There is no doubt that these sudden 
changes were contradictory, and most likely, those who made them also perceived 
them as incongruous. In an ambiguous situation, Muscovites could not be expected 
to act in an uncontradictory way. 
We may not succeed in interpreting Muscovite legal consciousness without 
contextualising these seemingly contradictory points of view. It is necessary to adjust 
the framework of interpretation so that we are able to account for a quite different 
7111 1 ., 15-19,20-1 712 Enin, Kormlenie, 305-26 
713 Hellie, Ulozhenie, chapt. 1Ono. 150 
714 Brown, "Neither", 4 
711 Schmidt, Christoph, Sozialkontrolle in Moskau, Stuttgart 1996,395-7 
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environment. In this investigation, it is essential to differentiate not just between 
social groups, but also their different needs and interests, which were not necessarily 
unified throughout a social group, or in time and space. In other words, a cossack 
sent to Moscow, Eniseisk or Tobol'sk to represent the interests of his comrades was 
indeed on one level interested in pressing for them. On another level, however, he 
could find it difficult to resist interests and opportunities that offered themselves in 
the different setting of Moscow, or, for that matter, on the road between his home 
town and the capital. Communities in the Russian north attempted to institutionalise 
this fundamental clash of interest in one and the same person by prohibiting all 
private enterprise on journeys undertaken on behalf of the community and financed 
by it, a condition to which the petitioners had to swear an oath; moreover, they 
constantly exchanged letters with their communities. 716 At the same time, Siberian 
cossack groups already found it hard, if not impossible, to formulate such stringent 
rules. After all, men absent for a year or two simply could not be asked to abstain 
from all private business, particularly when the dangers of the road and the rivers and 
portages inflicted by nature and widespread brigandage were taken into account. 
Furthermore, petitioners were likely to carry the fur iasak, or bring back the 
sovereign's salary. Thus, by standing up for the rights of their comrades, and 
enduring all the risks of the road including that of being arrested in Moscow or by 
one of the fellow voevodas of the most influential of their foes back at home, 
cossacks found themselves elevated to a position which bestowed on them the most 
valuable reward available in Muscovy: that of being close to the tsar ("they saw the 
sovereign's clear eyes" in an audience), but also gave them temporal sway over 
substantial material means. 717 In this regard, they suddenly resembled the very hated 
chancellery staff that allegedly interfered with the tsar's ways of justice. It comes as 
no surprise that they reacted in the same time-honoured way as did the chancellery 
staff. According to a decree signed by d'fak Vasilii Altemira at the Siberian 
chancellery on 16th March 1699, they often misused their temporary power and put 
some of the money aside for their own benefit, while claiming they were forced to 
bribe the chancellery staff excessively. However, the chancellery staff denied any 
716 Bogoslovskii, Samoupravlenie, vol.!!, 64 
717 Pokrovskii, Tomsk, 266 
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such allegations, claiming they had only accepted money "for their 
nourishing... according to the cossacks' vybori"' which the messengers carried. The 
decree demanded an investigation to be held, and also ordered the voevoda to ask the 
cossacks whether they deemed two dengi per rouble worth of salary an acceptable 
fee (za rabotu) "to preclude further quarrels about this issue". According to voevoda 
Nikolev, the cossacks accepted. 718 Adding to the evidence concerning the role of 
negotiation in Siberia, this is the only known decree defining fees during Peter's 
reign throughout Russia719, and what is more - it was promulgated as dialogical law, 
rather than a one-sided command. 
Time and distance were particularly prone to change the way an institution was 
interpreted. Fedor Pushchin experienced irritating shifts of leitideas, which 
dominated according to the space he passed through and the social groups he 
encountered when he returned from Moscow. With the delegation of petitioners he 
headed, Pushchin returned only on 6`h April, over one and a half months after the 
chancellery's decrees arrived in Tomsk. His pace was slow, and the delegation was 
in an optimistic mood. On their way along the river Ob' they called on the Ostiaks to 
come to Tomsk since they carried the sovereign's decree of favour. Even in Tomsk, 
cossacks were first inclined to believe that essential news was arriving. They were 
further persuaded by the convincing stories the "moskovshchiny", as the members of 
the delegation were tellingly called in Tomsk, had to report. The tsar had received 
them, and they carried the decrees that instituted proceedings against the first 
voevoda Shcherbatyi. They had even received a guarantee that Shchcrbatyi was to be 
put before court, and could cite the tsar's word that his visitors from the "sovereign's 
faraway Siberian frontier" were not to fall into disgrace for their measures against the 
voevoda. 720 
In Tomsk, however, they met with a completely different assessment of the 
decrees they carried. Already on 30th July 1648 the new clerk Kliucharev, who had 
taken the side of voevoda Shcherbatyi, had arrived in Tomsk raising doubts as to 
whether it could be expected that their rebellion would be accepted as legal 721 In 
718 RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 451 11.160-2 (report) 719 Potter, "Payment? ", 30-3 
720 Pokrovskii, Tomsk, 299-302 
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February, the decrees, copies of which Pushchin's delegation carried, had reached 
Tomsk. The tsar had ordered an investigation of Shcherbatyi's misdemeanours, but at 
the same time commanded the cossacks to obey him until the new voevodas arrived. 
Another problem was that the Tomskans had already questioned the authenticity of 
the very decree that Pushchin brought. Yet for Pushchin and his comrades, at least 
until they met with the pessimistic mood in Tomsk, the reality of their meeting with 
the tsar was far stronger than anything written in a decree they may not even have 
read en route. They carried the tsar's salary paid out in advance, an extra allowance 
in cloth to pay for the journey, and they had even been able to loot boyars' courts in 
cooperation with like-minded Moscow rebels, actions which were not condemned by 
Aleksei Mikhailovich. In September, however, after a pause of several months, the 
tsar had appointed Trubetskoi, a member of the clientele of his former tutor, B. N. 
Morozov, to head the Siberian chancellery again. Returned to the position he had 
held before the rebellion, Trubetskoi, though not daring to deny the Tomsk rebels' 
demands, included this awkward stipulation in the decree. 722 Some of the 
delegation's members in Tomsk reiterated the claim that the decree had been 
changed before it was written down. Pushchin however no longer seemed so 
convinced. When cornered publicly by syn boiarskii Juni Tupal'skii at the review, he 
refrained from answering the question as to whether the decree was forged. 
In Tomsk, the delegates encountered a very harsh climate for any attempt to 
appraise their journey positively. If the decrees they carried were authentic, this 
meant that petitionaries were unable to fulfil in the rebellious capital a task which 
seemed straightforward from a Tomsk perspective. If, on the other hand, the decrees 
were forged, it meant that the delegates had obviously only made shady deals in the 
capital and obtained "stolen property". In meetings of the rebels, they had to listen to 
exhortations, claiming they were not worth the trust of the Personenverband. Others 
were already promising to make it better - there were already plans for another 
delegation. 
Prince Shcherbatyi reported the verbal clashes during one of these meetings on 
I1th April, repeating the words of eye-witnesses. In Bunakov's gornftsa, more than 
722 Ibid., 267-70 
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thirty people met - Il'ia's "advisors", the secretaries, and Fedor Pushchin and the 
cossack M. Kurkin, who accompanied him to Moscow. Accordingly, Bunakov 
chided Kurkin: 
"Why did you fail to bring the order of execution for Oska [Shcherbatyi]? " 
0. Liapa, one of the advisors, shouted: 
"Now they, Ostashka Liapa and his comrades, travel to Moscow and they will not go to 
the boyar courts. But Fedka Pushchin and Mishka Kurkin went to the boyars' courts 
(khodili po boiarskim dvorom), and that is why they did not obtain the order to hang 
Oska. " 
Bunakov was not yet satisfied and scolded the delegates: 
"Why did you visit the boyars' courts at Moscow [and robbed them during the rebellion] 
and neglected our common business - you travelled to Moscow to behave like bandits 
and traitors! "723 
There was much ambiguity and even doubt whether they had actually accepted 
some boyar's favours or not. Thus, however inadvertently, delegates faced similar 
accusations to those they had complained about in Moscow. 
Different environments shaped appraisals differently, and since Muscovites, and 
especially Siberian cossacks, lived in so extremely different environments, this had a 
tremendous impact on their views. Specifically, to change environments fostered 
changing needs, and these ultimatively translated into changing leitideas, which were 
not necessarily stable among the members of one group, or in an individual, in time 
and space. 724 In the encounter of Pushchin and Kurkin, who returned empty-handed 
to Tomsk, with their partisans, differences in time, space, opportunity and 
information even made an action of reprisal against hated boyars look dangerously 
similar to illicit bribe-taking. 
The notion that accountability had to be enforced, so obvious in town rebellions, 
can be treated as one of the principles which combined in a leitidea. It is quite 
explicit as a demand in the many collective petitions of the 1620s-1640s, as well as 
in the rebellions of the 1640s. 25 It may not seem surprising that the tsar and his 
72' Ibid., 301 
724 On institutions, see 13-29 725 Aleksandrov, Hast', 354-5; Bazilevich, KV. (sort. ), Gorodskie vosstaniia v Moskovskom 
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boyars wished to hold officials accountable, and most of their activities in this 
respect were directed towards an increase in accountability of those ranking below 
them. The most effective measures, such as the stipulations of the Ulozhenie, were 
directed against corruption and the arbitrary decisions of relatively lowly state 
secretaries and clerks. 726 However, what does seem surprising is that even the boyars 
had an interest, if limited, in ensuring the accountability of other boyars. This is very 
explicit in the encounter between I. I. Saltykov and M. F. Streshnev at Verkhotur'e 
mentioned in chapter III, where two members of top-ranking clans on the one hand 
fought for the right to alienate resources, and, on the other hand, to uphold 
accountability. Yet alienation may not be the right word for what happened in the 
chancellery system everywhere, and was nevertheless fought about so relentlessly. 
While for the two boyars the prevailing interest was defined by patronage and the 
affairs of their kin, one of the means that could prove decisive was to enhance 
accountability. In such a way, Saltykov could enlist the support of the local 
population - and what is more, in Siberia at least, the support of the cossacks - as 
well as the support of the tsar, who was interested in increased accountability and 
concomitant improved revenues to further foreign political interests, which were 
paramount for any European princely state. 27 
In fact, the tsar's viewpoint is a very good spot from which to understand why 
different leitideal could not be reconciled, yet were ultimately accepted as part of the 
same institutional mechanism. While the tsar benefited from accountability, since 
this meant that taxation was much more efficient, he - or the regent - nevertheless 
had to take into account that the means to organise taxation in a fully accountable 
manner simply did not exist. The problems of collecting taxes in such a vast range of 
climatically and economically adverse environments meant that the centre could not 
live off the meagre revenues from one region, but had to rely on many to meet its 
targets. However, from this an even more vexatious issue arises: Why did the 
rebellious Muscovites of the seventeenth century not do away with such a voracious, 
seemingly inadequate centre? While the second leitidea - exterior competition for 
power - seems at first glance only applicable to the tsar or regent and his or her 
726 Brown, "Neither", 4; See Forsyth, Wade, Administrative Law, 24,26 
727 See 134-7. Hinrichs, Ernst, Fürsten und Mächte, GSttingen 2000,238-41 and 248-50 
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immediate entourage, we have to take into account a common threat, which was 
perceived by Muscovites throughout the century and marked a difference to the 
common European case. It effected an equally pressing need as the immediate 
material situation and the quest for accountability of the chancellery system. 
Seventeenth-century Muscovites all lived, albeit to varying degrees, with the danger 
of being captured and brought to the slave markets of the south. After Africans south 
of the Sahara, Eastern Slavs were the second biggest pool of potential victims of 
slavery. Any state or dominion erected on the East European, and likewise Northern 
Asian, plains, except perhaps for a nomad confederation, could not but address this 
threat and misery; otherwise its subjects were simply carried away. 728 The Ulozhenie 
was in part the result of the institutionalisation of this pressing need. It stipulated 
annual levies for the ransoming of captives729 at the rate of 0.2 roubles from peasant 
or posad homesteads, service landholdings and hereditary estates. Lower-ranking 
servitors, such as cossacks, musketeers, artillerymen, gunners, gatekeepers, and 
others, who were most susceptible to captivity, were taxed at half the rate. These 
monies were to be collected annually in the Foreign Affairs chancellery on the basis 
of new census books: 
"so that no one will be omitted from that cash levy because such ransoming is a common 
act of mercy [for all]. The pious tsar and all Orthodox Christians will receive great 
recompense from God, as the righteous Enoch said: `Do not spare gold and silver for 
your brother, but redeem him, and you will receive a hundred-fold from God. s9430 
In the original, the passage reads both times: "iskuplenie ... iskupite ego" - to 
ransom/to redeem are two aspects of the same word, commonly used in a slightly 
different context for "the Lord, your redeemer", among others, in the Books of 
Enoch of the Russian Orthodox bible. This citation, however, is not found in the 
Russian Orthodox Bible; 731 it is therefore all the more significant for the emphasis 
put on the tsar's obligation for ransoming. The Ulozhenie also stipulated rates to be 
paid for ransom, in a progression according to rank and the circumstances of 
72 Khodarkovsky, Steppe, 222-4 
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captivity. 732 Many publications dealing with the Time of Troubles also supported and 
propagated this leitidea of the tsar as the pious protector of the poor and redeemer of 
captives. 33 
The dire need arising from the defencelessness of the frontier, expressed in the 
language of Russian Orthodoxy, also made the chancellery system indispensable. 
Without it, there could be no successful extraction of the means to accommodate the 
steppe nomads, not to speak of the Sisyphus-like attempt to construct defences on the 
open southern steppe frontier which commenced in the 1630s. It was in particular the 
defence of the southern frontier that Muscovite higher officials organised 
adequately. 734 If military tasks were accomplished ineffectually, the military and 
administrative establishment became susceptible to forceful restructuring. 35 
To underpin the image of pious concern for the Orthodox flock, the tsars also 
paid their troops on campaign, and punished arbitrary requisitions among the local 
population. 36 Such pious concern was advisable also regarding valuable troops in 
general. Muscovy's agrarian economy was still oriented at subsistence rather than at 
the market, and most of its products never found their way to market: In critical 
moments Moscow could not divert supplies on the markets in sufficient amounts. It 
thus faced the choice either to leave its valuable troops at the mercy of the forces of 
inadequate markets and to the vicissitudes of foraging while on campaign. Therefore, 
efforts at creating and developing an in-kind supply system in the south, where 
troops were needed to repel nomad and Ottoman forces were encouraged and 
sustained to a degree that would not have been acceptable in Western Europe. 737 
This did not mean that supply was always adequate. The evidence about 
encroachments and atrocities of troops on their way to Siberia is derived from 
official complaints, and related court proceedings often hint that the troops felt they 
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were themselves victimised and cheated, and thus merely took their due in the areas 
which profited most from the fur trade. The picture is ambiguous, with voevodas 
extorting additional dues from inhabitants of the regions they passed through, while 
the chancellery took measures to control the material benefit the voevodas could 
derive - when they left Moscow, their belongings were measured, documented, and 
compared to a set table of allowed goods to curb smuggling. 38 They were also 
controlled at the Siberian border, at Verkhotur'e. Cossacks and musketeers were 
flogged and sometimes executed, although this could only apply to cases that the 
Personenverband did not cover. The older historiography believed it was evidence of 
the futility of complaints that government did not always pay recompense to 
victims. 739 On the other hand, the seizure of voevodas' possessions on the part of the 
tsar had the benefit of encouraging those eager to show their trustworthiness, and the 
side-effect of filling the treasure for such purposes as the redemption of slaves. In the 
same vein, demanding actual recompense of the victims in every case, although this 
was exactly what the Ulozhenie demanded, actually meant a serious over-assessment 
of early-modern administrative capabilities. 740 After all, there was no means of 
verifying the potentially inflated claims of village or town elders, as even elaborated 
lists of individual claims were usually not checked against evidence. Thus, beyond 
internal divisions of the land communes and awareness of their powerlessness, was 
one uncommonly positive reason for the surprisingly low inclination of Russian 
peasants to rebel. 741 In this regard, their perception of the "pious and merciful" tsar 
was firmly rooted in the care the tsar's troops were ordered to take, and even more so 
the chancelleries supervising them. 742 At the same time, however, cossacks could use 
the iasak-payers as a bargaining chip in negotiations or as "remuneration" in case 
regular recompenses were not delivered. 743 
738 Lantzeff, Siberia, 49 
739 Butsinskii, Zaselenie, 191-4 
740 Ilellie, 1649 Ulozhnie, ch. 10 no. 150. Cf. the amount of paperwork generated over the 
recompense of the citizens of Reval by the Swedish administration, involving properties valued 
incomparably higher: Frost, Northern, 309-10 
" Moon, Peasantry, 239,243 
742 Bushkovitch, Peter, 266 
743 Aleksandrov, Mast, 22-54; Davies, "Chigirin", 104,113-8; Slczkine, Mirrors, 3-47; Smith, 
"Logistics", 49-50; Ogloblin, Obozrenie pt. III, 233 
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Perceptively, Niemojewski included his descriptions of the army in 1606 in a 
consideration of the income and expenditure of the tsar's court. In order to prove the 
tyrannical character of the tsar's reign, Fletcher concentrated in one of his largest 
chapters on the tremendous amount of income from all regions, and the many means 
available to the tsar to increase them. Niemojewski, however, put the income at 
150,000-200,000 roubles, i. e. about ten times lower than Fletcher and, unlike him, 
systematically considered the outgoings of the court. Regularly-paid salaries made 
for the most important part of the service relationship as far as Siberian cossacks 
were concerned, and for the greatest part of spending in town, as chapter II has 
shown. Service remuneration generally constituted a large part of expenses. 744 The 
reliability of payments, limited as they were, was the stock-in-trade of the 
relationship between the tsar and his military and chancellery personnel. Where this 
was not the case - and, not surprisingly under early modern conditions, it was quite 
frequently not the case - those at the receiving-end of the deal felt entitled to rebel745 
or to accept payments in a semi-illegal grey zone. 
It is instructive to consider the context in which these institutions developed. 
After the decline of the Mongol empire and its successors, the Muscovite grand 
princes, formerly entrusted with raising the Golden Horde's tax, were increasingly 
capable of disbursing these means partly for their own ends. They used them to 
attract uprooted Tatar warriors in growing numbers, which were also remunerated 
with pomest'e. 746 Contrary to what is often perceived as mainly a measure of 
depriving lofty nobles of their regional identity and powerbase747, in the context of 
steppe warfare the obligation to serve the tsar personally in Moscow was an 
expedient way to pacify nomad nobles who otherwise engaged in raiding and in the 
slave trade. Prohibiting arbitrary requisitions in this context was a means of agitating 
for the tsar, since it set Muscovy apart from the unreliable steppe warriors competing 
for the meagre agricultural surplus. Moscow could fall back on this nomadic factor to 
establish authority. Yet all the tsar demanded was prompt payment of taxes - 
something learned from the Mongols. Therefore, linking the levying of the tax to 
744 Floria, "Nemoevskii", 113 
gas Ibid., 111-3 
746 On pomest'e as Tatar heritage: Ostrowski, Mongols. 747 Pipes, Old Regime, [German version] 102-3 
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Christian notions moved Muscovy closer to Europe. Showing concern for the 
population's lot served Moscow well even in the more central regions, where a semi- 
nomadic lifestyle reappeared in the guise of banditry, which was often committed in 
alliance with local strongmen. 748 Therefore centralisation and bureaucratisation, 
though by no means a remedy to exploitation in general, served the common man in 
a very basic, existential way. 
Consequently, despite the wrath about the opportunistic behaviour of chancellery 
staff, especially among the gentry who lost their peasants during raids, there was at 
least an equal interest in supplying officials in whatever way seemed feasible. In 
general, they could not be disparaged as exploiters, even if at times such a notion was 
deservedly widespread among Russians. Others would take their place, and this was 
not due to the slavish nature of the Russians, but on the contrary, was perceived as a 
concerted effort to overcome the threat of slavery for all individuals in the 
steppeland 749 Contrary to what we are used to think, though, it was perfectly rational 
to believe that the tsar was merciful, but some of the boyars "evil" advisors, since 
Orthodox notions were so central - not only - to ransoming. 
Since Muscovy was cash-starved, and could only fortify the steppe frontier by 
constant overstretching of resources, the centre hardly commanded the means to 
compensate administrative personnel. In a similar vein as the cossacks who were co- 
opted - albeit in a different sense than the nobles - and allowed to participate in trade 
at a reduced tax rate, members of the duma ranks were given dispensation from many 
strictures of administrative law. They became usufructuaries of their own service 
obligations, thereby making sure if not that they always worked according to the rule, 
but that they actually went where they were ordered, and at least performed a job. 
There is little evidence available to persuade us that all chancelleries were 
performing inadequately on a constant basis. 750 Similarly, positions of power in a 
frontier setting, such as the prikazchiki, were allowed to participate in the usus 
fructus and thus granted dispensation from the stipulations of certain decrees. In 
1685/1686 two Irkutsk cossacks were sent to collect the iasak and the tithe. A decree 
748 Bogkovska, "Bojaren", 347,376 
749 See chapter III; Rustemeyer, "Verrat", 272; Novombergskii, Slovo, tom I, 537 
750 Hellie, Slavery; Brown, "Administrative", 20; Davies, Governors, vols. 1-2 passim 
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of the tsar dated 1681/1682 stipulated that such prikazchikf were not eligible to 
receive their regular salary. In the way of an exception, the document noted, the two 
cossacks nevertheless received their salary since they "are sent involuntarily 
according to the sovereign's decree as prikazchiki to serve". 751 It did not take Petrine 
rationalisation from above to make Muscovy's prikaznye liudi aware of the potential 
for calculated dispensation from administrative law. As the next chapter will show, 
there can be no doubt that ordinary cossacks detested such behaviour. At times, they 
rebelled against it; at other times, however, they relied on the very same persons to 
overcome and investigate administrative misdemeanours. Yet on the other hand, this 
exemplifies a typical problem in administrating Siberia - and Russia as a whole: The 
gap between potential revenues and the risks and hardships of collecting them in a 
very thinly populated country could only be overcome if a great part of revenues was 
systematically allocated to a tiny, motivated minority. "Involuntarily", they went to 
serve and become wealthy. 
Thus, in the leitidea concerning the supply of officials, or feeding, a wide array of 
needs overlapped. Consequently, a voevoda could be granted a pardon even if the 
local population opposed him, while the rebels were still treated with some 
consideration. As has been shown, a voevoda had different options during his period 
of office - he could become a popular leader of the Personenverband either by 
undertaking a successful campaign or by co-operating with cossack groups wishing 
to side-step regulations on iasak collection. Yet most of the voevodas - except in 
Tobol'sk and Verkhotur'e, and to an already lesser extent in the more important 
regional centres such as Tomsk and Eniseisk - were of modest social background, 
pomeshchiki or members of impoverished lines of great noble families. 752 They had 
an incentive to serve faithfully, seeking to be rewarded with a larger land and salary 
allowance by the tsar. Osip Shcherbatyi was one of these careerists, and a desperate 
one at that. As his 1654 petition for reward describes vividly, from his first 
allowance he never managed actually to receive what was due to him. Old enmities 
between his family and a chancellery clerk blocked rewards and payments, and fire 
and siege played their part in impoverishing him. While he actively and quite 
751 RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 n. ß211.35-7,65-8 (receipts) 
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successfully sought the profit of the sovereign's treasury, he understandably also 
furthered his personal welfare. Tomsk cossacks were righteously outraged by his 
nominally illegal trading enterprises, among others monopolising the Kalmyk market 
and exploiting cossack and other labour. Yet in their dealings with this ambitious, but 
impoverished noble they adhered mostly to the leitidea of accountability and security 
in the frontier area, coupled with a good deal of self-interest expressed in terms of 
the tsar's profit and piety. A leitidea is never coherent, since it expresses partly- 
diverging needs in a field of conflicting and mutually contradicting interpretations 
which prevail only at a given time, in a given location and social group. 753 For their 
part, Shcherbatyi and his imprisoned partisans stressed their merits and the profit 
Shcherbatyi had made for the tsar, and accordingly interpreted the sovereign's affair. 
For the latter part of his period in Tomsk, however, he was unable to follow his aims, 
and in material terms this was the Tomskans' most tangible success. From the 
government's point of view, both objectives were entirely valid, and Shcherbatyi, 
having received for more than twenty years a meagre seventeen roubles and 450 
quarters of land allowance, was awarded an additional thirty-eight roubles and 250 
quarters. 754 While in principle, no one could object if the enterprising and poor 
among the tsar's servitors filled their pockets, there was a limit to such assertiveness. 
This limit depended on the situation, on the relative power of the involved parties, 
and was therefore contested by all available means. 
Conclusion 
Restraining the arbitrariness of chancellery personnel, supplying them and the 
diverse elites, and military defence capability as well as ransoming from captivity 
were three discernible basic needs throughout the zone of interpenetration of the 
steppe and agriculture. Concomitant principles were protest against the "strong 
people" as well as red tape (volokita), the principles of general exchange and 
remuneration, and the image of the pious tsar - the redeemer. None of these 
principles, mutually exclusive in part, though also overlapping, could finally win the 
upper hand, and they never appeared in a "pure" form. Yet in a given setting of time, 
753 Rehberg, "Institutionenwandel", 101-4 
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space and social entity the struggle to interpret the processes of institutionalisation, 
which was common to all of Muscovy yielded temporarily obligatory results. 
Leitideas formed from partly contradictory principles and cannot be attributed solely 
to one social group - in fact they often served to facilitate communication between 
members of a clientele. While peasants and townsmen fled from serfdom and from 
tax and service obligations, for example, others who were left behind had a very 
strong interest in binding people to the land, to make sure tax quotas were met. In 
Siberia, cossacks quite easily came to occupy the very position they had only 
recently fervently fought against, and did not behave much different from their foes 
either. Whole groups of cossacks sometimes found themselves in a powerful 
position, and practiced, for example, bribery, which they otherwise and before had 
feverishly fought, to further their own interests. 
Administrative law provided a degree of stability in this otherwise highly volatile 
environment. This was a feeling that the opponents of the Personenverband in 
particular could entertain, as they sued and suddenly found the former supporters of 
their enemies supported them. In particular, when the Personenverband could no 
longer rely upon unanimity during investigations, the cossack group lost its power to 
individuals capable of defending their own interests. 
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Chapter V Local and Central Power in the Baikal Region 
1689-1720 
The 1696-1698 Transbaikalian rebellion was virtually ignored before 
Aleksandrov and Pokrovskii's detailed account published in 1991. The only previous 
account struggled to apply the inappropriate paradigm of peasants' war to Siberia. 755 
It is to the lasting credit of Aleksandrov and Pokrovskii that they have provided a 
detailed account of this rebellion, portraying the uprising of the Western 
Transbaikalian cossacks as one of the most organised and purposeful risings in early 
modem Russia, aiming at nothing less than securing the final expulsion of the 
voevodas from Siberia. While being elicited by a situation common to Siberia, it 
intended to establish the self-administration of the voisko. 756 
This rebellion was indeed one of the most enduring risings in Russia during the 
seventeenth century; although its termination cannot be nailed down, the rebels 
wielded considerable power at least until an official investigation was launched after 
two years and three months. Despite its length, it is doubtful whether the aim of self- 
administration was as significant as Aleksandrov and Pokrovskii suggest, especially 
with regard to their more extreme claims that at the end of the century, the rebels 
"intended to drive the voevodas out of Siberia". On the threshold of the Petrine 
reforms, and already confronted with a new age evolving at the centre, though yet 
more tentatively throughout the frontier, the rebels still drew heavily on the habits 
and patterns of thought of the seventeenth century frontier. This rebellion is worth 
examining in detail on account of the cossacks' contradictory reactions to these 
developments and their attempts to redefine the rules of the game; a detailed 
investigation of its various stages and aspects ensures that the institutions described 
so far in detail can be explored in their habitual environment. For it is in their 
interaction that institutions offer most insight into the changes in Siberian 
administration and social relations at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. 
Iss Kudriavtsev, F. A., Vosstaniia krest'ian, posadskikh i kazakov v Vostochnom Sibiri, Irkutsk 
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Soviet as well as western historians have suggested that conflict in the 1690s 
around lake Baikal - and not only there - was bound to evolve along the line of 
cleavage between the impoverished cossacks and the cossack elite. 757 Ordinary 
cossacks are depicted as a faceless, undifferentiated and unruly mass claiming their 
rights. The united Transbaikalian cossack garrisons, with the exception of some 
negligible, but purportedly universally-hated prikazchiki, according to this version, 
marched to Irkutsk, to demand payment of their salaries and to oust the voevoda. In 
Irkutsk, their demands were met with suspicion, yet this attitude is said not to be 
representative of the opinion of the general populace. Thus around lake Baikal, there 
was a united front against the voevoda, with some minor disagreements concerning 
tactical issues, again traceable to the split between poor cossacks and their more 
wealthy comrades and immediate superiors. The affluent Irkutsk upper crust, 
enriching themselves illegally at the expense of ordinary cossacks, unequivocally 
despised this movement 758 This view of the events in turn is related to the general 
tendency of Soviet scholarship on Siberia to overestimate social cleavages and to 
underestimate the importance of negotiation between the centre and the periphery, 
and of local initiative as well as the effects of social dislocation in an expanding 
frontier area. Although it cannot be denied that some of the more established 
cossacks and deti boiarskie suffered during the rebellion, one should be cautious 
about generalising on the basis of their experiences. 
Furthermore, the hypothesis is advanced that these social "problems of life" led 
the cossacks of Udinsk and Selenginsk to a necessary struggle for the realisation of 
their socio-political ideas, in this case for "cossack democracy". 759 Ill-defined 
concepts uncritically transferred from Western discourses such as this cloud our view 
of Siberian conditions at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries rather 
than opening them to comparative investigation. 760 
The rebellion in the Transbaikalian fortresses and towns Selenginsk, Udinsk, 
Il'insk and Kaban'sk, which also spread to Barguzinsk and Verkholensk started with 
a treaty signed by the cossacks of the towns and fortresses on the Selenga in early 
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1696. They intercepted a caravan with Irkutsk voevoda Afonasii Savelov's goods 
bound for China at Posol'skii Mys'. Despite the treaty, which stipulated joint 
obligations and peaceful relations between the Personenverbände, there was conflict 
between Udinsk and Selenginsk cossacks about the status of the small fortress of 
Il'insk. While most Il'insk cossacks sympathised with the prikazchik Grigorii 
Turchaninov, Udinsk cossacks replaced him forcibly with syn boiarskii Ivan 
Novikov. Selenginsk cossacks disagreed on this assignment, and appointed Stepan 
Kazan'. Savelov, who already feared for his position, quickly confirmed him. Yet 
after this agreement, conflict between Selenginsk and Udinsk persisted, centring on 
the goods of Anton Savelov, voevoda of Nerchinsk, which were stored in Il'insk. 
Irkutsk voevoda Afonasii Savelov also attempted to appease the Udinsk cossacks by 
seizing equipment for distilling alcohol in the villages surrounding II'insk. He thus 
let down his former crony Turchaninov, who was protecting the distillers and 
siphoning off grain supplies for Udinsk. However, this endeavour came to nothing, 
as the distillers were warned in advance and the Udinsk cossacks were more 
interested in controlling the distillers themselves. 
At the same time, however, the Personenverbände of Udinsk and Selenginsk also 
pursued their common aims, as they tried to explain to the tsar in a common petition. 
The petitioners, however, were intercepted by Irkutsk cossacks. When the voevoda 
rejected the demand of the Selenga cossacks for a substantial advance on their salary, 
200 Selenga cossacks embarked with the aim of forcing the voevoda to pay out the 
full credit. Their hope was that the cossacks of Irkutsk, situated across lake Baikal, 
would join them in the pursuit of what they conceived as a sovereign's affair. 
However, despite the considerable misgivings of the Irkutsk cossacks concerning 
their voevoda, Afonasii Savelov, they supported him against the claims they 
considered baseless. The siege of Irkutsk thus came to nothing. The angry Selenga 
cossacks plundered several small settlements possessed by deli boiarskie. They 
received a temporary settlement with the abbot of the monastery of the Ascension, 
although the voevoda did not partake in it. On their way back from Irkutsk in late 
summer 1696, and after a second futile siege, the Udinsk Personenverband, led by 
Moisei Borisov, seized a cossack trader from Irkutsk on the river Angara, whom they 
beat and robbed. This event marked the turning point in the rebellion, and the last 
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common undertaking of Selenginsk and Udinsk cossacks. Growing tension soon led 
to violence when Udinsk cossacks robbed and injured Stepan Kazan' and his family. 
After returning from Irkutsk, Borisov replaced Andrei Beiton as prikazchik. In 
this position of elected prikazchik he ruled the town and, with decreasing 
effectiveness, the Selenga area, for another year. In September 1697 he was accused 
of a sovereign's affair, relieved by yet another elected prikazchik, Ivan Novikov, and 
found guilty of peculation. 
In the meantime, in April 1697, Irkutsk cossacks had overthrown voevoda 
Savelov who had attempted to seize the opportunity for a second period in office 
when the relieving voevoda had died on his way from Moscow. The town was 
effectively ruled by the elected sud'ia and Irkutsk syn boiarskii Ivan Perfil'ev. After 
receiving the news of Borisov's deposition, Perfil'ev ordered an investigation in June 
1698 before delivery of the Siberian chancellery's decree, which also demanded an 
investigation but called for restraint. Perfil'ev had some important witnesses 
interrogated on the Selenga before voevoda Nikolev relieved him in October. 
The enquiry acquitted the rebels except for several of the so-called "instigators" 
who were found guilty exclusively of embezzlement. In the meantime, the 
Personenverbände of the rebels continued to wield considerable influence. In 1701 
Nikolev succeeded in catching a number of Borisov's partisans who had been 
accused by their neighbours, cossacks at Il'insk. At about the same time, there was 
the trial of Andrei Beiton, the officially-assigned prikazchik of Udinsk after Novikov, 
who nevertheless supported the former rebel Personenverband. He was accused of 
bias by an Irkutsk merchant and a local cossack. While Afonasii Savelov suffered 
from harassment during the investigation and financial losses by the resolution of the 
trial, most of the Selenga rebels were never punished. 
Two Faces of Power around Lake Baikal 
The lower Selenga was a rough and strategically-important frontier region close 
to the major trade route from Moscow to Beijing, taking the longer way via 
Nerchinsk and the rivers of northern Manchuria, rather than the shorter route through 
the Selenga valley and the Mongol steppe, which was considered too dangerous. This 
thoroughfare more or less bypassed the frontier fortresses in the 1690s, but the 
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problem with the Manchurian route via Nerchinsk, the bustling emporium for the 
caravan trade with China, was that it was Nerchinsk cossacks who enjoyed the 
privilege of accompanying caravans abroad - thus the Selenga cossacks lost out on 
huge profits 761 This route was not changed before 1703.762 
Seven great official caravans left from Nerchinsk for Beijing between 1689 and 
1697, while no official caravans went in 1690 or 1694. The staff of a caravan - as 
many as four hundred people, with hundreds of carts and draught animals, and cattle 
for food - left Nerchinsk over several days. It included representatives of the wealthy 
Moscow merchants, the gosti or the gostinnaia sotnia, minor traders, workers, and a 
cossack convoy. Most of the staff were hired in Moscow, where the merchants 
received their passports for travel to China. The staff was nevertheless fluid in 
composition. Merchants often hired additional local workers to assist in defence, 
loading, packing, and other activities, and they often left some porters at Nerchinsk 
or on the Nun-chiang river inside China, to be picked up on the return journey. 
Although labour costs at Nerchinsk were quite high, anyone who succeeded in 
making the journey all the way to Beijing found it profitable, because a certain 
amount of unregistered petty trade was permitted, in particular to cossacks of the 
convoy, and yields were huge. 763 
Caravans carried Siberian furs, but increasingly, as the huge demand in furs 
depleted stocks in Siberia, traders also bought furs in European Russia, as well as 
small amounts of Russian and Western manufactured goods. They brought back tea, 
nankeens and, most valuable, Chinese silk cloth and garments. 7M While Irkutsk 
cossacks could not participate to the same degree in this trade, they were still in a 
favourable position to profit from caravan trade. They sold agricultural products to 
the caravans which they grew in the moderately fertile valleys around Irkutsk which 
were safe from nomad intrusions. 765 Grain was also transported and sold at 
Nerchinsk, where attempts to introduce agriculture had met with less success. Since 
the cession of Dauria to China - the mythical lost agricultural paradise of the 
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Siberian cossacks on the Amur - in the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk, the town of 
Irkutsk had been elevated to an economically favourable position. 
Irkutsk and Nerchinsk thus profited from the peace treaty of Nerchinsk 
concluded by prince Golovin with the new Manchu dynasty. Unfettered Russian 
expansion in the South-East during the period of internal war in China was curbed by 
this acknowledgement of the military valour and historic right of the Chinese empire, 
but trade between the two empires could develop on a heretofore unknown level, an 
outcome Moscow preferred. 766 Caravan trade in the 1690s-1720s differed 
substantially from the small-scale frontier trade of the 1680s which had prevailed in 
Nerchinsk, and which had carried on despite serious warfare on the Amur and the 
Selenga. Trade across the border during the 1680s was scant, reduced to sporadic 
exchanges at shifting, informal frontier sites, reminiscent of the informal small-scale 
cossack trade traversing the Terek in the North Caucasus. 67 At Irkutsk, as in the 
other larger towns of Siberia such as Tobol'sk or Eniseisk, at the end of the 
seventeenth century, houses in most cases were two-storeyed or contained a 
basement dwelling partially above ground level (podklet). 768 Throughout the 
eighteenth century, on a frontier much closer to Moscow, in the North Caucasus, 
small-scale frontier trade continued to prevail. In the main town of Kizliar, a two- 
storeyed house remained an exception reserved to the first ataman of the Terek- 
Kizliar host, the Kabardian noble E1'murza-Bekovich Cherkasskii, projecting his 
importance. 769 Irkutsk started to develop already in the late 1680s, and was rebuilt in 
1693 with stout fortifications, an inner bailey containing the most important 
buildings and a surrounding citadel with more buildings; beyond was a third fortified 
settlement, irregular in shape in contrast to the other two, which was for artisans, 
peasants and other civilians. In 1699 the town harboured 1,000 inhabitants. 70 
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Clashes between the impoverished Transbaikal towns and prosperous Irkutsk 
were inescapable, but they were never restricted to mere conflicts between members 
of two classes or strata however defined. In February 1685, eight rank-and-file 
cossacks "with comrades" complained about the prikazchiki of Kaban'sk and Il'insk 
to the voevoda at Irkutsk, claiming they had not received any help when they were 
caught unawares by freezing cold weather on their trip back to Irkutsk. They had 
sailed four doshchaniks with official grain supplies to Udinsk in the summer of 1684, 
and set out to return in the autumn. When they got stuck in sudden ice on the lower 
reaches of the Selenga, losing four barges, they went with their sails and anchor to 
ask prikazchiki Emelian Panikadilshchik and Ivan Novikov in nearby Il'insk and 
Kaban'sk for a replacement doshchanik, but received none. This was hardly a 
coincidence, if the statement of the cossacks from Irkutsk can be trusted, since they 
were not even given decent housing in the homesteads of the village and the hamlet, 
and had to live in outlying winter cabins and bath huts. Further harrassment was 
ahead, as "unknown thieves" stole cossack Timofei Serebrianikov's merchandise, 
linen cloth, from one of the barges. As usual, the cossacks did not hesitate to make 
use of their right to conduct minor customs-exempt trade. Yet this right could not 
protect them from local envy when Panikadilshchikov shrugged off their demands to 
investigate the theft. Meanwhile, they incurred even greater expenses, for they had to 
hire a barge with their own money to cross lake Baikal when the weather turned 
more amiable. Back in Irkutsk, they demanded an investigation to be conducted 
about the behaviour of the prikazchiki. 771 
As no report on any subsequent investigation has survived, this petition may 
contain twisted facts or straightforward forgery; but what remains of this story in any 
case is the brisk enmity of some rank-and-file Irkutsk cossacks, without any record 
of unusual wealth, sent to deliver supplies to Transbaikal towns for two prikazchiki. 
The two prikazchiki continued to be leaders in their own right. Panikadilshchikov 
was a humble desiatnik, who was to be one of the focal figures of the campaign 
against Irkutsk and voevoda Savelov in 1696; he was among the so-called radicals 
during the rebellion. He was also one of the first cossacks at Selenginsk. In 1672, 
771 RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 68,1.22 (petition) 
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when he was first mentioned, another act of bitter competition between fortresses 
was recorded - at his instigation, Selenginsk cossacks, instead of finding new iasak 
payers, "persuaded" Buryats to deliver iasak at Selenginsk, and not at the more 
northerly, defenceless Barguzinsk - cossacks were not allowed to live there year- 
round, to prevent the introduction of agriculture in its rich hunting grounds. 772 In 
complete contrast to the conventional image of the rebels as poor recent recruits, he 
was also in that year already owner of a kabala worth fifty roubles, while his 
business required him to repay his own debts. 773 Already in 1683 he was a prikazchik 
who usually had to bribe the voevoda for an assignment; he appears an unlikely 
candidate for the leadership of impoverished radicals. As will be discussed below, 
the other enemy of the suppliers from Irkutsk, the syn boiarskii Ivan Novikov, was 
twice elected prikazchik by the rebels: once in Il'insk as candidate of the "radicals", 
as Aleksandrov calls them on the grounds that they were newly recruited and 
allegedly followed a more extreme tactic, while adhering to the same aim of 
"democracy", and for the second time at Udinsk in September 1697, where he was a 
key figure among the upper stratum of cossacks supposedly dismantling the 
rebellion. 774 
Novikov's case is a very good example of the political structures of the Baikal 
region. He was on voevoda Savelov's payroll, receiving excess salary in 1693-6, 
which he had to pay back after Savelov was relieved. 775 In 1695, while rebellion was 
already organised in Selenginsk, he was prikazchik in Kaban'sk, a small fortress not 
far from the mouth of the Selenga. In 1698/1699, during the investigation of claims 
of administrative misdemeanours raised against him by a Kabansk cossack, he stated 
that he was made prikazchik in 1695 "with the help of Grigorii Turchaninov", the 
mighty prikazchik of Il'insk who in turn was, apart from the voevoda, the most 
prominent object of the rebels' wrath. 76 As owner of a mill at Il'insk, Novikov was 
also one of the wealthier deti boiarskie on the Selenga. Perhaps one of the reasons he 
was so successful in winning cossack support during the rebellion was his generous 
772 Ibid. no. 2,11.22-23 73 Ibid., 1.6 
774 Aleksandrov, Wast', 308,310,325. See also below. 
775 RGADA f. 1121 op. 2 no. 146,1.3 (receipt book) 
776 Ibid. op. 1 no. 429,1.22 
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offer to grind their grain without taking fees in his mill. After the rebellion had 
ceased, he could not, however, win compensation from Irkutsk or Moscow for the 
credit he had thus offered. 777 After the rebellion, he also faced other investigations, in 
part reopened cases which had been dormant during the years of rebellion. At the 
onset of the rebellion, he became involved in the investigation concerning 
Turchaninov's encouragement of the illegal distillation of alcohol, which had been 
appointed by the voevoda Savelov. Novikov was accused of the same practices as 
Turchaninov by the cossacks Ivan Chiuzhanin and Ivan Rozgildeev - both from 
Selenginsk - in their petition signed and handed in at Irkutsk in 1696. While a minor 
perpetrator was apprehended and interrogated, the same did not happen to Novikov, 
as he was among those warned in advance; it is not clear in this source who tipped 
them off 77' As will be shown below, sympathies in the voevoda's office allow for 
the possibility that a partisan of the rebels warned Novikov. Novikov and 
Panikadilshchikov were not the main leaders of the revolt in 1696, but they played 
very important roles. Yet they were hardly part of a radical movement to drive the 
voevodas out of Siberia and establish a premeditated cossack "republic", a "Don" not 
accepting any authority above them. Rather, they acted according to the demands of 
the moment, trying to mobilise support which could be found at least in times of 
rebellion only - see chapter I- when subordinating themselves to aims agreeable to 
the Personenverband, which they embodied even more than their supporters, or by 
securing or promising tangible material advantages. 
In the Transbaikal, a number of issues brushed over by earlier accounts of the 
Transbaikalian rebellion had aggravated older tensions between the rising dominance 
of Irkutsk and the Transbaikal. Situated on opposite banks of the southern tip of lake 
Baikal were Udinsk and Selenginsk on the major tributary from the southern Mongol 
steppe, and Irkutsk on the only outlet to the north and west; the latter was much more 
in a position to profit from supplies towed on the Angara from Eniseisk or, 
increasingly, grown around Irkutsk itself. Irkutsk was founded in 1661 as an ostrog. 
In 1666, Selenginsk was established by local initiative, and was registered as a town 
(gorod) already in 1683. Irkutsk, however, in 1684 had developed into a key centre 
"' Ibid. no. 407,11.1-16; no. 452,11.1-8 (1699) 778 Ibid. no. 420,11.41-3 
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with its own voevoda, a full range of administrative buildings, warehouses, baths, a 
merchants' hall, cottages for the cossacks and other inhabitants, a guard house and a 
church. In 1686, Irkutsk was elevated to the status of a town and Sclenginsk, which 
was situated 400 kilometres further to the southeast and very close to the open 
steppe, was made part of the Irkutsk prisud. There was an inner bailey in Irkutsk and 
a citadel, fortified like the inner bailey, but containing a larger number of buildings. 
Beyond this was a third fortified settlement, irregular in shape in contrast to the other 
two. It contained craft workshops, shops and counting houses for the commercial, 
cossack and artisan communities"9 In 1697, nearly all of the 269 peasants of Irkutsk 
prisud lived in the main town or in the villages and hamlets around it. They also grew 
the supplies for Nerchinsk and Iakutsk. Spafarii noted Irkutsk's favourable location 
already in 1675: 
"... the fortress Irkutsk is located on the left bank of the river Angara on a plain site. The 
fortress is built very well,... and the area is very suitable for agriculture"780 
Selenginsk and the Transbaikal as a whole, however, were in a doubly 
disadvantaged position, in particular because, after the treaty of Nerchinsk with 
China, Nerchinsk cossacks monopolised the Chinese trade - beyond the state 
monopoly exercised and exploited by Moscow merchants. At the end of the century, 
Iakutsk on the river Lena in the northeast boasted the major remaining fur resources 
in Siberia. Nerchinsk, which was not subordinated to the Irkutsk voevodas, was 
prosperous enough to buy grain to supply its garrisons; already in 1690 it was 
capable of paying cossack salaries without arrears. 781 The western Transbaikal, as 
opposed to Nerchinsk and Dauria, was just a poor steppe forepost, where, despite the 
southerly climate, for a long time nothing much was grown except for some 
vegetables in gardens in the close vicinity of the fortress. There was nearly no posad 
in Selenginsk either, a condition unchanged even in the first decades of the 
eighteenth century. The reason was Mongol raids, against which the Selenginsk area 
was particularly hard to defend. 782 A special envoy of the Mongol Tsetsen-Khan 
779 Collins, "Subjugation", 39; Kudriavtsev, Irkutsk, 6-29; Vasil'ev, Zabaikal'skie, 120-1; 
Spafarii, Puteshestvie, 192 
780 Spafarii, N., Puteshestvie, 115 
781 Leont'eva, Sluzhilye, 295; Aleksandrov, V. A., Russkoe naselenie Sibiri, Moscow 1964,261 782 Spafarii, Puteshestvie, 163 
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stated the difficult position of Selenginsk already a year after its foundation, when he 
arrived at Moscow to mark claims to the site and the region. Even in the 1690s, 
Selenginsk was not safe from Mongol raids. The Transbaikal was dependent on 
Irkutsk, but had little to offer, as iasak was of marginal significance. 
Udinsk was erected first in 1641783 but remained a minor outpost until it was re- 
erected on Golovin's orders on a well-fortified hill above the Selenga. A strategic 
point half surrounded by mountains, it was without any peasants, posad, or iasak 
people. While local revenue bottomed out at four roubles twenty kopeks, irregular 
(neokladnye) expenditure amounted already to more than thirty roubles annually. 
Since the caravans took the route of the river Uda in the 1690s, it was a station of 
marginal importance and little local produce to offer except for horses and cattle. 
When the Nerchinsk treaty was signed, most of the Khorinsk iasak-paying Buryats 
under Nerchinsk administration lived on the Uda, Khilka and Selenga rivers, which 
lay close to Udinsk. This inclined Golovin to re-assign most of them to Udinsk and 
grant the settlement town status in 1690. The town of Selenginsk was registered as a 
mere ostrog in the new Udinsk uezd; Kabanskii ostrog and Il'insk sloboda, in which 
a small garrison was later stationed - thus becoming an ostrog - were also part of 
this new district. In turn, Golovin subordinated them all to the Irkutsk prisud. 784 
Udinsk was therefore an ideal candidate for a Personenverband operating in isolation 
and independently, in what can be identified as very close to the original cossack 
fashion. 
Selenginsk, on the other hand, had been an early contender for trade with China. 
It enjoyed the advantages of the Selenga, and drew on the experiences of the oldest 
Russian settlement south of Lake Baikal. In contrast to Udinsk, Selenginsk also held 
claims to fertile soils immediately south of the lake. The Selenga valley has some 
moderately fertile soils, but even in the end of the twentieth century the dry climate - 
the southern shore of the Baikal enjoys 2,400 to 2,700 hours of sunshine annually - 
yields low harvests and has led to preserve the predominance of cattle-raising 785 
783 Huttenbach, "Penetration", 89 
784 Vasil'ev, Zabaikal'skie, t. I, 212. In this thesis, "Udinsk" always means Verkhneudinsk; since 
the revolution it has become the capital of Buryatia, Ulan-Ude. 
785 Wein, Sibirien, 18,209 
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Already in 1668 syn boiarskii Ivan M. Perfil'ev, still living in Tara in Western 
Siberia, reported on his journey to Beijing that: 
"[Selenginsk] is the best fortress in Siberia, since the climate is warm, and promises rich 
harvests; even Chinese cucumbers grow in the gardens. A huge market could be 
established since China is very close. There are many nomads around who want to 
establish trade in horses, dromedaries, cattle and.. . Chinese products, but.. . there are few 
Russians... Eniseisk syn boiarskii Ivan Porshennikov, the merchant Gavrilo Romanov 
and forty-three Selenginsk cossacks rode ... to China through 
Mongolia [in 1675f'786 
Milescu met them in the same year at Eniseisk, but their business had been "very 
unprofitable, owing to [an internal Chinese] war. , 787 Nevertheless, he echoed 
Perfil'ev's observations on Selenginsk. In 1659 Perfil'ev had been sent with the 
Bukharan merchant Ablin as a messenger to Beijing, carrying Aleksei Mikhailov's 
letter to the Chinese emperor, which reflected the new approach Moscow had 
adopted: Rather than trying to establish diplomatic relations, which were hampered 
by mutual sensitivities, the tsar asked only for trade relations. Perfil'ev, who also 
played a major role during the 1696 rebellion, was received favourably and his 
mission met with success. It was no accident that the syn boiarskii, who was an 
experienced merchant and thriving cossack leader, settled in Irkutsk. 788 
Cossack salaries at Selenginsk and elsewhere depended on trade. Already in the 
mid-1680s Chinese luxury wares surrendered to customs in place of the toll appeared 
as elements in salary payments. The Selenga benefited from conflict between Russia 
and China - in 1687/1688, at the peak of the war on the Amur, customs tithes 
collected from Chinese goods at Selenginsk and Udinsk totalled 1,361 roubles, 
indicating at least ten times that amount in value was on hand on the local markets. 89 
After the peace treaty was signed, owing to continuing insecurity on the Mongol 
steppe, Nerchinsk drained this source of income and thrived on it - in 1687/1688 
Nerchinsk customs tolls amounted to just 1,461 roubles, in 1689 1,148 roubles, but 
from 1694-1697 they had already risen to 26,983 roubles, and from 1698-1702 as 
high as 105,908 roubles. After 1703, when a Dzhungar nomad confederation 
786 Spafarii, Puteshestvie, 127-8 
787 Mancall, China, 349 n. 18 
788 Ibid., 54-56; Spafarii, Puteshestvie, 21; Leont'eva, Sluzhilye, 297 
789 Mancall, China, 349 n. 19 
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campaign against the Manchu Chinese was defeated, the way through the Mongolian 
steppe was cleared and caravans changed to the shorter route through the Selenga 
valley and the Mongolian steppe; consequently toll revenue at Nerchinsk dropped to 
virtually nothing. 790 In Nerchinsk, mining made up for a sizable part of this loss, but 
Selenginsk and the western Transbaikal were left without any additional source of 
income between 1689 and 1703. 
As far as defence and military personnel was concerned, the Transbaikal 
garrisons, which were assigned an important role during conflict with China in 
securing supply lines from Mongol interference, were further strengthened after the 
treaty of Nerchinsk. Yet this endeavour proved anything but straightforward. 
Western Siberian cossacks, proud of their service record and accustomed to voicing 
their opinion, did not comply easily with provisions concerning their future made 
without their consent. Golovin first attempted to assign cossacks sent from Western 
Siberia for eternal service in Udinsk, but since vybori had been signed in their home 
garrisons documenting and guaranteeing that they had to serve for a defined number 
of years, too many of them fled. According to one contemporary calculation, out of 
740 cossacks whose assignment was changed to eternal service at Udinsk, 296 men 
were married and owned a house in "Siberia" (i. e. Western Siberia), while 218 left 
their aged parents behind. 791 While Leont'eva stresses Golovin's use of economic 
stimuli to induce cossacks to stay at Udinsk, the actual policies applied were more 
mixed. At first, the Siberian chancellery hoped for the "volunteers" 
"from various ranks who arrived by their own initiative, or swapped with musketeers 
mounted or on foot. " 
Golovin supported this view in a report dated 28 January 1691: "Among the 
servitors who were enlisted" at Tobol'sk, Tiumen', Tomsk, Narym, 
"those who voluntarily stay may do so. Many of them will stay, since some have set up 
houses and married.. . give them a small aid 
from the treasury to build houses. i792 
The chancellery, answering to these pressures, cut the Udinsk garrison by half: 
790 Ibid., 349 n. 16; Leont'eva, Sluzhilye, 117-8. Khodarkovsky, Steppe; DAI, vol. X, 369 791 RGADA, f. 214, stb. 1059,1.282 (report) 
792 Ibid., 11.290-292 
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"Cossacks who were elected from all ranks.. . and who were left in Udinsk shall be 
divided in two halves... Leave the first half of 376 men at Udinsk for defence, and 
release the other half to go to the Siberian towns, whence they were elected. s9793 
While, in Central Russia, vybori were an institution of collective responsibility - 
members of the posad elected customs officers, thereby pledging to pay any 
irregularities794 - during the expansion into Siberia they also acquired the function of 
backing Personenverbände who confronted the demands of the chancellery and the 
tsar. 
Initially, Golovin's policy proved successful: In 1691 Udinsk first sent so-called 
godovalshchiki to Selenginsk to serve there for a year, while Selenginsk in turn 
stopped to dispatch its own godovalshchiki to Udinsk. 795 Golovin left 150 strel'tsy 
and fifty mounted cossacks in recently re-erected Udinsk. They were called 
"polkovye" musketeers, as they had been levied from volunteer cossack sons and 
young cossacks. 796 After Golovin's reform, the Selenginsk garrison comprised 150 
cossacks, twenty more than before the war, of which two units of fifty were mounted, 
and one served on foot. Of these two or three desiatki were sent each year to 
Barguzinsk and Kaban'sk. In 1694 in addition to these cossacks thirty-two male kin 
of cossacks and three retired cossacks lived in Selenginsk. 797 
In 1693, however, another reinforcement was sent, but this time there was no 
opportunity to win service merits, booty or land, and there were no volunteers 
available. Forcibly sent under orders, among the 125 cossacks from Tobol'sk, 
Tiumen', Tomsk, Berezov and Pelym there were actually many outlaws and 
vagrants. On their way to the Transbaikal, lacking sufficient supplies, they raided 
towns and fortresses as they could. One hundred of them were sent to Nerchinsk, in a 
benign setting, where they staged nothing comparable to the Selenga rebellion during 
the mid-1690s. Twenty-five remained in Udinsk, in quite pitiful conditions, and with 
little prospects of improving their conditions. 798 Another 340 recruits from Western 
793 Leont'eva, Sluzhilye, 67-8; RGADA, f. 214, st. 855,1.86 (decree) 
794 Dewey, Horace "From the Kinship Group to Every Man His Brother's Keeper", JBGO 
vol. 30.3 (1982), 321-35 
795 Leont'eva, Sluzhilye, 69-70 
796 Macura, P., Elsevier's Russian-English Dictionary, Amsterdam 1990, pt. III, entry "polk". See 
chapt. I. On the use of "musketeer" and "cossack", see pp. 8,30. 
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Siberia were sent to Udinsk in 1694; of these, 325 arrived 799 Rather than a 
consolidated upper layer of rich cossacks and deti boiarskie on the one hand, and 
poor, but united rank-and-file cossacks on the other, as Siberian cossacks are often 
described, the picture thus presented on the Selenga is a mosaic consisting of men 
with altogether different backgrounds. The effects of war, imperial expansion and 
arbitrary rule had severely socially dislocated some of them - the "newly-recruited". 
Nevertheless, in their opposition and envy towards Irkutsk, virtually all cossacks on 
the Selenga were united, although with varying degrees of intensity. 
It is thus not surprising to find an ordinary mounted Irkutsk cossack embroiled in 
a dishonour suit against a former Udinsk rebel leader. On February 9th 1700 L. 
Korchazhenskii accused the Udinsk piatidesiatnik of mounted cossacks Ivan Ivanov 
syn Oshurkov, formerly a staunch ally of elected prikazchik Borisov, for the disgrace 
he had suffered in the bazaar. Korchazhenskii claimed that the reason was a loan of 
thirty-three roubles he was meant to pay back, but Oshurkov also made reference to 
the wider differences between Irkutsk and Udinsk: 
"He called me [Korchazhenskii] a traitor... and said: `I am going to cut your hands off 
for your traitorous letter and torture you! ' - without your, sovereign, decree, although I 
have not perpetrated anything. " 
Although Oshurkov repeated his allegations before the voevoda, Korchazhenskii 
brushed it away by reference to his recent election as a iasak collector: 
"... if there had been any treasonable affair I... would not have been assigned and elected 
to your great sovereign's affairs and now... I am chosen... according to 
your... sovereign's decree and according to the election of Irkutsk cossacks for 
your... sovereign's sable iasak collection and the document... is registered in Irkutsk 
voevoda's office. Thus Ivan denounces me falsely and dishonours me. s800 
Honour had direct repercussions on social rank8Ö1, on appointments to profitable 
service journeys, and the support of the Personenverband elevated an ordinary 
cossack well over an apparently unaware Udinsk piatidesiatnik. Although it was 
registered and protected by the local chancellery, its point of reference, its basis was 
not in the official organs, but rather in the limited public sphere of the cossacks. 802 
79' Leont'eva, Sluzhilye, 68 
800 RGADA f. 1121 op. l no. 145,1.37 (petition) 
801 Kollman, Honor, 121-9 
'020n the limited public sphere, see 141,253,278. 
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The pre-history of the conflict between Korchazhenskoi and Oshurkov, which 
occurred during the final enquiry into the Selenga rebellion, will be investigated in 
this chapter. 
Competition and envy between cossacks of different towns in the Irkutsk prisud 
was exacerbated by the fact that Irkutsk cossacks - and those living in the valley of 
the Angara - were the main suppliers of grain to caravans and the Nerchinsk 
administration as well as by individual cossacks. Grain was supplied not merely by 
wealthy deli boiarskie and rich cossacks, but many cossack owners of smallholdings 
also sold their spare produce in the market or to purveyors. 803 If the Selenga cossacks 
asked for their salary, there was no profit in it for their comrades on the opposite side 
of the lake. Since the prisud fell under the Irkutsk voevoda's responsibility, grain 
was not bought but taxes raised. Unsurprisingly, when they marched to Irkutsk to 
claim their salary, the disgruntled Transbaikalian veterans of the battles for the Amur 
stated that not just the voevoda - who had not been in Siberia in 1689 - but Irkutsk 
inhabitants in general were traitors. Accordingly, in the Nerchinsk treaty of that year, 
they "left three towns in the hands of the Chinese emperor. , 804 Such were the 
resentments of uprooted, socially dislocated men, conflicts that were at the root of 
events analysed in this chapter. 
While Irkutsk enjoyed reliability in the supply of grain salary due to its 
homegrown supplies, the Selenga fared much worse. Although grain was sent on a 
regular basis, quantities did not always live up to expectations. Nevertheless, in most 
cases this did not cause social disorder. Thus in 1681, Selenginsk cossacks were 
short of 449.5 quarters of rye and 444.5 quarters of barley. The following year, they 
received their full allowance, but no compensation for earlier losses. Arrears were 
lower before the rebellion - in 1693 Irkutsk sent 400 quarters of rye to Selenginsk 
and 1,597.25 quarters to Udinsk, while the settlements on the lower Selenga 
contributed another 165 quarters of rye. Yet this did not mean that Sclenginsk was 
short of rye and oats, as has been claimed; the reason why 328 quarters of rye were 
not paid out was that some cossacks did not petition to Irkutsk, or had been sent on 
distant service. Udinsk, the frontier town with a large resident garrison, was 
803 Leont'eva, Sluzhilye, 295; Aleksandrov, Naselenie, 261 
804 Aleksandrov, Vlast', 315 
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relatively well supplied with arrears of only 14 quarters of rye and 40 quarters of 
oats. In 1696, this relation looked worse, as Sclcnginsk, Il'insk and Kaban'sk 
asserted they had received only 233 quarters, while Udinsk was stripped of all but 60 
quarters of rye. 805 
Hasty conclusions as to the motives of the rebels drawn from these isolated facts 
nevertheless conceal more than they can illuminate. 806 For the year 1689/1690 we are 
in the fortunate possession of full records of the calculations and negotiations 
between Selenginsk cossacks and the Irkutsk voevoda administration concerning 
cash reimbursement. 167 men were entitled to receive 910 roubles. In August 1690, 
when Selenginsk cossacks petitioned at Irkutsk for their salary for the following year, 
the amount of Selenginsk revenue, iasak and customs tolls came to a meagre 266 
roubles. Although the cossacks could refer to an impressive chain of precedences 
when they had received the full allowance in the past, all they accomplished at 
Irkutsk was that this Selenginsk "sovereign's treasury" was redirected to meet the 
demands of cossacks, who received another 192 roubles on top of the 60 roubles 
already distributed. 807 An entry under the year 1692/1693 also attests to the precedent 
of lending grain on the part of Irkutsk Voznesenskii monastery to cover arrears in 
1691/1692 which were paid back one year later by the vocvoda's office. 808 
Sedentarisation and Rebellion 
Thus payments of salary depended on military performance and the revenues a 
garrison yielded. The Selenga was disadvantaged in the first half of the 1690s, but 
the Transbaikalian cossacks did not grudgingly wait to be U. Like others in their 
situation, they sought to increase the area under cultivation. By the early 1690s, 
encouraged by the Siberian chancellery, they had made a huge effort to plough and 
sow the Kudarinsk steppe, an area close to the edge of lake Baikal, just north of the 
Selenga, which was guarded by mountains. This area was warm during summer, 
805 RGADA f. 1121 op. 2 no. 156,11.1-2 (petitions); RGADA f. 214 kn. 768,1.236; kn. 1034,11.236- 
248; st. 1141,11.26-42 (excerpts, receipts); st. 1424,1.80 (petition). Leont'eva omits deliveries in 
1692/1693 to Selenginsk from the lower Selenga and the reasons for arrears. 806 Leont'eva, Sluzhilye, 135 
807 RGADA f. 1121 op. 2 no. 130,11.2-7 (excerpt, decision) 
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fertile and suitable for growing grain. 809 In their settlements, Selenginsk cossacks 
became increasingly self-sufficient although Selenginsk reached the level of 
subsistence only in 1700, and even then this condition could not be maintained in 
1705 and 1710. Only the small ostrogi Il'insk and Kabansk could offer significant 
surpluses in the early 1690s. 810 
While more cossacks moved to the outlying hamlets, tensions between the 
Buryats and the cossacks increased. As in most cases, when fertile steppe lands were 
opened up to agriculture, these were not "virgin" lands as peasants might think for 
the Itantsynsk Buryats claimed them as their ancestral pastures. Some historians have 
stressed cooperation between the rebels and the Buryats, conjuring up a vision of 
harmony between the nomads and rank-and-file cossacks that could only be 
disturbed by lofty prikazchiki like the syn boiarskii Grigorii Turchaninov. Yet as 
mentioned before, Turchaninov had started as an ordinary cossack, and his relations 
to the Transbaikalian cossacks were much more complex than such accounts allow. 
The petition of the Itantsynsk Buryats leaves no doubt about the true reasons of their 
collective manifestation, riding into Il'insk on the day of Turchaninov's arrest. This 
action was not a sign of sympathy for the rebels, but a protest against the links 
between the rebels and the former prikazchik. Thus the Buryats wrote in August 
1696, five months after these incidents: 
"In recent years in [our]... grazing grounds along the Selenga the Selenginsk 
cossacks... [have settled]. [They] have caused great oppression: They take excess fees for 
grazing and surfeit fines for murder. The prikazchik Grishka Turchaninov and comrades 
put [us] in fetters in the forts and small settlements and torture [us] excessively without 
investigation. They do not release [us] to find [our] rights with the prikaznye of 
Itantsynsk. Their oppression and forcefulness has destroyed [us] and [we] cannot graze 
in the distant steppe since the Mongols rob [our] herds. s811 
Again, they stressed the connection of Turchaninov and Selenginsk cossacks in the 
final sentences of the petition that demanded redress for their grievances, reaching 
back to the early 1690s: 
809 Spafarii, Puteshestvie, 126 
810 Leont'eva, Sluzhilye, 136 
811 RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 374,1.6 (petition) 
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"[Sovereign]..., order the investigation of these offences and the oppression that we 
have suffered from the Selenginskans and prikaznye.... The prikazchiki of Irkutsk prisud 
shall not judge our court-cases. s812 
Turchaninov was a willing ally in the fight for the Kudarinsk steppe, on whom 
Selenginsk cossacks could rely. Already in 1691/2 the Siberian chancellery had 
given orders, answering the Buryats' first petition: 
"... in future appoint Grishka Turchaninov and comrades neither as prikazchik or to the 
iasak collection nor to any other position at Udinsk, Verkholensk, Balagansk and in... the 
iasak-paying districts. He should not be released or sent anywhere. s813 
This order, however, was to no avail - it was never enacted by voevoda Gagarin. 
For several years, up to 1695, this cooperation between Turchaninov and the 
Selenginsk cossacks thrived. Turchaninov's credit in the eyes of the cossacks 
depended, however, on their position vis-ä-vis the Itantsynsk Buryats. By the middle 
of the decade, Selenginsk cossacks settling on the Kudarinsk steppe faced increasing 
problems. The Buryats decided that only aggression, however desperate in the long 
run, held any prospects of restoring their rights to the pastures. Itantsynsk Buryats 
remained under Nerchinsk jurisdiction in 1690 when Golovin assigned the iasak- 
paying Buryats of the Selenga area to Udinsk, perhaps because there was little 
opportunity to collect iasak among the Itantsynsk Buryats. 814 They relied on the 
Nerchinsk prikazchiki, who gained nothing from allowing the settlers into their 
territory, giving shelter to the Buryats while harassing the settlers. The cossacks 
expressed indignation at this collusion and referred to a decree allowing them to 
settle in the Kuda steppe, since they could not accept the right of the nomads to use 
their ancestral pastures: 
"We complain... about the iasak-paying Buryats of Nerchinsk prisud. They graze 
their.. . 
herds in the Kudarinsk steppe. We cossacks have set up our houses [there] to 
grow grain for your sovereign's grain salary according to [your] decree and to the 
allotment of these places in our possession. We have fenced in our plots with good 
fences, which the Buryats destroy arbitrarily and mischievously and then let their 
copious herds graze on the fields. " 
812 Ibid. 
813 Ibid. n. 88,1.102 (decree) 
814 Vasil'ev, Zabaikalskie, vol. 1,212 
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The Buryats, they claimed, stole from their farms and beat them on the fields 
"within an inch of our lives". 
"However, the prikazchiki, interpreters and cossacks of the Nerchinsk prisud at 
Itantsynsk do not judge these our... petitions and our indictments, and have not addressed 
our destruction. They evade court procedure, investigation and even public 
announcements ... 
in cases concerning these Buryats because of their greediness. " 
They added that the Nerchinsk cossacks destroyed them with their "impertinent 
treachery", although there were not even fur-bearing animals the iasak-payers could 
hunt. 815 
In September 1696/1697, answering further Buryat complaints, the Siberian 
chancellery announced a penalty to be paid by any future voevoda who did not 
comply with the rule that Itantsynsk Buryats were to remain under Nerchinsk 
administration. 816 Later, in 1696/1697 in their petition demanding aid for their bad 
loans, Selenginsk, Kabansk and Il'insk cossacks of all ranks and backgrounds, 
irrespective of any intermediary opposition during the rising, explained away losses 
caused by this conflict, asserting the lower Selenga had suffered a major "bad 
harvest". 817 
The conflict and the increasing helplessness of Selenginsk cossacks and their 
prikazchik marked a turning point in the pre-history of the rebellion - Selenginsk 
cossacks were alienated from Irkutsk and Nerchinsk, and they also valued 
Turchaninov less than before. By now, they had other concerns and pressing needs, 
and they found allies to pursue their new aims. In this situation, and for some, the 
way was free to get even. Udinsk cossacks were ready to cooperate with Selenginsk, 
since they were eager to get hold of Turchaninov. The new constellation in the 
Transbaikal meant trouble for the two men who represented power in Irkutsk prisud. 
Selenginsk cossacks living in the hamlets of the Kudarinsk steppe were among those 
who took the lead in rebellion: Among twenty-five cossacks who signed the 
aforementioned petition against the Buryats and the prikazchik of the zimov'e there 
were at least ten active rebels and petitioners against voevoda Savelov and 
Turchaninov. Four of the signatories, the desiatnik Anton Bcrczovskii, the 
815 RGADA £214 st. 1424,11.123-4 (petition) 816 RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 88,11.99-105 (rescript) 817 Ibid. op. 2 no. 156,11.1-2 (petition) 
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piatidesiatnik Dmitrii Tarakanovskii and the deti boiarskie Petr Arsen'cv and Stepan 
Kazan' were the leaders of the rebels in Selenginsk. 818 Thus one of the reasons for 
the rebellion was a classic example of steppe frontier settlers disturbed in their 
recently-established, fragile relationship to agriculture. In many cases, throughout the 
slow-moving history of sedentarisation, whether it was Crimean or Kazan' Tatars or 
cossacks, they sought relief in raids on other settlements or merchants from hardships 
induced by unstable climate or destruction of their harvest by nomads. 819 
A Shaky Alliance on the Selenga 
Preparations for rebellion started with the first letter calling on the cossacks in all 
fortresses on the Selenga and those living in the hamlets to come to Il'insk in late 
1695. One of the three signatories was Ivan Novikov, the prikazchik mentioned 
above, who lived in a hamlet. 820 It befits the area of the estuary of river Selenga, with 
its established mercantile interests, that another signatory who also lived in 
Kudarinsk steppe, piatidesiatnik Vasilii Anofriev syn Vesnin, was a merchant: The 
fifth paid for his saltworks at Selenginsk was 50 pud in 1694, rising to 280 pud in 
1704. Already in 1695 he had lent 200 pud of salt to the voevoda. Apparently he had 
made a fortune earlier, when he contracted to buy and transport 1,890 pud grain for 
Golovin's army at Nerchinsk in 1687, out of a total of 3,000 required. 82, 
Sclenginsk cossacks also intercepted voevoda Savelov's barges carrying his 
caravan to China at Posol'skii Mys, the estuary of the Selenga. In February 1696 a 
delegation was sent from Selenginsk to the voevoda to demand the full salary in 
advance for the year 1696/1697, that is, including August of the following year. 
Senka Krasnoiar and Petr Arsen'ev returned with half-empty hands, or so cossacks 
on the Selenga deemed, for they received only the salary for the year 1695/1696, 
which had not yet been paid fully. 822 Savelov was not at all ready to give them a loan 
of one and a half years' salary in advance, and as events will show, most of Irkutsk 
cossacks firmly acceded to this notion. For cossacks on the southern side of the lake, 
818 RGADA f. 214 st. 1424,11.79-80,122,124 (petitions) 819 Ostrowski, Mongols, 53 
820 Aleksandrov, "Materialy", 351 (letter). RGADA f. 1 121 op. 1 no. 468,1.26 (investigation) 
821 Leont'eva, Sluzhilye, 277; Istoriia Sibiri, vol. 11,91; Aleksandrov, Dal'nevostochnykh, 152 
822 Aleksandrov, "Materialy", 352 (investigation); Aleksandrov, Wast', 307; RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 
no. 377,1.26 (petition) 
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it must be said, the preceding years had shown that Savelov was unreliable; they 
claimed that the former voevoda, Gagarin, had paid out their full salary for one year 
in advance, but now they demanded even more than that. After all, some might 
recollect, Gavril Lovtsov, already retired in 1696, had received three years worth of 
salary in advance in 1667.823 Although this was not an entirely isolated incident over 
the years, recent developments had indicated an altogether different situation - as the 
collected iasak fell even below subsistence, the Siberian chancellery allowed 
Selenginsk cossacks to distribute the iasak treasury in place of salary. 824 
When their attempt at negotiating their salary failed for the most part, Selenginsk 
cossacks put a premeditated plan into action. Petr Arsen'ev and Selenginsk 
piatidesiatniki Anton Berezovskii and Leont'ei Chiuzhakin and two desiatniki sent a 
letter to Udinsk calling for the conclusion of a treaty "for a good undertaking (dlia 
dobrogo dela)". 825 The treaty (dogovor) was not a call to abolish tsarist rule, but for 
rebellion in a more restricted sense. On a broad base of signatures from both towns, it 
was derived from the oath cossacks signed when they contracted for service. 826 This 
remarkable document proves the exact opposite of what some historians have read 
into the Selenga-rebellion - there is no sign of an attempt to chase the voevodas out 
of Siberia, but typical notions of the Personenverband are reiterated and confirmed. 
The Udinsk document started with a long list of names of deli boiarskie, 
piatidesiatniki, desiatniki and rank-and-file cossacks, in which all of them, except for 
the syn boiarskii Ivan Novikov and ataman Kornei Stroikov were listed as "old and 
newly-enlisted cossacks", irrespectibly of their rank, which was indicated further 
down the list. In a Muscovite - and Siberian - setting, which placed a huge emphasis 
on rank this is evidence of the perceived homogeneity of the Personenverband, while 
rank was not entirely forfeited by the treaty. All of them 
"beat their forehead to the Selenginsk deli boiarskie,... and rank-and-file", 
pledging that 
823 RGADA f. 214 stb. 1697,11.240-243 (excerpt); f. 1121 op. 1 no. 377,11.25-44 (petition); no. 403, 
1.46 (investigation); Aleksandrov, Mast', 313; Vasil'ev, Zabaikal'skie, 121 
84 Leont'eva, Sluzhilye, 116 
ges Aleksandrov, "Materialy", 365 (letter); Aleksandrov, Vlast', 307 
826 RGADA f. 214 st. 75,11.4-19; f. 1121 op. l no. 462,11.2,4,6 and passim; op. 2 no. 41 (oaths) 
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"we have agreed to stand together as one peacefully (poliubovno), to observe good 
counsel among us, to serve the... sovereign by collecting the lasak, to obey each other in 
everything and to petition the... sovereign at Moscow about all our needs. Unnecessary 
enmity amongst us must be avoided. 19827 
Institutionalisation of the Personenverband was sought in this document by 
reference to advice as described in the death bill of Ermak's cossacks (sec chapter I, 
60-2), as well as to the joint obligations in European Russian towns. 828 In spite of the 
treaty's overt attempt to limit opportunities for investigation, it reserved important 
roles for the tsar and the nachal'nye liudi, the officially-appointed as well as elected 
leaders, from the voevoda downwards. Considered far more dangerous than these 
men were internal divisions, "smuty" which the treaty attempted to ban by provisions 
for a mutual obligation to report every cossack who tried to sow distrust between 
Udinsk, Selenginsk, Il'insk and Kaban'sk to the "nachal'nye ludi". The Selenga 
treaty differed from a cossack's oath delivered while contracting for service in that it 
codified terms and obligations for the "leading men (nachal'nye liudi)", who were to 
be reported to the sovereign if they dared to cause any grievances, levy unnecessary 
taxes or cause destruction. To institutionalise these aims, the form of the Siberian 
cossack oath to the tsar was not chosen accidentally, since it was, by way of Ermak's 
cossacks and the death bill of Ermak and comrades, derived from the oaths sworn to 
each other by members of the southern European steppe cossack Personenverband. 
Formulas such as: 
"not to open illegal dens, to pimp, to gamble, to steal and to beat others up. " 
were preserved and fitted well conditions on the Siberian frontier. In place of the 
group's disciplinary force, the tsar was formally assigned this power. Lantzeff, who 
also noted the prominence of these oaths, believed that the oath that was 
administered by the centre created an "esprit de corps" among the cossacks rather 
than treating it as an expression of forms of social organisation. 829 Yet 
institutionalisation opened up opportunities to both sides - the tsar, the chancellery 
and the cossacks remained within a common institutional culture, but they could take 
827 Aleksandrov, "Materialy", 363-5 
828 Torke, Staatsbedingte, 87-9; Aleksandrov, Mast', 251,276; Vvedcnskii, A. A., "Klassovaia 
bor'ba i `odinachestvo' v pomor'e v XVI-XVII vekakh", VI (1955) iss. 5, pp. 116-123 
829 Lantzeff, Siberia, 76 
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advantage of the provisions made in these documents only according to the actual 
distribution of power. Attempts at enforcing these provisions can be found in 
particular with regard to loans on salary, when individual cossacks fled from service, 
although the connection between service and salary is not explicit in the oaths: 
"In the year 1698/1699 [two cossacks] were sent to Irkutsk to transport the grain 
supplies [for Udinsk]. On their way back to Udinsk they fled with the doshchanik. I 
[prikazchik Andrei Beiton] received orders to recover the... salary from their guarantors. 
However, the perpetrators were recruited beyond the control of the Udinsk servitors of 
all ranks so that there are no guarantors and no documentation. s830 
In an age when bureaucratic and social relations were overstretched in Siberia, an 
overarching institutional culture, which allowed for the interpretation of institutions 
according to leitideas, was tantamount to the lowest common denominator between 
Moscow and the Pacific Ocean. 831 Thus the Selenga treaty followed the general 
provisions of the 1649 Ulozhenie, and claimed to adhere to the sovereign's service 
(the "dobroe delo"), while agreeing on the obligation to jointly overcome the pitfalls 
of investigation. 832 At the same time, however, it could rely on cossack institutions 
incorporated in the body of Muscovite procedures. 
While the rebels sought to legitimate their actions in semi-official written 
documents like the treaty, they did not hesitate to make use of the power of the 
Personenverband during their actions. Especially in Udinsk, the Personenverband 
employed its own signs and rituals of power: those cossacks calling for meeting 
carried staffs. Piatidesiatnik Ivan Alemasov denied his part in these meetings when 
he described the call, yet there is still some truth in his account: 
"When [1]... started dinner in [my] winterhut in Udinsk with [my] comrades, the Udinsk 
musketeer Danilko Fyk and comrades - [I] do not remember who they were - appeared 
under the window, carrying a staff. [Fyk], the ringleader, called ... Alemasov and 
comrades to the council on the riverbank. [I] asked Danilko: `What kind of council do 
you hold and to what end? ' Fyk answered: `Go honourably to the council, Ivan, 
otherwise you go insulted! "'833 
830 Müller, G. F., Opisanie sibirskago tsarstva, St. Petersburg 1787,188; Ogloblin, Obozrenie, pt. 
III, 129; Lantzeff, Siberia, 76; RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 457,1.32 (rcport) 
831 On institutions and leitideas, see Introduction. 
832 Perrie, "Outlawry", 530; Skrynnikov, R. G., Sib! rskaia ekspeditsiia Ermaka, Novosibirsk 1986, 
135-7; Torke, Staatsbedingte, 86-8 
83 Aleksandrov, "Materialy", 356 
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As already mentioned, questions of honour were crucial for status and the 
chances to be assigned on service journeys. Thus, the cossacks left no doubt where 
power lay. They supported this claim by the emphasis placed on the staffs they 
carried as ritual signs of the power of the cossack group - they were called "karshi", 
as a hostile piatidesiatnik indignantly reported. 834 The term refers to the world of 
river navigation in which the cossacks lived - it signifies a tree with extensive roots 
washed from the shores, lurking beneath the surface of a river. 835 Karshi were 
attributed to the "rebellious burlatuki", the unmarried men who owned no house and 
worked as day labourers who were hired for the doshchaniki. 836 Ivan Alemasov, 
however, avoided the term "karsha" in his statement, for despite his later attempts to 
cover his role in the rebellion, he had followed the call more than once: 
"[I]... went with him to the riverbank, where there were over thirty Udinsk musketeers, 
the piatidesiatnik Borisov, Petrushka Kainov, Fyk - [I] do not remember the others. The 
old and well-to-do cossacks and [I] started to persuade Borisov and comrades to 
reconsider their plans for rebellion. [The cossacks] threatened and beat [us] with sticks... 
They killed the old cossack Il'ia Ivanov on that occasion, for he tried to persuade them to 
give up their villainous plans... "837 
When Ivan Alemasov made this statement in 1699, he overstated his actual fear 
for his life as well as his attempts to curb the rebels' zeal. The old and the higher- 
ranking cossacks were also more exposed to government reprisals; some of them, 
such as Alemasov, could rely on their rank-and-file comrades' support. Nevertheless, 
the decisions of the cossack circle were absolute decrees, and whoever dared 
question them once they were agreed, or held to a minority position, was punished 
severely. In the sources related to the rebellion, whenever a collective entity of the 
rebels appears, a number of names are mentioned, never just one. They figure as the 
best-known leaders and heads of the respective Personenverband. Alcmasov's 
declared inability to tell who and how many cossacks and desiatki were taking part - 
except for the few who were, for different reasons, offered up to investigation - 
834 Ibid., 353 
835 SRla, entry "karsha". On ritual and state-building, see Kertzer, D. I., "The Role of Ritual in 
State-Formation", in: E. R. Wolff (cd. ), Religious Regimes and State-Formation, Albany 1991,58-103, 
here 85-103 
836 RGADA f. 214 st. 1367,1.98 (investigation) 
837 Aleksandrov, "Materialy", 356 (investigation) 
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saved his own life and ensured that he could be accepted further as a leader in 
Udinsk. Even in 1699 and later, when the Personenverband could no longer show 
itself openly, it lost little of its former power for some time to come. Alemasov's 
self-serving stylisation in the midst of his supposedly peaceful, anonymous 
artel'shchiki also underlines how thoroughly the Personenverband moulded life in 
Udinsk. Rather than chasing away the deti boiarskie and piatidesiatniki - and even 
the wealthier ones -, the Personenverband sought to control and place onerous 
obligations on them, as the case of syn boiarskii Ivan Novikov's mill shows. 
Regardless of gloating remarks referring to Novikov's fate, even a relatively highly- 
placed man like Petr Aleksandrov syn Arsen'ev, who, despite being outlawed for his 
Old Believer sympathies was also a client of high-ranking nobles at court, did not 
stay away from the rebel Personenverband for long; rather he attempted to use it in 
his own interests. Spiteful towards the voevoda who had stolen his property worth 
400 roubles, including the four books he owned838, Arsen'ev led the rebels at 
Selenginsk during the early stages of the uprising, and he was embraced by the 
cossacks as an experienced leader, provider of vital information and patron. In a 
letter written at Irkutsk in 1697/1698, his brother Ivan mentioned the favourable 
changes indicated by the relieving voevoda of Nerchinsk, Samoil Fedorovich 
Nikolev 
"seek security from... our former patron (milostivets) and never forget by all means to 
knock your forehead to him" 
The Arscn'ev family were also clients of the boyar Fedor Mikhailovich 
Rtishchev, an influential advisor to the late tsar Aleksci Mikhailovich and tutor of the 
heir Aleksei until 1669.839 
Rtishchev opened Muscovy to Ukrainian scholars in 1649. In contrast to the 
paucity of sources in many other similar cases in early modern Russia, his clientele is 
an unusually fully-described patronage network. It is noteworthy that it included 
more than just kin, which was an essential but not exclusive feature. 840 While 
Arsen'ev's membership of the clientele may be explained by his leanings towards 
838 RGADA f. 1121 no. 429 11.44-6 (investigation) 839 Ibid., 375,347. Rtishchev's patron was Boris Morozov: Bushkovitch, Peter, 40-2 
840 See Dixon, Simon, The Modernisation of Russia 1676-1825, Cambridge 1999,138; cf. 
LeDonne, "Ruling Families in the Russian Political Ordcr", CMRS, vol. 28.3-4 (1987), 233-322 
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Old Belief, which was promoted by Rtishchev, the network extended not only to 
ranks above his position, but also to cossacks ranking below him. Arsen'ev's 
exhortations to P. Ermolin not to join the Udinsk rebel Personenverband at a late 
stage addressed the client with a familiar "Brat Petr Ermolin, zdravstvui, Per 
Arsen'ev chelom bet". Friendship is otherwise largely missing from the Russian 
record of patronage linkages, at least in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In 
part this may be attributed to the lack of personal written sources such as letters or 
diaries; however, the power of the Personenverband in Siberia supplies an additional 
explanation, since a voice in the circle and information about decisions and moods in 
neighbouring towns was crucial in the gamble for power and influence. The 
Personenverband was officially recognised, albeit in a diluted form - all attempts at 
prohibiting "krugi i bunty" aimed at actual rebellions, and were never successful. It is 
therefore less surprising to find friendship as a resource of patronage in distant 
Siberia at such an early point, since letters were less likely to be immediately burnt. 
Kinship networks around lake Baikal, too, can more often be suspected than proven, 
since even in seemingly obvious cases relevant information - such as patronymics - 
is often missing - for example, in the cases of the Kazanovs in Nerchinsk, Irkutsk 
and Il'insk, the Evseevs in Irkutsk, Selenginsk, Nerchinsk and Tiumen' or the 
Leont'ev's in Irkutsk, Kabansk, Udinsk and Ilimsk. Still, the 1720 Sclenginsk 
investigation into bribery has produced tangible evidence of the remaining influence 
of the Personenverband and of kinship links. 841 
The two leaders, Petr Arscn'ev, the Selenginsk syn boiarskii, who lived in his 
hamlet in the Kudarinsk steppe, and Novikov, who shared the lives of his Udinsk 
men, although he also owned a small settlement, provide good examples for the 
difference between the two towns. Selenginsk lived off trade while also starting to 
cultivate the steppe near the lake. Yet since Sclenginsk was situated far to the south, 
on the very brink of the open steppe, Udinsk separated Sclcnginsk and its agricultural 
settlements. Since the trade route had taken a more easterly turn, Sclcnginsk cossack 
merchants also set up shop in Il'insk. At the same time Udinsk, on its protected, but 
isolated hilltop within sight of the open Mongol steppe, had to rely on supplies 
941 RGADA f. 214 kn. 619 11.13-100 (investigation) 
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brought from far away. It is significant for the divided attitudes in the Transbaikal 
regarding voevodas and their representatives that Selenginsk cossacks aimed at trade 
relations between voevodas. Intercepting the voevoda's men and his merchandise at 
Posol'skii Mys, the estuary of the Selenga, in early March 1696 was a well-planned 
raid, which took plenty of organisational talent and information in advance. It is 
possible that syn boiarskii Ivan Arsen'ev at Irkutsk informed his brother Pctr about 
the caravan, although there is no surviving proof; however, Petr was involved in 
decisionmaking at Selenginsk at this time. 842 Since the coup had to be planned in 
advance, there remains some doubt whether a syn boiarskii, who was not an intimate 
follower of Afonasii Savelov should have known in time. 
There were other potential sources of information available to the Selenginsk 
cossacks at Irkutsk. The clerk of the voevoda's office Timofei Pezhemskii does not 
fit the pattern of a poor cossack in rebellion against the upper crust on both sides of 
the Baikal either, but his trial is fraught with sympathies expressed for both sides in 
the conflict. In 1693/1694 he won back his slave Akulina, a Mongolian woman. His 
brother-in-law Sofron Kashaev at the Selenga had refused to return her after the year 
Pezhemskii had agreed to allow her to work at his mother-in-law's homestead. 841 
Clerks were often beaten by rebels for their suspected greediness, but 
Pezhemskii, perhaps through his personal connections to the Selenga settlements, felt 
very different about them. On 4 May 1696, two months after the raid on Afonasii 
Savelov's caravan, he was apprehended as a traitor and banned to Iakutsk. Two 
cossacks testified against him. Evsei Evseev of Nerchinsk, who had declared furs 
several times at Irkutsk, and Ivan Bechevin, a ropemaker and spinner and hardly an 
exceedingly rich man, who left little compromising trace in the records. While the 
rebels were already on their way to Irkutsk, the witnesses claimed Pezhemskii had 
declared sympathy one night, bragging that he wanted to "thrust the voevoda's office 
[which was posted in front of the town walls; C. W. ] into the river. " Denying any 
involvement in the uprising, Pezhemskii was soon convicted when cossacks ordered 
to search his house found incriminating lettcrs. 844 Pezhemskii and the Arsen'ev 
842 Aleksandrov, Vlast, 307 
843 RGADA f. 1121 op. 2 no. 147,11.1-3 (petition, decision) 
g44 Ibid., op. 1 no. 88,11.31-6 (investigation) 
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brothers testify to the dense network of unofficial connections between Sclenginsk 
and Irkutsk, which existed despite competition between the two towns. These 
connections and sympathies were by no means restricted to ordinary or poor people 
without influence; some of the latter also fled with the rebels. 845 A few local 
merchants, like Gerasim Lyskovets, showed their sympathy with the rebels by 
leaving Irkutsk or sending their family to the Selenga, when the rebels' barges left 846 
Thus there were many ways news about the voevoda's caravan could travel to 
Selenginsk in time since private networks of information and support, not altogether 
different from those maintained by voevodas or deli boiarskie, were common among 
cossacks and merchants on lake Baikal and elsewhere in Siberia. 
Afonasii Savelov's goods, taken at Posol'skii Mys, were sealed and brought to 
Selenginsk. In town, a cossack circle was convened by Petr Arsen'ev, and the 
piatidesiatniki Anton Berezovskii and Dmitrii Tarakanovskii. 847 Bcrezovskii, leader 
of the Selenginsk cossacks during the campaign to Irkutsk and soon-to-be elected 
prikazchik, was anything but an uprooted or lower-class cossack - apart from his 
support for the common stance against Itantsynsk Buryats implying he owned land, 
he had also lost three of his dependents in 1691, who were killed by Tungus when 
they fled from their master; Berezovskii was compensated with 150 horses and 
cattle. 848 The Tarakanovskiis ranked among the wealthiest and oldest clans of 
Selenginsk. Tarakanovskii's father, the merchant Andrei Fedorov syn had already 
stayed in Irkutsk in 1674, where he contracted and delivered one thousand pud of 
grain to Irkutsk in 1687.849 His sons, Dmitrii, Filip and Grigorii entered cossack 
service; two of them continued their father's business with considerable success. 
Dmitrii was a well-known merchant in Nerchinsk and Selenginsk. He contracted rye 
in 1688/1689 and travelled with merchandise to China without a service assignment, 
providing a substitute for service at Selenginsk. 850 In 1692-1700 Grigorii regularly 
declared furs. Dmitrii and Filip were also among the settlers in the Kudarinsk steppe 
aas Aleksandrov, Mast', 313 
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who petitioned against the Itantsynsk Buryats. 85' Thus men who were comfortably 
off took seemingly radical measures. 
The circle accused voevoda Afonasii Savelov of treason -a "sovereign's affair" - 
claiming he had sent weapons abroad, which was a particular grave offence under 
1693 trade regulations forbidding any arms sales to the Dzhungars. 852 Witnesses 
cited "Don cossack customs" when describing how they divided the booty among the 
cossacks. Several cossacks who had acquired part of the loot before its official 
distribution were beaten ritually in the circle - every cossack had to hit them with 
karshi to make sure the unity of the Personenverband was preserved. 853 Booty was 
also divided among the cossacks of Udinsk and Il'insk. Sclenginsk cossacks thus 
lived up to the implicit conditions of the treaty, to secure peace by considering booty 
as a common possession. Il'insk piatidesiatnik Ivan Iziurev and desiatniki Matfei 
Ivanov and Vasili Shemiakinskoi rode to Selenginsk to claim part of booty, which 
was divided among the cossacks: "two polar fox furs or corsac foxes for each, and 
others received one corsac for their losses of [salary], which they sold ... at 
low 
prices", later claiming that they, too, had not received their grain salary that year. 854 
In aiming at competing in foreign trade, Selenginsk cossacks differed from their 
Udinsk comrades, who already in 1695 had defined as their principal aim the 
removal of Grigorii Turchaninov. His role as a patron for all those distilling liquor 
from grain on the eastern bank of the Baikal made them his sworn enemy. Their 
grievance was that they did "not receive enough grain to serve the sovereign", since 
Turchaninov appropriated it "to starve us". They had petitioned the recently-arrived 
voevoda Afonasii Timofeevich Savelov when he travelled through Irkutsk prisud in 
1695, yet obtained nothing but punishment. 855 Yet the Udinsk cossacks' role in 
clamping down on illegal distilleries is overshadowed by inconsistencies in their own 
petition. Thus, among those who contributed to distilling was Udinsk syn boiarskii 
Ivan Novikov, who was soon assigned prikazchik in Il'insk - without a proper 
election - by Udinsk rebels after they had deposed Turchaninov. The other person 
851 Mashanova, "Promyslo-torgovaia", 146; RGADA f. 214 no. 1424,1.122 (petition) 852 Mancall, China, 175 
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who was not easily reconciled with a common rebellion directed against distilleries 
and injustice was Vasilii A. Vesnin, the co-initiator of the meeting at Il'insk. 
According to the report of Irkutsk cossacks who were sent to confiscate distillery 
equipment in early January 1696 he was among those warned in advance, covering 
up their traces. 856 Udinsk cossacks, rather than aiming at the general eradication of 
distilleries, intended to control them. This was underlined also by the report. It 
supported the voevoda, highlighting that it was due to the Selenga rebellion that 
Savelov could not summon those responsible for distilling activities. Yet it was 
Savelov who fell victim to an intrigue rather than the rebels who were cheated. The 
leader of the investigation, Irkutsk undersecretary Pezhemskii, as mentioned above, 
was soon afterwards apprehended as a clandestine supporter of the rebels in Irkutsk. 
The tacit agreement between the prospective rebels and the distillers was that 
Turchaninov was to be the culprit, while Udinsk seized real power in Il'insk, rather 
than the nominal subordination to Udinsk district Golovin had instituted. The alleged 
distiller and Selenginsk syn boiarskii Ivan Uvarov had signed the petition against the 
Itantsynsk Buryats, and gave his new enmity to Turchaninov additional vent by 
accusing him of taking sixty podstavs of Chinese silk at a price of six hundred 
roubles by force. Nevertheless, he was also among those who had been elevated to 
their rank by voevodas Savelov and Gagarin and who were put back on their old 
places during the subsequent investigation. On 15`' April a delegation sent from 
Irkutsk headed by Ivan Perfil'ev to offer negotiations was turned back at Udinsk with 
the remark "we are going to live on our own. " The rebels also threatened to dispatch 
cossacks to Irkutsk to incite the garrison to depose the voevoda. 857 
Confrontation was inevitable with the Il'insk cossacks, who took a different view 
of the situation at the Selenga. Tension was palpable already on 7th March 1696, 
when during the night piatidesiatnik Borisov with fifty Udinsk cossacks rode to the 
villages of Kolesnikov and Iugovoi, near Il'insk. Grigorii Turchaninov reported that 
several men, including a Buryat and a peasant from Iugovoi, had complained that 
Udinsk cossacks had robbed them of their horses "and they did not tell us for what 
856 RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 420,11.41-3 (report) 857 RGADA f. 214 st. 1424,1.124 ob. (petition); f. 1121 op. l no. 429,1.47 (investigation); no. 451, 1.163 (report). Aleksandrov, Vlast', 311 
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reason or on what orders. " Returning to Udinsk, they shot at the walls of Il'insk. Yet 
when Savelov later ordered an investigation, syn boiarskii Stepan Kazan' declared he 
could not investigate in Udinsk for he feared the retaliation of Borisov "and 
comradess858 even if he gathered twenty cossacks for support. He was not alone with 
his estimation, for all the petitioners and other witnesses soon refused to reiterate 
their statements - the Buryat Oneiko declared that Udinsk cossacks had returned his 
horse, the peasant from Iugovoi discovered that cossacks had only peacefully 
"watched" the village, while not even trying to take his horse, and Il'insk cossacks - 
the garrison was just twenty-four strong - asserted they had seen the cossacks, but 
could neither see who it was, nor how many rode with them. Vasilii Ivanov syn 
Shemiakinskoi, who signed and wrote the first letter calling for a meeting of the 
Selenga cossacks, and his comrades tried to spare themselves trouble in the 
immediate future when they stated: 
"[We] did not hear any shots. [Although we] saw the bullet hit the southern wall, [we] 
do not know who fired. , 859 
This I1'insk Personenverband, however, had already proven very unstable during 
the days between the two statements, when a few of them, most prominently Ivan 
Pinega, had turned against the rest. Pinega, along with five other cossacks at Il'insk, 
decided to take advantage of the opportunity; he had good reason for this step. In the 
report by Irkutsk cossacks sent in early 1696 to apprehend illegal distillers in the 
villages on the lower Selenga, Pinega was mentioned as one of those who managed 
to disappear before the arrival of the Irkutians. One of the tiny group of supporters of 
Borisov, Stepan Okhera, rode to Udinsk to inform Turchaninov's enemies about a 
good opportunity to seize the prikazchik, Okhera was later awarded a horse from the 
Udinsk booty. 860 
On 20th March thirty Udinsk cossacks arrived at Il'insk, showing little respect for 
the locals: They "gave us [witnesses, Il'insk cossacks] their horses to keep them at 
the merchants' hall" and encircled Turchaninov's home. Turchaninov hid in his 
858 This translation of "s tovaryshchf' avoids a possessive pronoun not found in the sources, 
which might be seen as contradicting the equality of the cossacks. 
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homestead, which he defended with the help of his brother-in-law Par Fedorov, 
clerk Fedor Kotiurev, cossack desiatnik Emclian Panikadilshchikov and Ivan 
Bechevin. The last two are remarkable for their role in the rebellion. Bcchcvin, 
whose role at Turchaninov's place is not clear, was an unassuming ropemaker and 
spinner and hardly a rich man, but he disapproved of the rising, given that he was 
one of the witnesses who accused Pezhemskii. 861 Significantly, he was not among 
those who were beaten by the rebels, a disparate group after all, which also included 
outsiders to the immediate struggle. Panikadilshchikov's position, as already 
mentioned, was much more ambivalent - at this stage, he identified with the majority 
of Il'insk cossacks, perhaps slightly overfulfilling their expectations; to portray him 
as Turchaninov's devoted supporter would distort the rebellion. 
The next day, while the siege continued, abbot Misailo of Troitskii monastery on 
the Selenga near Il'insk arrived, but could not convince the rebels to spare 
Turchaninov. Nevertheless, Turchaninov went with Misailo to church. The rebels 
recognised the monastery's immunity as well as the right of the prikazchik to attend a 
church service. Udinsk cossacks only seized him in the merchants' hall after he had 
left church on his own. They led him to the prikazchik's office and cast him in irons; 
he was guarded by Udinsk cossacks "and by Il'insk cossacks on duty according to 
the sovereign's decree". 
11'insk cossacks witnessing this event stressed the absence of Sclenginsk 
cossacks. There were more supporters of Turchaninov at Il'insk than historians allow 
who follow the interpretation of a conflict between the upper class and the poor 
cossacks - Ivan Ievlev, for example, added that "Udinsk cossacks and the cossacks 
Aleksei Balmashnoi, Anika Moiseev, ... Pinega, Petr Shestakov and... Okhcra beat 
the clerk Fedor Kotiurev, ... Panikadilshchikov, Ivan Shcmiakinskoi, the retired 
cossack Petr Kyzylov and me with sticks not caring about our lives. " Kotiurev 
actually died after the beating. The witnesses interrogated in 1699 were all rather 
obscure rank-and-file cossacks, who claimed that they had also suffered from 
Savelov's reluctance to pay out their grain salary in the preceding year. Yet despite 
861 RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 88,11.31-6 (investigation) 
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evident patronage which had connected Savclov and Turchaninov at least in 1695862, 
nearly all of them expressed strong disapproval of Turchaninov's arrest: 
"Udinsk cossacks detained Turchaninov and deposed him from his office by force, 
against the will of Il'insk cossacks. We do not know for what grievances they deposed 
him and took him to Udinsk. And [we], the cossacks of Il'insk fortress, told the Udinsk 
cossacks `for what reason did you take Grishka Turchaninov from office and fetch him 
to Udinsk and who will hold office at Il'insk to take care of the sovereign's affairs? ". 
Harassed Udinsk cossacks countered this argument by an uncommonly elaborate 
speech, which the witnesses repeated verbatim: 
"We carry Grishka Turchaninov to Udinsk since he did not let pass grain traders to 
Udinsk. He intercepted them at Il'insk and took [grain] for himself, brewed beer and 
distilled alcohol from it; he wanted to starve the Udinsk musketeers. Grishka also 
prohibited Udinsk musketeers from staying overnight in Il'insk. Grishka falsely reported 
to Irkutsk that [we] rode through the villages, robbed the peasants and shot at Il'insk fort 
with harquebus. Nothing like that happened, and so we bring Grishka to Udinsk for his 
treachery. " 
On account of the pointed question about a new prikazchik, the Udinsk cossacks, 
according to Il'insk witnesses, also did not hesitate to act confrontationally and 
avoided asking the Il'insk cossacks for a suitable candidate: 
"They said `we leave you in Turchaninov's place even two prikazchiki at once. , v863 
A minority of witnesses - the cossacks Semen Tarkhov, Alcksci Balmashnoi, 
Anika Moiseev and Petr Semenov - however, were not entirely satisfied with this 
version of Turchaninov's deposition. At least two of them had been implicated in the 
confrontations on the Udinsk side. They hinted at conflict with the iasak-paying 
Buryats who accused Turchaninov publicly at Il'insk of illicitly acquiring the 
sovereign's furs. These cossacks were nevertheless content with amending this to a 
common statement of disapproval about Udinsk interference with Il'insk affairs. It 
was one rank-and-file cossack, Ivan Alenin, whose separate statement deviated from 
the common stand taken by other witnesses at Il'insk. In his version, emphasis was 
put on Turchaninov's illicit gains during collection of the iasak, and he acquitted 
Udinsk cossacks and their supporters at Il'insk of some of the most extreme and 
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illegal actions of which they had been accused - such as beating the "uninvolved" 
Ivan Ievlev and Vasilii Shemiakinskii as well as chaining Turchaninov. He also 
strove to shorten the period during which the appointed prikazchiki ruled without a 
proper election or other written document, claiming, "within a day Savelov sent a 
decree ordering Stepan Kazan' to hold office. s864 It was thus by no means unfeasible 
after the accession of the new voevoda Ivan Fedorovich Nikolev in late 1698 to 
express sympathy with Udinsk cossacks. Enmity between many Il'insk rank-and-file 
cossacks and Udinsk was a reality in 1696, and cannot be dismissed as a mere 
attempt to reduce witnesses' culpability in 1699. 
On 22nd March 1696, just before the Udinsk cossacks left Il'insk, some 
Selenginsk cossacks from the hamlets in the Kudarinsk steppe made their 
appearance. They disapproved of the Udinsk choice for the post of prikazchik. 
Instead of Novikov, they favoured piatidesiatnik Stepan Kazan'. Once conflict with 
Itantsynsk Buryats had proven stifling to the settlers' cause, they changed their 
priorities and sought to arrange more peaceful relations with the nomads. Kazan' was 
a law-abiding person, as far as the records can tell; in February 1699 his practice as a 
prikazchik yielded a rare approving petition by Itantsynsk Buryats which criticised 
the appointed prikazchik of Selenginsk, Leont'ei Chiuzhakin, while speaking out in 
favour of Kazan's candidacy, because he "is well versed in judging according to our 
customs"; this was despite quarrels over land in which he, as a Kudarinsk settler, was 
involved. 865 Leont'ei's son Ivan was recruited for cossack service at Selenginsk in 
1711 as a newly-baptised Mongol; his father's origin however was the town of 
larensk, while the bribe of ten roubles -a postav kamki - which he paid for the 
recruitment of his son shows that he was moderately well-established in Selenginsk - 
all of which may explain the alienation. 866 Mongols were not always on easy terms 
with the Buryats. 867 Ivan signed petitions aimed at Savelov and Turchaninov's 
distilling activities, indicating he sided with the rebels. 
Shortly after the accession of Novikov and Kazan' as prikazchiki, conflict 
between Udinsk and the lower Selenga was rife again. The merchandise of the 
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voevoda of Nerchinsk, Anton Ivanov syn Savelov had been seized by Udinsk 
cossacks, but the issue was contentious, and the wares, primarily alcohol and hops 
were sealed in the sovereign's cellar at Il'insk by Udinsk piatidesiatnik Oshurkov 
and Kazan'. Soon afterwards, Oshurkov was sent again on orders from Udinsk to 
weigh the seized commodities but was prevented from accomplishing his task at 
Il'insk. Thereupon piatidesiatnik Borisov, leader of the Udinsk rebels, rode to Il'insk 
with over ten armed men. Threatening force, he ordered Kazan' to return 
immediately; Kazan', who had left for a marriage ceremony at Kaban'sk, returned to 
Il'insk where, with the support of Il'insk cossacks, he refused to open the cellar, 
claiming he was awaiting orders from Irkutsk. Borisov illicitly and, as Il'insk 
witnesses stressed, "by force and against the will of Il'insk cossacks" opened the 
seals and sold part of the alcohol, while the rest was drunk on the spot or brought to 
Udinsk. 868 Indeed, as Kazan' was yet to experience, the Udinsk Personenverband 
proved the more menacing reality on the Selenga. After all, conflict between Udinsk 
and the prikazchik approved by the cossacks was also proof of more persistent fault 
lines - before the establishment of Udinsk, Selenginsk was the undisputed centre of 
the Selenga valley, whereas in administrative terms it was downgraded by Golovin, 
and by 1696 the Udinsk Personenverband even attempted to sever existing ties 
between the lower Selenga and Selenginsk, by then, in comparison to Udinsk, a 
distant steppe outpost. 
Nevertheless, conflicts between the law and the cossack right of supply were not 
confined to those between Il'insk and Udinsk; they also played a role internally in 
Udinsk. Syn boiarskii Maksim Posel'skii was in trouble for trying to secure M. 
Arsen'ev's personal belongings which were safe in storage, scaled by Posel'skii and 
a Nerchinsk tseloval'nik. For opposing their demand to break the seal, Borisov's 
recently-recruited cossacks beat Posel'skii and a number of rank-and-file Udinsk 
cossacks. Yet this was neither a conflict about different tactics, nor was it caused by 
distinctions of wealth among the participants. Five rank-and-file cossacks broke the 
silence otherwise so pervasive in Udinsk, accusing Borisov of stealing "with many 
people" Anton I. Savelov's barley without even possessing the key to the barn. Rank- 
868 Ibid., no. 403 1.41-54 (investigation) 
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and-file cossacks who tried to dissuade Borisov's comrades from this action were 
threatened with sabres. 869 It may well be doubted, in this case too, that it was only the 
"housed" cossacks who opposed the distribution "na pay"' of Mikhail Arscn'ev's 
merchandise. 870 As discussed above, voevodas enjoyed a certain leeway concerning 
the prohibition of trade, since Moscow knew very well that under frontier conditions 
the best - and perhaps only - means to persuade administrators to take up their posts 
was to exploit their self-interest. A voevoda and stol'nik with connections such as 
M. M. Arsen'ev was likely to be held in such esteem that a syn boiarskii would fare 
better if he did not raise his hand. On the other hand, the leaders could rely on being 
clandestinely supported if they wanted, during a rebellion, to stylise themselves as 
loyalists. But the same was not necessarily applicable to Borisov, who as the leader 
of a Personenverband was under pressure to succeed in providing supplies to justify 
his role as a leader and to avoid punishment by the group. He was already too 
exposed to avoid being tainted. Nevertheless, even Borisov tried to make such a case, 
referring to his journey with two hundred cossacks to Irkutsk: During investigation 
he claimed that he was "sent [by the cossack circle] with the newly-recruited 
cossacks to Irkutsk. ""' He knew very well that his statement could not be refuted, 
even though he could not corroborate it, nor would any of his former followers suffer 
from it. 
All of these cases were characterised by requisitions resolved in exclusive 
cossack circles, while even rank-and-file cossacks frequently disagreed. They were 
overwhelmingly attributed by witnesses to newly-recruited cossacks, who had a 
record of robbing along their way from Western Siberia. In part these requisitions 
were motivated by legitimate concerns of supply, but there was also the aim of 
increasing the Udinsk cossacks' influence over the Sclenga settlements. Opponents 
of the requisitions however did not fit into any social category. Despite the arbitrary 
rule of the cossack circles, there was also a sense of legality among cossacks, even in 
rough-and-ready Udinsk. Two considerations of customary as well as codified law 
conflicted - the right of cossacks to be fed during a crisis, and the right of the 
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voevodas and other administrators to receive remuneration for their service. Over 
and above the immediate crisis, however, there were also concerns of power and 
influence in the Baikal region. 
Confrontation 
When cossacks from Udinsk, Selenginsk, Il'insk and Kaban'sk united in May to 
travel across lake Baikal to Irkutsk to claim their grain salary, they did not form one 
large army, but stuck to their respective Personenverbände. Even during the heyday 
of the uprising, there was no one organisation embracing all Selenga cossacks, let 
alone an estate. Cossacks used two large flat-bottomed vessels and a small boat for 
transport across the unpredictable Lake Baikal, each of which were manned by either 
Selenginsk and lower Selenga cossacks or by Udinsk cossacks and a few partisans 
from Il'insk. 872 Blinded by their belief that Irkutsk cossacks would support the 
rebellion, they turned down the most extensive concession voevoda Savelov ever 
made: To avert the threat posed by the rebels, he agreed to pay out grain salary in 
advance for 1696/1697 as well as for the current year. This seemed insufficient to the 
Selenga rebels, who felt safety in numbers and still nourished the futile belief that 
Afonasii Beiton would open the gates of Irkutsk to them, or at least give orders to 
turn away the threatening cannons on the towers. They demanded that their full 
allowance in cash should be paid in advance as well, but Savelov refused. During 
negotiations, the Selenga cossacks were already kept at a distance, the voevoda did 
not allow them to enter the fortress. When they finally opted for his deposition, 
laying siege to Irkutsk, Selenga cossacks were surprised to find that in town nobody 
was interested in the sovereign's deed they had declared, claiming that Savelov had 
tried to sell prohibited wares - such as weapons - to the Mongols. 
873 According to 
Aleksandrov and Pokrovskii "obviously the Irkutsk upper class" was responsible for 
thwarting the attempt to depose Savelov, since they wished to retain their influence 
in Irkutsk. It is indeed futile to question whether wealthy Irkutsk cossacks were 
interested in the possibility of a representative of the Selenga ruling in Irkutsk. But 
there is much less indication of lesser cossacks' sympathies for the rebels. The 
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cleavages between Irkutsk and the Selenga were largely based on issues of trade 
politics, involving most of the Irkutsk cossacks, since their economy depended on 
foreign trade. Only a handful of cossacks, some members of the posad and a few 
trappers changed sides, most of them in the countryside and a few fleeing from direct 
oppression on the part of the voevoda who tried to cover up the traces of his 
misdemeanours. 874 
Afonasii Beiton was not the only person the Selenga rebels misjudged, and they 
expressed their disappointment accusing Irkutsk inhabitants in general of being 
traitors who, in the Nerchinsk treaty, "left three towns in the hands of the Chinese 
emperor. s875 Disgruntled Selenga veterans of the battles for the Amur had lost their 
stake in trade - up to the Treaty of Nerchinsk, the Selenga towns served as bustling 
markets for Chinese products, but lost that position when hostilities ceased on the 
Amur. Due to the war between the Manchus and the Dzhungars, from 1689 to 1703 
the Manchurian caravan route became the sole road to China although it was much 
longer than the Central or Mongolian route beginning at Selenginsk. For Selenga 
cossacks, war on the Amur held the promise of survival, booty and, for many, 
increased opportunities for profitable trade. Betrayed over their share in the spoils of 
the peace of Nerchinsk and the war they had fought, Selenga cossacks were now 
denied the leader they had hoped for to guide them to the Amur. What is more, in a 
petition "inhabitants of all ranks of the town of Irkutsk" condemned the siege of 
Irkutsk, claiming "the rebels came with many men to town.. . rudely and not 
according to custom" and referred to their overblown salary demands. Little is 
known about the way this petition was drawn up. Its exaggerated and formulaic 
claims concerning the revenue Savelov had managed to increase during his tenure, 
were not backed up by any facts and were probably intended to be helpful to the 
voevoda in his dealings with the Siberian chancellery. Nevertheless, to claim that this 
petition "did not express the mood of all layers of Irkutsk inhabitants" on all counts 
seems too far fetched. 876 In July 1696, Savelov was still able to collect statements 
corroborating the view of the petition of almost all Irkutsk inhabitants as well as the 
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cossacks, peasants and trappers of surrounding settlements and ostrogi of the western 
Baikal region. 877 
Where the Irkutsk petition describes the siege, a much less formulaic language 
comes to the fore than in the parts flattering the voevoda, stressing that the rebels 
wanted to "rule the town of Irkutsk". Not only had the rebels called for the 
deposition of the voevoda, but also once it became obvious that Irkutsk cossacks 
were disinclined to comply, the rebels charged them with treason and rebellion, 
claiming that they had conspired with the voevoda. Tellingly, the petition claimed 
that it was deti boiarskie and cossacks who had been robbed, but did not mention any 
posadskie liudi. Selenga cossacks identified the posad with its agents of lofty 
Moscow merchants as a potential partner, and not, as they viewed Irkutsk cossacks, 
as rivals blocking their access to wealth. In this, they differed from earlier rebels, for 
example in Tomsk, where Moscow merchants were confronted as allies of the 
voevoda. Probably the much-increased distances and higher turnover of caravan 
trade on the direct route to China changed these perceptions. The petitioners also 
confessed that they were appalled by the threats uttered towards Irkutsk inhabitants: 
"They said: `We [Selenga rebels] are not going to leave Irkutsk, we will live here 
fearlessly. But if we are indeed forced to leave..., we will return in winter, with five or 
six hundred men, and depose the voevoda. ' [The rebels also] threatened that we 
[Irkutians] will not be able to hide. " 
Before accepting that the opportunity was forsaken, enraged Selenga rebels 
inimically warned that: 
"If anybody shoots a single bullet at us, we will bum the fortress from one side, and on 
the other side we will kill the inhabitants of Irkutsk! "878 
The loyalty to the Siberian chancellery and the tsar displayed by the Irkutsk 
cossacks was also motivated by a specific kind of protection and patronage afforded 
by chancelleries to certain kinds of low-born clients, motivated by their tax-paying 
potential, which usually depended on their group status. 879 Irkutsk was a similar case, 
as Andrei Osharov's loyalty demonstrates. Although he was suffering harrassment in 
877 RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 381,11.114-136 Savelov's copy quotes signatures of almost all 
Irkutians. 
878 Aleksandrov, "Materialy", 367-70 
879 Shveikovskaia, Gosudarstvo, 266-77. 
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1696 from his creditor, the syn boiarskii Sidor Shestakov, and the vocvoda, Osharov 
nevertheless did not support the Selenga rebels. Considering his record of financial 
reliability afforded by the Siberian chancellery through a binding promise of 
permanently paying Osharov's future reimbursement to his creditor Shestakov, 
Osharov had little reason to break away from the chancellery (see chapter II). In 
1698/1699 Osharov, enjoying the trust of Irkutsk cossacks and their elected sud'ia 
Ivan Perfil'ev, accompanied the treasury to Moscow with his "comrade" Tit 
Evseev. 880 
Evseev was consistently loyal to the Siberian chancellery, too: In 1697/1698 he 
denounced a peasant of Ilimsk, T. Kopytov, who had written a "letter of advice" to 
Evseev in 1696 concerning the Krasnoiarsk rebellion, asking what had happened in 
Irkutsk and whether "you are staunch supporters of the affair? " Kopytov was banned 
to Turukhansk. 881 Evseev's son Ivan was a major witness in favour of the posadskii 
Gerasim Lyskovets, who accused voevoda Savelov of embezzlement and ordering 
the theft of his possessions. 882 Thus alongside noble patronage networks controlled 
largely by voevodas, there existed networks sponsored by the Siberian chancellery as 
well as others, at least to a degree based on friendship. None of these, with the 
potential exception of some networks spawned by great nobles, could subsist for a 
long time without the support of the Personenverband. 
Much less obvious are the motives that inclined the Selenga rebels to adopt a 
threatening stance. Rather than universal hatred, a more flexible attitude may have 
prevailed. Their threats served them well when it came to negotiating loans on 
advance salary. In addition to the grain reimbursement drawn from the Bel'skii 
fortress for the upcoming year 1696/1697, the actual extent of which was contested 
by the rebels and the voevoda, they also managed to compel several Irkutsk deli 
boiarskie and the founder of the Irkutsk monastery of the Ascension to lend them 
500 quarters of rye each. Considering the precedents mentioned above, the rebels 
may well have credited themselves with a good deal, since Moscow appeared 
predisposed to grant repayment. 883 
880 RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 175,11.41-2 (petition, decision) 
881 Ogloblin, Obozrenie pt. III, 330 
882 RGADA f. 1121 op. 2 no. 160,1.14 (investigation) 
883 Ibid. no. 156,11.1-2 (petition) 
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After the sieges of Irkutsk and raids on the hamlets of two deli boiarskie in the 
vicinity of the town, the high point of unity among Selenga cossacks drew close. 
Subsequent splits and quarrels after the near-failure at Irkutsk have been explained 
by different appreciations of tactics by the upper ranks and ordinary cossacks, the 
latter being more radical than the former. Close examination of the sources, however, 
brings a welter of evidence to light that proves that it was hardly this issue, which 
proved so divisive. Already on their way across lake Baikal back to the Selenga, 
purportedly "radical" leaders struggled for survival - their strategy had failed and 
they needed a new incentive, having failed in their bid for wealth. Thus Borisov 
wrote a letter to Udinsk, demanding the immediate deposition of the prikazchik 
Andrei Beiton. Those cossacks who had stayed in Udinsk complied without 
hesitation. Yet Beiton had been a trusted prikazchik since before the treaty between 
Selenginsk and Udinsk had been signed. Aleksandrov and Pokrovskii ignored 
continuity in their account of the Selenga rebellion, and they even managed to 
depose the prikazchik twice, although witnesses unequivocally stated that he was 
deposed only once, when the cossacks returned from Irkutsk. Indeed, the 
uncorroborated first deposition of Andrei Beiton serves as the crucial backdrop for 
the hypothesis of a democratic regime in Udinsk. 884 Reality was not so 
straightforward. Conflicting factions kept to the proper idea of autocracy, which was 
always a bone of contention, allowing for considerable leeway for conflicting 
interpretations. Borisov was motivated by the mechanisms of power in the 
Personenverband - once its aims were thwarted, it sought to change its leader. Thus 
there was indeed a network spun between fortresses - but instead of being 
exclusively based on ordinary cossacks, and oppositional in outlook, it was based on 
the reputation of leaders and knitted between cossack leaders and Personenverbände 
- or at least potential Personenverbände, for they had to be formed first. And since 
Afonasii Beiton, the father of Andrei, had refused to act as the Sclenga's leader, spy 
and representative, his son, too, lost influence. 
884 Aleksandrov, "Materialy", 352,357. Cf. Aleksandrov, Mast', 308-9,315 
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Trade and Rebellion 
The disintegration of the rebel forces was already underway during their return to 
the Selenga. An incident on the upper reaches of the Angara, close to lake Baikal, 
proved very divisive, as revealed in particular during an investigation in 1698/1699. 
There are several versions concerning who robbed and tortured the rank-and-file 
Irkutsk cossack Ivan Isakov and his servant Fedot Kochnev. Isakov, returning from 
Nerchinsk with merchandise, met with the Selenga rebels on the Angara above 
Irkutsk. He had probably made a good profit at Nerchinsk, as yields even in internal 
Siberian trade averaged twenty-two to twenty-five percent. 88' The cossack claimed 
later, in a rather formulaic way, that almost every Selenga cossack had committed the 
crime: 
"The Selenginsk, Udinsk, Il'insk and Kabansk cossacks Berezovskii, Borisov, Pinega, 
and their traitorous iasaul Ivashko Ivanov and comrades - over 200 men - assailed 
me... they beat and wounded me to within an inch of my life, not like Christians do, with 
larch rods.. . they 
badly maimed and robbed me and my serf worker. 9486 
Court protocols concerning the Irkutsk witnesses he cited have not survived, 
although virtually everyone who was involved in this incident appeared for 
interrogation by voevoda Nikolev. 
There are no doubts concerning several of the Udinsk cossacks, again - as 
already in the Il'insk incidents - most prominent among them Borisov, Ivan Ivanov 
syn Durnitsyn and their Il'insk ally and former Udinsk cossack Pinega. Borisov 
admitted that he was a member of the band which had assaulted Isakov, although he 
claimed that all the cossacks had perpetrated robbery "to the last one", making it 
easier for him to claim that he had been forced to participate by the majority in the 
Personenverband. He also tried to invoke the sovereign's mercy, since as he said 
"we did not receive your sovereign's merciful salary at that time, we were scraggy and 
hungry" 887 
His strategy for his defence, trying post factum to create a unified 
Personenverband, failed although it was supported by eleven Udinsk cossacks and 
B85 Mancall, China, 188 
886 RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 n. 37ß, 1.10 (petition) 887 Ibid., 11.24-5 (investigation) 
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strel'tsy, who never failed to back him. They admitted at the same time that they had 
taken Isakov's possessions "by force". Six other Udinsk cossacks also refused to 
make any statement at all; four of them, however, were listed as robbers. 
Borisov's statement was repeated word by word by Durnitsyn and Pincga, who 
had exposed themselves to such a degree that any other strategy could only fail. 
Nevertheless it was more than the prisoner's dilemma that brought down the united 
Selenga front. Among the 150-200 cossacks present on the barges there was nobody 
else who was ready to speak out at all. Once the prikazchik of Udinsk was in prison 
in Irkutsk, however, other Selenga cossacks defied him. Il'insk E. Panikadilshchikov, 
as already mentioned, had good reasons to wish Borisov and Pinega the worst, even 
though he had taken part in the campaign to Irkutsk led by Borisov. On top of 
asserting that it was Borisov, Durnitsyn and Pinega who had led the band, he did not 
fail to call the extortion by the proper orthodox term - "vymuchenie", thus adding to 
the growing ostracism Borisov faced by 1698/1699.888 
Selenginsk desiatnik Anton Berezovskii, leader of the second barge, who in 
1698/1699 was sent to Eniseisk under guard on other charges, claimed that he had 
never wanted to be involved in the crime, although the above-mentioned Udinsk 
witnesses asserted that he was among the active robbers. He claimed that he had 
jumped on the bank seeking to stop the beatings when he heard Isakov's cries on the 
barge. While nobody supported this over-assertive claim Selenginsk cossacks did not 
fail to support their leader. Although they had not seen anything at all of the robbery 
and torture, they claimed it was Borisov and his comrades who had brought Isakov's 
possessions to the barges, where they were divided among the cossacks. One of these 
witnesses was a godovalshchik from Udinsk, who was not accused and not even 
mentioned in any of the three lists of those cossacks who divided the booty. Since he 
had become part of the Selenginsk Personenverband, he accommodated to his new if 
fleeting place of abode and kept to his Sclenginsk comrades' version. 889 Udinsk 
voices are perhaps more revealing, although some of them are themselves not free of 
doubts, such as piatidesiatnik Ivan Alemasov, who in his statements concerning 
earlier events also attempted to distance himself from the atrocities committed by 
888 On political theology, see chapt. I, 57-67. 
889 RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 378,1.40 (investigation) 
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Borisov and his comrades. His attempt to exclude Borisov and his closest entourage 
from the Personenverband was cast in unambiguous words: 
"He [Alemasov] did not tell them to rob or to behave traitorously and villainously. They 
did that all on their own and asked nobody else [to give advice]. 9490 
The robbery also brought about the breakaway of Anisim Kozmin syn Paderin, an 
Udinsk piatidesiatnik elected petitioner in May 1696, charged with the task of 
representing the Udinsk Personenverband in Moscow at least until 1698. The tsar's 
first decree ordering investigation of the rebellion, dated 23rd June 1697, was 
prompted by Paderin's report at Moscow denouncing the robberies. 891 His case 
shows that even among Udinsk cossacks, at an early stage in the unfolding of the 
rebellion, individuals could change their allegiances. Even Borisov had signed 
Paderin's vybor - for a purported "member of the upper strata". While the 
Personenverband was isolated most of the time in the frontier region, issues of salary 
and confrontations with merchants could open a field of opportunity which made it 
look more like a network, split into shifting coalitions which were forged by 
cleavages and followed contingent events. 
The Siberian chancellery was alerted to the dangers to trade posed by the 
Personenverband. The decree answered to this peculiar condition of trade in the 
frontier area in a typical Muscovite and appropriately ambiguous way: 
"... they robbed merchants and trappers of all ranks and distributed the proceeds among 
themselves. Investigate by all means thoroughly. If [your investigation], Afonasii 
Savelov's reports and the interrogation of Anisimko Paderin show that the [Selenga] 
servitors are.. . guilty, 
first try to coax them from their traitorous and rebellious ways and 
reassure them of our great sovereign's grace and salary, considering the local customs. 
Aim at distracting them from their villainous affairs and to win them over to bit! chelom 
to the... sovereign and deliver the worst traitors, instigators and those who started this 
smuta for investigation. When they [agree], investigate by all means how much they 
robbed from the ... voevodas, which chattels and wares and their prices and what they 
took from other people of all ranks and from merchants. Interrogate each of them 
890 Ibid., 11.17-42, here: 1.42 (investigation) 
91 Ibid. no. 394,1.10 (decree); no. 381,1.11 (election). Few Paderins are known in the Baikal 
region, of unclear kinship status. Apart from D. Paderin in Irkutsk, who contracted supplies of 400 
pud grain in 1687, there was only Pavel Paderin, an Udinsk desiatnik and tseloval'nik who made a 
decisive statement accusing Borisov in 1698: Aleksandrov, Dal'nevostochnykh, 152; RGADA f. 1121 
op.! no. 403,1.14 (investigation); no. 88,1.85 (decree) 
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individually. Put all stolen goods in our great sovereign's treasury and put those traitors 
and worst instigators in prison.. . until you receive our... decree. "892 
The decree made provisions for settling the conflict by punishing its alleged 
instigators. This was a form of negotiation frequently applied in the dealings between 
the cossacks and the government, which meant former leaders no longer dear to the 
Personenverband were used as bargaining chips. 893 
It was Ivan Pinega's letter, which was most detrimental to the common cause so 
ineffectively set in motion by Borisov. His letter also documents the involvement of 
the rebels in trade networks. Pinega admitted to have cashed in the kabala they had 
stolen from Isakov, while leaving any further resolution concerning appropriation of 
the remaining outstanding debt to the Udinsk cossacks. In his address he left little 
doubt as to whom he considered his master and source of legitimate power - he 
included the piatidesiatniki, thus counting the so-called "upper layer" in the 
Personenverband at a rather late point: 
"To our masters the Udinsk piatidesiatniki, desiatniki and rank-and-file cossacks 
mounted and on foot Il'insk cossack Ivashko Grigor'ev syn Pinega knocks the forehead. 
100 roubles have been taken from Afonasii Putimets' but he did not pay out nine roubles. 
He entreated to be released; on account of these nine roubles the merchants Ivan 
Maksimovich and Porkpie Iakovlev signed a guarantee for Afonasii. Afonasii says that 
these nine roubles are on the bill for us in Irkutsk. Now it is your masters' decision 
whether the rest shall be recovered from Afonasii.... Our masters piatidesiatniki..., have 
mercy on me masters and give me my remuneration (zarabotishko) for my travel 
expenses and for the zeal I have shown. I will be your slave (rabotnik) in future as you 
see fit. For this I am knocking my forehead. 494 
The putative stratification of cossacks on lake Baikal is called in question by this 
letter which also concerns the processing of the extorted kabala. This promissory 
note was part of Isakov's possessions; the robbers exacted it along with a voluntary 
conveyance (dannaia) making the kabala payable to Ivan Pinega. It is most revealing 
for the structure of Muscovite - and Siberian - society that merchants collaborated to 
such a degree with the rebel cossacks who were described by Isakov as 
s92 Ibid., no. 394 11.10-1 (decree) 
93 Perrie, "Outlawry" 530-42 
894 RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 n. 37ß, 1.43. Letter not written before early 1697: sec below Putimcts's 
return to Irkutsk. 
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"traitors, rioters and murderers of the soul (dushegubtsy)". 
Isakov however did not content himself with verbal abuse. After his wretched 
return to Irkutsk he soon started litigation. His aim was to exact from his debtor, 
Afonasii Putimets, or from Putimets's agent at Irkutsk, Prokof ii Ivanov, the money 
left from his transactions. But Ivanov failed to comply with his obligations, although 
Isakov produced a letter presented to Ivanov by Putimets's salesman at Il'insk, which 
ordered the payment of 109 roubles to Isakov. In a desperate mood after the siege, 
voevoda Savelov ordered Ivanov to be flogged daily between 22°a and 30t' of July 
1696, a practice called pravezh, a legal procedure to exact debts. 895 On the 31st 
Ivanov demanded a delay in payment which was granted until 18th of August; even 
thereafter, from day to day Ivanov tried to convince Isakov that his patron would 
return and arrange for payment, yet Isakov found out that his debtor had set out for 
northern China, to the emporium of Naun. According to Isakov, Ivanov soon 
proceeded to threaten him with the loss of his debt, saying Putimets would pay the 
robbers at Il'insk. With Savelov's power already waning, nothing was done until in 
early 1697, Afonasii Putimets returned to Irkutsk. Irkutsk cossacks had recently 
deposed Savelov in a kind of velvet rebellion, but even then the so-called unity of the 
cossack upper strata did not exert any influence on Isakov's litigation. Summoned to 
the voevoda's office by elected sud'ia and syn boiarskii Ivan Perfil'ev, Putimets 
bluntly stated that he had paid 109 roubles to Pinega and Durnitsyn at Il'insk when 
presented with the kabala and the voluntary conveyance, and added that "they did 
not use any force to oblige me". Indeed, there was no need to resort to brute force in 
this case, since the cossacks could rely on the assurance signed by two other 
merchants at II'insk guaranteeing the remaining nine roubles, which Putimets had not 
paid on the spot. To Durnitsyn and Pinega, Putimets was part of the trade networks 
they and their allies on the Selenga wanted to do business with. On the one hand, the 
newly-established trade partners relied on a sense of due process all too present in 
Putimets's and Pinega's argumentation. As prikazchik of the Moscow gost' Aleksei 
Filat'ev, on the other hand, Putimets could also rely on his superior's protection, yet 
what actually interfered with any serious steps towards redress of Isakov's grievance 
895 Dewey, Horace, "Coercion by Righter ('Pravezh') in Old Russian Administration", CASS 
vol. 9 (1975), 156-67 
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was the continuing power of the Udinsk cossacks in the Selenga valley. Although 
this power was already waning seriously, as we have seen before, Isakov's case was 
at the very heart of the Selenga rebellion. Isakov never made an attempt to reclaim 
the money from Pinega until the rebel leaders had been deposed. Unlike in other 
cases, he did not succeed until a new voevoda arrived in Irkutsk with renewed 
qualities of leadership and readiness to impart patronage. It was only his petition in 
1699 that set in motion the separate investigation mentioned above on 2°a February, 
when voevoda Nikolev summoned Borisov, Pinega and Durnitsyn to Irkutsk for 
interrogation. The total judgement debt owed to Isakov amounted to 329 roubles plus 
the kabala; not even this modestly wealthy rank-and-file cossack could find any 
redress to his grievance against a coalition of rebel Personenverbände and the 
Moscow-based networks of merchants. 896 
If Isakov entertained a notion of his foes as traitors, rioters and "soul-destroyers", 
the Selenga rebels mirrored it as best they could. The infuriated Isakov reported that 
when robbing him in the zimov'e on the Angara the cossacks again day-dreamed of 
their plans, which Chinese might would never allow in their lifetime, and the treaty 
of Nerchinsk finally sealed: 
"It would be wonderful, father (batiushka), to recover Amur! "897 
Protected from all sides Irkutsk gained much from the treaty of Nerchinsk, 
whereas the exposed Selenga had fought the Chinese allies, the Mongols, but lost 
most in the terms of the treaty. In other words, Udinsk cossacks told Isakov through 
this seemingly unconnected turn of phrase that in their eyes he was a traitor like all 
the rest of Irkutsk, who agreed with the terms of the treaty, and especially being a 
merchant - and therefore was rightfully robbed. Fighting the Chinese on the Amur 
would have meant that trade was diverted to the route through Mongolia and left 
Russian territory at Selenginsk. This expression was indicative of the self-image of 
the Selenga rebels, which was based largely on their grievances towards Savelov, 
and, by implication, all of Irkutsk. Most ominously, Isakov did not mention any 
questions on the part of Borisov concerning who owned his merchandise. Moisci 
Borisov, who claimed that when torturing Isakov he and his cossacks tried to 
896RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 378,11.2-22 (investigation) 
997 Ibid. no. 377,1.51(investigation) 
277 
establish whether these were Savelov's goods, had to admit during investigation that 
the cossacks had stolen Isakov's private merchandise and movables, as well as that 
such an action was clearly against all law and custom. More forthrightly, showing 
disdain for Irkutsk, he also asserted that fifty roubles out of the booty from this raid 
were used to pay back the Udinsk cossacks' loans to the Irkutsk monastery of the 
Ascension. 898 Trying to veil his attempt to live up to the disappointed rebels' 
expectations of their leader at the expense of another rank-and-file cossack, Borisov 
failed dramatically; he, his closest Udinsk allies and the very few hardliners from 
Il'insk had gone too far. They were in consequence gradually isolated among most, if 
not all of their own followers, at the very latest during the investigation. Robbing a 
rank-and-file cossack threatened to destabilise trade; thus one of the basic tenets of 
the rebellion, to facilitate mercantile rivalry between Irkutsk and Nerchinsk, was in 
danger. No merchant dare send his goods through the Selenga valley, except the very 
largest, official caravans, even entrusting it to a cossack group, as long as the rebels 
could not even avoid robbing one of their own, a fellow cossack. Robbing Isakov, 
tempting though it was to Borisov after the near-failure at Irkutsk, proved the first 
step on the long road to the collapse of the rebellion. Isakov had felt fairly secure 
when he left Irkutsk. He travelled to and from the Selenga with only one servant, 
without any cover from fellow cossacks or other merchants -a Personenverband 
could have saved him from the small group of cossacks which assaulted him. The 
1690s was already a period in which merchants could travel fairly safe most of the 
time; apart from on the open steppe commencing beyond Selenginsk and on the first 
part of the way from Udinsk to Nerchinsk, nomad assaults were infrequent. 899 Under 
such conditions, merchants, Irkutsk cossacks and the Siberian chancellery contended 
that a discontented cossack band garrisoned half-way to Nerchinsk had to be satisfied 
at nearly any cost. 
It was the same disillusion which drove the Selenga rebels after the siege of 
Irkutsk to attack Stepan Kazan' in his homestead in the small village of Kolesnikov. 
Although during the investigation Udinsk cossacks tried to protect their leader, 
piatidesiatnik Maksim Posel'skii, they could not stop their Selenginsk comrades 
898 Ibid. no. 378,11.24-5 (investigation) 
899 Ibid. no. 422,11.79-81,88,112-4 (petitions and excerpts); Hundt, Beschreibung, 143-4 
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from giving graphic and, in the most important details, concurring testimony of the 
injury inflicted on Kazan' and his family. It took some carefully calibrated 
provocation to overcome the inhibition to rob Kazan'. On returning from Irkutsk, 
where the Udinsk cossacks had at least received a substantial part of their grain 
salary, they moored on the banks of the Selenga in the hamlet of Kolcsnikov, where 
Kazan' lived. According to custom, and with the earlier confrontations with Borisov 
in mind, Stepan Kazan' came to the barge offering a barrel of sturgeon as a gift (v 
pochest'), thus acknowledging Posel'skii's - and the absent Borisov's - authority 
and appeasing the cossacks. The Udinsk cossacks also haggled about another barrel, 
and Posel'skii "and comrades", as witnesses bothered to specify, finally agreed on a 
price of two roubles. Although cossacks fetched the barrel, however, Posel'skii and 
his men never paid the price. Kazan' appeared at the mooring and demanded his 
money. Reluctant to pay, Posel'skii sent his men, the Udinsk desiatnik Semen 
Uteshev and comrades to get even more fish. When they approached his homestead, 
according to one Selenginsk witness, Kazan' stood in the doorway asking 
sarcastically if desperately for how long they wanted to rob him. Without ceremony 
Uteshev and his men shot the piatidesiatnik with a musket. One witness saw Uteshev 
and his cossacks leaving Kazan's home, and found the wounded family, wife and 
daughter "staggering about in their blood". Kazan' claimed that fifty-seven roubles- 
worth of clothes were stolen and others torn, although there was no substantiation of 
this detail; but every witness remembered the five to six barrels of stolen fish. The 
prikazchik stressed that he had suffered disparagement, and thus feared to leave his 
house. Honour was an important regulatory force in Muscovite society; there were 
frequently cases of injured honour in court at Irkutsk as well. 900 Honour could have 
serious repercussion on the ability to offer leadership to cossacks. Thus in 1700 
Nerchinsk cossacks dishonoured the new rotmistr, sent from Moscow. One cossack 
expressed the general opinion saying 
"at the voevoda's court-before many people threatening with disobedience: `... we do 
not obey those who are sent [from Moscow: the intermediary ranks]. 90901 
900 Ogloblin, Obozrenie, III, 89-90; Ogloblin, "Tomskii", 240; Vershinin, Voevodskoe, 39; 
RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 362,1.93; op. 2 no. 16,1.94 (petition); no. 123,11.1-8 (investigation). On the 
1ega1 rotection of honour: Kollmann, Honor. 
Leont'eva, Sluzhilye, 93; RGADA f. 214 kn. 1388,1.224 (report) 
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Thus Kazan' risked losing all chance of future position if his reputation was 
impugned. 
Kazan' therefore correctly estimated the motive for the crime: Posel'skii's 
tactical choice is less attributable to his social standing, but rather to his current 
position as the Personenverband's leader - he had to reassert his role even more 
vigorously to embody the aims of the group he led, just as Kazan' had done earlier in 
confrontations with Borisov and the Udinsk cossacks. After their unexpected defeat 
at Irkutsk, the Udinsk cossacks sought to get even with their foes on the Selenga. 
Consequently, to evade reprisals on the part of the cossacks, for which he presented a 
target equal to Kazan', Posel'skii unleashed them on another putative member of the 
"upper layer of cossack society" who was in fact a leader of a rival 
Personenverband. Aleksandrov and Pokrovskii named Posel'skii as a candidate of 
the "housed" cossacks for the position of elected prikazchik at Udinsk in the early 
stages of the rebellion, to pronounce the difference to the golyt'ba, in an analogy to 
the Ukrainian and Don cossacks. This was a seemingly clear-cut case involving a 
number of cossacks frustrated by their forced resettlement, who shared an experience 
of brutal requisitioning unrestrained by any law or command. Still, in Siberia, there 
was no general resentment directed at the piatidesiatnik. 902 
Posel'skii choose a different tactic when he returned to Udinsk. When the 
possessions of Anton Savelov, the voevoda of Nerchinsk were fetched from the 
Il'insk Trinity monastery on the Selenga to Udinsk, it was Posel'skii's task to seal 
the storehouse's entrance. He also made several attempts to persuade the recently 
elected prikazchik Ivan Novikov, who relieved Borisov, to confiscate these 
possessions in favour of the sovereign's treasury; Novikov, however, was reluctant. 
Posel'skii's stance later pitched him against some of the newly-recruited cossacks, 
who in the summer of 1697 seized the chattels on the way to the prikazchik's office. 
Other cossacks tried to dissuade them, but were repelled at sabre point, while the 
assets were distributed . 
903 Nevertheless, Posel'skii remained a significant figure on 
the Selenga at least until 1700, supporting the remnants of the rebels' power. His 
personal policy was still to appease the Personenverband, but to single out criminal 
902 Aleksandrov, Hast', 315; RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 467,1.4 (investigation) 903 Ibid. no. 403,1.24 (investigation). Dated according to Novikov's vybor. 
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leaders who had fallen from the Personenverband's favour: Thus, he gave testimony 
against Borisov in 1697/1698.904 
The temporary alliance between Selenginsk and Udinsk was shattered after the 
assaults on Kazan' and Isakov, and threats uttered by Borisov in Irkutsk concerning 
another common Udinsk and Selenginsk campaign to besiege Irkutsk with even more 
cossacks therefore remained empty. Still, Borisov's power on the Selenga was 
unbroken for another year, and Kazan' did not dare to accuse Udinsk cossacks until 
1700.905 
The degree of power that undoubtedly remained with the Udinsk cossacks was 
not coterminous with Moisei Borisov's tenure of the position of prikazchik, which 
ended relatively soon, in September 1697.906 Whereas some historians have judged 
him an ideal prikazchik, and believed him deposed exclusively by members of the 
upper strata, the Udinsk cossacks had serious grievances against him. 907 At first 
glance, it seems to confirm the strata theory that it was piatidesiatnik Semen 
D'iakonov who accused Borisov a year after the siege of Irkutsk, in September 1697, 
invoking publicly the gosudarevo delo. D'iakonov, however, was one of Borisov's 
closest advisors at least until the first week of Lent 1697, when Borisov's followers 
threatened to drown the "fat" cossacks in the water of the river Uda, while D'iakonov 
was still a member of the circle. His ambiguous role shows that the calculations of 
Borisov's closest advisors included the victimisation of some cossacks and deti 
boiarskie if such a step might bring control of the cossacks; but the charges brought 
against Borisov also testify to D'iakonov's acute awareness that the prikazchik had 
gone too far. Borisov was deposed and syn boiarskii Ivan Novikov was elected 
prikazchik "by the whole garrison", as he reported. 908 While many of the targeted 
"old" and "fat" cossacks fled Udinsk for a while, and conflict was undoubtedly rife, 
the confrontation over Anton Savelov's belongings shows that cleavages between 
those who maintained a legalist stance and the others who redistributed at sabre's 
point did not follow simple patterns of wealth and social standing. These cleavages 
904 Ibid. no. 468,11.18; no. 403,1.23 (investigations) 
90' Ibid. no. 423,11.1-9 (investigation) 906 On 8th January, he was called "former" prikashchik by the Udinsk cossacks: ibid. no. 88 1.83 
(rescrit). 
907 Cf. Aleksandrov, Viast', 315,325 
908 RGADA f. 1 121 op. 1 no. 419,1.2 (petition); no. 403,1.4 (investigation) 
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were rather drawn by a radicalisation stemming from forced recruitment, dislocation 
and the loss of prospects from which the newly recruited cossacks still suffered. 
Charges brought against Borisov amounted not just to "a huge deficit in the 
sovereign's finances and gunpowder". The cossacks also claimed arrears amounting 
to half their salary for the year 1697/1698 by January, which meant that Borisov had 
not bothered to pay out the full annual allowance, although Moscow and Irkutsk had 
taken every imaginable step to ensure satisfactory levels of supplies. Altogether, 
Borisov was indicted of peculating 3,498 roubles, 150 furs of sable and fox and 51 
bales of nankeens -a record sum given his short tenure. Two years' worth of salary 
were lost without a trace in the accounts. 909 Borisov, who had acceded to the office 
of elected prikazchik by vowing to uphold the common weal (the "dobroe delo") thus 
failed where Savelov had been accused, too. D'iakonov also blamed Borisov for 
showing favour to his sworn brother, the former cossack Matfei Lcont'ev, who was 
sent to China with some of the wares and cash seized from the voevodas. As the 
tselovalnik Pavel Paderin asserted, the prikazchik clandestinely exempted Leont'ev 
from the tithe on exports which Udinsk cossacks had bothered to fix at thirty roubles 
in the circle. In this case, however, the rank-and-file Udinsk cossacks remained 
neutral, claiming ignorance. 910 It is thus not clear whether the enterprise was 
Borisov's private initiative or backed by his supporters, and it cannot be ruled out 
that Borisov, who could not be saved anyway, was the beast of burden of his former 
supporters. 
Borisov's closest supporters provided a number of examples for a new 
engagement in trade. Some even managed to continue years after Borisov's 
deposition, enlisting the support of Udinsk cossacks, just as Pinega did in his 
transactions with Isakov's kabala. In September 1699 the son of the former cossack 
and member of Irkutsk posad, Nikifor Lanin Kazanets, Kozma, appeared in Udinsk 
prikaznaia izba to claim a kabala worth ninety roubles. Only one of the faulting 
debtors, the musketeer Vasilii Tsynkov, could be found in town. He cunningly 
persuaded the callow Kozma to petition by mutual agreement the prikazchik, Andrei 
Beiton, to release Tsynkov so that he could pay his debt at Kabansk. In October, 
909 Ibid. no. 88,11.84-5 (rescript); Aleksandrov, Hast', 326 
910 RGADA f. 1121 no. 419,1.11; no. 403,1.14; no. 419,1.3 (investigations) 
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Kazanets returned with empty hands; he was offered horses and Nanking cotton cloth 
at an unacceptable price, as was confirmed by the witness he had taken to Kabansk, 
Udinsk desiatnik Vasilii Starozhilov. They also asserted that Ivan Novikov figured as 
Tsynkov's debtor, helping to deceive Kazanets. Kozma petitioned to Beiton, again 
only orally, without any written confirmation, to send for Tsynkov and his father 
Ivan and arrest them for failing to pay compensation. However, when the messenger 
arrived at Kabansk, Vasilii had disappeared and his father forcibly resisted arrest. To 
make things worse for Andrei Beiton, a witness appeared to assert that he had seen 
Beiton accepting a bribe, a horse offered by Tsynkov. The eye-witness, Kabansk 
cossack desiatnik Maksim Lobanov, also claimed that he had obliged himself to 
bring the horse back to Udinsk. The second guarantor for the deal he named, 
however, musketeer Sidor Fedorov, denied any involvement, although he admitted 
he had heard that Beiton had accepted an inducement. 
Desperately seeking a way out, Beiton accused Lobanov of slander. There may 
have been some truth in this, yet in the first place it sheds light on conditions on the 
Selenga. Beiton was still condescending to the Personenverband, dominated in no 
small measure by the remaining rebels. Lobanov was caught right in the middle; he 
indeed had a grievance, and he was determined to carry his issue through. He backed 
another allegation at the same time, directed against Pinega, Balmashnoi and Okhcra, 
who still lived in Il'insk in 1700. As Il'insk clerk Filip Leon'tev claimed, these three 
were notorious for their unruly behaviour; they owned nothing for the simple reason 
that they spent all day in the tavern and played at hazard and dice. In the eyes of 
Leont'ev, Lobanov and other cossacks, they were also not averse to further acts of 
treason and rebellion, an expectation that was underpinned by their role in the 
confrontations between Il'insk and Udinsk cossacks and the seizure of Turchaninov 
and the voevodas' possessions. What was more, Maksim Lobanov suffered from 
their blows and acts of robbery, which had cost him a horse and further 
possessions. 911 The two cases were connected by more than just a lone plaintiff - 
Vasilii's brother, Nefed Tsynkov, who was co-signatory of the failing kabala, who 
worked closely with Pinega and his comrades in 1696 with the aim of deposing 
911 Ibid. no. 509,11.58-60 (investigation) 
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Turchaninov. 912 Andrei Beiton, prikazchik of Udinsk though he was, had undertaken 
nothing to detain Pinega, Balmashnoi and Okhera; they were only taken to Moscow 
for investigation when the Beiton/Kazanets case was well under way in 1701. What 
is more, Nefed Tsynkov had been sent as a guard with the official caravan of 
merchant Spiridon Liangusov in 1699 to China; he was thus unavailable when 
Kazanets tried to recoup the debt. Whether he owed this favour - and the connected 
benefits in advance salary - to Beiton or to his good old friends in the Sclenga and 
Udinsk network cannot be judged from the files; these appointments were often 
handled according to the "queue"; that is cossacks decided on these issues in a 
formalistic way. This kind of controlled rotation is indicative of distributive 
principles rooted in equality; inasmuch as they reigned over everyday life, it was not 
"modem" principles of selection that applied. Yet in the majority of cases, unlike the 
cossack groups Kumke observed in Ukraine, ocherednost' did not apply to leading 
functions. Merit, popularity and honour were the more frequent principles of 
selection observed by Siberian cossacks, which had a certain propensity for 
organisation and were not completely averse to hierarchy. 913 Still, whether the 
ochered' decided or not, it meant at least that cossacks enjoyed a high degree of 
influence on matters of assignment. 
Thus it is hardly a coincidence that there were at least three well-known Udinsk 
rebels and supporters of Borisov among the eleven guards. Apart from Tsynkov these 
were Aleksei Uvarov, who was sent with the secret rebels' letter to Selenginsk in 
1696 and accompanied the tsar's fur treasure to Moscow under Borisov in 
1696/1697. I was not able to establish his kinship in Udinsk, although a syn 
boiarskii, Liubim, owner of saltworks who organised a caravan to China and served 
as an envoy to the Mongols lived there. So did the piatidesiatnik Ivan, whose 
possessions amounted to at least 600 roubles in Chinese atlas which he claimed were 
illegally appropriated by Turchaninov. 914 The third former supporter of Borisov on 
the 1699 caravan was Petr Kainov, indicted for killing Irkutsk cossacks in a conflict 
912 Aleksandrov, "Materialy", 361 
913 Kumke, Geführte, 261. On the high frequency of the ochered' sce Nikitin, Sluzhilye, 98-100; 
Bakhrushin, Trudy, vol. IV, 73; Alcksandrov, Vlast', 157-8,357; RGADA f. 1121 op. 1 no. 457,1.34 
(report) 
914 Ibid. no. 330,11.4-5; no. 429 1.47 (investigation); Leont'eva, Sluzhilye, 321; Vasil'cv, 
Zabaikal'skie kazaki, 216 
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during the campaign and siege of Irkutsk. 915 Andrei Beiton became even more 
involved in this case when Kainov was eventually found in 1701 while he hid in 
Nerchinsk living "on building sites by his own fancy, not enlisted as a Ncrchinsk 
cossack", after returning from China, the voevoda reported. Andrei Beiton stopped 
the convict's transport, changed the guards and ordered poruki signed in Udinsk. But 
Kainov, unsurprisingly given the power relations in the Selenga valley, fled on his 
way to Irkutsk. 916 It was no exaggeration for the piatidesiatnik Stepan Kazan' to 
claim that he could not accuse his tormentors before 1701, as he feared retaliation. 
Maksim Posel'skii was still in charge at Udinsk, serving part-time as an unsalaried 
pod'iachii in the prikazchik's office; in this capacity he observed Kozma Kazanets' 
petitions, and he took no pains to give anything but a very distanced account which 
supported Beiton's case during investigation in Irkutsk. 917 
Although there is no judgement found in the file, it is fairly obvious in the 
opinion that Nikolev indicted Beiton for not taking poruki before he released Vasilii 
Tsynkov, a procedure prescribed by the 1649 Ulozhenie code of laws and explicitly 
cited by Lobanov and in the opinion. Kozma Kazanets, however, did not improve his 
case when he dishonoured Beiton and his father Afonasii in front of the judge, then 
left the voevoda's office during a confrontation while the court procedure was not 
finished. Thus sentence is likely to have been slight; nevertheless, taken together 
with the arrest of some major figures of the rebellion, among them Borisov, Fyk, 
Aleksei Uvarov and the Il'insk cossacks named above, the rule of the rebel 
Personenverband suffered a severe blow in 1701. Most of this was accomplished or 
at least initiated by regular local court procedure rather than by central orders, even 
as some of the following investigations proceeded in Eniseisk or Moscow. 
Similar conclusions can be drawn if we look at the larger picture of the demise of 
the Selenga rebellion. Historians have stressed that it was "liquidated" from above 
once the new voevoda arrived in October 1698. In this version, the local impetus to 
pacification is called into question. Thus it is suggested that investigations started 
only after Nikolev arrived in Irkutsk, while the elected sud'ia Perfil'cv - acting as 
915 RGADA, f. 1121 op. 1 no. 457,11.31 (report) 
916 Ibid. no. 468,11.70-77 (investigation) 
917 Ibid., 11.18 (investigation) 
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voevoda since the new voevoda had died during the journey, and only his immature 
son had arrived (see below) - allegedly did not dare to interfere with the Sclenga 
rebels when Moscow ordered an investigation. Yet it was not Nikolev who launched 
this investigation; it had a much more complex prehistory. It was indeed the Siberian 
chancellery that decided first, on is` December 1697 to have the perpetrations of both 
the voevoda and the rebels investigated; yet its decision took an estimated nine 
months to reach Irkutsk. Still without news of this decision, Udinsk cossacks planned 
to seize Sidor Shestakov's caravan in March. An atrocity during Shestakov's journey 
to China provoked confrontations between the syn boiarskii and the Nerchinsk 
cossacks, which resulted in his death. Yet even in this period there was no change in 
the typical Personenverband pattern of collaboration with their leaders and patrons. 
In March, too, another syn boiarskii, Petr Arsen'ev, hostile to the Udinsk 
Personenverband and proud of his connections at Peter's court, was elected 
prikazchik of Kabansk by the Selenginsk cossacks. 918 Only in Udinsk in the first 
week of Lent did the short-lived caprice of Borisov and his comrades develop a 
certain momentum. Under threat of being killed - Borisov and his advisors boasted 
that they would throw them in the water - the "fat" and "old" cossacks fled to live 
elsewhere. 919 
As already mentioned, Irkutsk cossacks did not side with voevoda Savelov 
because of his virtues, but rather on account of the lack of alternatives during the 
siege. When the wife of the relieving voevoda arrived at Irkutsk in 1697 all alone, 
apart from her young son, after the assigned vocvoda Poltev had died during the 
journey, the cossacks did not allow Savelov to serve a second term. During the last 
week before Easter they accepted Semen Timofeevich Poltev as their new voevoda, 
and elected the aged, but experienced and respected Ivan Maksimov syn Perfil'ev 
sud'ia -a traditional institution in Irkutsk, also known from Krasnoiarsk and Pskov; 
but in this case effectively this was a kind of second voevoda, in view of the 
immature voevoda. After Moscow's letter of confirmation arrived, Perfil'ev 
proceeded to investigate Savelov's misdeeds in Irkutsk. 920 With regard to the 
918 Aleksandrov, Past, 324-5 
919 RGADA, f. 1121 op. l no. 403,11.4,27 (investigation) 
920 Aleksandrov, Mast', 322-4 
286 
Selenga, he indeed was at first reluctant to take a stern approach. It is not clear 
whether it was still during the last days of Savelov's tenure of office or already on 
Perfil'ev's initiative, but at some stage in 1696/1697 Irkutsk cossacks supported the 
claims of the Selenga cossacks for more salary to be sent from Nerchinsk. There was 
92' obviously a keenly-felt need to appease the cossacks on the other side of the lake. 
In September 1697 Borisov's advisor Semen D'iakonov decided that the 
prikazchik's rule should finally be abandoned. The background of his decision is not 
clear, and there may also be doubts about the sincerity of Novikov's report, claiming 
that after D'iakonov had appealed to the sovereign's deed, Borisov was deposed by 
"cossacks of all ranks". Afterwards, the syn boiarskii Novikov was elected 
prikazchik by "all the garrison" to rule and judge them until further notice by the 
Siberian chancellery. 922 Yet there are unmissable signs of broad dissatisfaction 
among the Udinsk cossacks - on 8t' January 1698 a written petition was delivered at 
the Udinsk prikazchik's office, signed by "Udinsk deli boiarskie, mounted and foot 
cossacks and musketeers", claiming half their salary for the current year, which 
Borisov had not yet given them. According to Novikov, Borisov was reluctant to 
hand over the account books, asserting that he had no such thing. Already in 
December syn boiarskii Stepan Staisupov had accused Borisov of alienating the 
Udinsk share of 505 out of the total of 1,010 roubles sent from Nerchinsk for the 
Selenga cossacks' salaries under Staisupov's tutelage, which Borisov did not account 
for at all; there were also no accounts of distribution among cossacks. 923 This 
supports the view that it was highly unlikely that "the upper layer" of the cossacks all 
on their own and against the will of the majority deposed Borisov. 
Poltee and Perfil'ev signed the instruction to Irkutsk syn boiarskii Andrei Savelev 
syn Moskvitinov in June 1698, which was probably not an accidental choice. 
Moskvitinov was connected to Turchaninov by events reaching back as far as 1678, 
when a court case reveals serious conflicts between the then ordinary cossack 
Moskvitinov and cossack Petr Studenitsyn. Their wives, Anna Sergeevna doch and 
Maritsa Ivanovna doch had quarrelled publicly, accusing each other of debauchery 
921 RGADA, f. 1121 op. I no. 88 11.84-5 (rescript) 
922 Ibid. no. 4191.2 (petition) 
923 Ibid. no. 88 11.84-5 (rescript); no. 145 1.56 (petition) 
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and serious dishonour. During the usual court procedings, the plaintiff and the 
defendant had to agree on witnesses, which turned out to be difficult since several 
were not acceptable to Andrei Moskvitin who referred to earlier conflicts and 
dishonour. Among them were the wife of Elizar Sadovnikov and Katerina 
Turchaninova. Three generations of Turchaninovs arc known to the records in 
Irkutsk between 1672 and 1720: Ivan Aleksandrov syn, his sons Grigorii, Gerasim, 
Leont'ei and lakov, and grandson Terentei; all Turchaninovs in the records 
unequivocally relate to the same kin, with the only exception of Katerina. In 1682, 
which is highly suggestive, Petr Studenitsyn lived in the same neighbourhood as 
Iakov Turchaninov. Together with their comrades, cossacks who lived shoulder to 
shoulder - among them also a Sadovnikov - in that year they tried to deprive a 
peasant who lived in the vicinity of his land. Grigorii Konakov apprehended them on 
the voevoda's order with comrades. Konakov's wife had already severely 
disappointed Studenitsyn in 1678 in court by siding with Andrei Moskvitin 924 Once 
again this shows that honour was an important resource throughout the Siberian 
frontier, where it was among the issues deciding the popularity of a leader. Cleavages 
such as these are indicative of groups linked by kinship, the Personenverband and 
patronage. It is therefore more than likely that Katerina's kin was to some degree 
inimical to Andrei Moskvitin at this early stage. Subsequent events during the 
aftermath of the Selenga rebellion suggest that with Moskvitin, Perfil'ev consciously 
chose a permanent foe of Turchaninov. 
With regard to the Selenga rebels, Moskvitin was bound by clear government 
instructions. Rebels were to be accommodated, while only those who had perpetrated 
serious crimes ranging from murder and robbery to embezzlement were to be 
punished. Already in the very month Moskvitin was sent to the Selenga, 
investigation had commenced seriously in Il'insk and Udinsk - Lovtsov, 
Tarakanovskii and Rozgildeev made their statements; in early July such key figures 
as Maksim Posel'skii, Ivan Oshurkov, Pavel Paderin, and the ll'insk rank-and-file 
added evidence. Poltev and Perfil'ev sent the first report on Borisov's irregularities 
and the Udinsk petitions including records of interrogations concerning the 
924 Ibid. no. 33,1.90; op. 2 no. 74,11.1-6 (investigations) 
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allegations against former voevoda Savelov and former prikazchik Turchaninov to 
the Siberian chancellery on 11`h August, whereas only in October did the new 
voevoda, Nikolev, arrive in Irkutsk. 925 His presence reinvigorated investigations 
between 1699 and 1701, yet they had already started without him, and largely on 
account of the grievances of the Udinsk cossack discussed above, which were 
directed at their former elected prikazchik. Borisov's mishap as a prikazehik is hardly 
surprising. Once the Udinsk cossacks had returned from campaign, Borisov was 
thrown back on his closest entourage, since he could no longer promise unlimited 
opportunities for booty in wealthy Irkutsk, not to speak of the famed Amur. To show 
signs of accommodation increased their loyalty, but alienated those cossacks who 
were excluded from the narrowest circle. Since the rebellion gradually broke down 
by itself, there was little need to suppress or "liquidate" it from above. As with other 
Siberian town rebellions, it was a sign of good common sense to accommodate 
ordinary rebels, rather than a particularly cunning move by Peter I. There was much 
less continuity in the uprising than has heretofore been claimed; yet still there were 
many persons who remained in their position and wielded considerable power. The 
threat the old Personenverband constituted by the treaty agreeing on the "dobroe 
delo" posed to trade made sure that Moscow and Irkutsk had to accommodate 
demands raised on the Selenga, but it was also a Personenverband that asked for an 
investigation and partially overlapped with the former. 
Grigorii Turchaninov's misdemeanours were also seriously investigated. Finally, 
in 1700/1701, when scores were settled on all sides, he had to pay 822 roubles to 
Selenginsk and Udinsk claimants. This considerable sum cannot be broken down, 
however, since Moskvitinov's proceedings only list claims, nowhere recording any 
attempt to corroborate them. 926 Due process in Muscovy relied on groupings of 
inhabitants in a similar vein to the early English jury. 927 The decision to investigate 
Turchaninov's misdemeanours and corrupt practices therefore meant, in a climate of 
persistent if somewhat weakened social cohesion in the Personenverband, Irkutsk's 
basic compliance with the Selenga demands. Unlike many Siberian voevodas, 
925 Ibid. op. 1 no. 419,1.18 (instruction); no. 403,11.21-3,48,50,56 (investigation); Aleksandrov, 
Nast', 325 
926 RGADA, f. 1121 no. 500,11.23-4 (investigation) 927 Weickhardt, "Due-Process", 479-80 
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Turchaninov's suffering lasted longer. He remained in prison until 1698/1699. Not 
even then did he receive his salary for his lost years. Only remuneration for 
1698/1699 was granted on behalf of his petition in which he tried to incline voevoda 
Nikolev to mercy, hinting at his utter destitution. Similarly, Savelov could not escape 
prosecution; he was fined 4,000 roubles 928 The rebellion had brought about lasting 
changes to patronage linkages in the Baikal area, and at least temporarily, Grigorii 
Turchaninov was not included in these alliances. 
Conclusion 
Rather than by divisions between social groups, rebellion on the Selenga was 
triggered by competition between different Personenverbände and towns. A 
tendency to seek the support of the central institutions and organisations was there 
long before the rebellion; it lasted during the rebellion and after it as well. It took 
different shapes and varied in arguments, but united all warring parties. However, 
this does not prove that the central state could rule in a despotic fashion or by a 
strategy of divide et impera. Rather, it had to rely on the strongest partner, or at 
times, on more than one, without being able to internally divide local agents like the 
rebellious Personenverbände. Moscow was thus more dependent on the good will of 
its local non-gentry partners than has hitherto been thought. One of the ways in 
which Moscow sought to enhance integration was the protection of honour. 
Repeating the general pattern, honour was based on the reputation among fellow 
cossacks and thus, related to political issues as it was, in practice depended more on 
competing, limited public spheres than on the tsar. 
At the heart of the conflict in 1696-7 was negotiation and competition of the 
terms of trade - about who was eligible to what extent to be placed in an official 
position, and to receive or distribute subsidies. Rather than ousting all voevodas from 
Siberia, the quarrelling Personenverbände pursued different political strategies: one 
option was to build various, more equal than hierarchical, forms of patronage 
networks built on the local strength of the Personenverband in the trading frontier on 
the one hand, and the capacity of wealthy cossacks, nobles, monastery authority, 
local or central chancellery personnel, or merchant agents for advancing money and 
928 RGADA, f. 1121 no. 422 1.120 (pctition); Alcksandrov, Vlast', 326 
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soliciting the chancellery on behalf of the rebels on the other hand, with the aim of 
challenging the monopolies enjoyed by a voevoda or a competing town, such as 
Irkutsk. It was a negative aspect of the Personenverband under these conditions, on 
the other hand, that in case of a set-back such as the failure of the initial aspirations 
to rule Irkutsk from the Selenga, there was a strong impulse to break the law and 
allow unrestricted booty-making in order to preserve the authority of the cossack 
leader. While this had the unwanted disadvantage to seriously disrupt the flow of 
trade, and consequently led to the split in the Personenverband, another strategy 
consisted of the same elements, but adhered to due process and equal administration 
of justice. Despite apparent set-backs, this previously neglected tendency is 
observable from the onset of the rebellion, especially on the Selenginsk side of the 
split rebel Personenverbände, and it increasingly united the warring sides after the 
siege of Irkutsk throughout the late 1690s until the first decades of the eighteenth 
century, from the conflicts over the treatment of Turchaninov and the ostrog Il'insk, 
to the local initiatives in delivering the errant former leaders of the rebellion, and 
finally to the individual statements in the centrally ordered investigation concerning 
the cases of members of the Personenverband and outsiders "bribing" the voevoda 
for their recruitment in Selenginsk and Udinsk in 1720.929 After the confrontation 
with the Buryats over the issue of their ancestral possession of the Kudinsk steppe 
had proven disruptive to the point of deposing the prikazchik, a new balance was 
sought in the aftermath of the rebellion. On the one hand, significant demands of the 
Buriats were fulfilled when Andrei Beiton became prikazchik in Udinsk, who on the 
other hand yielded to the trade-related demands of members of the former rebel 
Personenverband. His trial, although he was eventually acquitted, is another sign of 
the tendency towards due process and equal justice. 
Moscow pursued this strategy by sending the capable administrator Nikolev, 
who, despite his reputed leaning toward the former rebels observed the rules of the 
process and thus promoted the inner peace that was needed for smooth trading 
operations. Nevertheless, local agents like the elected official (sud'ia) Pcrfil'ev or 
cossacks on the Selenga successfully initiated this policy, which was only then 
929 Cut due to word limit: RGADA f. 214 kn. 1619 11.13-100 (investigation) 
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sustained by central agents. The rebels - except for a few of the most recently 
recruited and most severely socially dislocated cossacks, who could gain more in 
robbery - opted for denouncing and delivering their former leaders when it turned 
out that they did not sufficiently advance inner peace and stability while the relevant 
central decree only reached the Baikal area after their decision. A side effect of this 
step was a weakening of the Personenverband, since investigation was then 
conducted individually rather than collectively. This policy was promoted by the 
successes of the rebels in trade, by the promising perspectives in trade with China, 
and by the timely inclination of Irkutians to compromise. Thus, local elite and 
cossack agents sought central support in a situation with promising perspectives that 
critically involved local affairs, but also those of the empire as a whole. This explains 
why the centre found it difficult to seize initiative, while local aspirations took the 
ascendancy. 
International trade remained restricted by Peter's attempts at imposing a 
monopoly operated by Moscow merchants, yet this was a common situation in 
distant territories isolated from the direct influence of the centres of early modern 
states. As was the case in other, comparable territories, local merchants bought into 
this lucrative trade by bribing the voevoda or prikazchik for their sons or relatives to 
be recruited in Selenginsk or Udinsk. 930 This practice also contributed to lower levels 
of conflict between cossacks and voevodas. While wealthy cossacks increasingly 
sought to join the posaa931, their relatives and other cossacks who acted as their 
agents in the caravan and abroad became more dependent on the merchants. 
Similarly, Nerchinsk, situated at a comparable dead end as the Selenga towns but 
thriving on trade until 1703, was reluctant on all but moderate terms to join the rebel 
movement; overall, it was rather opposed to the cause of the Selenga. Yet Ncrchinsk 
suffered little from the changing path of the caravans. After 1703, mining activities 
932 replaced a good part of its former dependence on trade. 
930 Ibid. 
931 Leont'eva, Sluzhilye, 287 
932 Aleksandrov, Hast', 301-2 
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Conclusion 
Much more than has been thought until very recently the Muscovite empire was 
dependent on local forces, elites and groups that sought the collaboration of the tsar 
and central institutions and organisations to bolster their own influence. They 
increasingly sought central support as local affairs became more and more involved 
in the affairs of empire by heightened mobility of land and people, and augmented 
dependency of local elites on interregional trade and regulation 933 While Kivelson 
has recently demonstrated that the provincial gentry could influence government 
decisions on their behalf, this study proves that there were other, non-noble groups, 
such as the Siberian cossacks, that wielded similar powers. The findings of this thesis 
add further weight to a number of recent studies which have changed significantly 
the overall conception of centre-periphery relations in Muscovy. 
The cossack Personenverband was a suitable power basis for the Siberian 
cossacks to influence political decisions in their favour since it was adapted to 
frontier conditions, as a temporary primary group oriented towards specific aims 
rather than the acquisition or maintenance of social status, but was not based on 
kinship relations and could therefore flexibly respond to the changing demands of 
service and trade. The cossack Personenverband therefore was the most cost- 
efficient organisation capable of protecting valuable government transports in 
frontier conditions. The regular army was never sent in, partly because it quickly 
would have exhausted resources brought from Muscovy at great expense, partly 
because it was less efficient in protecting transports in the steppe environment than 
cossacks, and partly because of the danger to the tsar's main objective in Siberia, the 
furs that inevitably would have proven too tempting for any superior force sent to 
Siberia; providing the material means for such an army to go to Siberia inevitably 
meant that they acquired the opportunity to enrich themselves. In sum, a force 
capable of overcoming the rebels was never worth the costs of its deployment and 
would have interrupted trade and the provision of fur-tribute to a greater degree than 
any voevoda or rebels. This and the bottlenecks created by frontier conditions 
reinforced by the authority of the Personenverband over transports and the right to 
933 Lieberman, "Introduction", 455-6 
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give advice to their commander and the tsar's representative, the voevoda, generated 
a favourable basis for negotiations with him and with Moscow. From these 
negotiations sprang a whole system of privileges that were made conditional on 
service achievements, but were allotted flexibly and mostly locally by the voevoda - 
or by rebels - on a case-to-case basis to individual cossacks and cossack groups. 
These grants and credit agreements of up to three years promoted trade and 
expansion and made especially the rank-and-file cossacks who protected transports 
fundamentally interested in all matters of trade. As a consequence, to ensure the 
smooth functioning of the system that was so vital for the tsar's revenues and in 
particular as the Siberian fur provided ready convertibles for financing wider military 
reforms, the cossacks received their salary in a regular fashion that was uncommon 
in the early modem period. 
Another consequence of these conditions was that cossacks on the one hand 
became actively interested in due process of law to ensure reliability in trade 
relations. On the other hand, due to the way the Personenverband was constituted, 
conflict with due process was programmed, especially when the terms of trade were 
perceived to be unjust. Differences of opinion were argued out in the public spheres 
of reviews and cossack assemblies on campaign, in the town square, or in the church 
refectory. These public spheres were limited thematically by service issues but not by 
accessibility - members of other social groups also took part in campaigns and 
deliberations, although the cossacks were usually decisive if only by virtue of their 
absolute numerical predominance in seventeenth-century Siberian towns. Other 
institutionalised concepts, such as honour, although the tsar guaranteed and the 
voevoda in the last instance judged it, referred to this limited cossack public deciding 
over such essential issues as eligibility for prestigious and lucrative service 
assignments; by means of election, cossacks guaranteed the honour of the elected and 
gave them an instrument to claim their right to return from long-term service 
assignments. 
In the last instance, however, all Siberian cossacks sought to exchange wares 
with Moscow. Only a common institutional culture could guarantee the smooth 
functioning and reliability of internal and external trade relations. In particular, 
Mongol princes accepted the tsar as an equal "Chinggisid", while they perceived 
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cossacks as illegal traitors as soon as they were not in the tsar's service and therefore 
refused them the right to trade. Universal service was the overriding principle in the 
Muscovite empire, not, as for example in France, the preservation of estate 
privileges. 34 In Siberia, concepts of service therefore became embedded in the 
language of cossack trade and the sovereign's affair, meaning in this context 
primarily the tsar's - mainly financial - interests and the corresponding tasks his 
servitors, the cossacks, chancellery personnel, and the voevodas were obliged to 
carry- out, developed into the main institution of their trade. Institutions put the 
symbolical order and permanence of an organisation on display, although this order 
is naturally more likely to break down than to endure. To enhance reliability and 
permanence, any institution and especially the sovereign's affair depends on an 
element of illusion - those who adhere to it ritually, regularly confirm to each other 
that it is derived from pure and authentic sources, that is from the sovereign's decrees 
and interests even where the association is tenuous at best, for example in the case of 
formal deposition. Thus, at least in the Siberian case, the theory of institutionality 
helps to contextualise the elements of illusion in the sovereign's affair, noticed but 
hardly understood by contemporary and modern observers, in a setting dominated by 
trade. With regard to the sovereign's word and affair, Lukin has recently cautioned 
that "illusion" is a judgmental term, which should not be used in historical 
accounts, 935 but here it is used analytically to explain reliability. This derivation from 
the "pure" source also made independent cossack actions, which they regularly 
claimed to be in accordance with the institution, that is the tsar's interests or "profit", 
impregnable with regard to investigations and the sovereign's justice. Where in some 
early modem republics limited public spheres were structured and focused by 
symbols of community, 936 in Siberia - although in rebellions they sometimes 
cropped up as well, such as the karshi in Udinsk - the sovereign's affair provided 
analogous functions in the Siberian partitioned and public spheres limited by service 
issues. As a set of related norms, expectations and patterns of behaviour, this 
institution provided resources of power actors could make use of in the pitched semi- 
934 Lieberman, "Introduction", 455-6 
935 Lukin, Predstavleniia, 255 
936 Meier, Ulrich, "Die Sicht- und Hörbarkeit der Macht. Der Florentiner Palazzo Vecchio im 
Spätmittelalter", in Rau (cd. ), Taverne, 229-272; Dörk, "verwilderte Raum", 124-9 
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public battles for information and control that were characteristic of seventeenth- 
century Siberia. These relatively open debates, often attracting non-cossacks too, 
corresponded to the first, inclusive phase of a cossack Personenverband before its 
aims were agreed unanimously and the leader was elected successively, or when the 
group disagreed with its leader. 
Since social relations are unstable, and Siberian society was particularly unstable 
due to its economic dynamism and territorial expansion, an institution established to 
stabilise social relations also had to adapt. To facilitate this adaptation, but at the 
same time keep to its authentic sources in appearance, conflict is expressed by way 
of leitideas. Leitideas set certain - often contradictory - elements of laws, decrees, 
instructions, and custom considered to be related to the institution, above others and 
made them temporarily, locally, or in a given social group obligatory according to 
the needs of that group or an interregional network of patronage that could include 
cossacks, merchants (gosti), and nobles. The sovereign's affair was also an article in 
the law code of 1649, which in the form of chancellery writs was in force even 
before that date, and protected the honour and integrity of the tsar. Accordingly, the 
litigant was transferred to Moscow immediately and thus removed from the influence 
of local authorities. The Siberian cossacks introduced a leitidea of deposition (otkaz) 
derived from cossack Personenverband custom, which had an interesting status: the 
Tobol'sk archbishops had institutionalised it and the tsar had endorsed it, but it never 
became imperial law. Although it was not considered legal by the tsar, the local 
power of the Personenverband meant that it was unimpeachable at least as long as 
the cossacks guaranteed not to deliver each other to impending investigation. As far 
as we know, this quasi-legal status of deposition in Siberia was unique in the 
Muscovite empire, where otherwise, as Lukin has recently stressed, limitations of the 
power of the tsar - or his representative - rested exclusively on moral images 
without institutionalised leverage. A further difference to Muscovy west of the Urals 
is evident in the personal, denounciatory character of virtually all cases of the 
sovereign's word or affair, which were moreover usually directed against persons of 
lower status, as compared to the mostly - limited - public character of petitions that 
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referred to this institution in Siberia typically indicting persons of more exalted 
status 
937 
Besides, the practice of non-deliverance reinforced one of the major institutions 
of Muscovy, collective responsibility. For the same reason, cossacks signed petitions 
collectively, thereby constituting a Personenverband. Signing the collective petition 
and, occasionally, secret oaths of mutual allegiance and non-deliverance, 
corresponded to the second, exclusive phase of the Personenverband characterised 
by isolation in the frontier and steppe environment, purposefulness, and temporarily- 
disappearing individuality as the collectively-delivered signatures and statements in 
investigation show. As an institutional mechanism providing appeal to the tsar that 
promoted an organised Personenverband, the sovereign's affair was used in almost 
all of the frequent town rebellions, and on numerous other occasions of lesser 
importance, in small fortresses, on campaigns or among members of a cossack group. 
Some of the Siberian cases, especially minor ones, are probably still buried in the 
archives, though the known evidence is already impressive. 
There is a correspondence between the recent turn to institutionality in the social 
sciences and the history of the Siberian seventeenth century. It is a symptom of 
perceived crisis and related fears that spawned from the transformation of Eastern 
Europe, globalisation and other recent social and cultural processes on the one hand, 
and on the other hand from the Muscovite Time of Troubles and the rebellious 
seventeenth century, though of course more generally such fears were incited in 
Europe by a century in the throes of internal war. Already the Institutionalism of 
Arnold Gehlen938 was impelled by the Hobbesian fear of the dissolution of all order 
and the natural human condition of club-law - embracing institutions as a safe 
harbour from human degeneration ("Entartung"). 939 Cossacks in Siberia as well as 
their opponents constantly referred to the Time of Troubles, claiming for each side 
that it had stemmed and was still stemming the tide of anarchy while generally 
accepting the tsar as pacifier. 
937 Lukin, Predstavleniia, 253-4; Rowland, "Limits? ", 125-55 
938 Rehberg, Karl-Siegbert (ed. ), Der Mensch [by A. Gchlen], in: Arnold Gehlen Gesamtausgabe, 
Vol. 3, Frankfurt/Main 1993; Gehlen, Arnold, Anthropologische und sozialpolitische Untersuchungen, 
Reinbek 1986 
99 Rehberg, Karl-Siegbert, "Institutionenwandel und Funktionsveränderung des Symbolischen", 
in: Göhler, Gerhard (ed. ), Institutionenwandel, Opladen 1997,94-120, here: 98 
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As cultural determinations of orientation, institutions have a pacifying function. 
Thus, one of the great institutions of the post-medieval world, the state, developed 
exactly in this perspective as a fixation of civil war, receiving an important impulse 
in Muscovy in the aftermath of the Time of Troubles. This is not a retrospective 
issue, but already the basis of Jean Bodin's theory of sovereignty. 940 In Muscovy this 
took root without known transfer of these terms, more or less autonomously. Elias's 
theory of civilisation can be read in this way, too: the development of the princely, 
later state monopoly that successfully put through its norms against the partial 
economic and social powers, the estates, albeit, as we have seen, in Muscovy the 
estates were less powerful and the prince still could not achieve this without their 
collaboration. This is the background on which Elias sees his theory of civilisation, 
which could not develop without repression or force, but had a pacifying effect. 41 In 
Siberia, in a rough-and-ready frontier world, institutionalisation also had a 
pacificatory effect, although it cannot be overlooked that its most efficient regional 
harbinger was the cossack Personenverband, straddling the divide between pre- 
modern and modern, as well as not fitting comfortably the concept of an elite power- 
group. 
In the debate about social disciplining, the "plebeian" variant of the process of 
civilisation, recent appraisals of Moscow and Russia have adopted a rather negative 
attitude to the concept, 942 although they have also identified potential islands of an 
increased consciousness of law among the population, such as in the manufacturies at 
Tula or in the central Muscovite regions. 43 This study does not claim to be an 
investigation of the implementation of criminal law in Siberia; it can only suggest 
lines of enquiry towards the aim of an appreciation of the development of social 
discipline in Siberia. Schmidt's findings are conclusive at least for the city of 
Moscow in the eighteenth century, probably much of European Russia, not least, as 
he stresses, owing to the development of serfdom, the concomitant monopolisation of 
justice by the noble landowner, and resulting waves of migration, 944 which did not 
940 Ibid., 99 
941 Elias, Norbert, Die höfische Gesellschaft, 1969 
942 Behrisch, Lars, "Social Discipline in Early Modern Russia", in: Schilling, Ileinz, Institutionen, 
Instrumente und Akteure sozialer Kontrolle und Disziplinierung, Frankfurt/Main 1999,325-357 
943 Schmidt, Sozialkontrolle, 405 
944 Ibid., 13,397-8 
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find an equivalent in Siberia gas Criticising Oestreich's concept of social discipline as 
lopsidedly oriented at the promulgation of law - although he also emphasises the 
positive aspects of this concept - instead of at its effects, Schmidt has underlined the 
importance of dialogic, inclusive, absolute, and formal law for the formal 
(effectiveness of prosecution) and informal (consciousness of law) aspects of social 
discipline, all of which were largely absent in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
central Russia. The same was true for the replacement of negotiation with authority, 
and innovation in law seeping away in distant parts. However, as the Siberian results 
of cossack negotiation prove, distance is not an absolute category; its effects depend 
on the social, economic and cultural framework, and in particular, on the distribution 
of resources of power and the capability to use them. The appreciation Siberian 
cossacks showed for due process of law at least in their political struggles, for 
precedence in negotiation, for the limited public in dealing with authority, as well as 
the late developments towards individualisation946 in the procedure of investigation 
provide some clues for the resolution of the question as to whether there was an urge 
towards more individual reliability and responsibility in social relations in parts of 
Siberia that eventually transcended the isolationist confines of the Personenverband. 
Trade, especially since it involved a great part of the population, had a pacifying 
effect, notwithstanding the fact that the Russians who arrived there were more rough 
and ready than civilised. 
The downside of this relatively positive evaluation of Siberia is that the efforts to 
meet cossack needs had to be financed - and in cash-starved Muscovy this meant 
that the peasants of the north of Russia were milked beyond their means. Thus, 
although this is usually overlooked, beyond the importance of the fur trade for 
purchasing weapons and instructors abroad, the liberties and privileges of the 
Siberian cossacks affected the general development of Russia. The "Siberian supply" 
tribute in grain was among the more ominous reasons for increasing pressures for 
enserfinent in European Russia and for peasants to desert northern villages and 
945 In 1662, Siberia's proportion of exiles among the Russian population was at just 10.5 per cent, 
just above one tenth of what Australia experienced: Wood, Alan, "Russia's "Wild East': Exile, 
Vagrancy and Crime in Nineteenth-Century Siberia", in: idcm, Siberia, 117-39, here: 117-8 
94 Ludwig Steindorff arrives at a similarly guarded conclusion regarding the noble mcmoria in 
sixteenth- to seventeenth-century Muscovy: "Wer sind die Meinen? ", in: Bessmertny, Yuri (ed. ), Das 
Individuum und die Seinen, Göttingen 2001,231-258 
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therefore, problems with social discipline; also, the practice of internal redistribution 
of fuel exports accompanied Russian history until very recently. Thus making the 
frontier safer, contributed to the undermining of social control in Russia's older 
regions. 
With continued expansion in the eighteenth century, the cossacks moved to the 
south and east and important towns were inevitably now situated further and further 
from the steppe frontier, and less in need of locally-garrisoned protection. With 
increased security, trade became the monopoly of the merchants, while many 
wealthy cossacks converted to their ranks. The Personenverband was thus removed 
from the centres of decision and administration and deprived of its former economic 
and political significance not least by the decrease in importance of the fur tribute. 
Since there are only a very few narrowly-focused studies on the eighteenth 
century947, we may conclude that the evidence of further development is 
contradictory, although it eventually resulted in the last quarter of the eighteenth 
century in a regionalism that was loyal to the tsar, and, compared to most parts of 
European Russia, in an early and vigorous educational and reading revolution 
featuring schools and intellectual circles that published general-interest magazines 
voicing Siberian lay culture to itself and to the rest of the empire. Remarkably 
continuing and echoing the lines of development highlighted in the present study, 
business-minded local merchants and administrators rather than the usual gentry 
supported and organised this cultural upsurge. 948 
947 But see Zuev, A. S., Russkoe kazachestvo Zabaikal'ia vo vtoroi chetverti XVIII - pervoi 
polovine XIX vv., Novosibirsk 1994; Istoriia kazachestva Aziatskoi Rossii vol I: XVI pervaia polovina 
XIX veka, otv. red. V. V. Alekseev, Ekaterinburg 1995; Mincnko, Nina A. (red. ), Kazaki Urala i Sibiri 
v XVII-XX vv.: Sbornik nauchnykh trudov, Ekaterinburg 1993 
948 According to Gary Marker, Tobol'sk stood out among contemporaneous provincial publishing 
initiatives, and it could already look back on local literary life prior to 1790: Publishing, Printing, and 
the Origins of Intellectual Life in Russia, 1700-1800, Princeton 1985,135-151, esp. 144-6,150. Sec 
the recent discovery of copies of the first Russian newspaper in a provincial backwater of Pctrine era 
European Russia that was situated on the road to Siberia: Waugh, Daniel (D. K. Uo), Istoriia odnoi 





Six den ga or three kopeks 
amanat Official captives who lived in the forts and towns to ensure 
their relatives paid the iasak. Antecedents of this institution 
existed in steppe tradition 
ataman Leader of a cossack group. Origin probably Turkish, 
referring to the head of a kin group. Traditional cossack 
rank preserved among Siberian cossacks. 
1 quarter (chetvert') 146.4 or 164.7 kg (4 or 4% pud) for the period before 1710. 
Den ga 0.5 kopek-_ 
Deli boiarskie Pl. of syn boiarskii 
desiatnik Official cossack rank, literally: "Leader of ten cossacks", 
though a group led by a desiatnik was not necessarily ten 
strong. 
doshchanik Flat-bottomed transport vessel; length of the keel up to 21.6 
m. 949 
godovalshchik Cossack serving a year in a distant fort or town 
gorodnichii Town governor 
gosti Wealthy Moscow merchants 
guliashchie liudi People not attached to any tiaglo, and therefore free to 
move from place to place; usually they were itinerant 
workers 
iasak Tribute, in Siberia usually furs, sometimes also cattle or 
other herds. According to region, way of life and custom, it 
was collected as a regular tax or considered an irregular tax. 
The latter meant it was a form of barter, with the use of 
force by both parties or the protection offered by the 
Russians accounted for in the terms of trade. 
iasaul Elected cossack leader 
iasyr' Cossack captives taken on campaign, whom cossacks were 




kabala Agreement exacting obligation of labour for a creditor in 
case of non-payment of debt 
kormlenie Alimentation; as form of service remuneration collected, 
paid and controlled locally by the community or the 
voevoda 
1 Ian (Chinese monetary unit) =9 zolotnikov = 38,34 grams 
949 Vershinin, E. V., "Doshchanik i koch v zapadnoi Sibiri (XVII v. )", in: Issledovaniia, Moscow 
1989,95 
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litva Originally a special unit made up of prisoners of war from 




mestnichestvo System of places (ranks) of Muscovite nobles 
odinachnaia zapis, Written resolution stipulating not to hand over each other 
also: zaodinachnaia zapis' during investigation 
okolnichi Second duma rank 
otkaz Deposition of the voevoda by the cossacks 
(cossack) Personenverband, (pl. ) -Specific cossack form of primary group, constituted 
verbände according to changing occasions, aims or needs to survive 
in a steppe frontier environment. Open to virtually anyone 
when it was constituted, it became exclusive and obliged its 
members to keep faith to the stated group aim once a 
consensus was reached among prospective members. 
Leaders were not socially exalted and the group controlled 
them, since external social relations had little bearing on 
isolated groups in the frontier. In Siberian reality this 
largely self-contained "ideal type" interacted in various 
ways with Muscovite institutions. 
piatidesiatnik Official cossack rank, literally "Leader of fifty cossacks", 
though a unit led by a piatidesiatnik was not necessarily 
fi stron . 
pismennyi golova Officer capable of keeping records such as compiling 
statistics and attending to official communication; a high- 
ranking official, but not necessarily reserved for Moscow 
nobles; could be assigned voevoda in the voevoda's 
----- ------ - ---- -- -- 
absence. 
------- 
pod "iachii Undersecretary 
pod "iachii s pripis'iu Clerical official assigned for record-keeping and other 
clerical work, associate of the voevoda similar to a second 
voevoda though not necessarily a noble. 
posad Community of townsmen 
prikaznaia izba, or: prik. palata Voevoda's office 
prikazchik Head of administration in small forts; assigned by the 
voevoda 
prisud When parts of Siberia became more densely settled in the 
end of the seventeenth century, local towns, forts and 
villages formed prisudy; the local voevoda held court in the 
town of theprisud, for example in Irkutsk. 
promyshlenniki Hunters and trappers 
1 pud 36.6 kg 
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Razriad Military chancellery keeping the service rolls which also 
-- -- --- --- -- ----- 
appointed voevodas. 
razriad-town or -voevoda The first and second level of Siberian administration, 
comprising Tobol'sk on the first level and Tomsk, Eniseisk 
and Iakutsk (and for several years in the 1680s, 
Verkhotur'e) on the second. The nominally subordinated 
towns often disputed their position in vital civil issues since 
there was only a formal hierarchy in military affairs. The 
Siberian chancellery maintained regular communications 
with all Siberian towns, while razriad-voevodas had largely 
nominal control, which was most effective in urgent 
military affairs, sometimes in public investigations and 
otherwise was often by-passed. Moscow introduced the 
razriady largely to regulate disputes between towns and 
their voevodas and to enhance defence. 
I rouble =10 grivny =100 kopeksA rough rule is that 1 rouble corresponded to 1 ducat or 5 
= 200 den'gi; Dutch gulden. For extensive information on price relations, 
6 den gi =1 altyn refer to Hellie, Material Culture. 
s "ezzhaia izba One of two terms for the voevoda's office; literally 
translated the `riding-together [meeting] house'. The other 
term being the prikaznaia izba. 
smuta Time of Troubles (1605-1612). Also used locally as a term 
-- -- ----- --- -- -- - 
describing unwanted turmoil. 
--- 
sotnik Official cossack rank; literally "Leader of hundred 
cossacks", though a unit led by a sotnik was not necessarily 
a hundred strong.., 
stol'nik Last rank of the Moscow list beneath the duma ranks. 
sud'ia Head of a chancellery in Moscow. During rebellions also 
elected "judges" who headed the town administration. 
syn boiarskii Hereditary rank. Close to cossacks due to their similar tasks 
and appointment from among the latter, though better paid 
and more frequently appointed to responsible tasks. Not 
identical with European Russian syn boiarskii. 
tseloval'nik Elected official, responsible for collecting taxes 
ukaz Decree, writ 
voevoda / first and second Governor. The voevodas assigned to a town formed a 
collegiate (tovaryshchi); instructions formally advised 
colleagues to decide harmoniously, "in good advice". Until 
1682, mestnichestvo regulated who had the say among 
colleagues. 
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zimov'e `winter-hut', blockhouse with a small window for 
collecting or bartering the fur tax, minimising direct contact 
of the cossacks with the native hunters and thus, risk of 
being overpowered. 
zipun' (Originally Tatar) silken shirt allowing arrows to be 
extracted more easily. Also for Tatar booty and captives. 
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Illustration II: Reception of Ermak's cossack envoys by Ivan the Terrible in the 
imagination of the Tobol'sk cartographer, cossack and svn boiarskii S. U. 
Remezov more than a century after the events depicted. Despite the slight 
exaltation of Ermak (left, above), the representation of the cossack group - 
especially its formation closed to the outside and same-size of the members - 
testifies to the author's intimate knowledge of such groups. The person handing 
the letter to Ivan is a courtier or clerk. 
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Map 2: Part of the "Caert" of Irkutsk prisud by S. U. Remezov, which was probably 
sketched sometime before 1700. The original, multicolour facsimile includes Selenginsk 
and other ostrogi and is far too detailed and huge to be reproduced here, but has plenty of 
additional information. 
Scanned image taken from the wcbsitc of Irkutsk State University. Cf. "Caen", Moscow 2003. 
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